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ILLINOIS
CLASSICAL
STUDIES

VOLUME VII.1
Spring 1982

Miroslav Marcovich, *Editor*

SCHOLARS PRESS

ISSN 0363-1923

ILLINOIS CLASSICAL STUDIES,
VOLUME VII.1

STUDIES IN MEMORY
OF ALEXANDER TURYN (1900–1981)
PART THREE

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Scholars Press

101 Salem Street

P.O. Box 2268

Chico, California 95927

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THE TWO FACES OF HESIOD'S MUSE

PATRICIA ANN MARQUARDT

The Muses, of all the feminine figures in Hesiod, enjoy the most positive and enthusiastic treatment.¹⁾ As embodiments of the highest intellectual and artistic values, they are both a delight to the gods (*Th.* 37, 40 and 51) and a comfort to men (*Th.* 98-103). Music and poetic inspiration, however important for their own sake, represent only part of the Muses' power, which extends to the very enactment of justice. It is the Muses who bestow on favored princes the gift of righteous speech and the ability to bring peace through persuasion (*Th.* 81-86). Such a gift is declared sacred by Hesiod (*Th.* 93) and links the Muses to Zeus in the poet's conception of divinely sanctioned justice since princes are said to derive from Zeus (*Th.* 96). So closely are the Muses linked to Zeus that they are the only other deities to whom Hesiod gives the epithet "Olympian" ('Ολυμπι-άδεσ; *Th.* 25 and 52).

More immediately, the Muses are responsible for Hesiod's poetic awakening since they inspired him with "divine voice" to celebrate in song the immortal gods and events of the past and future beyond mortal vision (*Th.* 31-33).²⁾ A striking instance appears in the *Works and Days* in the section on sea-faring. Hesiod admits to his limited personal experience with the sea but relies upon the insight gained through poetic inspiration (*Op.* 660-662). He asserts that the tutelage of the Muses has made it possible for him to relate the will of Zeus: Μοῦσαι γάρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον αἰεῖδειν (*Op.* 662). The word Hesiod uses in this context to describe his song is ἀθέσφατος, which properly means "impossible for gods to tell" or "inexpressible". It is a striking expression of the fundamental mystery and awe which often surround the poetic process.

Despite the essentially spiritual relationship of man and the Muses, the latter appear as young, attractive women, but with undertones of sensuality and wildness. The opening lines of the *Theogony* (3-7) describe how the Muses dance on Mt. Heli-

con and bathe in the mountain springs:

- καί τε περὶ κρήνην ἰοειδέα πόσσ' ἀπαλοῦσιν
 ὄρχευνται καὶ βωμὸν ἔρισθενέος Κρονίωνος·
 5 καί τε λοεσσάμεναι τέρενα χροά Περμησσοῖο
 ἢ Ἴππου κρήνης ἢ Ὀλμειοῦ ζαθέοιο
 ἀκροτάτῳ Ἑλικῶνι χοροῦς ἐνεποιήσαντο...

The Muses' "soft" feet (πόσσ' ἀπαλοῦσιν; 3) and "tender" skin (τέρενα χροά; 5) evoke sensual images similar to those evoked by Aphrodite, whose "shapely" (ῥαδινός; *Th.* 195) feet as she walks stimulate the fertility of the earth, and by the "soft-skinned" maiden (ἀπαλόχροος; *Op.* 519), still maturing sexually, who spends the cold winter indoors by the fire (*Op.* 519-521) and bathes her "tender" body (τέρενα χροά; 522). Further evidence that the Muses carry sensual undertones for Hesiod is their association on Mt. Olympus with the Graces and Himerus (Desire; *Th.* 64), close attendants of Aphrodite. Hesiod's description makes clear that different forms of beauty, both physical and poetic, are components of the creative vitality embodied in the Muses.³⁾

It is probable that the sensual quality of the Muses derives largely from their similarity to nymphs, female nature-spirits who represent the divine powers of mountains, waters, woods and trees.⁴⁾ Just as νύμφη denotes a bride or marriageable maiden, so the nymphs were traditionally envisioned as young and beautiful women, fond of music and dancing and able to inspire mortals with poetry and prophetic power. Although nymphs are usually benevolent, they can be angry and threatening. At first glance, Hesiod's encounter with the Muses on Helicon (*Th.* 22-34) seems to be the meeting of nymphs and mortal caught alone in their domain. Their first words to him are harsh and somewhat threatening; they insult his lowly shepherd-status and proclaim their ability to speak, at will, both plausible falsehoods and the truth (*Th.* 26-28). Only after they have declared their prerogatives, do they manifest their benevolence by presenting Hesiod with the laurel shoot as a symbol of his poetic calling and by inspiring him with the prophetic voice of poetry (*Th.* 29-31). Further, there is an element of compulsion in the Muses' epiphany. The poetic charge, so suddenly thrust upon Hesiod, is not contingent upon his own acceptance or rejection, but he is "ordered" to sing

as the Muses bid (*Th.* 33).

That Hesiod regards the Muses as akin to divine mountain nymphs is evident from the emphasis given their mountain haunts.⁵⁾ The *Theogony* begins in the mountainous setting of Helicon:

Μουσῶν Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ' αἰδεῖν,
αἳ θ' Ἑλικῶνος ἔχουσιν ὄρος μέγα τε ζᾷθεόν τε...

Again, it is on "highest" Helicon (7) that the Muses dance and at the foot of "numinous" (ζᾷθεος; 23) Helicon that they appeared to Hesiod. It is significant that the Muses are called Heliconian only in the "first" proem to the *Theogony* (1-35). The "second" proem (36-115) maintains their association with mountain tops (42 and 62) but transfers them to Olympus without mention of Helicon.⁶⁾ According to the second proem which emphasizes their position as Zeus' children, the Muses are born on Mt. Pieria in Thessaly (53-54) but move to Olympus (68 and 71) and permanently reside there in "Olympian homes" (63 and 114). The transfer to Olympus clearly subordinates them to Zeus and their new role appears to consist, in large part, of entertaining the gods (37, 40 and 51). It is true that the Olympian Muses possess the enormous power of granting righteous speech to favored princes, but they wield this power as Zeus' offspring and in the context of his theological system (71-80).

In the first proem the Muses function more independently. Helicon is properly their haunt and there they freely exercise their powers, as in their appearance to Hesiod. Although they bid Hesiod sing the praises of the immortal gods, they demand that their own praises be sung first and last (34). Hesiod can sing of the Muses of Pieria (e.g. *Op.* 1) and Olympus, but it is for the Heliconian Muses that he feels personal affection. When he won the tripod at the funeral games of Amphidamas, for example, he dedicated it on Mt. Helicon to the Muses who first inspired him with poetic song (*Op.* 656-659). The archaeological remains at Thespieae and in the Valley of the Muses adjacent to Ascra, scanty though they are and later than Hesiod, confirm a strong tradition of devotion to the Muses around Mt. Helicon, a tradition for which we find strong and ample evidence in Hesiod's text. The extent to which the Muses represented a personal, religious experience can be gauged from

the special care Hesiod exercises in describing their soothing effect on men, much like a drug (*Th.* 98-103).⁷⁾ Even if there were no remains, we would have to assume from Hesiod's own words that the Muses were the objects of enthusiastic devotion. The close connection of the Muses with wild nature, which will be discussed fully below, makes it likely that the earliest sites of worship were not confined to temple precincts at all, but were chosen precisely for their wild and uncultivated qualities.

The Muses go back to an early stratum of Greek religion since their genealogy, despite the popularity of the *Theogony*, was never firmly set and one tradition even named Uranus as their father. Their original number is also unknown although the belief persisted in antiquity that they first composed a triad.⁸⁾ Since their number is unspecified in the first proem, it is uncertain how many Muses Hesiod saw. It is not surprising that he refers to them only as a vague plurality since he is recounting a personal, religious experience and not delineating a divine hierarchy. It is in the second proem, where they are exclusively Olympian Muses, that Hesiod proceeds to define them and to fit them neatly into an ordered cosmos by setting their number, assigning them individual names (77-79) and stressing their relationship to Zeus.

It cannot be argued that Hesiod is thinking of two completely different sets of deities because at one point in describing his encounter with the Muses on Helicon he calls them Olympian and daughters of Zeus (25). The Heliconian and Olympian Muses are essentially the same to Hesiod; the difference is that the former represent the older goddesses of local cult with independent traditions which prevent them from fitting easily into the Olympian system, and the latter are largely the product of Hesiod's intellectual ordering of the world, although even these Muses may have originated as mountain nymphs and may have been central figures in Thessalian cult.⁹⁾ For Hesiod, though, the Olympian Muses enjoy little existence apart from Zeus and are a fundamental part of his conception of Zeus-fostered justice, since they are instrumental in granting the righteous speech (*Th.* 81-84) which results in just acts.

The Muses of Helicon, on the other hand, are viewed in a more personal light. In their realm Hesiod had a religious

experience which deeply affected his life and which he later remembered with gratitude when he placed his victory-tripod on Mt. Helicon in the very spot where the Muses claimed him as their own (*Op.* 658-659). Since Hesiod's village of Ascra lay on the slopes of Mt. Helicon (*Op.* 639-640) and since he is the earliest poet to call the Muses Heliconian, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he was familiar with their worship, perhaps as a devotee, and that even after he aligned himself intellectually with Olympian religion, he still retained a lingering affection for the old cult and the local goddesses.

An oblique reference to such a cult may be contained in the enigmatic line: ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρυῖν ἢ περὶ πέτρην;, commonly translated as "But why all this about oak or rock?" (*Th.* 35). The Heliconian Muses, in a setting befitting their elemental nature, impart their inspiration to the common folk who frequent the rugged slopes of Mt. Helicon. The physical token of their appearance is a tree branch, a shoot of the laurel, which symbolizes the power inherent in the poetic calling (*Th.* 30).¹⁰⁾ The Heliconian Muses, moreover, were joined in cult, at least in later times, with Thespian Eros, who continued to be represented as an unwrought stone and whose worship included circular dances by his female devotees.¹¹⁾ Hesiod emphasizes the Muses' dancing (e.g. 7-8) and says specifically that they dance around an altar of Zeus (περὶ... βωμόν; 3-4). The altar of Zeus on the Heliconian mountaintop would probably have been a conveniently sized and shaped rock and little more, and therefore when Hesiod makes reference to the rock in his proverbial expression (περὶ... πέτρην; 35), it seems possible that his imagination linked the rock and the altar, and for that matter may account for his selection of precisely this transitional line. Since δρυῖς originally meant tree in general, a more accurate translation of line 35 may be: "But why (do I concern myself with) those things (which happen) round tree or rock?" This interpretation is consistent with the strictly local sense of περὶ.¹²⁾ By "tree" and "rock", Hesiod may be indicating the traditional sites or activities (i.e. dancing) of the Muses. Despite Hesiod's attempt to assimilate them, the Muses of Helicon remain close to their origins and retain always a wild, independent quality.

Hesiod undoubtedly knew the proverbial meaning of the phrase as it occurs in Homer, where to talk ἀπὸ δρυὸς... ἀπὸ πέτρης (*Il.* 22.26) means to talk without consequence or meaning, but note that the Homeric preposition is ἀπό and not περὶ.¹³⁾ Hesiod probably intended that his readers

understand the phrase as expressing his eagerness to shift from local cult associations to a more transcendent, theological plane. He turns then from the Heliconian Muses with their religious and emotional associations to the Olympian Muses who, because of their intimate connection with Zeus in the poet's mind, are more fitting attendants of a poet who is setting out to delineate a Zeus-oriented universe. By using the phrase of "tree and rock" in a local sense, however, Hesiod makes the proverbial expression work for him on another level, as he bids farewell to the local goddesses.

The closeness of the Heliconian Muses to wild nature emerges sharply in the account of their dancing. Hesiod's first glimpse of the Muses sees them dancing, perhaps naked, at night on the top of Mt. Helicon around a spring and altar of Zeus (*Th.* 5-8):

5 καί τε λοεσσάμεναι τέρενα χροά Περμησσοῖο
 ἢ Ἴππου κρήνης ἢ Ὀλμειοῦ ζαθέοιο
 ἀκροτάτῳ Ἑλικῶνι χοροῦς ἐνεποιήσαντο,
 καλοῦς ἱμερόεντας, ἐπερρώσαντο δὲ ποσσίν.

Local pride may have prompted the mention of Permessus, Olmeius and Hippocrene, but their inclusion in the poem demonstrates Hesiod's familiarity with the topography of Mt. Helicon, and perhaps even with the recognized sacred haunts. The poet's description reveals that the Muses of Helicon are dancing a kind of ring-dance, one of the most ancient dances closely associated with springs, trees and altars.¹⁴⁾ Historically the ring-dance seems to be a refinement of the primitive circle-dance which attempted through sympathetic magic to badger the sun and moon into returning in their proper courses around the earth. Sympathetic magic also lay behind the ring-dance, which was performed around springs to promote a continuous flow of water. Magical power, which the circle formation helped to contain and direct, was believed to be generated by dancing, particularly of an ecstatic kind.¹⁵⁾ The uninhibited nature of the Muses' dancing is suggested by the words ἐπερρώσαντο δὲ ποσσίν, meaning "they moved vigorously (or lustily) with their feet", i.e. they plied their dance (*Th.* 8). This same, rather unusual verb in an uncompounded form appears in *h.Ven.* 5.261 in reference to the dancing of mountain nymphs (καλὸν χορὸν ἐπρώσαντο). It is tempting to see this verb as a *vox propria* which describes

the distinctive qualities of the dancing of mountain nymphs.¹⁶⁾

Furthermore, although Hesiod is not concerned to state the details of the Muses' actions, it seems what we are to envision here is a series of ritualistic acts, involving group-bathing and nocturnal dancing. The sequence in which the acts are performed is explicit, however, and contrary to expectation, in that the vigorous dancing is said by Hesiod to follow the bathing rather than to precede it. The purpose of the bathing, then, would not be to cool the feverish dancers but, more likely, to purify them before dancing. It is noteworthy that the Muses of Helicon also dance around an altar of Zeus (4), whose presence on the mountaintop reflects his original role as weather-god.¹⁷⁾ Although it is impossible to know the precise nature of the Muses' dancing, it is clear that it is related to their early role as deities of nature.

The dancing of the Olympian Muses in the second proem, as they move from Pieria to Olympus, is more structured and appears to be a procession accompanied by chanting (*Th.* 68-71):

αἶ τ' ὅτ' ἴσαν πρὸς Ὀλυμπον, ἀγαλλόμεναι ὀπί καλῇ,
 ἀμφοσὶ μολεῖ· περὶ δ' ἔαχε γαῖα μέλαινα
 70 ὑμνεύσαις, ἐρατὸς δὲ ποδῶν ὑπο δοῦπος ὁρώρει
 νισομένων πατέρ' εἰς ὄν· ὃ δ' οὐρανῷ ἐμβασιλεύει.

Although grammatically ἐρατὸς ("lovely") describes the sound (δοῦπος; 70) of their dancing, it applies more properly to the beauty or form of their dance.¹⁸⁾ There is a striking contrast between the vigorous dancing of the Heliconian Muses and the formal, orderly steps of their Olympian counterparts. In addition, their dancing is noticeably separated from the song they sing honoring Zeus and the Olympian gods (ἐνθεν ἀπορνύμεναι... ἐννύχαια στεῖχον... ὑμνεῦσαι Δία: "Starting from there... they march at night... singing of Zeus"; *Th.* 9-11), as though these are acts that could not easily be reconciled (even though the Muses are said to dance around an altar of Zeus). The sequence of activities emphasizes the primacy of their dancing. Afterwards, when they sing of Zeus, Hesiod chooses the verb στεῖχον, denoting orderly and measured movement, which contrasts with the ἐπερρώσαντο, chosen to describe their earlier dancing. Hesiod shows no such hesitancy to unite the two actions of dancing and singing in the description of the Olympian Muses, whose dancing and singing in the passage above (68-71) are integrated harmoniously with Olympian ideals. In fact, judging from the lack of emphasis,

the dancing of the Olympian Muses (63 and 70-71) is secondary to their singing (e.g. 37, 41-42, 43-44, 48, 51, 60, 65-67 and 68-69). Finally, even the Muses' dancing-places underscore their fundamental difference. The Muses of Helicon dance in the wilds at night (10) in a setting which suggests an alignment with earth-deities and chthonic powers who thrive in darkness. In contrast, the "glistening" (λιπαρός; 63) dancing-places of the Olympian Muses near "beautiful" homes on "snowy" Olympus (62-63) further emphasize their allegiance with Zeus and the positive associations of his order.

In summary, the Heliconian Muses are sensual, feminine figures closely associated with wild nature. There is a concrete, disturbing element about them, which is evidenced by their more immediate, emotional effect on men. The Olympian Muses, on the other hand, are civilized figures, drawn into the masculine sphere, who dwell in houses on Mt. Olympus rather than in the wilds. As a specific part of the hierarchy of Zeus, they are more remote and tamer than their primitive Heliconian counterparts. There is even a social distinction. The Heliconian Muses breathe divine song into the mouths of rustics (26-32), while the Olympian Muses grant the gift of , pervasive speech to princes (81-83). There is overlap, though, between the two sets of Muses, as in the passage where the Olympian Muses are conceived concretely as the bringers of forgetfulness of sorrows (*Th.* 98-103) and where poet and king are seen to exercise their powers from that flow of words which comes from the Muses (80-84 and 94-97). Although the beauty of the Olympian Muses is more abstract than physical, appearing primarily as a talent for song (e.g. ἐρατήν... ὄσσαν: "lovely voice"; *Th.* 65; cf. 67 and 104) and inspired speech (e.g. μαλακοῖσι... ἐπέεσσιν: "soft words"; *Th.* 90; cf. 83-84 and 97), it is conveyed in concrete terms which contain much of the sensuality more insistently associated with the Heliconian Muses (e.g. *Th.* 3, 5, and 8). Nor should we forget that the Olympian Muses dwell near the Graces and Himerus on Olympus (64) and that one is named Erato (78). The Heliconian Muses, in like manner, though not fully assimilated into the Olympian Hierarchy, are still daughters of Zeus (25 and 29) and supporters of his order (11-21 and 33). Though conceived

in strongly physical terms, they are powerful to impart the supernatural gift of poetic inspiration (31-33).

The Muses really represent two levels of religious experience and provide a striking example of the tension or ambivalence which appears in Hesiod's poetry when these two levels are interwoven. Hesiod has commingled the two sets of Muses into one Muse who faces in two directions - backward to an older level of religious experience so appealing to the poet and forward to what Hesiod sees must be the order of the new day. Hesiod listens to one Muse, but she speaks with two voices.

Marquette University

NOTES

1) This paper derives from my dissertation, "Ambivalence in Hesiod and Its Relationship to Feminine Deities" (University of Wisconsin 1976). I use throughout the texts established by M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) and *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford 1978).

2) Traditionally the functions of poet and seer are in many ways co-extensive. For the poetry-prophecy complex in early song, see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Boston 1957) 80-82.

3) Cf. the lyric fragments: "Cretan girls dancing with tender feet around a lovely altar and pressing the soft, smooth flowers of the grass" and Sappho's "Come hither, soft Graces and lovely-tressed Muses," E. Lobel and D. Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford 1955) 294 and 92. Hesiod also calls the Muses "gold-filleted" (χρυσόμυτις; *Th.* 916), thus associating them with other recipients of χρυσος-epithets, notably Pandora (*Op.* 74; *Th.* 578) and Aphrodite (e.g. *Th.* 822). Cf. *Th.* 17 and 136. On their simplest level responses to physical and poetic beauty are closely related. On the physical basis of poetry's effect, see E. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Oxford 1963) 145-160, esp. 153-155, and E. Kris, *Psycho-analytic Explorations in Art* (New York 1952) 300-302.

4) There is no scholarly consensus concerning the relationship of Muses and nymphs. On their similarity, see, for example, Mayer in *RE s.v.* "Musai" 16.1 (1933) cols. 692-693; Kurt Latte, "Hesiods Dichterweihe," *Antike und Abendland* 2 (1946) 156-158; F. Krafft, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod* (Göttingen 1963) 145 (for the permutability of their names); and West (*Theogony*) 154-155. Denying a similarity are Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin 1931) I, 184; and Karl Deichgräber, "Die Musen, Nereiden und Okeaniden in Hesiods *Theogonie*," *AbhMainz* (1965) 203, n. 1. Whatever the objective reality may have been, Hesiod's poetic vision seems to have commingled the two kinds of creatures. Support for this view is found in Athanasios Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik* (Heidelberg 1965) 39 and 46, who speaks of an "encounter"

was built over the Muses' temple on Helicon. For the Muses as a triad representing the "triple-goddess of heaven, earth and underworld in her orgiastic aspect", see Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths* (Baltimore 1955) I, 55 and *The White Goddess* (New York 1948) 385-386. Female trinities as a Boeotian cult-type are examined by A. Schachter, "Some Underlying Cult Patterns in Boeotia," *First International Conference on Boeotian Antiquities* (McGill Univ.; Montreal 1972) 17-26.

9) See West (*Theogony*) 152 and 174. When Hesiod calls the Heliconian Muses "Olympian" (25), this is a device, a kind of bridge, which connects the local Muses with the Muses of the new (Olympian) order. Hesiod knew what he was doing when he drew no sharp distinctions between the Olympian and Heliconian Muses. The awkwardness in the transition, however, is proof of the difference between the Muses of the wilds and the Muses who should fit into the hierarchy of the Hesiodic scheme.

10) Helicon may be derived from the word for "willow"; see Boisacq (above, note 5) s.v. "ἑλίκη" 243. Hesiod's description of the Heliconian Muses is echoed in *h.Ven.* 5.257-261 in the description of the nymphs who inhabit a "great and holy" (μέγα τε ζᾶεος) mountain and dance their fair (καλός) dances among the immortals. The life-span of these nymphs is mirrored in the growth and decay of their individual trees (264-272). On the connection of trees and nymphs, see Richard Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford 1896) II, 427-429. For ancient tree and stone cults in general, see Edward M. Bradley, "*Theogony* 35," *SymbOsLo* 44 (1969) 12-14 and Martin Nilsson, *Greek Folk Religion* (New York 1940) 8-18, who discusses the relics of these cults in modern Greece. One primitive idol at Thespieae was a branch worshipped as an image of Hera (Arn. *Adv.Nat.* 6.11).

11) Plutarch (*Amat.* 1) relates that a joint festival in honor of the Muses and Eros, called the Erotidia, was celebrated every four years at Thespieae. Cf. Paus. 9.31.3. Eros, as an unwrought stone (Paus. 9.27.1), seems to have been a divinity of procreation much like Priapus. For the connection of the Muses with prostitution, see J. S. Morrison, "Pythagoras of Samos," *CQ* 50 (1956) 145. The nymphs were also associated with herms in general. A fourth century Arcadian herm dedicated to a trinity of unspecified nymphs is described by Constantine Rhomaïos, "Arcadian Herms," *Archaiologike Ephemeris* (1911) 154.

12) Some simple altars of Zeus on mountain tops, as a characteristic of the aniconic stage of Greek religion, are discussed by Arthur Bernard Cook, *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* (Cambridge 1914) I, 117-121 and II.2 (1925) 898. The many interpretations of *Th.* 35, surveyed by West (167-169), include: to talk of ancient things (because man was born in the wild or from trees); to recite oracles (since Dodona is indicated by the oak and Delphi by the rock); to chatter like lovers among trees or rocks; to talk about simple, country matters; to talk about one's private affairs; to be distant from mankind among rocks and trees; and to relate what no one will believe. West (169) emphatically states "Anyone who attempts to explain how Hesiod's expression came to have one of these senses or some other sense, should in future take note of the fact that περί with the accusative in early epic always has a local sense; so that the phrase is not simply 'about', i.e. concerning, tree and rock, but 'round'. The original meaning of δρύς was simply 'tree', so that the species 'oak' may have no significance." Further support for the interpretation offered in this paper is given by Edward Bradley (above, note 10) 7-22, who suggests that the phrase originated in an allusion to the forms and concepts of an animistic religion (e.g. the "tree" and "rock" are Dodona and Delphi), viewed later with scepticism, and that it came to mean superstitious be-

lief in improbable divine forces; and Heinz Hofmann, "Hesiod *Theogonie* 35," *Gymnasium* 78 (1971) 90-97, who interprets the line literally as the physical characteristics of the wilderness which Hesiod must leave to practice his new calling as poet. We need not look so far afield as Delphi and Dodona to substantiate this phrase's connection with trees and rocks, however. Nor is the line only to be interpreted as a change of life-style; rather it marks a shift in religious focus from the "tree" and "rock" of Helicon's primitive cults to the enlightened theology of Olympus.

13) Hesiod's use of *περί* with "tree" and "rock" is significant because it appears to be unique. The Homeric preposition is *ἀπό* (e.g. *Od.* 19.163), which is also used in a number of later instances of this phrase: e.g. *Pl. Apol.* 34D, *Resp.* 8.544D, and *Plut. Mor.* 608C. Other appearances of this phrase, surveyed by West (167-169), are written in a variety of constructions and hold various meanings: *Pl. Phdr.* 275BC, *Plut. Mor.* 1083D, *Lucr.* 5.130, *Cic. Acad.* 2.101 and *Juv.* 6.12 et al.

14) The antiquity and forms of the ring-dance are discussed by W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Sacred Dance* (New York 1923) 86-106.

15) Energy or power is the basis of all magic. T. C. Lethbridge, *Witches* (Secaucus, N.J., 1962) 145-147 points out the antiquity of the belief that power can be obtained by increasing the current in human bodies through wild dancing or other ecstatic activity. Oesterley (above, note 14) 89-90 suggests that dances around springs and wells may have originated in the belief that the water itself was a living organism possessing will and prophetic power. In addition to the emphasis on water in the account of the Muses' dancing and bathing, Hesiod also depicts the inspiration they impart as a flow of liquid. Cf. *Th.* 83-84 and 97. For the Muses as earth-goddesses: "denn das fließende Wasser hat chthonische Bedeutung", see Otto Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* [1926] (Berlin 1963) I, 208.

16) The verb *ῥόομαι* and its compound *ἐπιρρώομαι* (see *LSJ s.v.*) are words of various meanings indicating rapid movement of some sort. The verb is used of dancing with quick steps and when it is used to signify such action in the early texts, in each case it is the nymphs who perform the action. In addition to *Th.* 8 and *h.Ven.* 5.261 *supra*, cf. *Il.* 24.616 (*Νυμφῶων, αἵτ' ἄμφ' Ἀχελώϊον ἐρρώσαντο*). In a late text (*Anth. Pal.* 9.403.3), the verb is used of Dionysus in a context that implies music and unfettered motion of the feet (*λεύκωσαι πόδα γαῦρον, ἐπύρρῳσαι δὲ χορεύειν*). This may support the contention that the verb is used properly in contexts in which the dancing is of an unrestrained or orgiastic nature. Cf. the dancing of Pan in *h.Pan.* (19) 22-23.

17) The large number of weather-epithets for Zeus in Hesiod (e.g. *Th.* 41, 558 and 730) attests to his origins as a sky-god. For mention of the major weather-cults of Zeus, see Farnell (above, note 10) I, 42-52, esp. 50-52, and Nilsson (above, note 10) 6-8. The cults of Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia, Laphystius in Boeotia, Acraeus in Thessaly and Panhellenius on Aegina were associated with mountain tops and are thought to have involved rain-making magic.

18) Processional dances are discussed by Maurice Emmanuel, *The Antique Greek Dance*, trans. Harriet Beauley (New York 1916) 265-269 and by Lillian B. Lawler, *The Dance in Ancient Greece* (Middletown, Conn., 1964) 102-115.

UN PASSAGE HÉRACLITÉEN DANS LE POLITIQUE

PIERRE COLACLIDÈS

Aux exemples de l'expression τὸ πᾶν τόδε (variante de τάδε πάντα), signifiant "l'univers",¹⁾ que M. L. West²⁾ a relevés chez Platon pour appuyer indirectement la leçon τάδε dans le fragment 79 d'Héraclite³⁾ τάδε πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός, on devrait ajouter un de plus: Τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε τοτὲ μὲν αὐτός ὁ θεὸς συμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον⁴⁾ καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ ἀνῆκεν (*Politique*, 269 c 4).

Cet exemple a, par rapport aux autres, l'avantage de figurer dans une phrase qui rappelle en partie le fragment susdit d'Héraclite. Des deux côtés, une volonté divine⁵⁾ conduit le monde en marche. Platon appelle de son propre nom ce qui en tient lieu chez Héraclite. Quant à l'image de la direction d'un bateau, présente nécessairement dans οἰακίζει, mais non pas dans συμποδηγεῖ et συγκυκλεῖ, on doit noter que, lorsque Platon, en poursuivant la narration de son mythe, arrive au point où Dieu laisse aller le monde à sa rotation rétrograde, il se le représente comme un pilote qui lâche la barre du gouvernail: ... τότε δὴ τοῦ παντός ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἷακος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη (*Politique*, 272 e 3). L'image du pilote et du gouvernail, accompagnée cette fois de celles de la tempête et de l'océan, revient au moment où le démiurge, craignant que le monde livré à lui-même n'aille à sa perte totale, se rassied à son gouvernail: Διὸ δὴ καὶ τότε ἦδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτόν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεῖς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεῖς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀπειρον ὄντα πόντον δύη, πάλιν ἔφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνώμενος... (*Politique*, 273 d 4-e 1). La conception du monde qui ressort de ces images est celle d'un vaisseau, de sorte que, quand Platon parle du monde en tant que αὐτοκράτωρ

τῆς αὐτοῦ πορείας⁶) (*Politique*, 274 a 5), l'idée sous-jacente est celle d'un bateau qui règle sa propre course sans l'intervention d'un pilote.

Mais Dieu n'est pas seulement un capitaine cosmique dans le mythe du *Politique*. Il est conçu aussi, dans ce qu'on a appelé la fable sociale de ce mythe, comme pasteur du troupeau humain: θεὸς ἔνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, καθάπερ νῦν ἄνθρωποι, ζῶν ὃν ἕτερον θεϊότερον, ἄλλα γένη φαυλότερα αὐτῶν νομεύουσι (*Politique*, 271 e 5). La section du mythe qui contient ce passage a été rapprochée de *Critias*, 109 b 6-c 4, où il est question de dieux qui paissent les hommes comme ceux-ci paissent les animaux: ... οἷον νομῆς ποίμνια, κτήματα καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον (sc. θεοί), πλὴν οὐ σώμασι σώματα βιαζόμενοι, καθάπερ ποιμένες κτήνη πληγῇ νέμοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ μάλιστα εὐστροφον ζῶν, ἐκ πρύμνης ἀπευθύνοντες οἷον οἶακι πειθοῖ, ψυχῆς ἐφαπτόμενοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν, οὕτως ἄγοντες τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ἐκυβέρνων. Il est à remarquer qu'ici aussi s'introduit l'image du pilotage; les pasteurs divins sont comparés à des pilotes qui gouvernent leur navire du haut de la poupe. Quant à l'expression κτήνη πληγῇ νέμοντες, elle a été unanimement considérée comme une référence au fragment 80 d'Héraclite: πᾶν ἔρπετόν πληγῇ νέμεται. Par ailleurs, il y a ceux qui voient dans ce fragment un corollaire du fragment 79. M. Marcovich, qui les classe ensemble, dit:⁷) "I think that πληγῇ might hint at πληγῇ κεραυνοῦ, 'stroke of the thunderbolt.' Consequently, the saying might imply: *Thunderbolt (Fire) is the Supreme Guide (Shepherd) of mankind.*"

Le but des rapprochements qui précèdent a été d'éclaircir l'arrière-plan des associations qui sous-tendent la phrase du *Politique*: τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε... αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς συμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ. Reposant ainsi sur une base élargie, cette phrase a plus de chances d'être considérée comme une réplique du fragment d'Héraclite τόδε πάντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός.

NOTES

1) C'est du sens de "tout ce qui est là", "tout ce qu'on peut saisir par la vue", que s'est développé celui de "tout ce qui est". C'est comme si le philosophe qui s'en sert se mettait à la place d'un observateur qui, du haut d'une élévation et en montrant ce qui est sous ses yeux, prononce les mots: "tout ce qui est là", tel le diable dans la scène de la tentation de Jésus (Mt. 4:8-9).

2) *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford, 1971), p. 196.

3) Les numéros des fragments renvoient à l'édition de M. Marcovich (Mérida, Venezuela, 1967). La leçon τάδε (H. Boeder), de préférence à τὰ δέ, sera adoptée par J. Bollack et H. Wismann dans leur livre *Héraclite ou la séparation* (Paris, 1972) et par M. Marcovich lui-même dans son édition italienne des fragments (Florence, 1978).

4) Cf. ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ (Cratyle, 412 d 1).

5) M. Marcovich, cité d'après l'édition de 1967, p. 424, dira à propos de κεραυνὸς dans fr. 79: "Namely, the thunderbolt is Zeus' main weapon and, *pars pro toto*, recalls easily the idea of Zeus as the *Supreme Divinity*".

6) Cf. l'équivalent tardif αὐτοκυβερνήτης.

7) Marcovich, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

PINDAR'S ELEVENTH NEMEAN ODE:

A COMMENTARY*)

W. J. VERDENIUS

Performance

The ode was intended to be performed at the inauguration of Aristagoras as *prytanis* (cf. *K.P.* IV, 1206.44ff.) at Tenedos. As we do not know the programme of such inaugurations (εἰσιτήρια), the time of the performance cannot be determined. There will probably have been a banquet, but the view expressed by Dionysius of Phaselis and Didymus that the song belonged to the genre of *paroinia* (similarly Bury, 217) seems to be a mere deduction from vv. 6-10 (cf. Puech, 141-2). That it was performed in the Prytaneum appears from the beginning of the poem.

Date

It is by no means certain that *N.11* is a work of Pindar's old age, as is commonly assumed. A connection with fr. 123 cannot be established (see the commentary on 11 Ἀρκεσίλαν), and even if Aristagoras was a brother of Theoxenus, no chronological conclusion can be drawn from fr. 123: cf. Farnell, II, 325, B. A. van Groningen, *Pindare au banquet* (Leiden 1960), 79, de Vries, 153-4. Similarities between *N.11* and other odes do not prove anything: H. A. Pohlsander, "The Dating of Pindaric Odes by Comparison", *GRBS* 4 (1963), 131-40, has pointed out that "Pindaric odes widely separated by time can show considerable similarities of thought or diction. Thus we must reject the comparison of parallels within Pindar not only as a means of dating *N.3* and *N.11* but as an approach to Pindaric chronology generally" (139; cf. also Fogelmark, 84-5).

Metre

The metre (dactyloepitrite) does not present special difficulties. It may be noted that at 5 etc. choriambi appear between epitrites, a fact which supports the view of those who accept the correspondence of these metres.

Commentary

1: Παῖ 'Ρέας. Cf. Hes. *Th.* 453-4 and West *ad loc.*

1: ἄ τε. For survivals of epic τε cf. Denn., 523-4; not all his examples of a use "in general statements" in Pindar are equally convincing: here (and e.g. at *O.* 2, 35, *O.* 14, 2) the function is more likely to be emphatic with a slightly causal nuance (Denn., *ibid.*). See also C. J. Ruijgh, *Autour de TE épique* (Amsterdam 1971), 981ff., who thinks that the relative sentence is digressive and denotes a permanent fact.

1: πρυτανεῖα. Cf. S. G. Miller, *The Prytaneion* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1978). The Prytaneum contained the hearth of the city. For Hestia Prytaneia or Prytanitis cf. *K.P.* II, 1119.31ff.

1: λέλογχας. Properly 'have obtained as your portion', when the parts of the world were distributed among the gods (cf. Hom. *Il.* 15, 190, Hes. *Th.* 393-6, Pind. *O.* 7, 55-9, A. *Pr.* 229-31), but the perfect often means 'to have under one's care' and is especially used of tutelary deities (e.g. *O.* 9, 15, *H.Hom.* 19, 6, Hdt. VII 53, 2, Pl. *Tim.* 23d 7).

2: ὑψίστου. A traditional epithet of Zeus (LSJ 2) based on the Homeric ὑπατος, ἡμενος ὕψι, ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὑψίζυγος, etc. Similarly, *N.* 1, 60, *O.* 4, 1. See further Bowra, *Pindar*, 45, Fogelmark, 49ff., H. Schwabl, *Zeus, R.E.* Suppl. XV (1978), 1275.28ff.

2: ὁμοθρόνου. Although gods are represented as sitting on the same throne (e.g. Hades and Persephone), the element -θρονος refers to rulership rather than to a concrete seat: cf. A. *Ag.* 43, 109, *Cho.* 975, S. *O.R.* 237, *O.C.* 425.

3: εὔ. Equivalent to εὐνόως (cf. LSJ I 2).

3: δέξαι. H. Meyer, *Hymnische Stilelemente in der frühgriechischen Dichtung* (Würzburg 1933), 64, points out that this forms the connection between the hymnic beginning and the theme of the song, just as *O.* 5, 3 δέκεν, *O.* 13, 29 δέξαι, *P.* 8, 5 δέκευ.

3: θάλαμον. Not necessarily a shrine within the Prytaneum: at *O.* 6, 1 θάλαμος is the whole house (cf. LSJ I 3 and the similar use of μέγαρον *O.* 6, 2, *P.* 3, 134). Miller, *op. cit.* (above on 1 πρυτανεῖα), 36, writes: "One should expect with some probability a prytaneion to have two

main rooms (the dining room and the room of the hearth)". Farnell is more explicit: "we do not hear of separate chapels within the Town-Hall, though there may have been a barrier round the sacred fire; if so, this spot would be in a special sense her 'thalamos'". I doubt this last conclusion: $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\iota$ obviously refers not only to the installation, but also to the tenure of office, and this was performed in the whole building (cf. schol. $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$).

4: $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}$. The anaphora (similarly 6-7 $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$) is characteristic of the hymnic style: cf. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 149ff., H. S. Versnel, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 368ff. Pindar, however, mostly uses it for the sake of emphasis: cf. Bowra, *Pindar*, 206-7. See also D. Fehling, *Die Wiederholungsfiguren und ihr Gebrauch bei den Griechen vor Gorgias* (Berlin 1969), 206-7.

4: $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omega$. Not of Aristagoras (Fränkel, 572), but of Hestia. Farnell suggests that this is an imaginary picture, because statues of Hestia were comparatively rare. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Glaube d. Hell.*, I, 156: "ein Bild der Göttin neben den Herd zu stellen, der sie ist, würde widersinnig sein". But Pausanias (I 18, 3) mentions a statue of Hestia in the Prytaneum at Athens, and if we assume the performance of the song to have taken place in the town-hall, as the invocation of Hestia seems to imply, a reference to an invisible sceptre would have been rather confusing.

5: $\gamma\epsilon\rho\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$. The force of the participle (their rule is accompanied by their worship) is lost in such translations as 'They honour you and keep Tenedos upright' (Bowra), 'who guard the glory of Tenedos and often honor you' (Nisetich). In a Greek sentence the main idea is often expressed by the participle: cf. K.G. II, 98-9, Schw. II, 389, and my note on Men. *Epit.* 219-20, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 27. This is well rendered by Lattimore: 'who honor you as they keep Tenedos upright'.

5: $\acute{o}\rho\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu$. 'Upright', hence 'safe', 'prosperous' (LSJ III 1). Cf. N. 1, 15 $\Sigma\iota\kappa\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\ \pi\acute{\iota}\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\nu\ \acute{o}\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$, I. 6, 65 $\acute{o}\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \omicron\dot{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu$. Lefkowitz (51) wrongly translates 'on a straight path'. Péron (119 n. 1, 283-4) thinks that $\acute{o}\rho\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu$ refers either to the direction or to the position of a ship, because $\varphi\upsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\epsilon\iota\nu$ is sometimes used of a steersman (116 n. 7). But in connection with a town the verb most probably means 'to guard' (cf. e.g. A. *Sept.* 135-6 $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\nu\ldots\ \varphi\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\alpha\chi\omicron\nu\ \kappa\acute{\eta}\delta\epsilon\sigma\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \tau\epsilon$) and in connection with a predicate 'to maintain', 'to preserve' (cf. LSJ B 3). The predicate is used in a resultative sense: cf. O. 10, 95 $\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\varphi\omicron\nu\tau\iota\ \delta'\ \epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\rho\acute{o}\ \kappa\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$, K.G. I, 276, Bruhn, §9, Schw. II, 181 (who wrongly call this use 'proleptic').

6: $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$. Equivalent to $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\varsigma$ (LSJ III 1a).

6: ἀγαζόμενοι. An unusual word, perhaps chosen because it sounds more subdued (or austere) than ἀγαλλόμενοι.

6: πρώταν. Not 'the first of the gods' (Bury) or 'the first of goddesses' (Bowra), but 'before the other gods' and to be connected with ἀγαζόμενοι: cf. schol. ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἤρχοντο and *H. Hom.* 29, 4-6 οὐ γὰρ ἄτερ σοῦ / εἰλαπῖναι θνητοῖσιν ἔν' οὐ πρώτη πυμάτη τε / Ἔστῃ ἀρχόμενος σπένδει μελιηδέα οἶνον (see also Allen *ad loc.*), *S. fr.* 726 πρῶρα λοιβῆς Ἔστία (and Pearson *ad loc.*).

7: κνίσq. Lefkowitz (51) suggests that men who worship a deity with burnt offerings are 'celebrating death and the gods' gift to them of life', but her references to Vernant (*Mythe et pensée*, 142) and Burkert (*Homo neans*, 158-9) do not prove anything.

7: λύρα. Musicality is a *topos* in the praise of cities and rulers: cf. *O.* 1, 17, *O.* 11, 18-9, G. van N. Viljoen, *Pindaros se tiende en elfde Olympiese odes* (Leiden 1955), 24-5.

7: σφι. Usually taken to be a dative of interest, but more probably a *dativus auctoris* (βρέμεται being equivalent to 'is played'); cf. *S. Ai.* 970 θεοῖς τέθνηκεν, K.G. I, 423, Bruhn, §47, and my note on Men. *Epitr.* 534, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 37. A possessive dative seems to me less likely in this connection, and is to be generally suspected (although it is assumed by Schw. II, 189: but see K.G. I, 429-30).

7: βρέμεται. This verb seems to be more appropriate to the sound of a stringed instrument (cf. *N.* 9, 8 βρομίαν φόρμιγγα) and the *aulos* (cf. Cat. 64, 264 *stridebat tibia*) than to songs. De Vries (152) speaks of a *zeugma*, but the word could apparently refer to resounding voices (cf. 'to peal'). Slater's translation 'murmur' is correct at *P.* 11, 30, but absurd in the present passage.

8: ξενίου. Hospitality is a *topos* in the praise of cities and rulers: cf. *O.* 1, 16, *O.* 2, 6 and 93-4, *O.* 3, 40, *N.* 5, 8, *I.* 2, 39, Viljoen, *op. cit.* (above on 7 λύρα), 23 n. 31.

8: Διός. Themis is a wife of Zeus (fr. 30, 5, Hes. *Th.* 901) and his *paredros* (*O.* 8, 22). In the present passage, just as at *E. Med.* 208 τὰν Ζηνὸς ὀρκίαν θέμιν, their relationship is not specified, but the genitive certainly has possessive force (as in *Il.* 6, 460 Ἔκτορος ἥδε γυνή) and should not be connected with τραπέζαις (as is done by Sandys, who refers to Athen. IV 143f., and Bowra).

8: θέμις. Most editors do not print this word with a capital, because ἀσκεῖται cannot mean 'is worshipped' but only 'is cultivated', 'is practised': cf. Hdt. I 96, 2 δικαιοσύνην ἥσκεε, LSJ II 2 (Slater's

translation 'honour' is misleading). In that case the word may be translated by 'order' or 'law'. But at *O.* 8, 21-2 Σώτειρα Διὸς ξενίου / πάρεδρος ἀσκεῖται θέμις she is both a personal deity and an abstraction. This is considered by Farnell to be "one of the signs of a hurried composition", but he has overlooked the fact that a similar ambiguity is to be found at *P.* 3, 108-9 τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ φρασὶν / δαίμον' ἀσκήσω, *N.* 7, 4 τεὰν ἀδελφεὰν ἐλάχομεν ἀγλαόγυιον Ἥβαν, *Hes. Op.* 222-4 ἧ (Dike) δ' ἔπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἦθεα λαῶν, / ἥερα ἔσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα, / οἳ τέ μιν ἐξελάσσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἴθεῖαν ἔνειμαν, 763-4 φήμη δ' οὐ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦν-τινα πολλοὶ / λαοὶ φημίξωσι· θεὸς νύ τις ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή, *Th.* 231-2 Ὅρκον θ', ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους / πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσῃ (similarly *Hdt.* VI 86 γ, 2, *Aesch. Ctes.* 233). The law of hospitality, just as *δική*, is a principle, but this principle is so fundamental that it is considered to be a divine power, and as soon as a divine power becomes operative in a striking way it is imagined as a divine person. Cf. Wilamowitz, 202: "Was lebt und wirkt, wird als persönlich gefühlt: darum ist es pervers, von Personifikation zu reden". See also F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin 1921), 50ff., Farnell, II, 467ff., Duchemin, 125ff., W. Pötscher, "Das Person-Bereichdenken in der frühgriechischen Periode", *WS* 72 (1959), 5-25. For the association of hospitality with righteousness (i.e. giving others their due) cf. *O.* 2, 6 ὅπι δίκαιον ξένων ('strict in his consideration of strangers'), *N.* 4, 12 δίκῃ ξεναρκέϊ.

8: ἀνάοις. In my commentary on *O.* 14, 12, *Mnemos.* IV 32 (1979), 24, I have argued (1) that it is wrong to restore the Doric form αἰένας, (2) that there and in the present passage the word is simply the adjective belonging to αἰεῖ, so that we should not look for some association with 'flowing' (Bury 'never running dry', Farnell 'tables of ever-flowing cheer').

9: ἐν τραπέζαις. Bury writes: "Mr Fennell takes ἐν here in the sense of *with*, but I agree with Rumpel that it has the more literal meaning of place. The tables are not only the instrument, they are also the place of the ἀσκησις". However, hospitality is not practised *on* the tables, but *at* table. For ἐν denoting an occasion cf. *O.* 2, 43-4 ἐν ἀέθλοις / ἐν μάχαις τε, *O.* 9, 112 ἐν δαιτί, *Il.* 4, 259 ἐν δαίθ', *Od.* 11, 603 ἐν θαλίῃς, *A. Suppl.* 174 ἐν λιταῖσιν, *Thuc.* VII 73, 2 ἐν τῇ ἐορτῇ, *LSJ* II 1. For τράπεζα 'meal' cf. *LSJ* I 2.

9: ἀλλά. In wishes and prayers ἀλλά usually means either the transition from the present to the (unknown) future, or from introductory

arguments to the wish proper (Denn., 15-6). In the present case these conditions do not apply, but 9-10 forms the continuation of the wish expressed at 3-4. For progressive *ἀλλά* cf. Denn., 21-2.

9: *σὺν δόξᾳ*. Equivalent to an adverb: cf. *P.* 9, 96 *σὺν δίκᾳ*, *s. El.* 872 *σὺν τάχει*, *LSJ A 6*.

9-10: *τέλος... περᾶσαι*. The translation 'reach the end' (de Vries, 151, Nisetich) is misleading, because (1) *τέλος* properly means 'fulfilment', hence 'performance of a task', 'office' (*LSJ I 3*), and (2) *περᾶω* properly means 'to traverse' and so refers to the whole term of office (*LSJ I 3* seem to me wrong in classing the present passage with *S. O.R.* 1530 *τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάση* and *E. Andr.* 101-2 *τὴν τελευταίαν... περάσας ἡμέραν*). Cf. *schol.* *τὴν πρυτανείαν*.

10: *περᾶσαι*. For infinitives in prayers cf. *P.* 1, 68, *K.G.* II, 22-3. Some editors read *περάσαι* (opt.), but the subject is more likely to be the whole Council: 11 *ἄνδρα* marks the point where the attention is focused on Aristagoras.

10: *σύν*. Not to be altered into *νιν*, for (1) the subject *αὐτούς* is easily supplied from the preceding lines, and (2) repetition of words is avoided by Pindar only in the case of proper names and important appellatives (Schmid, *Gesch.d.gr.Lit.*, I, 610 and n. 5): cf. *P.* 9, 112-4 *γάμον... γάμον*, *N.* 3, 28-30 *φέρειν... φέρειν*, *N.* 8, 41-2 *ἀνδρῶν... ἀνδρῶν*, Schroeder, *Prolegomena*, 43-4. For the resultative use of *σύν* cf. *Hes. Op.* 119 *σύν ἐσθλοῖσιν*, *Theogn.* 50 *κέρδεα δημοσίῳ σύν κακῷ ἐρχόμενα*, *s. Ant.* 172 *ὦλοντο σύν μιάσματι*, *LSJ A 6*.

10: *ἀτρώτῳ*. 'Without annoy' (Fennell; similarly Puech 'dans la paix du coeur') is too weak: *τιτρώσκω* originally means 'to damage' (*LSJ 2*, e.g. *Hdt.* VIII 18 *αἱ ἡμίσεαι τῶν νεῶν τετρωμέναι ἦσαν*), and here the meaning is 'not injured by misfortunes or sharp criticisms': cf. *I.* 3, 18 *αἰὼν δὲ κυλινδομέναις ἀμέραις ἄλλ' ἄλλοτ' ἐξάλλαξεν*. *ἄτρωτοί γε μὴν παῖδες θεῶν* (I doubt whether Bowra, *Pindar*, 116, is right in concluding that "the truly noble", just as Aristagoras, "do not take injuries to heart"). It is not correct to say that *ἀτρώτῳ* repeats the idea of *σύν δόξᾳ* in a negative form (Mezger, followed by Fennell and Bury).

11: *ἄνδρα*. Equivalent to *αὐτόν*: cf. *P.* 1, 69, *P.* 2, 29, and my note on *Pl. Prot.* 309a3 in *Studia Platonica: Festschrift H. Gundert* (Amsterdam 1974), 41. The word must refer to Aristagoras, as appears from the identity of 12 *δέμας* and 13 *μορφῇ*. The accusative is not an acc. of respect ('As for the man...'), for we can hardly supply 'as contrasted

with the goddess' (as is suggested by Mezger, who is followed by Bury and Fränkel, 572-3), but we have to assume a σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος (cf. K.G. II, 289-90, Schw. II, 81; rightly explained as a form of 'parenthesis' by B. A. van Groningen, *Mnemos.* III 9, 1941, 275; Lefkowitz, 52 n. 19, wrongly calls πατέρα, δέμας, and ἀτρεμίαν accusatives of respect). For the father as μέρος cf. Wilamowitz, 431 n. 1: 'der Vatersname ist kurz für die Abstammung gesetzt, die sozusagen ein Teil des Mannes ist'. For μακαρίζω with double accusative Ar. *Vesp.* 588 is the only exact parallel (if Reiske's emendation is accepted; Bury wrongly thinks that τοῦτί is a cognate object equivalent to τοῦτον τὸν μακαρισμόν). But at 30-1 μέμφομαι (which is the reverse of μακαρίζω) has the same construction. Lefkowitz (*loc. cit.*) compares A. *Pr.* 340 τὰ μὲν σ' ἐπαινῶ, but there τὰ μὲν is adverbial ('on the one hand'). S. *Al.* 1381 πάντ' ἔχω σ' ἐπαινέσαι and Pl. *Symp.* 222a 7 ἃ ἐγὼ Σωκράτη ἐπαινῶ are no convincing parallels either, for πάντα and ἃ are more obviously accusatives of respect.

Fennell writes: "I cannot see the point of congratulating the son upon his father, who kept him from winning the Olympian and Pythian games (v. 22)" (similarly de Vries, 152). But praise of the father is a *topos* in the victory ode: cf. e.g. *O.* 7, 17, *P.* 11, 43, *N.* 4, 13, *I.* 1, 34; see further Thummer, I, 49ff. Besides the father's hesitation with regard to his son's athletic chances hardly detracts from his general laudability.

11: μακαρίζω. C. de Heer, *Μάκαρ - εὐδαίμων - ὀλβιος - εὐ-τυχής* (Amsterdam 1968), 31-2, points out that μάκαρ usually implies the idea of divinity or at least of a status resembling that of the gods, and that such a suggestion is ruled out by vv. 13-6. He therefore concludes that the verb may be connected with μακάριος, a word which is less heavily loaded, as appears from *P.* 5, 46.

11: μὲν. Not to be connected with 12 καὶ... τε (Mezger), but with 13 δέ.

11: Ἀρκεσίλαν. Some editors read Ἀγησίλαν (B) or (for metrical reasons) Ἀγεσίλαν, but the fact that Pindar's beloved Theoxenus of Tenedos was a son of Hagesilas (fr. 123, 15) has been used to satisfy sentimental romanticism (a handsome boy son of a handsome father, and 48 ἐρώτων as a personal confession: cf. Fränkel, 575: "Obwohl allgemein formuliert, klingt die Schlusswendung wie ein Ausbruch persönlichen Gefühls") rather than to build up a solid argument. Turyn rightly observes: "cum in scholiis p. 187, 8 et 187, 9 bis nomen in utroque codice BD casu accusativo ἀρκεσίλαν legatur, dubium non est, quin v. 11 Ἀρκεσίλαν (non

Ἀγεσίλαν) sit legendum".

12: θαητόν. Bury (216) writes: "The island of Tenedos, noted for the beauty of its women (Athen. XIII, 609e), was perhaps a land of handsome men also" (similarly Mezger, 481). But cases of individual beauty were thought worth mentioning, and not only by Pindar (e.g. *O.* 8, 19, *O.* 9, 65): cf. the epigram from the first half of the 5th cent. quoted by Lefkowitz (52 n. 19): παῖδα... κάλλιστον μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἀθλεῖν δ' οὐ χεῖρονα μορφῆς. The Greek admiration for physical beauty is strikingly illustrated by an extreme case mentioned by Herodotus (V 47, 2): a citizen from Croton was worshipped as a hero after his death at Segesta διὰ ἑωυτοῦ κάλλος. See further my note on Tyrt. 6-7 D., 9, *Mnemos.* IV 22 (1969), 342-3. Physical beauty was considered important for a magistrate: cf. Xen. *Symp.* 8, 40.

12: ἀτρεμίαν. Usually translated by 'fearlessness', but 'calmness', 'composure' is more correct and better suits his function.

12: σύγγονον. For the value attached by Pindar to inherited capacities (cf. *P.* 10, 12, *N.* 6, 8 τὸ συγγενές) see below on 33 πάλαι.

13: δέ. Lefkowitz (51) wrongly translates 'If then...': δέ has adversative (restrictive) force and answers 11 μὲν.

13: ὄλβον. Pindar often emphasizes the importance of wealth, but adds that it should be used to realize ἀρετή: cf. Gundert, 14, 28, 86-7, P. R. Colace, "Considerazioni sul concetto di πλοῦτος in Pindaro", *Studi in onore di A. Ardiccioni*, II (Rome 1978), 737-45.

13: μορφῆ. Dative of limitation rather than of instrument: cf. K.G. I, 317, 437-8, 440, and my note on Men. *Epitrr.* 590, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 39. See also F. Eggermann on Thuc. I 22, 2 ἀκριβεῖα, *Hist.* 21 (1972), 594-5. The difference between the two kinds of dative (confused by K.G.) clearly appears from *N.* 5, 39 σθένει (instrum.) γυίων ἐρίζοντι θρασεῖ (limit.).

13: παραμεύσεται. Doric for παραμείβομαι (cf. *P.* 1, 45 and fr. 23). Not a gnomic future (cf. K.G. I, 171-2), but rather a subjunctive of the aorist: cf. *O.* 6, 11, *O.* 7, 3, *P.* 4, 266 and 274, K.G. II, 474. The shift to the indicative ἐπέδειξεν cannot be explained by the assumption that the poet lost sight of the relative beginning of his sentence (as at *O.* 7, 6 and *P.* 4, 268), but may imply that v. 14 indicates a more firmly established fact than v. 13. B. Breyer's emendation ἐπιδείξῃ (*Analecta Pindarica*, Vratislava 1880, 26-7; similarly B. L. Gildersleeve, *AJP* 3, 1882, 440-1) is unnecessary.

13: ἄλλων. Not to be altered into ἄλλους or ἄλλον: the genitive

is used on the analogy of διαφέρεισθαι τινος. Similarly υπερβάλλειν and καίνυσθαι with genitive (K.G. I, 393).

14: βίαν. Used in a favourable sense ('strength'). The original meaning is 'natural or vital power': cf. LSJ I 1 and F. Stoessl, *Die Sprache* 6 (1959), 67-74.

15: θνατά. Pindar points out man's mortality at P. 3, 59, I. 3, 23, I. 5, 16, etc., and it cannot be maintained that the emphasis is stronger here than elsewhere. Lefkowitz (52) argues that the tone of the famous beginning of N. 6 is more optimistic than that of N. 11, 13-6, but the two passages are hardly comparable: (1) N. 6, 6-7 does not refer to death, but to the unpredictability of the outcome of any human undertaking (as has been pointed out by Fränkel, *Wege u. Formen*, 30 n. 2), and (2) the point of N. 11, 15-6 is closely connected with 17-8, as appears from 17 δέ (omitted in Lefkowitz's quotation of the Greek text!). The force of δέ has been either neglected (e.g. by Fränkel, 574, who calls 15-6 "einen harten Umschlag" and simply remarks: "Die neue Triade hebt von frischem mit Festesklängen an") or taken to be (a) adversative, (b) explanatory (motivating), (c) consecutive. (a) Mezger assumes a contrast between 15 μεμνᾶσθω and 17 λόγοις, which is inept. Nisetich translates 'yet', which he explains (287) by "But death is no reason not to celebrate when the opportunity arises" (similarly de Vries, 151, 155). This idea seems to me too flat and trivial for Pindar. (b) Thummer (I, 76) translates μεμνᾶσθω by 'der mag sich getrost vor Augen halten', but the intention of the Greek cannot be to ease our mind. (c) is considered by Thummer in n. 53, but he again overstates his case (the importance of praise in a poem of celebration) by suggesting that the sadness of death is outshined by the joy of future fame. The train of thought seems to me to be as follows: 'Man's physical being is doomed to perish, and therefore his achievements have to be recorded', (so that he may still obtain some degree of immortality). The idea that immortality is to be secured by fame, and most effectively by a laudatory poem, is a *topos* in Pindar: cf. O. 7, 11 (where ζωδάμιος has a causative sense), O. 10, 91-6, N. 6, 30, N. 7, 12, N. 8, 40, Duchemin, 283-4. For the consecutive force of δέ cf. Denn., 170, and my notes on O. 12, 10, *Zetesis: Album Amicorum E. de Strycker* (Antwerp-Utrecht 1973), 337, and Men. *Epitr.* 332, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 31. Bowra (*Pindar*, 319) points out that in most poems the metrical division "corresponds neither with the grammatical structure of sentences nor with the flow of the sense" (though he is wrong in taking N. 11 to be an exception).

15: περιστέλλων. In spite of Emp. B 126 σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα (sc. τὰς ψυχὰς) χιτῶνι, the phrase περιστέλλων μέλη cannot mean 'sterblicher Glieder Umhüllung tragend' (Werner; similarly Nisetich 'that he wears a mortal set of limbs'). The word probably refers to his robes of office worn at the installation (Mezger) and need not imply that "Aristagoras was a 'glass of fashion' as well as a 'mould of form', somewhat of an 'exquisite' perhaps in personal adornment, or studious at least to compose the folds of his tunic and mantle for displaying most becomingly the graces of his limbs" (Bury, 217). The fact that περιστέλλω "can denote decking out a corpse" (Lefkowitz, 52) is irrelevant in this connection, for there is no evidence for the assumption that the word was especially used in this sense (Lefkowitz refers to *Od.* 24, 293 and *S. Ant.* 903, *Al.* 821, 1170, but the passages from Sophocles do not, or not exclusively, refer to dressing).

16: τελευτάν. Usually explained as quasi-adverbial, but more naturally to be taken as an apposition to γὰν. Pindar may have had Xenophanes B 27 ἐκ γαίης γὰρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τελευτᾷ in mind. For reminiscences of the Presocratics in his poetry cf. Gundert, 55-7, Strohm, 20-3. The apposition is put at the beginning of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: cf. *I.* 3, 7 εὐκλέων δ' ἔργων ἄποινα χρῆ μὲν ὑμῆσαι τὸν ἐσλόν. Lefkowitz (52) creates a structural phantom by assuming a connection between 9 τέλος and 16 τελευτάν.

16: ἐπιεσσόμενος. The metaphor is based on *Il.* 3, 57 λάϊνον ἔσσο χιτῶνα and is first found in Alcaeus 129, 17. See further I. Waern, *Γῆς ὁστέα: The Kenning in Pre-Christian Greek Poetry* (Upsala 1951), 19-22.

17: ἐν. Quasi-instrumental, "indem das Mittel als der Gegenstand aufgefasst wird, in dessen Bereich eine Handlung oder ein Zustand fällt" (K.G. I, 464). Similarly *O.* 1, 15 ἀγλαΐζεσθαι μουσικᾶς ἐν ᾧτῳ, *O.* 5, 19, *P.* 5, 98, *I.* 5, 27. See further K.G. I, 465-6, LSJ A III.

17: ἀγαθοῦς. No enallage (Mezger and Bury with schol. ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν), but 'favourable': cf. *O.* 7, 10 φᾶμαι ἀγαθαί, *I.* 1, 46 ἔπος ἀγαθόν, *I.* 3, 3 ἄξιος εὐλογίαις ἀστῶν μεμῦχθαι. Pindar probably suggests that the name Aristagoras may be understood as 'very well spoken about'. This seems to me more likely than the etymology 'mächtig im Rath' (Pape-Benseler) adopted by Barkhuizen, 86 (who may be right, however, in taking 14 ἀριστεύων to be another allusion to the name).

17: μιν. This or νιν (Puech) is a plausible emendation of μέν (defended by Bury as emphatic): δαίδαλθέντα sc. μέλη (suggested by

LSJ) cannot serve as the object of μελιζέμεν. It is true that the object has sometimes to be supplied from the context (cf. K.G. II, 561-2), but this is easier if a related word (in this case the same word, but as a subject) precedes.

17: ἐπαινέϊσθαι. A certain emendation of αἰνεῖσθαι: at P. 5, 107 the MSS. have the same mistake.

17: χρεών. Contains an ambiguity: fame is necessary to obtain immortality (see above on 15 θνατά), but it is also due to the victor: cf. O. 1, 103, O. 3, 7, O. 8, 74, P. 8, 33, P. 9, 104, I. 1, 43, I. 3, 8, Gundert, 43.

18: μελιγδούποισι. The original meaning of δοῦπος, 'thud', 'roar', 'clash' is widened into 'booming sound' (see above on 7 βρέμεται). Cf. *Dith.* 2, 12 ἐρίγδουποι στοναχαί. Pindar likes to characterize the beauty of songs as 'sweet': cf. μελίγαρυς, μελίκομπος, μελίφθογγος and the frequent use of γλυκύς. See also M. Kaimio, *Characterization of Sound in Early Greek Literature* (Helsinki 1977), 158.

18: δαιδαλθέντα. 'Glorified': similarly O. 1, 105, O. 5, 21 *Parth.* 2, 32. The word does not imply 'skilfully' (Fränkel, 572 'mit kunstvollem Gesang').

18: μελιζέμεν. Not to be altered into μελίζεν or μέλειν ἐν (Bury, Lefkowitz, 52): for the synizesis in αἰοδαῦς cf. I. 3, 17 τετραοριᾶν, Schroeder, *Proleg.*, 25-6, 39. There is a pun in the juxtaposition of μελιγδούποισι and μελιζέμεν: cf. P. 1, 12 κῆλα... θέλγει and Barkhuizen, 104ff.

19: ἐκ περικτιόνων. A brachylogy for 'gained from places inhabited by π.' or 'from games organized by π.' (cf. N. 2, 19 ἐξ ἀέθλων νίκας ἐκόμιξαν). Fennell wrongly connects the phrase with ἐστεφάνωσαν and translates 'on the authority of'.

19: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force: cf. Denn., 169.

20: πάτραν. 'Clan' or (more probably) 'native land': cf. O. 8, 20 ἐξένεπε κρατέων πάλα δολιχήρετμον Αἴγιναν πάτραν, P. 1, 32, P. 9, 73, N. 9, 12, I. 3, 12. See further W. Keuffel, *Der Vaterlandsbegriff in der frühgriechischen Dichtung* (Würzburg 1942), 32ff.

20: εὐώνυμον. Probably a resultative predicate (see above on 5 ὀρθάν), for Tenedos could hardly be considered famous in itself like Athens (N. 4, 19) and Aegina (N. 7, 85). Bury and Barkhuizen (89) take the word to allude to 33 Πεισάνδρου, which name forms a good omen for Aristagoras' function as *prytanis*, but apart from the question whether πάτραν refers to the clan, Pindar now concentrates on Aristagoras'

athletic, not his magisterial, qualities.

21: πάλα. 'On the occasion of...'. For this use of the dative cf. *O.* 1, 50 τραπέζαισι. *O.* 10, 76 θαλάιαις, *P.* 1, 47 μάχαις, K.G. I, 445 (who do not clearly distinguish this use from the dative denoting attendant circumstances).

21: μεγαυχεῖ. 'Glorious' (similarly *A. Pers.* 642). At *P.* 8, 15 μέγαλαυχος means 'vainglorious': αὐχέω often means 'to boast', but the original meaning is 'to declare proudly or confidently' (whether or not rightly), so that at *S. O.C.* 713 αὐχημα has a favourable sense.

22: ἐλπίδες. The original meaning of ἐλπίς is 'supposition' (cf. ἔλπομαι at *Il.* 9, 40; 16, 281; 18, 194), of which 'expectation' is a specialization (Plato, *Leg.* 644c 9 defines it as δόξα μελλόντων). See further O. Lachnit, *Elpis* (Tübingen 1965), 3ff.

22: ὀκνηρότεραι. 'Too hesitant': for this use of the comparative cf. K.G. II, 305, Schw. II, 184-5. Lefkowitz (53) observes that "this apology for non-accomplishment of deeds never attempted is unique", but does not explain why Pindar included it. A possible answer has been suggested by Gundert, 111 n. 40: "Fragt man, warum Pindar den Fall, der zumindest für die Eltern peinlich war, überhaupt erwähnt und so weit führt, so ist ein Hauptmotiv die Aufgabe des Dichters, verkannte Arete zur Geltung zu bringen". This is a more plausible explanation than that given in *Mnemosynon* (5-6), where he maintains that 'fast zwei Drittel des Festlieds gelten dem Versäumnis der Eltern' and suggests that "es ist, als ob er [Pindar] den Anlass, dass er keine grösseren Siege hatte, geradezu gesucht hätte, um den Abgrund aufzureissen zwischen der lichten Welt des Adels und der Gottverlassenheit der Menschen". E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1962), 48ff., has rightly pointed out that past misfortunes in the family are used as dark foils for present glory (although his view that the victory ode "is dedicated to the single purpose of eulogizing men and communities", 35, is untenable).

22: βίαν. See above on 14 βίαν.

23: πειρᾶσθαι. One might expect the addition of μή, but this may be omitted if the infinitive is felt as an object: cf. *E. Or.* 263 σχήσω σε πηδᾶν, K.G. II, 214-5, Schw. II, 598 (who compares *Thuc.* VII 33, 3 ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν).

24: γάρ. Explains ὀκνηρότεραι (Bury) or (rather) the unexpressed idea of 'wrongly' (Fennell 'for else'): cf. Denn., 62-3, Bruhn, §114. Another possibility is to take γάρ as emphatic (γε + ἄρα): as such it often introduces emotional questions (Denn., 82-5) and it also occurs in

exclamations, usually preceded by ἤ (Denn., 284); in the present passage ναὶ μά may be considered equivalent to ἤ.

24: Ὅρκον. Conceived as a divine power: cf. Hes. *Th.* 231, *Op.* 219, Hdt. VI 86, 2, and above on 8 Θέμις.

24: ἐμὴν δόξαν. Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 983, *Pax* 232 γνώμην ἐμήν. Fennell thinks that "these are accusatives of 'extent, range, sphere', like τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος", Bury and K.G. I, 317, call the accusative 'adverbial', Farnell calls it 'absolute', Sch. II, 86, suggests that it originated from a 'prosthetic' nominative. These explanations are unsatisfactory. I am inclined to take the phrase as an apposition to the unexpressed internal object of the sentence: cf. *O.* 7, 17 αἰνέσω πυγμαῖς ἀποινα, K.G. I, 284-5, Bruhn, §11, Wilamowitz on E. *H.F.* 59 ἔλεγχον, Barrett on E. *Hipp.* 757 ὄνασιν.

24: παρὰ Κασταλίᾳ. The phrase 'if he had participated in the contests' has to be supplied from the context: cf. K.G. II, 565, Bruhn, §199.

25: εὐδένδρῳ. Cf. *O.* 3, 18, 23, 32-4.

25: μολών. Sc. 'tither': cf. *N.* 5, 45 ἄλικας δ' ἐλθόντας οἴκοι τ' ἐκράτει, S. *Ai.* 854 νῦν μ' ἐπίσκεψαι μολών, K.G. II, 87.

26: δηριώντων. The active form is not to be found elsewhere in the classical period. The participle may have concessive force: cf. Schw. II, 389. It is certainly wrong to assume that the vanquished adversaries function "nicht mehr nur als Folie, sondern zugleich als Beispiel für die κενεόφρονες αὔχαι der Sterblichen", as is suggested by H. Schmitz, *Hypsos und Bios* (Bern 1970), 49.

27: ἑορτάν. Apposition to the internal object of κωμάσαις (see above on 24 ἐμὴν δόξαν).

27: Ἡρακλέος. A *genitivus auctoris*: cf. *O.* 12, 15 τιμὰ ποδῶν, K.G. I, 332-3, Schw. II, 119, and my note on E. *Ba.* 8, *Mnemos.* IV 33 (1980), 2. For Heracles as founder of the Olympian games cf. *O.* 3, 11ff. For Pindar's special regard for him cf. Bowra, *Pindar*, 45ff.

27: τέθμιον. 'Established', 'organized according to fixed rules' (cf. *O.* 6, 69 τεθμὸς ἀέθλων), hence 'solemn'. The translation 'nach der Satzung des Herakles' (Mezger), 'founded by Herakles' (Bowra; similarly Lattimore, Nisetich) is misleading.

28: ἀνδησάμενος κόμαν. 'Having his hair wreathed': similarly *I.* 1, 28 ἀνδησάμενοι, *I.* 2, 16, *O.* 7, 15 στεφανωσάμενον, *O.* 12, 17, *N.* 6, 21. For this use of the middle cf. διδάσκεισθαι 'to have oneself instructed', K.G. I, 113, 116, Schw. II, 232 (who in *I.* 757 wrongly assumes a passive sense in στεφανωσάμενος), and my notes on Men. *Epitr.*

44 and 205, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 20 and 26. The force of ἀνα- may be explained from the fact that a wreath or a head-band (*Il.* 22, 469 ἀναδέσμη) makes the hair enclosed by it appear partly to rise above it.

28: ἐν. Bury rightly observes: "The expression loses its strength if we take ἐν as merely instrumental; the victor's locks are conceived as actually *in* the wreath of olive leaves". Cf. *Il.* 5, 386 δῆσαν κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ, and above on 17 ἐν.

28: πορφυρέοις. Not 'bound by purple fillets' (Slater, Lefkowitz, 53, following P. von der Mühl, *Kl. Schriften*, 194-6), but 'glittering', 'brilliant': cf. H. Gipper, *Gl.* 42 (1964), 39ff., O. J. Schrier, *Mnemos.* IV 32 (1979), 316ff. Similarly *P.* 2, 6 τηλαυγέσιν... στεφάνοις. Duchemin (198ff.) rightly points out that φοινικοπέζα said of Demeter and Hecate (*O.* 6, 94, *Pae.* 2, 77) does not refer to colour but to brilliance (cf. Homeric ἀργυρόπεζα). For the Greek tendency to subordinate colour to shine cf. Fogelmark, 17ff., who is wrong, however, in concluding (23) that πορφύρεος "denotes colour in Pindar but not in Homer". His interpretation of the present passage as giving "an impression of beautiful colour" (26) is rather arbitrary. It is true that we find at *O.* 6, 55 ἔων ξανθαῖσι καὶ παμπορφύροις ἀκτῖσι, but the addition of ἀκτῖσι is significant. Olive and laurel are called χρύσεος (*O.* 8, 1, *O.* 11, 13, *P.* 10, 40, *N.* 1, 17), but this refers to their value rather than to their visual appearance: cf. *P.* 3, 73 ὑγίειαν ἄγων χρυσέαν, LSJ III 1 (Duchemin, 226, thinks that "il s'agit d'un feuillage divin aux reflets lumineux, aux promesses d'immortalité"). Mezger suggests that πορφυρέοις, too, is intended "um seinen hohen Wert zu bezeichnen" (similarly Bury: "Regal 'purple' might be considered the queen of colours and used as a metaphor for supreme excellence", and Bowra, *Pindar*, 245-6), but there is no parallel for such a figurative use.

29: ἀλλά. Lefkowitz (53) thinks that "the reference to binding... leads into a statement of human limitations" (!). The function of ἀλλά obviously is to explain why the possibility indicated in the preceding lines was not realized: it is equivalent to ἀλλά γάρ marking the non-fulfilment of a condition (Denn., 104).

29: κενεόφρονες. Cf. *Il.* 8, 230 κενεαυχέες.

29: αὔχαι. See above on 21 μεγαυχεῖ. Wilamowitz (432) writes: "ihm wird in einem Atem gesagt, dass er ihn [the victory] hätte erreichen können, und angedeutet, es wäre wohl eher Selbstüberhebung gewesen". Similarly Lefkowitz, 53: "the contest is in the athlete's mind... the opponents are emotions, 'empty-minded boasts' ... and an 'unadventurous heart'".

But 32 θυμός ἄτολμος obviously refers to his parents' hesitations, and the first part of the sentence (τὸν μὲν...) serves as a foil to the second part (Gundert, 24 and 117 n. 95). It is well-known that the Greeks often use antithetical expressions to emphasize only one idea: cf. Fehling, *Wiederholungsfiguren*, 84-6, 274-9, and my notes on Semon. 7, 9, *Mnemos.* IV 21 (1968), 135-6, and A. Pr. 106, *Miscellanea Kamerbeek* (Amsterdam 1976), 453-4.

30: ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἔβαλον. Cf. S. Ai. 808 χάριτος ἐκβεβλημένη, *El.* 648-9 με πλούτου... ἐκβαλεῖν, Xen. An. VII 5, 6 μὴ ἐκ τῆς Σεύθου φιλίας ἐκβληθείη. The translation 'cast down from' (Fennell and others) is perhaps too strong, for βάλλω may also mean 'to place' (LSJ A I 6).

30: καταμεμφθέντα. The parallelism of the two parts of the sentence suggests that the sense is active (like Hdt. I 77, 1 μεμφοίς, etc.). There seems to lie a difficulty in the fact that θυμός refers to the parents and ἰσχύν to the son, but the parents may have regarded their son's abilities as part of their own: cf. P. 8, 44-5 φυᾶ... ἐκ πατέρων, Gundert, 15ff.

31: ἰσχύν. For the accusative see above on 11 ἄνδρα.

31: οἰκείων. 'Within his reach' (Fennell). For the *topos* of τὸ παρκείμενον (N. 3, 75) cf. Strohm, 72-5.

31: παρέσφαλεν. 32 ὀπίσσω shows that παρέσφαλεν cannot mean 'lässt vorbeistraucheln' (Fränkel, 573). The local force of παρα- ('to the side') has apparently been widened to the idea of 'missing' and 'failing'. For the genitive cf. LSJ σφάλλω III 2.

32: ἄτολμος. Another *topos*: one has to take risks (O. 6, 9-11 ἀκίνδουνοι δ' ἀρεταὶ οὐ... τίμιαι, P. 4, 185-7), but τόλμα should be combined with σύνεσις (N. 7, 59, I. 3-4, 63-5, fr. 231).

33: συμβαλεῖν. 'To conjecture' (cf. LSJ III 3), sc. the presence of ... in their son.

33: μάν. Denn. (330, 337) hesitates between an emphatic and a progressive sense, but the meaning is more likely to be adversative (Denn., 334-5, Slater, 311).

33: πάλαι. Not to be connected with ἀπὸ Σπάρτας (Fennell, Farnell, Puech), but with αἶμα: cf. I. 2, 1 οἱ πάλαι φῶτες, LSJ I 2. B. A. van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past* (Leiden 1953), 50, rightly observes: "The quality of the primogenitor determines the quality of the whole lineage and every member of it shines with the reflected light of his ancestral glory". Cf. also 12, 52, 54, and Gundert, 15, Bowra, *Pindar*, 101-2,

171-2.

34: Ἀμύκλαθεν. "Because in Pindar's opinion Amyklai had been the place where king Agamemnon was murdered on his return home from Troy... Not until Orestes had killed his mother did he set the Aeolians on their way towards Tenedos" (G. Huxley, *Pindar's Vision of the Past*, Belfast 1975, 34). I doubt whether Pindar alludes to the capture of Amyclae mentioned at *P.* 1, 65, as is suggested by Lefkowitz, 54.

35: ἀνάγων. 'Leading over sea': cf. *Il.* 9, 338 λαὸν ἀνήγαγεν ἐνθάδε, LSJ I 2. Orestes as a leader of Aeolian colonists is also mentioned by Hellanicus (*FGH* 4, F. 32).

36: ῥοᾶν. Puech reads ῥοάν with MSS. and scholia, but Pindar always uses the plural ῥοαί, and παρά ῥοᾶν is obviously parallel to ἀπὸ Σπάρτας, so that we have mentally to supply τὸ αἷμα (as is rightly observed by Bury, who spoils the construction, however, by translating 'mingled near the stream of Ismenus with the blood of...'; similarly Werner 'an Ismenos' Fluten beigemischt').

36 κεραιμένον. Sc. with the blood on the father's side.

37 Μελανίπποιο. Famous opponent of the Seven against Thebes: cf. *K.P.* III, 1164.16ff.

37: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force: see above on 19 δέ.

38: ἀμφέροντι. Mezger translates 'sie bringen mit sich', but this is φέρομαι (e.g. *P.* 7, 21). Fennell translates 'return' (similarly Farnell 'revive', 'renew'; cf. schol. ἀποφέρονται), but the comparison with cornfields shows that the meaning is 'raise up', 'give forth': cf. ἀναδίδωμι (LSJ II 1), and A. *Cho.* 447-8 ἀνέφερον... γόνον. The capacities (ἀρεταί) inherent in the γένος are like the fertile soil from which shoot up the achievements (ἀρεταί) of the individual members as flourishing plants (*I.* 5, 17 θάλλουσ' ἀρετά; cf. *O.* 9, 16, *N.* 4, 88, *N.* 10, 42), which may be kept alive by the water of the victory ode (*N.* 8, 40-1). See further my note on *O.* 14, 15 θαλία, *Mnemos.* IV 32 (1979), 27-8. Although the middle ἀμφέρονται is defended by Fennell by comparing *P.* 7, 21 φέρεσθαι, the active seems to be preferable because it is the regular form of φέρω when said of the earth or of trees: cf. 41 φέρειν and LSJ A V.

38: ἀλλασσόμεναι. Schol.: τοῦ μεταξὺ γένους ἡμαυρωμένου.

38: γενεαῖς. A dative of interest ('in the case of ...'): cf. *K.G.* I, 429, Schw. II, 189.

38: ἀνδρῶν. Not to be connected with σθένος (Sandys, Werner, Lefkowitz, 54), but with γενεαῖς: cf. *Il.* 6, 149 ὧς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἡ

μὲν φύει, ἣ δ' ἀπολήγει. I do not believe that the assonance Πεισ-
άνδρου (33)-άνδρων is intentional, as is suggested by Barkhuizen 147.

38: σθένος. May imply the idea of profusion: cf. *O.* 9, 51 σ. ὕδατος,
I. 3, 2 σ. πλούτου, *Paë.* 9, 14 σ. νιφετοῦ, LSJ II 2.

39: ἐνσχερώ. 'Without interruption'. Most editors read ἐν σχερῶ,
but Turyn rightly prints ἐνσχερώ: the MSS. do not have a iota here nor
at *N.* 1, 69 and *I.* 6, 21. Cf. *Ap. Rh.* I 912 ἐνσχερώ, Homeric ἐπισχερώ
(cf. Schw. II, 469 and n. 1), and Hsch. ἰσχερώ· ἐξῆς. Fränkel's transla-
tion 'auf der Erdenfeste' (573) is unintelligible.

39: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force: see above on 19 δέ.

39: ὦν. Cf. Denn., 419-20: "οὖν emphasizes the duality, or plurali-
ty, of the ideas negatived". Similarly εἴτ' οὖν (*Den.*, 418-9).

39: μέλαινα. Bury thinks that this word "is chosen with the pur-
pose of pointing the illustration by a play on Μελάνιππος" (similarly
Barkhuizen, 147), but μέλαινα is a conventional epithet of γῆ and χθών
(e.g. *Il.* 2, 699, Hes. *Th.* 69, Alc. 58, 3, Archil. 58 D. = 130 W., 2 Sa.
1, 10). I also doubt whether A. Kober, *The Use of Colour Terms in the
Greek Poets* (New York 1932), 32-3, is right in suggesting that μέλαινα
ἄρουργαί implies the idea of fertility: Fogelmark (30) observes that at
O. 9, 50 μέλαινα χθών "any thought of black fertile soil is out of the
question, as it is merely a variation on a conventional phrase bequeathed
by epic poetry".

39: ἄρουργαί. The same comparison is found at *N.* 6, 8-11. The dif-
ferences between the two passages suggested by Lefkowitz (54-5) seem to me
fanciful.

40: δένδρεα. Lefkowitz (54) maintains that a "natural connection is
drawn between the crowning of the victor (... ἔρνεσιν, rather than στε-
φάνοις, 29) and the flowering of the trees". I fail to see where the
connection is drawn except in the reader's imagination. For ἔρνεσιν
cf. *N.* 6, 18, *I.* 1, 29 and 66.

40: οὐκ ἐθέλει. Fennell rightly translates 'are not wont': cf. *O.*
11, 9, *P.* 1, 62, *N.* 7, 10, LSJ II 2, and my note on *Pl. Meno* 95b 1, *Mnemos.*
IV 10 (1957), 297. There may be an implication of 'are unable': cf. *Il.*
21, 366, *Od.* 3, 121, *Sol.* 3, 27. Lefkowitz (54) thinks that "there is a
special emphasis on intention" in the simile; she admits (n. 29) that ἐ-
θέλω "can denote customary behaviour", but argues that "English 'tend'
does not adequately convey the verb's sense of volition". But the point
is that in such cases the verb has lost its sense of volition. Nisetich
(62) argues that the poem contains "repeated instances of negative volition"

and that therefore "the literal connotation, secondary from the point of view of the immediate context, is primary from the point of view of the ode as a whole". But the only evident instances of negative volition are 22-3 and 31-2, both referring to the same fact.

40: περόδοις. One may think of the fact that the trees are in flower at different times during the year, but Pindar probably wished only to avoid such prosaic expressions as κατὰ ἔτος.

41: πλούτῳ. For the limitative force of the dative see above on 13 μορφῶ. Wilamowitz (431) wrongly takes πλούτῳ to refer to the fruits ("nicht jedes Jahr entspricht die Ernte der Blütenpracht"): Schroeder points out that in that case the text would have πλοῦτον ἄνθει ἴσον. For πλοῦτος 'abundance' cf. LSJ I 2.

41: ἴσον. Mommsen's τ' ἴσον is unnecessary, for ἴσον is construed as a predicate.

42: ἐναμείβοντι. Some editors read ἐν ἀμείβοντι (cf. ἐναλλάξ), but the verb (which further occurs at *Lyd. Mag.* 3, 39) seems to have been modelled after ἐναλλάττω. Pindar might have written ἐπαμείβοντι (cf. *Il.* 6, 339 νίκη δ' ἐπαμείβεται ἄνδρας), but ἐν- more strongly suggests alternation. For the plural after ἐθέλει cf. *Il.* 2, 135 δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σπάρτα λέλυνται and *K.G.* I, 65-6. For a plural verb after a plural neutre in Pindar cf. *O.* 8, 12, *O.* 10, 85, *P.* 1, 13.

42: ἔθνος. A certain emendation: cf. *O.* 1, 66 ἀνέρων ἔθνος, *N.* 3, 74 βρότεον ἔθνος.

42: ἄγει. Bury thinks that this means "'drive', like wind". One might compare *A. Pers.* 602 τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶ δαίμον' οὐριεῦν τύχης, but Moira is a more stable power than Tyche: cf. Strohm, 51ff., especially 52: "Sie stellt den ein für allemal festgelegten Grundriss dar". Accordingly, the meaning is 'guides', 'governs' (cf. LSJ A II 2-3, Slater, 8).

43: τὸ δέ. Usually connected with ἐκ Διός ('that which comes from Zeus'), either as an accusative of respect or as the subject of the sentence (σαφές τέκμαρ being the predicate). This is better than to connect τό with τέκμαρ (Mezger), but it seems to me more natural to take τὸ δέ as 'on the other hand': cf. *O.* 9, 95, *I.* 3, 11, *K.G.* I, 584. Anyhow it is important not to neglect the adversative force of δέ (as is done by most translators): the course of life of human generations, just as that of fields and trees, has been fixed by Destiny, but man is unable to foresee the future. This is a *topos* (cf. e.g. *O.* 12, 7-8, *N.* 6, 6-7, *I.* 8, 14-5) and as such does not need a special motivation, such as is suggested by Lefkowitz, 56: "the temporary nature of the occasion itself, election to

a political office, gives special emphasis to the topics of the limits of achievement, ignorance of the future, mortality, and change". On the contrary, the comparatively short duration of the office (10 δωδεκάμηνον) implies that these topics are not especially relevant to the occasion.

43: σαφές. 'Reliable' rather than 'clear': cf. *O.* 6, 20, *O.* 7, 91, *O.* 10, 55, *Il.* 5, 177, *S. O.R.* 390, *Thuc.* I 22, 4, and W. Luther, *Wahrheit und Lüge im ältesten Griechentum* (Borna-Leipzig 1935), 61ff. See also my notes on *Men. Epitrr.* 25 *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 19, *Pl. Phdr.* 275c 6, *Mnemos.* IV 28 (1975), 79, and *A. Pr.* 641, *Miscellanea Kamerbeek*, 465.

43: ἔπεται. 'Falls to': cf. *P.* 10, 17 ἔποιτο μοῦρα, *Il.* 4, 415 τούτῳ κῦδος ἄμ' ἔπεται, *LSJ* II 2.

44: τέκμαρ. Cf. *P.* 10, 63 τὰ δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀτέκμαρτον προνοῆσαι. This parallel shows that Pindar's outlook upon the limits of human power did not change very much in the course of his life. Cf. also *O.* 2, 30-3, *O.* 12, 8, *Strohm*, 64ff. For Pindar's view of the future see also C. G. Starr, *Essays on Ancient History* (Leiden 1979), 177-8. Bury (followed by Péron, 42 and n. 1) thinks that τέκμαρ "suggests a guiding star". He compares *H. Hom.* 32, 13, where the moon is called τέκμαρ βροτοῖσι, but even *E. Hec.* 1273 κυνὸς ταλαίνης σῆμα, ναυτίλοις τέκμαρ does not warrant such a conclusion. Pindar is more likely to have had *Il.* I, 525-6 in mind, where Zeus calls his nod μετ' ἀθανάτοισι μέγιστον / τέκμαρ.

44: μεγαλانوρίας. 'Self-confident ambitions': cf. *P.* 8, 90-1 ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέταται / ὑποπτέροις ἀνορέαις, *N.* 3, 20 ἀνορέαις ὑπερτάταις ἐπέβα. The translation 'hochmütig' (Werner) is misleading, and *Strohm's* paraphrase "verblendetes Menschentum" (78) is certainly wrong.

44: ἐμβαίνομεν. For the nautical metaphor cf. *N.* 3, 20 quoted above, *Pl. Phdr.* 252e 5, and Péron, 39ff.

45: τε. Mezger wrongly reads ἔργ' ἄτε (Mommsen). For τε introducing a participial clause Denn. (502) quotes two examples, *Lys.* 13, 40 ἀφικνεῖται, μέλαν τε ἱμάτιον ἡμφιεσμένη and *Pind.* *P.* 6, 45-6 πατρώαν μάλιστα πρὸς στάθμαν ἔβα, / πάτρῳ τ' ἐπερχόμενος ἀγλαῖαν ἄπασαν. He rightly explains the first τε as equivalent to καὶ ταῦτα, but wrongly thinks that from ἔβα we have to supply βαίνων (similarly Fennell and Bury): just as ἡμφιεσμένη, ἐπερχόμενος supplies an additional information closely connected with the first part of the sentence. Similarly *P.* 1, 70 υἱὸς τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος, *N.* 8, 19 ἀμπνέων τε (cf. Slater, 489: "almost καὶ ταῦτα"). Schroeder (on *P.* 1, 75-80) wrongly equates these cases with *O.* 7, 81 and *I.* 2, 38, where the parti-

ciple is used instead of a finite verb ("Variation des Ausdrucks"; cf. Bowra, *Pindar*, 207). In the present passage the additional information has an explanatory (specifying) character: for this use of τε cf. Denn., 502 (e), and my notes on Men. *Epitr.* 338, *Mnemos.* IV 27 (1974), 31-2, A. *Pr.* 152, *Miscellanea Kamerbeek*, 455, and E. *Ba.* 54, *Mnemos.* IV 33 (1980), 13-4.

45: δέδεταί. According to Fennell, "perhaps a metaphor from a slave chained to the oar", a view adopted by Bury, but rightly rejected as anachronistic by Péron, 41-2 n. 5. Strohm (78) wrongly sees a paradox in the phrase δέδεταί ἐλπίδι γυῖα: the verb does not imply paralysis, as is assumed by Strohm, but only inescapable compulsion, and it may refer to a holding as well as to a moving force (as is observed by Fränkel, 575 n. 22): cf. *P.* 3, 54 κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεταί, *P.* 4, 71 κίνδυνος... ὤησεν, and the phrase 'to be bound to'. Lefkowitz (55) thinks that the metaphor has been prepared by 15 περιστέλλειν, 16 ἐπιεσσόμενος, 23 ἔσχον, 28 ἀνδραπάμενος, 39-40 οὐτ' ἔδωκαν... οὐκ ἐθέλει, and concludes that "Pindar has elaborated the traditional connotation of binding, which in Homer regularly describes the effect of death and delusion, into a characterization of mental action". Such a hunt for hidden meanings and implicit connections seems to me a serious danger to a sound development of Pindaric scholarship.

45: ἀναιδεῖ. Not 'unconscionable' (Fennell). 'importunate' (Bury), 'insolent' (Farnell), 'wanton' (Bowra), 'shameless' (Gundert, 144 n. 393, Lattimore, Nisetich, Lefkowitz, 55), 'frech' (Werner, Fränkel, 573), 'effrontée' (Puech), 'insensée' (Péron, 256), but 'knowing no αἰδώς', i.e. 'shrinking from nothing': cf. *O.* 10, 105 ἀναιδέα θάνατον, *Il.* 4, 521 λαῶας ἀναιδῆς, 5, 593 Κυδοιμὸν ἀναιδέα, E. *H.F.* 165-6, where ἀναιδεια is contrasted with εὐλάβεια, and the λίθος ἀναιδείας in the Areopagus. In such contexts αἰδώς has its original meaning of keeping oneself at a respectful distance (cf. my remarks in *Mnemos.* III 12, 1944, 48ff. and *Lampas* 5, 1972, 114) and does not have a specifically moral connotation, as is suggested by Mezger ("schamlos - weil das gebührende Mass überschreitend") and is assumed by Lefkowitz (55), who defines it as "the ability to respect one's own person or another's rights". She refers to F. J. Nisetich, *TAPA* 107 (1977), 246-7, who more rightly, however, explains ἀναιδῆς at *O.* 10, 105 by: "What is shameless about death is that it makes no distinctions; it overtakes mortals without exception, when it pleases, with no regard to their wishes", and *N.* 11, 45 by: "Here it is men who are 'shameless', because their hopes will countenance anything".

It appears from these definitions that 'shameless' is not a happy translation.

46: ἐλπίδι. See above on 22 ἐλπίδες. Strohm (78) maintains that ἐλπίς is depreciated ("abgewertet") here and at *P.* 8, 90 more than elsewhere (*P.* 3, 23, *N.* 1, 33, *N.* 8, 45, *I.* 2, 43), and that a positive appreciation is to be found at *O.* 13, 103, *P.* 3, 111, *I.* 8, 15, fr. 214. Similarly Péron, 42: "l'homme, laissé par les dieux dans une ignorance complète de ce qui l'attend (v. 43), contribue aussi à son propre aveuglement, en se laissant entraîner par l'espérance, puissance d'illusion et d'égarement, à poursuivre des ambitions démesurées, sans rapport avec sa nature, par essence limitée; ἐλπίς a donc une valeur purement 'négative' (v. 46: ἀναιδεῦ)". I have already pointed out that ἀναιδεῦ does not imply criticism: Pindar does not blame man for cherishing far-reaching expectations, but he states the objective fact that ἐλπίς does not have a natural limit, because man does not know the future. The result is that in some cases ἐλπίς is too weak (22 ὀκνηρότεροι), in other cases too strong (cf. Bury, 218: "undue diffidence and undue confidence"). The question whether there occurred a change in Pindar's appreciation of ἐλπίς is wrongly put: Pindar did not evaluate ἐλπίς as such (as is rightly observed by J. J. A. Schrijen, *Elpis*, Groningen 1965, 60), but he observed its failures (for its connection with τύχα cf. Nisetich, *op. cit.* [above on 45 ἀναιδεῦ], 247ff.) and preached moderation (47). It can only be said that man's ignorance of the future, already signaled in his earliest work (see above on 44 τέκμαρ) is more strongly emphasized in *P.* 8 (93-5) and *N.* 11 (43-4, 46). The difference, however, is not very great: cf. B. L. Gildersleeve, *Selections from the Brief Mention* (Baltimore-London-Oxford 1930), 59: "For my part, I have not been able to recognize the symptoms of aging in Pindar, which Leopold Schmidt has dwelt upon in such detail. *P.* VIII is bitter, or, if you choose, austere, but the melancholy of the latest piece is matched by the melancholy of the earliest". Gundert (*Mnemosynon*, 5) and Lefkowitz (52, 56) make much of the fact that αἴγλα διόσδοτος (*P.* 8, 96) does not appear in *N.* 11, and that there is no trace of a similarity between men and gods (*N.* 6, 3), but faith in divine help is implicitly expressed at 5 and 8.

I doubt whether Pindar's view of human weakness should be called 'tragic', as is done by Strohm (79): "Der Mensch kann ja wesensgemäss gar nicht anders als gegen das ebenso wesensgemässe Gesetz seiner Bedingtheit verstossen" (similarly Fränkel, 575). But 47 χρόή implies that man *can* try to observe this law by aiming at moderation (as is implicitly admitted

by Strohm, *ibid.*). Foreknowledge is difficult, but possible to some extent: see below on 46 ἀπόκεινται. Consequently, Péron (130 and 257) is wrong in thinking that *N.* 11 is concluded by "un véritable aveu d'impuissance". That the term 'pessimism' is equally inappropriate has been pointed out by de Vries, 156-7 and *Mnemos.* IV 10 (1957), 8-15, who rightly observes that *I.* 7, 37 is counterbalanced by 38, and *P.* 95 by 96-7. Even the phrase 'resigned pessimism' (Bury, 218) is misleading, for it may induce us to underestimate Pindar's faith in man's power to crown his life with lasting values.

46: γυῖα. Nisetich, *op. cit.* (above on 45 ἀναιδεῦ), 247, suggests that this implies the idea of mortality, but elsewhere in Pindar the word more often refers to athletics than to death. In the present passage it seems to continue the image of 44 ἐμβαίνομεν.

46: προμαθείας. Not 'precaution' (Werner 'Vorsicht', Fränkel, 574 'sorglicher Voraussicht'), but 'foreknowledge'. Cf. *O.* 7, 44, where αἰδώς ('restraint': see above on 45 ἀναιδεῦ) is said to be characteristic of the προμαθής.

46: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force (see above on 19 δέ): ἐλπίς does not know limits, because it does not know the future. Schrijen, *op. cit.* (above on 46 ἐλπίδι), 56, wrongly explains the connection as adversative: "hope is shameless, but one should try to avoid shamelessness by bearing in mind that the human power of foresight is very weak".

46: ἀπόκεινται. Not 'sind verborgen' (Mezger) or 'are beyond our reach' (Puech: 'se dérobent à nous'; Péron, 257: 'être à l'écart'), but 'are far away', 'are difficult to reach'. A small degree of foreknowledge is not denied to man: cf. *I.* 1, 40 ὁ πονήσας δὲ νόφ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει.

46: ῥοαί. Not 'the tides of events lie beyond our foresight' (LSJ I), but to be connected with προμαθείας. The image of streams or waves is often used of destiny (cf. Péron, 251ff.), but its connection with foreknowledge is not immediately clear. Fennell's observation that "no doubt the mariners of Tenedos were familiar with and often grateful to the strong Hellespontine current" seems to me irrelevant. Péron (256-7), who rightly rejects the translation 'sources' (Werner, Fränkel, 574), argues that the phrase "ne constitue en effet que le dernier élément d'un tableau dominé par la présence de la mer"; he compares *O.* 12, 5-6, but there human expectations are compared with ships, not with waves. If we translate the word by 'rivers' (Bury, Romagnoli, Wolde), we may compare *I.* 2, 41-2, where the Phasis and the Nile are mentioned as symbols for remote parts of the world

(cf. Péron, 85-7).

47: κερδέων. 'Desires of gain': cf. *P.* 3, 54 κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται, *N.* 9, 33 αἰδῶς γὰρ ὑπὸ κρύφα κέρδει κλέπτεται, LSJ I, 2. Warning against κέρδος is a *topos* in Pindar: cf. *P.* 1, 92, *P.* 2, 78, *P.* 4, 139-40, and Péron, 210-1.

47: δέ. Strongly adversative (neglected in almost all translations): human aspirations and expectations tend to overstep all limits, but all the same they (κερδέων is a specification of μενοινῶντες and ἐλπίδι), have to keep within bounds, for else they lead nowhere (48 ἀπροσίκτων).

47: μέτρον. Cf. *O.* 13, 47-8 ἔπεται δ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ / μέτρον, *P.* 2, 34 χρὴ δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὄραν μέτρον. Pindar more often uses καιρός: Gundert, 63, 66ff., Strohm, 67-8, M. Riemschneider, *Ztschr.f.Ästh. u.allg. Kunstw.* 36 (1942), 105-9. These parallels show that the end of the poem is a *topos*, and it is wrong to assume that this must have a special application, as is done by Farnell (234), who supposes "that the kinsmen of Aristagoras being aware of his weaknesses had suggested to Pindar to convey this to him", and by Mezger, who thinks that the warning is addressed to "den Teil der Bürgerschaft, der überstürzenden Neuerungen zugethan ist", and that the praise of Aristagoras serves the purpose "die Warnung an die Unruhestifter recht eindringlich zu machen".

47: θηρεύμεν. To be contrasted with *P.* 3, 23 μεταμῶνια θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν. On Pindar's use of metaphors of hunting cf. C. J. Classen, *Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern* (Berlin 1960), 6-7.

48: ἀπροσίκτων. Not 'ad quem accedere non licet, inexpugnabilis' (Rumpel with schol.; cf. ἄπλωτος), nor 'unattainable' (Bury, LSJ, who wrongly take ἐρώτων to be 'objects of desire', Slater), nor depending on ἐρώτων (Christ), but 'not reaching their end', 'achieving nothing'. For the verbal adjective used with active force cf. Kühner-Blass, II, 289, Bruhn, §101, Wackernagel, *Vorl. ü. Synt.* I, 136, 288, Pearson on *S. fr.* 534, 4, Barrett on *E. Hipp.* 678.

48: ἐρώτων. Used in its general sense of 'desires', but especially 'desires of gain' (cf. 47 κερδέων). The genitive has been explained in various ways, none of which seems to me convincing: (1) gen. of object: 'aber die Gier nach unerfüllbaren Wünschen brennt allzuheiss' (Wilamowitz, 431). But (a) according to LSJ μανία with objective genitive does not occur before Hermesianax; (b) 'allzu' apparently means that μανία always prevents the attainment of μέτρον, a conclusion which makes χρὴ a sarcastic paradox and which attributes to Pindar an unparalleled negativism.

The suggestion put forward by Gundert (*Mnemosynon*, 5), that the poet was "in innerem Kampf", does not solve this difficulty. (2) gen. of subject: 'schlimm ist das wahnsinnige Begehren unerreichbarer Wünsche' (Mezger), 'Unerreichbares Sehnen ist der schneidenste Wahn' (Dornseiff), 'vom unerreichbaren Begehr aber ist heftiger der Wahnsinn' (Gundert, *Mnemosynon*, 4), 'Unerschöpflich Begehren heisst mir der bitterste Wahn', 'Doch unerfüllbares Begehren tobt in umso heftigerem Wahn' (Fränkel, 574, explained, 575, by "Wir sollen uns bescheiden, und doch brennt kein Sehnen so heiss wie der Wahnwunsch nach dem Unerreichbaren"), 'Too sharp is the madness of unattainable desires' (Nisetich; similarly Lefkowitz, 56), 'qui se laisse aller à des ambitions irréalisables s'expose à une démente éperdue' (Puech), 'Immers, de razernij van het verlangen naar het onbereikbare schrijnt fel' (de Vries, 156). But (a) some of these translations suggest that the μέτρον is never attained (cf. Gundert's explanation, *Mnemosynon*, 5: "Die kurze Mahnung zum Mass geht unter in dem Schluss"): see above on 1b; (b) others (such as 'schlimm', 'der bitterste', 'too sharp', 'éperdue') may imply a condemnation of μανία and a causal connection with the preceding sentence. De Vries explicitly defends this view: he explains ὀξύτεροι as 'extra sharp', which he takes to be equivalent to 'smarting', but although ὀξύς may be said of pains (e.g. *N.* 1, 53 ὀξεῖαις ἀνίαισι, *Il.* 11, 268 ὀξεῖαι ὀδύνας), I do not know instances of ὀξύς in itself meaning 'painful'. (3) gen. of origin: 'Sharp are the fits of madness wrought by unattainable longings' (Bury), 'From longings unachievable cometh madness passing fell' (Fennell), 'Too bitter are the pangs of madness after loves that are past attainment' (Lattimore), 'Loves beyond reach sting too sharply to madness' (Bowra), 'Unerfüllbare Gier ruft heftigeren Wahn nur hervor' (Werner). But (a) these translations, like most of the ones classed under 2, neglect ὀξύς, so that they leave us in the dark about the question whether the connection is adversative or explanatory. If it is adversative, see on 1b, if explanatory (motivating), it may be doubted whether the prospect of increasing insanity would be a sufficient incentive to aim at moderation; (b) for Lattimore's 'too bitter' see above on 2b.

The above difficulties may be avoided by taking ὀξύτεροι in the sense of 'too violent' (see above on 22 ὀκνηρότεροι), and ἐρώτων as a partitive genitive: 'For mad passions whose violence exceeds the measure (advocated in the preceding sentence) belong to the domain of unrealizable desires'. For μανία as disregarding measure cf. *O.* 9, 38-9 τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρὸν / μανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει. For the genitive express-

ing the idea of 'belonging to' cf. e.g. Pl. *Euthyd.* 277c5 τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ' εἰσὶν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἔχόντων; see further K.G. I, 372, Schw. II, 122-3. For δέ having explanatory (motivating) force see above on 19 δέ.

University of Utrecht

NOTES

*) Editions of the text, commentaries and translations will be referred to by author's name only.

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THE WORLD-SOUL IN THE PLATONIC COSMOLOGY

RICHARD MOHR

In each of Plato's major cosmological works, the *Timaeus*, the *Statesman* myth and the *Philebus*, he asserts that the body of the whole universe is alive and possesses a single World-Soul which extends throughout it. I wish to offer a new interpretation of the role of the World-Soul which gives the World-Soul a special function in the economy of the Platonic cosmology and which explains why Plato would place such repeated emphasis on the existence of such an odd-sounding creature. I suggest that Plato is not viewing the World-Soul on the model of the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* X, which view soul as a self-and-other moving motion. Nor, I suggest, is Plato viewing the World-Soul on the model of soul taken as a crafting agent that initiates order. Rather I suggest that Plato views the World-Soul merely as a *maintainer* of order against a natural tendency of the corporeal to be chaotic.

It is important to notice that in each of these three cosmological dialogues Plato claims that the ordered World-Soul and the *order* of the World-Body are severally and in their synchronizations the products of the workings of a single, eternal, divine, rational Demiurge, which resides outside the universe.¹⁾ Further, in all three of these dialogues the phenomena are viewed as necessarily in flux. The erratic flux of the phenomena wholly characterizes the pre-cosmic and acosmic periods of the *Timaeus* and *Statesman* myth -- but, in addition, it remains a potent and considerable factor even within the ordered and ensouled cosmos (*Timaeus* 43a-b, *Statesman* 273c-d and add *Philebus* 43a, 59a-b and *Cratylus* 439d, which do not distinguish between cosmic and acosmic periods).²⁾

With these observations in tow, I suggest that the World-Soul operates in the Platonic cosmology rather like a governor

on a steam engine: the governor regulates the motions of the machine in such a way that the machine's self-sustained and independently originated motions, which owing to unpredictable conditions of combustion tend to run off to excess, are nonetheless uniformly maintained and do not destroy the machine itself. However, the governor neither initiates the motions it regulates nor is it itself the cause of its being synchronized with the machine. This synchronization, which enables the governor to govern, is derived from some external source. And like a machine-governor, the World-Soul is capable of maintaining order only within a certain range of natural disruptions (*Statesman* 273d-e).

If, as is the case, Plato believes material objects to be necessarily in a chaotic flux even in the formed and ensouled cosmos (*Timaeus* 43a-b, *Statesman* 273c-d), then it is natural that he should view one of the major functions of soul to be the maintenance of order against the natural tendency of the corporeal to be chaotic, thus saving the appearance of the continuous order which we indeed do observe in the phenomenal realm. For Plato the homeostatic conditions of the observed world cannot be explained by physical theories; rather, they have to be explained in spite of physical theories (of the sort articulated at *Timaeus* 58a-c).

WORLD-SOUL IN THE *STATESMAN*. In the *Statesman* myth the Demiurge is said to make the World-Soul, to make it rational (269d1) and to form the ordered World-Body (269d7-9, 273b6-7, 273e3). In the structure of the dialogue as a whole the Demiurge is functionally contrasted with the World-Soul as a shepherd is contrasted with a human statesman (275a-276b). The Demiurge is like a shepherd in that he constructs on his own every material component of the objects of his craft, whereas the World-Soul is like a human statesman just to the extent that all the necessary material preparations and organizations of the object of its activities are handed over to it from other sources than itself. Since this is held to be the case at the level of discourse of the divisions that make up the bulk of the dialogue, it is difficult to claim that the division of the Demiurge from the World-Soul is merely a literary exigency of the myth (as some people would claim is the case in the *Timaeus*).³⁾ In the case of the World-Soul, it is the whole order of the world that is handed over to it (273a7-b2). This is dramatically represented by the withdrawal of the Demiurge from the world, which he

leaves in the care and control of the World-Soul. The World-Soul, though, unlike the human statesman, does not further organize the organization already handed over to it (305e ff.). Rather the World-Soul tries to maintain the orderly homeostatic conditions of the World-Body, as it is inherited from the Demiurge, against the necessary, erratic, even explosive (cf. ἐξαυθεῖ, 273d1), incursions of the bodily, which tend to throw the organization of the World-Body *and* World-Soul out of kilter (273b,d). The World-Soul performs this task not by initiating order, but merely by trying to remember and preserve the orderings given from the Demiurge (273b1-2, c6). Eventually though, the bodily incursions succeed in disrupting the World-Soul's memory and the World-Soul thereupon loses its ability to maintain order. This decay necessitates the reappearance of the Demiurge to restore order both to the World-Soul and World-Body (273d-e). It seems then that the World-Soul is not being viewed as an initiator of orderly motion either in itself or in the World-Body. For this role is reserved for the Demiurge. Neither is the World-Soul viewed as the source of the disorderly motions which are said to erupt into it.⁴⁾

If in addition to regulating motions, the World-Soul were able to initiate new motion it is not clear why it must succumb to the disruptions of the corporeal. If it were able to induce new motion, it would be able not merely to keep a lid on disruptive forces but to counteract and diffuse the cause of disruption. Further, if it had self-initiated thought and reason, items in the catalogue of self-motions in *Laws* X (897a-b), and did not have its rationality derived entirely from an external source, then it is not clear why, on its own, its failures of memory are irreparable and irreversible, such that it is necessary for the Demiurge to reappear to initiate new order.

It is, then, I suggest, to the homeostatic condition of living creatures, rather than to their ability to self-initiate locomotion and to move other objects, to which Plato in the *Statesman* myth is primarily appealing when he posits the world as a living creature (ζῷον, 269d1). This sort of appeal should be contrasted with the doctrine of the autokinetic soul in the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* X. In each of these texts it is not to homeostatic conditions of living organisms, but rather to the motor powers of living bodies to which Plato appeals in order to identify that which is autokinetic with soul. It is because living bodies move themselves and other things that we know that that which is autokinetic is soul (*Phaedrus* 245e, *Laws* 895c).⁵⁾

WORLD-SOUL IN THE *PHILEBUS*. The function of the World-Soul as a maintainer of homeostatic conditions, a function which results from its vivifying effects on bodies, is also evident in the *Philebus* (30a), a dialogue in which, as in the *Statesman* and *Timaeus*, flux characterizes the phenomena (43a, 59a-b) and in which there is not the slightest trace of the autokinetic doctrine. As in the *Statesman* and *Timaeus*, the order of the world's body is derived from the transcendent rational Demiurge (28d). In addition, also as in the other two dialogues, the Demiurge is the cause of the presence of the World-Soul and its rationality in the ordered World-Body (30c-d). And so again there is no suggestion that the World-Soul is the efficient cause of the motion or the order of the World-Body.

Rather, the World-Soul here is viewed as standing to the order of the universe, as represented in the orderly years, seasons and months, as our souls stand to our bodily order, as represented by health (30b-c). The *only* actions of our soul-body complex here mentioned as being relevantly paralleled in the World-Soul = World-Body complex are physical exercise and (self-) doctoring; both of which maintain or restore from deviation the homeostatic condition of the body. Notice that nutritional and sheltering arts are significantly not on the list of parallel practices, since we may assume they both involve manipulations of the external world while the only actions relevant to the World-Soul are internally directed. (For exercise and proper doctoring dealing only with the relation of the body with itself and not with the external world, see *Timaeus* 89a-b.) Our souls are the cause of the maintenance of health or proper orderings of our bodies against a natural propensity towards disease, which is viewed as a sort of internal corrosion (cf. *Timaeus* 82a-83a). Analogously, the only actions entertained as being performed by the World-Soul are the regulations of the World-Body which maintain its order against disruption natural to it. Indeed it is to save the appearance of rational order that it is claimed that there must be a World-Soul (30c-d). Plato does call the World-Soul a cause (30a10), but it is only in the sense of maintainer that Plato is so committed.

WORLD-SOUL IN THE *TIMAEUS*. In the *Timaeus* we are told little of the nature of the functional relations between the World-Body and the World-Soul. All that we are told is that the World-Soul is the mistress and governor (δεσποτιν καὶ ἄρξουσιν, 34c5) of the World-Body. What form this governance is to take, we are not told. I suggest, though, that it entails no more than the sort of governance I have already mentioned, namely, the maintenance of order. There is no suggestion in the *Timaeus* that

the World-Soul is either autokinetic⁶⁾ or is the efficient cause of either the order or the motion of the World-Body. The form and orderly motion of both the World-Soul and World-Body are derived from the Demiurge (31b-36e). In commenting on 36d-e Cornford writes: "The above sentences reiterate the emphasis already laid at 34b on the fact that the soul extends throughout the body of the world from centre to circumference, and communicates its motion to the whole" (p.93). Now it is true that the World-Soul is so extended, but there is not a word in the text about the World-Soul communicating its motion to the World-Body. Rather we have in the text a highly detailed account of parallel structures and synchronized motions (as represented in celestial dynamics) between the World-Soul and World-Body. This synchronization is derived from the Demiurge and is not of the World-Soul's making. Note that Plato is free to have said otherwise. For, when at 34c Plato admits that his narrative order was mistaken and misleading in having spoken of the World-Body being composed prior to the World-Soul, he could have taken the opportunity to claim that it was merely an exigency of his narrative order that forced him to claim that the Demiurge rather than the World-Soul composed the order of the World-Body and initiated its orderly motions, since in the mistaken narrative order the World-Soul did not even exist when the World-Body was established. But later, the mistake in narrative order having been pointed out, the cosmological claims of 34b are allowed to stand and are reiterated: the structure and motion of the World-Soul and World-Body severally and the synchronizations between them are all workings of the Demiurge (36d-e). Taken at face value, the *Timaeus* strongly suggests that when Plato claims governance on behalf of the World-Soul, he does not mean that the World-Soul acts as a crafting agent or as an efficient cause of motion.

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At first inspection the World-Soul strikes us as perhaps the oddest of many odd components of Platonic cosmology in that it is highly counter-intuitive: the world just does not feel like an animal. Most of it is clearly inert and the parts of it which are animate do not seem to form a single composite whole which is one animal. Further, the World-Soul appears to be redundant or useless ontological baggage on most interpretations, which assimilate it either to the autokinetic doctrine or to the view of souls as a crafting agent. For if the World-Soul is merely one more autokinetic soul, it has no special function in the economy of Plato's cosmology. And similarly if

the World-Soul is viewed (incorrectly in my opinion) as mainly an agent that crafts external objects, then it becomes indistinguishable in function from the Demiurge. If it is understood, though, that Plato viewed order among the phenomena as the thinnest of veneers, made out of and spread over that which is inherently rotting, we then see that it is reasonable for Plato: 1) To assume the existence of a regulating agency which on the one hand is necessarily non-material but on the other hand is immanent in the corporeal world, thus explaining the persistence of what sensible order there is in the world and 2) to leave the original source of the order of both the World-Body and World-Soul outside the soul-body complex, thus unaffected by the natural corrupting influence of the corporeal.

If my interpretation of the World-Soul is correct, two additional oddities of its characterization are explained. Typically one of the functions of an ensouled rational creature is deliberation and practical reason. Second, typically for Plato souls are viewed as capable of discarnate existence. Yet neither of these characterizations holds of the World-Soul in either the *Timaeus*, *Statesman*, or *Philebus*: 1) Though in the *Timaeus* the World-Soul has true opinion and contemplative reason (37 b-c, esp. c1,2), we never hear here or in the *Philebus* or *Statesman* of the World-Soul deliberating or making decisions, as do the Demiurge and statesmen (*Statesman* 305e ff.; *Republic* 483c-d, 500e). The World-Soul's rationality is not that of planning or producing with the aid of paradigms, as is in large part the rationality of the Demiurge and statesman. But, if as I have suggested the World-Soul's function is that of maintenance of order rather than initiating order, this is to be expected. 2) Unlike personal souls, the World-Soul is never viewed as existing in a discarnate condition. If its function is the maintenance of homeostatic conditions of material objects, it can only do this by being present in them. Insofar as the ordered world is to exist sempiternally (*Timaeus* 38b-c), so too must the World-Soul abide in it.

Aristotle thought that through the whole of the natural world the motions of bodies on their own were constant, uniform, and orderly enough that it made sense to describe both animate and inanimate objects as moving homeostatically, as though the

whole of nature were like someone who heals himself (*Physics* II, 8, 199b30-32). Plato felt that the corporeal itself was so chaotic that *at best* ensouled objects could maintain orderly homeostatic conditions, and even then with only limited success.

Further, though the World-Soul for Plato, *in order to* have its special function as a maintainer of order, is necessarily immanent in the corporeal, it is not immanent in the corporeal as the result of its ontological status or make up, which is the same as that of human souls, which *are* capable of discarnate existence (*Timaeus* 41d-e). *In principle*, then, the World-Soul should be capable of discarnate existence. So that though *in fact* the World-Soul is immanent in the material world, it is not to be confused as being merely the functioning or actualization of a body of a certain type, as is the soul for Aristotle, which as such is not capable, even in principle, of discarnate existence (*De Anima* II, 1, esp. 413a4). There are additional reasons to suppose the World-Soul is not the actualization of a body of a certain type. One, it is a pre-condition for any matter even being the sort of thing which might be ordered enough to be considered an organ with a function. Two, the World-Soul is not the functioning of a body, but is that which makes it possible that the functions of various bodily parts are sustained. And three, unlike Aristotelian souls, the World-Soul has no limit on what sorts of body it may vivify. There is no proper matter for the World-Soul: it is present in both flesh and brass. The World-Soul, unlike Aristotelian souls, is self-substantial independently of its material inherence. The immanent World-Soul is not a step in the direction of either *Laws* X or *De Anima* II.

University of Illinois at Urbana

NOTES

1) *Statesman* 269c-270a, 272e-273e; *Philebus* 28d, 30a-d; *Timaeus* 31b-36e. I take these texts to be doctrinally homogeneous with each other.

The account of how the Demiurge makes the World-Soul (*Timaeus* 35a) is, I think, largely inscrutable. For a reasonable attempt at an interpretation, though, see T. M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology* (Toronto, 1970), pp. 70-74.

2) Though I think it more likely than not that Plato means what he

says, when he says there was a chaotic pre-cosmic era, nothing in this paper hangs on whether Plato believed in an initial act of demiurgic world formation. Further, though I believe that the flux of phenomena is purely mechanical in origin, so that the *Timaeus*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus* are inconsistent with the claim of the *Phaedrus* (245c9) and *Laws* X (896b1) that soul is the source and cause of all motion, again, nothing I wish to claim in this paper hangs on this issue.

3) The overwhelming tendency in Platonic scholarship has been to read the claims about the Demiurge non-literally. The Demiurge has been taken as a doublet for the whole World-Soul (Archer-Hind), or for the rational part of it (Cornford), as a general symbol for any craftsman-like activity (Cherniss), as only a hypothetical entity serving as a literary foil to the human statesman and World-Soul (Herter) and recently as a "sublation" of the World-Soul (Stanley Rosen, "The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33, 1 [1979], 75-76).

4) Robinson suggests that the corporeal is merely like a virus which in itself is passive and inert and is active and disruptive only when it comes in contact with a living organism (pp. 136-7). This view though does little justice to the descriptions at 273a-b of the corporeal on its own as active and even explosive in its incursions into the World-Soul.

The majority of translators and critics take the World-Soul to be the efficient cause of the reverse rotation of the universe (Skemp, Herter). This is the result of mistakenly reading the $\delta\upsilon$ of 269d1 causally rather than descriptively, and thus as asserting the World-Soul as the cause of the reverse circuit. This cannot be the case, though, for the cause of the reverse circuit is left an open question to be answered only after 269d3 ($\delta\upsilon\lambda\alpha\ \tau\acute{o}\delta'$, 269d2) and when this cause is forthcoming (whatever it is), it exists *in spite of*, not because of, the presence of the World-Soul (269d7-9).

5) Robinson (mistakenly, I think) takes several reflexive phrases in the myth as referring to autokinetic soul (pp. 134, 135, 139):

i) $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\ \xi\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\ \sigma\tau\acute{\rho}\epsilon\phi\epsilon\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}$, 269e5 (of the Demiurge). But $\sigma\tau\acute{\rho}\epsilon\phi\epsilon\iota\nu$ cannot merely be a synecdoche for $\kappa\iota\nu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\nu$, for so construed it does not fulfill the demands of the context. It is because the Demiurge moves constantly *in one direction* rather than because it is autokinetic that it is said that the Demiurge cannot cause two contrary motions. That the phrase is reflexive merely means that the Demiurge's rotation is independent and non-contingent, in contrast to the rotations of the world.

ii) $\tau\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\iota\nu\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, 269e4. The antecedent of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, though, is the World-Body (269d7-8), not the World-Soul, which it comes to possess (d8-9, with d1). The phrase merely describes the motion of the World-Body (or World-Body=World-Soul complex) as it is moved in the train of the Demiurge's rotation. The term $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ means something like "proper to itself under the best of conditions."

iii) Finally, $\delta\iota'\ \xi\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ after Burnet, 270a5. This expression is to be taken mechanistically (as Robinson admits it might be), for the immediately ensuing account of the world's reverse motion is *described* entirely on a mechanistic model (270a6-8), even if one wishes to claim Plato *means* something else. But in the latter case the phrase ceases to be direct evidence for autokinesis. But in any case I think $\delta\iota'\ \xi\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ of the BT mss should be preserved, meaning "throughout itself".

6) On *Timaeus* 37b5, which is sometimes seen as such a suggestion, see Cornford's note *ad loc.*, which has not been superseded by later discussions (*Plato's Cosmology* [London, 1937]).

AGESILAOS UND TIMOTHEOS: ZWEI STAATSMÄNNERSPORTRÄTS AUS DER MITTE DES IV. JHS.

MARIAN PLEZIA

Bald nach dem im J. 360 v.Chr. erfolgten Tode des Spartanerkönigs Agesilaos II. hat sein Freund und Bewunderer, Xenophon von Athen, einen Lobpreis auf den Verstorbenen verfasst, der uns heute unter dem Titel Agesilaos in der Sammlung der kleinen xenophontischen Schriften vorliegt. Das Werkchen wurde im Laufe der Zeit viel und eifrig gelesen, u.a. hatte es Cicero in seinem verlorenen Cato (minor) nachgeahmt, wie es seinerzeit K. Kumaniecki in der Festschrift für K. Büchner schön dargelegt hat¹⁾. Die Ursache der Popularität des Agesilaos war wohl in erster Linie sein erbaulicher Inhalt, aber auch die echt xenophontische *charis*, die ihm eigen ist. Die Hyperkritik des 19. Jh. hat zwar an seiner Echtheit zu makeln versucht, aber seit der Jahrhundertwende gelten solche Gesichtspunkte als überwunden und jeder Zweifel an der Authentizität des Agesilaos scheint heute unberechtigt zu sein. Die neuere Forschung betrachtet die Schrift meist im Zusammenhang mit dem kaum 15 Jahre früher entstandenen Euagoras des Isokrates als zwei markantesten Beispiele der einer zeitgenössischen Persönlichkeit gewidmeten prosaischen Lobrede (während die älteren poetischen und prosaischen Enkomien der Griechen mythische Gestalten zum Gegenstand gehabt hatten). Man konnte aber bei dieser Betrachtungsweise nicht übersehen, dass im Aufbau der beiden thematisch und formell so nahestehenden Schriften ein nicht unwesentlicher Unterschied spürbar wird: Isokrates feiert die heroischen Taten seines Helden, indem er sie im Grossen und Ganzen in chronologischer Abfolge schildert; die xenophontische Lobrede auf Agesilaos zerfällt dagegen ganz auffallend in zwei Hauptteile, von denen der erste (Kap.1-2) als Tatenbericht, der zweite (Kap.3-9) als Tugendkatalog bezeichnet werden kann; an die beiden schliesst sich dann eine Art Schlusswort und Zusammenfassung an (Kap.10-11), die zu den Besonderheiten der Komposition des Werkchens gehört und die Erklärer vor schwierige Probleme stellt²⁾.

Uns braucht hier diese Spezialfrage nicht näher anzugehen, denn für unsere Betrachtung ist der Gegensatz zwischen der chronologischen Darstel-

lungsweise des Isokrates und der systematischen (Taten : Tugenden) Xenophons wesentlich³⁾. Dieser Gegensatz ist freilich in Wirklichkeit nicht so krass, wie man es sich nach der blossen Inhaltsangabe vorstellen könnte. Wir finden doch auch im Euagoras einen Abschnitt (Kap.41-46), der sich von der übrigen chronologisch verlaufenden Erzählung dadurch abhebt, dass er eine allgemeine Charakteristik der Regententugenden des Helden enthält; allein sein geringer Umfang im Vergleich mit der Ausdehnung der ganzen Rede macht seine Verschiedenheit weniger spürbar. Im Agesilaos wiederum überwiegt der Tatenbericht an Länge den Tugendkatalog⁴⁾, zu dem er sich wie etwa 5 : 3 verhält, sodass der Leser doch meist unter dem Eindruck einer fortlaufenden historischen Darstellung bleibt. Immerhin ist der Unterschied im Aufbau beider Enkomien ganz eindeutig und seit 70 Jahren fordert er die Philologen zu Erklärungsversuchen auf.

Den entscheidenden Schritt hat in dieser Richtung W. Seyffert in 1909 getan⁵⁾, mit dessen Ergebnissen sich die Forschung seither bald zustimmend bald ablehnend hat auseinandersetzen müssen. Er hat zunächst auf die Parallele in Anab. 2,6,1-15 hingewiesen, wo der Lob des lakedaimonischen Söldnerführers Klearchos anscheinend in dieselben zwei Teile zerfällt⁶⁾: einen kurzen Abriss seiner militärischen Laufbahn (2-5) und eine allgemeine Würdigung seiner Führereigenschaften (6-15). Dagegen hat aber D. Krömer mit gutem Recht geltend gemacht⁷⁾, dass der Zweiteilung dieses Abschnitts nicht der Gegensatz Taten : Tugenden, sondern zwei angeblich anerkannter-massen ($\delta\mu\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\acute{\nu}\omega\varsigma$) dem Klearch zugeschriebenen Charakterzüge zugrunde liegen: er sei kriegslustig ($\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$) und kriegstüchtig ($\pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\mu\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$) gewesen; der Uebergang vom ersten zum zweiten Gesichtspunkt ist ganz eindeutig in 2,6,7 markiert: οὕτω μὲν φιλοπόλεμος ἦν, πολεμικὸς δὲ αὖ ταύτῃ ἐδόκει εἶναι κτλ. Diese zutreffende Entgegnung liesse sich noch durch die Beobachtung einschärfen, dass der Bericht über Klearchs Verwendung in verschiedenen Kommandostellen und Kriegsabenteuern nur schwerlich mit seinen grossen Taten und die Uebersicht seiner Kommandeurfähigkeiten nicht viel leichter mit dem Tugendkatalog identifiziert werden könnten.

Mehr Beifall hat Seyfferts Behauptung gefunden, dass dasselbe zweiteilige Schema, das die Komposition des Agesilaos bestimmt, auch in der Agathon-Rede im platonischen Symposium (194 E - 197 E) zu beobachten sei⁸⁾. Der Vergleich war verlockend, denn in den beiden Fällen handelt es sich ja um eine Lobrede, was die Anwendung der gleichen Topik wahrscheinlich machen könnte. Tatsächlich geht Agathon von der Feststellung aus, seine Vorredner hätten eher die Menschen glücklich gepriesen wegen der Gaben, welche ihnen

seitens des Eros zuteil werden, anstatt den Gott selbst zu preisen. Er wolle dagegen den richtigeren Weg einschlagen und seinen Freunden auseinandersetzen, wie der Gott selbst beschaffen sein müsse, wenn er so vieler Güter Stifter sei (οἷος οἷων αἴτιος ὦν τυγχάνει 195 A). Dementsprechend entwickelt Agathon zunächst in ziemlicher Breite die Charakteristik des Eros (195 A - 197 B), um dann verhältnismässig knapp seine Wohltaten gegenüber den Menschen und den anderen Göttern zu erwähnen (197 C-E). Der Umstand, dass das zweite Glied der Zweiteilung im Vergleich zum ersten etwas kürzer gekommen ist, soll nach dem einstimmigen Urteil der diesbezüglichen Literatur darin seine Erklärung finden, dass schon die Vorredner die Wohltaten des Eros eingehend behandelt hätten, sodass sich ihre erneute Schilderung im Agathons Fall erübrigte⁹⁾.

Dasselbe zweiteilige Schema befolgt dann auch Sokrates in seinem Referat der Diotima-Rede (199 C ἐπιδειῖναι ὁποῖός τις ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως, ὅστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, vgl. 201 E). Da derselbe Sokrates im weiteren Verlauf des Gesprächs die Rede des Agathon als gorgianisch bezeichnet (198 C), hat man daraus schliessen wollen, dass auch die zweiteilige Komposition jener Reder (οἷος ὦν οἷων αἴτιος τυγχάνει) von Gorgias herührt und Gorgias galt manchmal für den Urheber dieses älteren Schemas des Enkomion-Aufbaus, das uns in geschlossener Form erst in Xenophons Agesilaos greifbar wird. In letzter Zeit hat Krömer, der sonst an der gorgianischen Herkunft dieses Schemas zweifelt, an seiner zeitlichen Priorität festgehalten und betrachtete es als allein sinnvoll und logisch, denn vorerst muss man wissen, wie etwas beschaffen sei, bevor man auf sein Wirken eingeht. Xenophon habe seiner Meinung nach dieses klare und logische Aufbauprinzip im Agesilaos verkehrt angewandt und Krömer muss sich dann viel Mühe geben, um seinen Lesern klarzumachen, warum der Verfasser eigentlich so ungeschickt gehandelt und trotzdem mit seiner unlogischen und sinnwidrigen Komposition doch letzten Endes treffliche künstlerische Effekte erzielt hätte¹⁰⁾.

Wie auch diese ganze Theorie auf den ersten Blick ansprechend erscheinen mag, gibt sie doch zu manchen Bedenken Anlass und ist im Grunde genommen ein reines Gedankengebilde, das die gegebenen Tatsachen nicht recht zu erklären vermag. Um zuerst mit dem angeblichen gorgianischen Vorbild fertig zu werden, möchten wir hervorheben, dass der platonische Sokrates, als er erklärt, ihn erinnere die Agathon-Rede an Gorgias, ihren Redeschmuck (ἄλλος τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων 198 B) und nicht ihre Komposition im Auge hat. Damit fällt das Argument zugunsten der Annahme ab, die Agathon-Rede sei nach einem von Gorgias aufgestellten Schema abgefasst. Soweit sind

wir mit Krömers Ansichten einig. Wenn er aber Seyfferts Auffassung billigt und zu erhärten versucht, Xenophon befolge im Agesilaos dasselbe Aufbauprinzip wie Plato in den Agathon- und Sokrates-Reden im Symposium und stelle nur die Abfolge der beiden Glieder der Zweiteilung um, so lässt sich dazu bemerken, dass die Wesensbestimmung des Eros schwerlich für identisch mit dem Tugendkatalog eines Menschen gehalten werden kann, während die Aufzählung seiner Gaben mit der chronologischen Schilderung der grossen Taten einer historischen Persönlichkeit einfach nichts zu tun hat.

Wenn man dazu noch in Betracht nimmt, dass die Anordnung der beiden Bestandteile der Zweiteilung bei Xenophon und bei Plato umgekehrt ist, wird man zugeben müssen, dass die vermeintliche Analogie im Aufbau der beiden Lobreden recht problematisch wird. Auf diesem Wege ist zu einer überzeugenden Interpretation der Komposition des xenophontischen Agesilaos nicht zu gelangen. Sein Aufbauprinzip ist auf keinen Fall so unlogisch, wie es uns Krömer naheulegen versucht¹¹⁾. Platos Gedankengang ist ein deduktiver, sein Verfahren philosophisch: er sucht das Wirken des Eros aus seinem Wesen zu erklären. Xenophon stellt sich dagegen ein viel bescheideneres Ziel: er ist bemüht, im Leben und Handeln des Agesilaos gewisse allgemeine Charakterzüge blosszulegen, die er Tugenden nennt. Er verfährt also induktiv, und die Induktion hat doch wenigstens seit Aristoteles in der Logik auch ihren Platz.

Ausserdem ist in einer Lobrede die streng logische Beweisführung nicht zu erwarten. Xenophons Absicht war ja nicht, etwas zu beweisen, sondern durch die Herausstellung der Tugend seines Helden sein Gedächtnis zu ehren, die Nachkommen aber zu seiner Nachahmung aufzufordern. Ueberhaupt arbeitet Krömer in seiner Analyse zu viel mit logischen Gesichtspunkten, ungeachtet dessen, dass das prosaische Enkomion eine Fortsetzung des poetischen war, und wer würde bei Pindar oder bei Bakchylides an der Unzulänglichkeit der logischen Komposition ihrer Gedichte Anstoss nehmen?

M.E. werden wir dem Nebeneinander von Tatenbericht und Tugendkatalog in Xenophons Agesilaos am ehesten dann gerecht, wenn wir uns vergegenwärtigen, dass die Entstehung dieser Schrift in die Mitte des IV. Jh. v.Chr. fällt, in eine Zeit, in der sich schon in den intellektuellen Kreisen ein Bedarf an der begrifflichen Durchbildung der ethischen Werte spürbar zu machen begann. Es genügte nicht mehr, wie in alten guten Zeiten, die grossen, vorbildhaften Taten als Offenbarung der *arete* in Erinnerung zu bringen. Man wollte wissen, um was für eine Tugend es sich in einem gegebenen Fall handle, da zumal in einem bestimmten historischen Vorfall mehrere verschiedene Tugenden zum Ausdruck kommen können. Es waren schon Jahrzehnte her, seitdem

Sokrates seine epochenmachenden Fragen nach dem Wesen der Tugend zu stellen begann, Plato hat längst seine kleineren Dialoge veröffentlicht, die den Einzeluntersuchungen über verschiedene Tugenden gleichkommen und in kaum zehn Jahren sollte Aristoteles seine tiefgreifenden Analysen des ethischen Verhaltens des Menschen in der Eudemischen Ethik darlegen. Auf diesem Hintergrund scheint es auch am zweckmässigsten, den xenophontischen Katalog von Agesilaos' Tugenden zu betrachten, denn sein Verfasser war ja trotz all seiner Biederkeit zu sehr Sokratiker, um sich diesem geistigen Trend seiner Zeit entziehen zu können. Es lag sonst seinen Absichten nahe, zu zeigen, Agesilaos habe praktisch alle in der sokratischen Literatur gepriesenen Tugenden in sich verkörpert.

Unsere bisherige Untersuchung hat somit zum negativen Ergebnis geführt, dass die in der einschlägigen Literatur vorgeführten Parallelen zu der Kompositionsart des xenophontischen Agesilaos sich sämtlich als unstichhaltig erwiesen haben. Wir wollen jetzt zu den positiven Beobachtungen übergehen, und darauf hinweisen, dass man dabei doch ein dem Agesilaos zeitlich sehr nahe liegendes Literaturdenkmal übersehen hat, nämlich den Lob des Timotheos in der XV. Rede des Isokrates (Antidosis 107-139).

An der Wende von 354/353 v. Chr. hat Isokrates, damals schon im fortgeschrittenen Alter von 83 Jahren, für angemessen befunden, seine ganze bisherige Lehr- und Schriftstellertätigkeit gegen ihre Verleumder vor Athens Öffentlichkeit in Verteidigung zu nehmen. Das geschah in der Form einer fiktiven Verteidigungsrede gegen die angebliche Anklage, dass er die Jugend verderbe, indem er sie lehre, vor Gericht auf ungerechte Weise Vorteile zu erlangen. Man hat die Schrift als eine "seltsame Mischung von Gerichtsrede, Selbstverteidigung und Autobiographie" richtig bezeichnet¹²⁾, aus der wir hier nur einen einzigen, den Timotheos betreffenden Abschnitt herausnehmen. Er bildet auch eine in sich geschlossene Einheit, einen Nachruf auf den kürzlich (in der zweiten Hälfte von 354) verstorbenen athenischen Staatsmann und Heerführer, dessen Politik Isokrates in den vergangenen Jahren eifrig unterstützt hatte.

Timotheos, der Sohn des berühmten Konon, welcher zur Wiederherstellung der athenischen Seemacht nach der Niederlage im Peloponnesischen Krieg massgebend beigetragen hatte, war mit Isokrates eng befreundet und hat seinerzeit dem Kreise seiner Schüler angehört. Er spielte in der politischen und militärischen Geschichte seiner Heimat während des zweiten Viertels des IV. Jh. eine bedeutende Rolle, erlebte Erfolge und Rückschläge, zuletzt aber wurde er nach der verlorenen Seeschlacht bei Embata (in der Nähe von

Chios, 356), in der er mit zwei anderen Strategen die athenische Flotte befehligt hatte, vor Gericht gezogen, als schuldig befunden und zu einer Geldstrafe von 100 Talenten verurteilt; er starb bald danach in Verbannung. In dem Moment als Isokrates seine Antidosis-Rede schrieb, durfte sein Andenken in der breiten Öffentlichkeit Athens eher unbeliebt sein und man machte dem alten Lehrer der Rhetorik zum Vorwurf, dass aus seiner Schule solche Politiker hervorgekommen sind. Unter solchen Umständen musste es Isokrates angelegen sein, den Namen des Timotheos unbefleckt zu erhalten.

Das war die Ursache, die ihn dazu bewog, in seiner Gelegenheitsschrift, die wir Antidosis-Rede nennen, ein Bild des Timotheos zu entwerfen und auf seine Rolle im öffentlichen Leben Athens einzugehen. Er tut das von einem gewissen geistigen Abstand, sub specie aeternitatis, nicht ohne Melancholie, die dem Bewusstsein des Misserfolgs von Timotheos' Wirken entspringt und die von ihm begangenen Fehler klar erblicken lässt - aber auch im Banne seiner grossartigen und anmutigen Persönlichkeit. Was aber für uns hier von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, ist die Tatsache, dass das Lob des Timotheos in der Antidosis-Rede nach denselben Gesichtspunkten entwickelt wird, die wir schon in Xenophons Agesilaos kennengelernt haben.

Nachdem nämlich der Redner in einer ziemlich Ausführlichkeit dargelegt hat, warum er die politische Rolle des Timotheos und seine eigene Freundschaft mit ihm zu rechtfertigen für unerlässlich betrachtet (101-106), zählt er die militärischen Erfolge seines Helden auf (107-113, vgl. 114 ἐξαρτισμήσαι τὰς πράξεις): die Gewinnung von Korkyra für den Zweiten athenischen Seebund, den Sieg über die spartanische Flotte bei Alyzia und den darauffolgenden Frieden mit Sparta, der nach seiner Auffassung dessen Niederlage bei Leuktra einbahnen sollte, die Eroberung von Samos, die Wiederherstellung der attischen Hegemonie auf der Chersonnesos und in Thrakien. Bezeichnenderweise versäumt er dabei nicht hervorzuheben, dass alle diese Erfolge mit ganz geringem finanziellen Aufwand Athens erzielt worden sind. Dann drückt er das Bedauern aus, dass ihm der Mangel an Zeit es verbiete, auf den inner- und aussenpolitischen Hintergrund der genannten Vorgänge näher einzugehen (114), er meint aber, seine Zuhörer werden ihm Dank wissen, wenn er es ihnen auseinandersetze, wieso habe Timotheos bei seiner zarten Gesundheit und bei all seinen innerpolitischen Verpflichtungen so gewaltige Taten vollbringen können (115 ἡγοῦμαι δ' ὑμᾶς ἡδέως ἂν ἀκοῦσαι, διὰ τί ποτε... τηλικαῦτα διεπράξατο τὸ μέγεθος), während die bei dem Volke beliebtesten Heerführer (gemeint ist der alte Haudegen Chares) dem attischen Reich nicht einmal ein Dorf einzubringen vermochten. Die Antwort auf diese Frage, die in eine Charakteristik der militärischen und

politischen Talente des Timotheos ausläuft, bildet den zweiten, bei weitem grösseren Teil des ihm gewidmeten Exkurses (115-128). Den dritten macht eine Betrachtung über die psychologischen Ursachen des jähen Endes von Timotheos aus (129-139).

Von dem Inhalt dieser Charakteristik werden wir im weiteren zu sprechen haben; vorläufig wollen wir ein wenig bei ihrer Komposition verweilen. Die Analogie mit dem Aufbau des xenophontischen Agesilaos springt jedem unvorgenommenen Leser in die Augen. In jedem der beiden Enkomien geht die Schilderung der Taten des Helden voran, ihr aber folgt die Analyse seiner Charaktereigenschaften. Besonders eindrucksvoll kommt in beiden Fällen die Identität des Aufbauprinzipis in dem Ueberleitungssatz vom ersten zum zweiten Teil zum Ausdruck. Wir haben soeben den entsprechenden Passus aus der Antidosis-Rede angeführt; in Agesilaos lautet er folgendermassen: "Jetzt aber will ich die seiner Seele inne wohnenden Tugenden schildern, dank denen er dies alles vollbracht hat" (3,1 νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴν πειράσσομαι δηλοῦν, δι' ἣν ταῦτα ἔπραττε). Der Begriff des Vollbringens (πράττειν bzw. διαπράξασθαι) und seiner Ursache (διὰ τί) kehrt sowohl bei Xenophon als auch bei Isokrates wieder. Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Fassungen liegt vom kompositionellen Standpunkt aus gesehen darin, dass das zweite Glied der Zweiteilung in der Antidosis-Rede viel ausführlicher behandelt wird als das erste, während in Agesilaos das Umgekehrte der Fall ist.

Für die Formgeschichte des frühen prosaischen Enkomions in der griechischen Literatur¹³⁾ sind die von uns hier gewonnenen Erkenntnisse von geringer Bedeutung. Zwar liess sich die Aehnlichkeit im Aufbau der zwei zeitlich so naheliegenden Denkmäler der attischen Prosa einwandfrei feststellen, aber gerade wegen ihrer zeitlichen Nähe kann man diese Aehnlichkeit am einfachsten durch die Abhängigkeit des isokratischen Timotheos-Bildes von dem xenophontischen Agesilaos erklären. Mit der Möglichkeit, dass beide Schriftsteller eine gemeinsame Quelle nachahmen, die dann ein älteres Enkomion-Stadium ergeben würde, ist wohl kaum zu rechnen¹⁴⁾.

Es ist dagegen reizvoll, zu beobachten, wie verschieden trotz aller Formähnlichkeit der Inhalt der beiden Auffassungen des grossen Staatsmanns ist. Nach der tief eingewurzelten Ueberzeugung der Griechen gehören zum Wesen des Staatsmanns seine grossen Taten, durch die er sich um die Polis-Gemeinschaft wohlverdient macht (εὐεργετεῖ). Dementsprechend gehört auch in das Lob eines Staatsmanns die Aufzählung seiner Taten und jeder der beiden uns hier angehenden Autoren ist dieser selbstverständlichen Verbindlichkeit nachgekommen¹⁵⁾. In der Aufklärung dessen, was dem Helden die Vollbringung

dieser Taten ermöglicht hat, d.h. in der Motivierung seines Staatsmann-tums, gehen sie aber völlig auseinander.

Dem Tatenbericht in dem ersten Teil der xenophontischen Lobrede auf Agesilaos (Kap.1-2) entspricht im zweiten Teil ein Register seiner Tugenden, das recht reichhaltig ist. An erster Stelle wird seine Frömmigkeit (ἡ εἰς τὰ θεῖα εὐσέβεια, Kap.3) hervorgehoben, dann die Gerechtigkeit in Geldsachen (ἡ εἰς χρήματα δικαιοσύνη, Kap.4), die Mässigkeit in verschiedener Hinsicht (σωφροσύνη, Kap.5), die Tapferkeit (ἀνδρεία) und die Weisheit (σοφία) im Krieg (Kap.6). Das sind bekanntlich die vier sogenannten platonischen Tugenden, die Xenophon als guter Sokratischer hier in den Vordergrund rückt. Damit ist aber die Liste von Agesilaos' Tugenden bei weitem noch nicht erschöpft. Er liebte seine eigene Heimat (φιλόπολις, Kap.7,1-3), war griechenfreundlich (φιλέλλην, Kap.7,4-6) und zugleich perserfeindlich gesinnt (μισοπέρσης, Kap.7,7). Trotz seiner hohen Stellung zeichnete er sich durch die Einfachheit und Menschenfreundlichkeit aus (Kap.8,1-2 u. 6-8); wenn die Lage es erforderte, wusste er aber auch seine Würde zu wahren (Kap.8,3-5), worin sein Verhalten zu dem der Perser im krassen Gegensatz stand (Kap.9).

Es ist leicht einzusehen, dass dieses ausführliche Register von Agesilaos' Tugenden im Grunde genommen von seinen staatsmännischen Eigenschaften nichts besagt. Es fehlt wohl bei Xenophon nicht an Bemerkungen solcher Art wie 1,37, dass es des lobenswerten Königs Ausgabe sei, unter den verbündeten Städten Eintracht zu stiften, oder 7,1, dass ein guter König seinen Untertanen so viel wie möglich Gutes zu erweisen habe - aber davon, was Agesilaos zu einem Politiker grossen Stils, zu einem wahren Herrscher und Leiter seines Staates erhoben haben sollte, ist in seiner Charakteristik von Xenophons Feder kaum die Rede. Seine Tugenden sind mehr die eines edelgesinnten Privatmanns in hoher politischer Stellung, eines καλῶς κάκῶς, der gegebenenfalls auch bedeutende Ämter zu bekleiden vermag, als eines zielbewussten und erfahrenen Staatslenkers. Selbst eine so ausgesprochene "politische" Tugend wie Gerechtigkeit wird in seinem Fall vom engen Gesichtspunkt der Selbstlosigkeit in Geldsachen aufgefasst.

Das ist die altertümliche Denkweise der griechischen Demokratie, nach der ein guter Bürger selbstverständlich auch guter Staatsmann war und die den Begriff des πολίτης von dem des πολιτικός nicht recht unterschied. Im sprachlichen Material findet diese Auffassung ihren Ausdruck noch im platonischen Gorgias, wo die Namen πολίτης und πολιτικός bisweilen vertauschbar gebraucht werden¹⁶⁾. Viel später, noch bei Cicero, heisst einmal in De re publica der Staatslenker (rector rei publicae) einfach hic civis¹⁷⁾.

Philosophisch durchgebildet erscheint dieselbe Auffassung in den älteren Schichten der aristotelischen Politik, wo das Ideal von ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι erörtert wird¹⁸⁾. Sie war die Frucht der altertümlich-biedereren Zustände, als die Leitung eines Stadtstaates noch kein Fachwissen beanspruchte und jedem vertrauenswürdigen Gemeinschaftsmitglied ebensoviel übertragen werden konnte¹⁹⁾. Im konservativen Sparta hat sich diese Auffassung tief in das aufgeklärte vierte Jahrhundert gehalten und das xenophontische Bild von Agesilaos beeinflusst.

Es ist an sich merkwürdig genug, wie wenig Xenophons eigenes Führerideal, das wir aus seinen anderen Schriften, vor allem aus der Kyropädie, aus dem Oikonomikos und aus der Anabasis kennen²⁰⁾, gerade im Agesilaos, wo wir es ganz besonders erwarten würden, zum Ausdruck und zur Sprache kommt. Dieses Ideal ist sonst weder kompliziert noch tief durchgedacht, obgleich es auch mancher feinsinnigen Beobachtungen nicht bar ist. Es basiert aber hauptsächlich auf Xenophons eigenen Erfahrungen als Soldat und Landwirt und braucht dementsprechend nur verhältnismässig einfachen Ansprüchen und Problemen Rechnung zu tragen.

Ganz anders bei Isokrates. Er hatte schon im Euagoras inmitten der im Grossen und Ganzen chronologisch aufgefassten Schilderung seiner Taten einen besonderen Abschnitt (Euag., 41-46) seiner Herrschertugend gewidmet, die er in der Einsicht (φρόνησις) erblickte (vgl. 41 ἡγούμενος μὲν, εἰ καλῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ φρόνησιν παρασκευάσειεν, καλῶς αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔξειν), die ihn bei seinem eigenen Handeln (41) wie bei der Beurteilung der äusseren Verhältnisse (42), in der Behandlung anderer (43) wie in seinem eigenen sittlichen Verhalten (44-46) überall das Rechte treffen liess. Es war also nach Isokrates' Ansicht seine intellektuelle Trefflichkeit, die ihn dazu befähigte, Sachen richtig zu erkennen und aufgrund dieser Erkenntnis der jeweiligen Lage Herr zu werden.

Was im Euagoras nur ganz knapp angedeutet worden war, ist im Lob des Timotheos in der Antidosis-Rede viel ausführlicher entwickelt worden. Auf die Frage nämlich, worin Timotheos alle übrigen Heerführer Athens in seiner Zeit übertraf, antwortet Isokrates (Antid. 117), dass er sich durch solche Eigenschaften auszeichnete, die den wahren Feldherrn ausmachen (περὶ ταῦτα δεινὸς ἦν, περὶ ἅπερ χρὴ φρόνιμον εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἀγαθόν). Er verstand es, den Krieg zugleich mit militärischen und politischen Mitteln zu führen, ihm geeignete Ziele zu stecken und zu ihrer Erreichung Verbündete zu gewinnen (117 f.). Er war Meister im zweckmässigen Aufbau seines Heeres und wusste es so zu führen, dass der Krieg sich selbst ernährte (119 f.). Er bestand darauf, gegenüber den Verbündeten Athens

eine loyale und ehrliche Politik zu führen, missbilligte jede Art von Gewaltherrschaft und war vor allem bemüht, die Freundschaft und das Wohlwollen der Bundesgenossen für sein Vaterland zu gewinnen. Selbst gegenüber den besiegten Feinden pflegte er Milde und Rechtschaffenheit zu üben (πρὸς Διόφιει καὶ νομίμῳ, 121-127). Isokrates schliesst dieses Bild des idealen Feldherrn und Staatsmanns mit der Feststellung, nur derjenige sei dieser Bezeichnung würdig, welcher in den vielen, ganz verschiedenartigen schwierigen Lagen stets das Richtige tut und die vollkommene geistige Klarheit bewahrt (128).

Der Gegensatz zu der xenophontischen Auffassung, die wir in Agesilaos kennengelernt haben, konnte nicht deutlicher werden. Es ist nicht die Gesamtheit der Tugenden eines Edelmanns alten Schlages, die den Timotheos über das Niveau der durchschnittlichen Söldnerführers vom Typ Chares erhob, sondern einzig und allein seine intellektuellen Fähigkeiten, die es ihm ermöglichten, die politische und militärische Lage von einer höheren Warte zu überschauen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist von seiner Gerechtigkeit und Enthaltensamkeit, ja selbst von seiner Tapferkeit keine Rede, obgleich ihm Isokrates auch diese lobenswerten Eigenschaften sicher nicht hat absprechen wollen; sie waren aber für seine Eignung zum Staatsmann und zum Feldherrn von zweitrangiger Bedeutung. Es ist die geistige Ueberlegenheit, die nach Isokrates' Urteil den wahren Staatsmann kennzeichnet.

Eine solche Feststellung dürfte uns bei Isokrates nicht überraschen. Der Einsicht (φρόνησις) kommt überhaupt in seiner Gedankenwelt eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Ein moderner Isokrates-Forscher bezeichnet sie als "eine allgemeine Fähigkeit der Seele, die Dinge richtig zu entscheiden, die die Lage jeweils mit sich bringt", als "einen durch und durch praktischen Wert, dessen Bedeutung nur in der Tätigkeit, in der Förderung des Lebens liegt"²¹⁾. Es ist daher kein Wunder, dass sie als für den Staatsmann wesentlich betrachtet werden musste. Diese Ueberzeugung war sonst auf keinen Fall dem Isokrates allein eigen. Sein grosser Gegner Aristoteles, dessen politische Ideen trotzdem mit den isokratischen so oft übereinstimmen, hat dieselbe Ansicht in seinem prägnanten Stil folgendermassen ausgedrückt (Polit. 3,4, 1277b25 ff.): ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη· τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, d.h. "die Einsicht allein kommt eigens dem Regenten zu, denn die übrigen Tugenden sind notwendigerweise den Regierten und den Regenten gemeinsam". Und in der EN 6,5, 1140b8 nennt er als ein typisches Beispiel des Einsichtigen (φρόνιμος) den Perikles, der das für sich selbst und für andere Menschen Nützliche vorauszusetzen vermochte²²⁾.

Auch die übrigen, in dem Timotheos-Bild hervorgehobenen Charakterzüge sind uns aus der zeitgenössischen Literatur und aus den Schriften des Isokrates selbst wohl bekannt. Das Wohlwollen, das Timotheos für Athen bei dessen Verbündeten zu gewinnen suchte, war in Isokrates' Augen überhaupt ein wichtiger politischer Faktor²³⁾. Diese Erkenntnis hängt zusammen mit dem in dem damaligen philosophischen Schrifttum des öfteren zum Ausdruck kommenden Grundsatz, dass die Macht über die Willigen (ἐκόντων ἄρχειν) ein Merkmal der legitimen Herrschaft ist, denn sonst entartet sie in die Tyranis. Auch die Milde (πραότης), welche Timotheos selbst gegenüber den Besiegten geübt haben sollte, ist keine sentimentale Barmherzigkeit; sie ist auf das Gewinnen eben jenes Wohlwollens berechnet und wird oft mit der Anwendung der Strenge zusammen erwähnt als ein untrennbares Paar. Cicero wird es später in Nachahmung griechischer politischen Theorie in De off. 1,88 klassisch ausdrücken: *Et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque clementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest*²⁴⁾. Die genannten Vorzüge sind also im Grunde genommen nichts mehr als Nebenerscheinungen jener *φρόνησις*, die darin besteht, einen Blick dafür zu besitzen, was dem Menschen in seinem engeren und breiteren Wirkungskreis wertvoll ist (Arist. NE a.a.O.).

Isokrates ist aber weit davon, sein Timotheos-Porträt zu einem idealen Regentenspiegel gestalten zu wollen. Neben den Vorzügen seines Helden kennt er auch seine Schwächen, sei es auch, wie er meint, seine einzige Schwäche, die den erfolgreichen Politiker zuletzt zur Verurteilung und Verbannung gebracht hat (Antid. 131-138). Sie bestand in seiner Unfähigkeit, um die Gunst der Menge zu werben und an die Demagogen, die damals die öffentliche Meinung Athens entscheidend bestimmten, Zugeständnisse zu machen. Timotheos war ein zu grosser Herr dafür, ohne sonst volksfeindlich oder hochmütig zu sein. Er war aber überzeugt, dass ihm seine schlagenden aussenpolitischen Erfolge auch in der Innerpolitik den Weg ebnen dürften und laut genug für ihn sprechen sollten. Er weigerte sich, zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, dass der breiten Masse ein Betrüger, der ihr mit einer heiteren Miene des Menschenfreundes naht, erwünschter ist als ein Wohltäter, der ihr mit gemessener Würde begegnet. Isokrates gesteht, er habe dies seinem Freund und ehemaligen Schüler des öfteren dargetan, ohne doch seine unbeugsame Natur ändern zu können. Diesem Mangel an gemeinsamer Sprache mit seinen Mitbürgern ist Timotheos letzten Endes zum Opfer gefallen²⁵⁾.

Das erinnert uns an Thukydides und seine Charakteristik von Perikles 2,60,5 (vgl. 2,65,5-13), wo er ihm in erster Linie zwei hervorragende Eigenschaften zuerkennt, die seine einmalige politische Grösse bestimmten.

Die erste bestand in der Fähigkeit, vorausszusehen, wie sich die Lage gestalten wird und auf Grund dieser Erkenntnis entsprechende Massnahmen zu ergreifen (γινῶναι τὰ δέοντα). Die zweite ermöglichte ihm das Erkannte seinen Mitbürgern darzulegen und ihre Zustimmung zu seiner eigenen Handlungsweise zu gewinnen (ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα)²⁶⁾. Der erste dieser Vorzüge war auch dem Timotheos in hohem Masse eigen, an dem zweiten dagegen mangelte es ihm weitgehend. Diese Beobachtung will nicht besagen, dass Isokrates seinen Timotheos mit den thukydidischen Massstäben gemessen hat, obgleich es an sich ganz gut wahrscheinlich sein kann, dass er das historische Werk seines grossen Landsmanns gekannt und gelesen hat. Er konnte aber auch infolge richtiger Einschätzung der geschichtlichen Tatsachen im Fall Timotheos' selbstständig zu demselben Ergebnis gekommen sein. Für unsere Betrachtung ist wichtiger, dass ein attischer politischer Denker noch vor Isokrates erkannt hat, worin das Wesen eines wahren Staatsmanns liegt und dass er diese Eigenschaft als politische Voraussicht bezeichnet hat²⁷⁾. Xenophon, der sein Leben meist weit von Athen verbrachte, hat dieser Erkenntnis noch keine Rechnung getragen. Plato dagegen hat sie gekannt, berücksichtigt, aber umgedeutet, indem er dem Begriff der Einsicht (φρόνησις) eine neue, metaphysische Bedeutung beimass²⁸⁾. Sie war für ihn das Wissen um die höchsten Werte des Lebens und ein echter Staatsmann derjenige, welcher mit Sokrates seine Mitbürger nicht mit Befestigungen, Werften und sonstigen Machtmitteln ausstattete, sondern sie zur wahren ἀρετή zu erziehen vermochte (ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, Gorg. 502 E, 515 C, vgl. 521 D; daselbst Kritik an Perikles, der seit Thukydides als Verkörperung des echten Staatsmanntums galt).

Academia Scientiarum Polona, Cracoviae

ANMERKUNGEN

1) Ciceros Cato: Forschungen zur römischen Literatur, Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von K. Büchner, hrsg. von W. Wimmel. Wiesbaden 1970, 168-78.

2) W. Seyffert, De Xenophontis Agesilao quaestiones. Diss. Gott. 1909, 22-25. Vgl. H.R. Breitenbach, RE IX A, 1702-07, und D. Krömer, Xenophons Agesilaos: Untersuchungen zur Komposition (Diss. Freie Universität Berlin), Augsburg 1971, 9-90.

3) Seyffert a.a.O. 26 f.

4) Breitenbach a.a.O. 1702.

5) Vgl. Anm. 2.

6) A.a.O. 31.

7) A.a.O. (vgl. Anm. 2) 127, Anm. 4.

8) Seyffert a.a.O. 29 f.

9) Krömer a.a.O. 126, Anm. 1.

10) Krömer a.a.O. 128 ff., vgl. den Schlussurteil 151: "Xenophon hat mit etwas fragwürdigen Mitteln ein eindringliches Bild des Agesilaos geschaffen".

11) A.a.O. 91-97.

12) W. Jäger, *Paideia* III³, Berlin 1959, 199-225, bes. 200; das Porträt des Timotheos 207-10.

13) Vgl. V. Bucheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles*, München 1960.

14) So meint auch Bucheit a.a.O. 34.

15) Xenoph. *Ages.*: πράξεις 1,10. 38; διαπράξασθαι 1,6. 12. 17. 37; 2,26. 27; εὐεργεσῆναι 7,1: βασιλέως ἀγαθοῦ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐνόμιζε, τὸ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν. Isocr. *Antid.*: πράξεις 111, 114, 119, 132, 134, 137; εὐεργεσῆναι 111 (= πράξεις), 133 (τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας), 135 (πλεῖστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος).

16) Gorg. 515 C 7; D 10; 517 C 2; 518 B 1; vgl. Dodds im Kommentar (Plato, *Gorgias. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, Oxford 1959), 356, vgl. 361.

17) *De rep.* 6,1.

18) Aristot. *Polit.* 7,14, 1333 a 11 πολίτου καὶ ἀρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός. Vgl. R. Develin, *The Good Man and the Good Citizen in Aristotle's Politics*, *Phronesis* 18 (1973) 71-79.

19) Vgl. auch das Lob des Alkibiades in Isokrates' 26. Rede (Vom Gespräch 15-41), wo die Tugenden des vorbildhaften Politikers und Bürgers (vielleicht nicht ohne eine gewisse Absicht) ineinanderzufließen scheinen. (Vgl. 28 von Perikles, er sei der gemässigste, gerechtigste und weiseste von allen Bürgern gewesen).

20) N. Wood, *Xenophon's Theory of Leadership*, *Classica et Mediaevalia* 25 (1968) 33-66.

21) E. Mikkola, *Isocrates*. Helsinki 1964, 203-05.

22) Vgl. Dirlmeier im Kommentar z. St. (Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*, übersetzt und kommentiert. Berlin 1964) 450.

23) J. de Romilly, *Eunoia in Isocrates or the political importance of creating good will*, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 78 (1958) 92-101, bes. 95 (über *Antid.* 122).

24) Vgl. M. Plezia, *The First of Cicero's Philosophical Essays*, *Ciceroniana: Hommages à Kazimierz Kumaniecki*, publiés par A. Michel et R. Verdière. Leiden 1975, 200 f.

25) Jäger a.a.O. 209 f.

26) G.F. Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmanns bei Thukydides*. Würzburg 1938, 6-20. Vgl. A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II*, Oxford 1956, 189 ff.; 198 f.; H.D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides*, Cambridge 1968, 23-42, bes. 302 ff. (Perikles als Typus des Staatsmanns).

27) So auch Cicero, *De rep.* 6,1: *totam igitur expectas prudentiam huius rectoris, quae ipsum nomen hoc nacta est a providendo*. Cf. *De legg.* 1,60: *nam cum animus... exacerit illam ut oculorum sic ingenii aciem ad bona seligenda et reicienda contraria, quae virtus ex providendo est appellata prudentia*.

28) Eine Skizze der Entwicklung des φρόνησις-Begriffes in der griechischen Philosophie des IV. Jh. geben R.A. Gauthier und J.Y. Jolif im Kommentar zur *NE* (Aristote. *L'Ethique à Nicomaque: introduction, traduction et commentaire II*², Louvain-Paris 1970) 463-69, bes. 465 f. (über Plato).

О ХАРАКТЕРЕ КОНФЛИКТА В КОМЕДИЯХ МЕНАНДРА

В. ЯРХО

Общим местом истории античной литературы является противопоставление новой и древней комедии как бытовой и политической. Верное в принципе, это представление о новой комедии подкрепляется, с одной стороны, целым арсеналом типов, заимствованных ею из реального афинского быта конца IV в. (воины, паразиты, гетеры, врачи и т. д.), с другой, — несомненным мастерством психологической характеристики, которым столь успешно владел Менандр¹⁾. Не последнюю роль в оценке его персонажей играет известное высказывание Аристофана Византийского: Ὁ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπειμιμήσατο; Отсюда нередкие в научной литературе отзывы о комедии Менандра как "зеркале жизни", отражающем ее с редкой достоверностью²⁾.

Вместе с тем, в последнее время все чаще раздаются голоса исследователей, ищущих более близкие точки соприкосновения между Менандром и Аристофаном. Начало этому направлению было положено в 1936 г. работой Ф. Верли³⁾, которому приходилось еще в значительной мере опираться на материал паллиаты. С открытием "Дискола" необычный для Менандра финал этой комедии заставил задуматься над его близостью к тем эпизодам из комедии Аристофана, в которых побежденный антагонист (или целая их вереница) становился объектом сатирической αἰσχρολογία. В этой связи не без оснований напоминают о том, что комедия Менандра, несмотря на всю ее психологическую достоверность, являлась все же частью праздника Диониса⁴⁾. Справедливо указывают на заведомую условность сюжетной схемы пьес Менандра: если принимать содержание его комедий за непосредственное отражение действительности, то надо признать, что в каждом втором афинском доме девушка на выданье подвергалась совращению со стороны юного насильника и что подкидывание детей и их последующее опознание составляло едва ли не главное занятие афинян в IV в.⁵⁾ Наконец была сделана попытка применить к анализу комедии Менандра мотив

аграрного ритуала, стимулирующего плодородие⁶⁾. Таким образом, и в отношении Менандра намечается тенденция к выявлению в его комедийном творчестве тех черт, которые восходят к традициям фольклорной схемы. Менее замеченным остается, однако, переосмысление данной схемы, и я попытаюсь сосредоточить внимание именно на этой стороне вопроса, рассмотрев его в связи с характером конфликта в комедии Менандра.

Начать придется несколько издалека. Существенным элементом древней аттической комедии является мотив "перевернутых отношений", объединяющий сюжеты комедий Аристофана с "логикой" сатурналий. Этот мотив, являющийся очень устойчивым компонентом фольклорных представлений о достижении "рая на земле", был в свое время прослежен в различных ареалах древней средиземноморской культуры советским историком и филологом С.Я. Лурье в его статье *"Die Ersten werden die Letzten sein"*⁷⁾. В современном советском литературоведении мотиву "перевернутых отношений" уделяется большое внимание в связи с исследованием проблемы комического, природы карневала и других проявлений "смеховой" культуры (работы М.М. Бахтина, Д.С. Лихачева и др.)⁸⁾. Возвращаясь к Аристофану, мы легко обнаружим логику "перевернутых отношений", когда "последние становятся первыми", "верхнее - нижним", едва ли не в каждой из его комедий, с чем связано и ярко выраженное фантастическое, утопическое разрешение конфликта. Важно, однако, что к этому финалу ведет весьма напряженная борьба, в которой сталкиваются защитники и противники общественно значительных концепций: вести войну или заключить мир? кому и как следует управлять государством? в каком духе воспитывать граждан? Наредкость острая борьба по названным вопросам ведет к тому, что средства фольклорного "срамления", направленного ранее на стимулирование производительных сил природы, теперь используются в целях политической сатиры, т.е. в конечном счете гротескно укрупняют объект критики.

Столь же гротескно укрупняются и результаты одержанной победы: почти обязательная для аристофановской комедии финальная свадьба (или заменяющая ее процедура) вместе с финальным обжорством восходит к тому же ритуалу плодородия и призвана с наибольшей мерой наглядности подтвердить преимущество нового порядка вещей, наступившего в результате победы протагониста над противником. (Именно в этой сфере терпит поражение потре-

бительский идеал Праксагоры, который модернизаторами античности совершенно непропорционально отождествлялся с коммунистическим устройством общества)⁹⁾.

В комедии Менандра мы находим переосмысление всех прежних стиливых координат. Ритуальное "посрамление", служившее стиливой основой для беспощадных аристофановских обличений *ὀνομαστί* и не вполне исчезнувшее в средней комедии (вспомним перечень лиц, замешанных в пропаже денег Гарпала, в комедии Тимокла "Делос"¹⁰⁾), сводится у Менандра до минимума. В первой его комедии "Гнев" упоминался Ктесипп, который ради удовлетворения своих прихотей продает камни от памятника, воздвигнутого на государственный счет его отцу Хабрию; упоминался также известный паразит Хэрефонт, который из боязни опоздать на обед явился в гости, едва рассвело (фр.303, 304). Того же Хэрефонта встречаем в "Самиянке" (603 сл.)¹¹⁾ и еще в нескольких фрагментах (51, 245, 265), как, впрочем, и у других авторов средней и новой комедии¹²⁾. Ясно, что это - не столько персональное обличение, сколько привычная дань публике.

Ближе к традиционному "посрамлению" - но не реального, а вымышленного персонажа - ругательные эпитеты, которыми Менандр наделяет в "Щите" Смикрина: *πονηρός* (140, 316, 369), *μαρώτατος* (313) - последнее напоминает одну из любимых негативных характеристик у Аристофана (*μαρός* - 36 случаев; сравн. степень - 1, превосходная - 23)¹³⁾. Наиболее же развернутую форму такого посрамления представляет, конечно, уже упоминавшийся финал "Дискола". Заметим, однако, что и здесь мучители Кнемона не ругают и не бьют его, как это делали, например, со сводником в папирусном фрагменте периода средней комедии¹⁴⁾ или будут делать в финале "Перса", заимствованного Плавтом тоже из средней комедии. Гета и Сикон оглушительно колотят в двери дома Кнемона, требуют выдать им несметное количество посуды, утвари и т.д., т.е. направляют свои удары на самое чувствительное место в нравственном облике нелюдимого старика, который на этот раз лишен возможности отвадить от дому несносных просителей. Таким образом, в этом фарсовом завершении комедии заметно скорее стремление к психологической характеристике "посрамляемого", который к тому же, в конце концов, отдает себя на волю победителей.

Теряет свое первоначальное назначение заключительное пиршество и вся стихия обжорства с неперенным осмеянием недопущенных к столу, столь отчетливо представленные еще во второй половине "Плутоса", не говоря уже о заключительных сценах "Ира" и "Птиц". В этой связи показательна эволюция, которую претерпевают от средней комедии к Менандру два типажа: повар и парасит.

Повар средней и отчасти новой комедии - прямой наследник той стихии обжорства, ритуальный смысл которой, однако, уже утрачен. В "Экклесиазусах" Аристофана перечень чуть ли не 20 компонентов, составляющих дикийвинное блюдо (ст. 1169-1175), служит еще сигналом для приобщения к праздничной еде всех граждан. В комедии IV-III вв. монологи повара, возводящего свое искусство в ранг высокой науки, доступной только посвященным, или негодующего, что он не может найти в доме ничего необходимого, не имеют никакого отношения к коллективному празднеству, хотя претензии повара по-прежнему должны были вызывать смех своим несоответствием действительности, а его фигура - хвостовством¹⁵⁾.

У Менандра единственный повар, сохраняющий свою традиционную болтливость, представлен в "Самиянке" (ст. 283-295): по замечанию раба Парменона, повар своим языком способен изрубить собеседника на мелкие кусочки. При этом, однако, повар не щеголяет своим искусством, а всего лишь интересуется тем, на сколько персон накрывать стол. И хотя повар принимал участие еще в нескольких комедиях¹⁶⁾, единственной пьесой, в которой ему отведена довольно значительная роль, остается ранний "Дискол", но и здесь эта роль не вполне укладывается в рамки традиционного амплуа: не сумев ничего получить от Кнемона, Сикон злорадствует по поводу случившегося со стариком несчастья, а затем принимает участие в его финальном осмеянии¹⁷⁾. Таким образом, традиционный *ἀλαζών*, каким полагалось быть повару, выступает не в качестве посрамляемого, а сам посрамляет другого - очевидная "перевернутость" по отношению к традиции древней комедии. Вершиной полемического переосмысления маски повара является финал 3-го акта "Ненавистного": здесь повар не больше, чем "немое лицо", и хозяин только дает ему краткие указания о числе гостей (ст. 270-275).

Отходит на задний план и парасит. У Менандра нет ничего, хоть отдаленно напоминающего гордые *profession de foi* парасита, за-

свидетельственные у других авторов¹⁸⁾, и сам паразит в "чистом виде" представлен среди имеющихся текстов, вероятно, только в "Льстеце" (ст. 27-70); образ его в "Сикионце" не вполне ясен. В функции паразита выступает также Хэрея, приятель Сострата, в "Дисколе", но здесь он в очень умеренной форме гордится своим дипломатическим искусством (ст. 57-70) и вскоре ретируется при виде приближающегося Кнемона. Вечно голодные паразиты Плавта, всякие Куркулионы, Артотроги, Пеникулы и пр., принадлежат типологически более древней фольклорной традиции, получившей отражение в уже упоминавшихся фигурах неудачливых претендентов на угощение из театра Аристофана. К Менандру они никакого отношения не имеют.

Свои ритуальные функции теряет еще более существенный элемент сюжета древней комедии - заключительное бракосочетание. Прежде всего, в целом ряде комедий действие начинается после того, как юридически оформленное или фактически совершившееся соединение молодых людей уже имело место¹⁹⁾. Однозначно возводить сюжет этих комедий к обрядовой игре, стимулирующей производительные силы природы, столь же неправомерно, как не замечать, что в тех случаях, когда целью интриги является "добывание невесты"²⁰⁾, главное внимание Менандра привлекают не столько внешние усилия, направленные к этой цели, и уж во всяком случае не описание чувственных радостей, обычное в *παλαί*²¹⁾, сколько гармония, возникающая в результате благополучного преоделения всех трудностей. В этом смысле интересно поведение менандровских героев, добывающихся соединения с любимой девушкой.

В "Дисколе" Сострат, помогая Горгию тащить из колодца Кнемона, оказывается один-на-один с его красавицей-дочкой и не может ею налюбоваться. Любой другой молодой человек у Плавта или Аристофана, конечно, не упустил бы случая обнять и расцеловать девушку. Между тем Сострат преодолевает это желание и выходит из дома Кнемона, сознательно отказываясь воспользоваться благоприятной обстановкой и беззащитностью своей любимой (ст. 666-690). Такую же деликатность проявляет в "Щите" Хэрея, живущий под одной крышей с девушкой, которую ему прочат в невесты (ст. 286-297)²²⁾.

Если Сострат имеет дело со свободной, то Стратофан в "Сикионце" и Фрасонид в "Ненавистном" испытывают нежные чувства к собственной рабыне, и ни один человек в реальном мире, окружав-

шем Менандра, не усомнился бы в том, что юная невольница является наложницей своего господина²³⁾. Тем более благодарный материал давала эта ситуация для комедии с ее древней традицией фаллического празднества. У Менандра владелец девушки не только не сожительствует с ней, но принимает все меры к тому, чтобы разыскать ее родных и получить от них разрешение на законный брак ("Сикионец"), либо всячески старается заслужить ее любовь своим благородным и деликатным отношением, - так в "Ненавистном", о котором мы еще скажем подробнее.

Стремление менандровских молодых людей оформить свои отношения с женщиной путем законного брака - еще одно существенное отличие его пьес от древней комедии в трактовке любовной тематики. В древней комедии торжествует всегда "побочная" любовь, развлечения на стороне ("Лисистрата" в этом смысле исключение), и эту традицию усваивает комедия Плавта, кроме тех случаев, когда гетера оказывается дочерью родителей-граждан²⁴⁾. В остальном главную цель плавтовских молодых людей составляет добыча денег, чтобы развлекаться с гетерой. У Менандра Эрос направляет молодого человека не к удовлетворению мгновенно возникшего вожделения, а к созданию прочного супружеского союза, закрепленного и освященного официальной формулой: τήνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμι' εἶχειν / γυναικῶν παῖδων ἐπ' ἀρότῳ²⁵⁾. Так обстоит дело в большинстве комедий, дошедших полностью или в значительных отрывках, причем везде молодой человек изъявляет полную готовность либо вступить в брак, либо его оформлением закрепить уже фактически возникший союз²⁶⁾. Не сексуальный разгул, заключающий комедию Аристофана, а гармоничное завершение возникших недоразумений составляет финал комедий Менандра.

Назвав слово "гармония", мы получаем доступ к тому, как переосмысливается в комедии Менандра самый важный стиливой элемент древней комедии - принцип "перевернутых отношений". В комедиях Аристофана, в конечном счете, тоже достигается своеобразная гармония - между крестьянином, добывшим мир для себя одного, и его окружением; между женщинами, выступающими за прекращение войны, и мужчинами, которые сначала им противодействуют, а затем примиряются с ними и т.д. Эта утопическая "гармония" наступает, однако, в результате ожесточенной борьбы между противниками, которая часто принимает физические формы потасовки с балаганным обливанием водой, погоней за "преступником" и т.п. трюками, свойственными клоунаде.

В комедии Менандра нет, в сущности, противоборствующих сил, нет персонажей нападающих или обороняющихся. Если влюбленный молодой человек подозревает существование соперника, то это либо плод недоразумения, либо предполагаемый соперник оказывается братом девушки²⁷⁾ или братом влюбленного²⁸⁾. Всем людям, вместе взятым, противостоит один, общий для всех враг и друг: случай, создатель всякого рода путаницы и взаимного непонимания, которые вследствие игры того же случая обычно разъясняются. Так, только по недоразумению Полемон подозревает Гликеру в измене, Харисий - Памфилу в добрачной связи, Демей - Мосхиона в сожительстве с Хрисидой, Кратия - Фрасонида в убийстве ее брата. Вместе с тем, для развязки, приносимой игрой случая, уже подготовлена благоприятная почва в характере людей, запутавшихся в отношениях друг с другом. Поэтому разрешение конфликта наступает у Менандра не в результате столкновения и противоборства антагонистов, а вследствие их готовности к взаимопомощи и взаимопониманию. Извечные для комедии конфликтные ситуации, известные нам по до-менандровскому периоду и по римским переделкам, переосмысляются таким образом, что конфликт из внешнего столкновения антагонистов превращается в конфликт внутренний, развивающийся в душе индивида. Традиционные ситуации обращаются в свою противоположность в важнейших типах комедийных конфликтов. Проследим это на нескольких примерах.

Мотив "борьбы отца с сыном" за женщину представлен в зачаточной форме в одном эпизоде аристофановских "Ос", где Филоклеон уводит с пирушки, устроенной для него сыном, флейтистку²⁹⁾ и обещает ей выкупить ее, как только вступит в права наследования (ст. 1341-1359). Спор между отцом и сыном за ласки соблазнительницы разыгрывался, судя по кратким фрагментам, у Ферекрата в "Корианно"³⁰⁾. В современной Менандру комедии этот мотив был разработан гораздо обстоятельнее в "Εμπορος у Филемона и в Κληροῦμενοι у Дифила, насколько можно судить по Mercator и Casina Плавта³¹⁾. У Менандра потенциальный конфликт отца с сыном за обладание женщиной заложен в сюжете "Самиянки": из неправильно понятых слов старой няньки Демей делает вывод о том, что Мосхион вступил в связь с отцовской сожительницей Хрисидой, которая родила ему сына (ст. 231-279). Оскорбленное чувство отца, несомненно, могло бы послужить причиной для острого столкновения между Демеей и Мосхионом. Между тем, менандровский Демей

сам находит доводы, оправдывающие Мосхиона и, не подавая ни о чем вида, продолжает готовить его свадьбу с дочерью соседа. Только неавпад сказанные Мосхионом слова доводят дело до взрыва, который тут же гаснет, поскольку обстоятельства подтверждают полную невинность молодого человека³²⁾.

Едва ли не самый распространенный мотив новой комедии, унаследованный также римской паллиатой, - "добывание возлюбленной" для юноши путем интриги, цель которой обмануть отца или сводника (или, еще лучше, обоих). Нечто подобное имело место, очевидно, и в *Δίς ἑξαπατών* Менандра, послужившем основой для "Вакхид" Плавта. Чаше, однако, в сохранившихся комедиях Менандра мы сталкиваемся с прямо противоположной ситуацией.

Сострату в "Дисколе" приходится добывать себе невесту собственным трудом в поле: нарядившись бедным земледельцем, он отправляется орудовать тяжелой мотыгой, чтобы завязать разговор с нелюдимым Кнемоном и просить у него руку дочери (ст. 366-392). Правда, маскарад этот не достигает прямой цели, но Сострат завоевывает таким путем доверие и благосклонность Горгия, которому Кнемон поручает распоряжаться судьбой сводной сестры. Больше того, Сострату удастся легко заполучить согласие отца на свой брак с бесприданницей и без особого труда убедить его выдать собственную дочь - богатую невесту - за бедняка Горгия, ибо тот - честный работяга (ст. 784-820). Таким образом, интрига, затеянная "против" Кнемона, оказывается избыточной, а улаживание двух законных браков, являющихся явным мезальянсом, обходится и вовсе без интриги.

В "Щите" интрига направлена не столько на добывание невесты, сколько на ее "вызволнение", поскольку скупой старик Смикрин, пользуясь родственным правом, хочет жениться на сестре Клеострата, давно обещанной молодому человеку Хэрее. Впрочем, и здесь интрига является избыточной: мнимая смерть богатого Хэрестрата, подставной врач, - все это становится излишним с появлением самого Клеострата, так как в качестве *κύριος* своей сестры он может выдать ее замуж за того, кого сам сочтет для этого подходящим. "Добывание невесты", сопряженное в римской комедии с массой трудностей, с необходимостью одурачить скупого отца и выудить у него деньги, в двух упомянутых комедиях не только совершенно отсутствует, но и те элементы "добывания", которые используются Менандром, либо находятся вне интриги ("Дискол"),

либо вовсе не направлены против отца молодого человека и не носят меркантильного характера.

Без применения всякой, и тем более сознательно направляемой интриги происходит "добывание невесты" в "Остриженной", "Ненавистном" и "Сикионце". Герои этих комедий, особенно двух первых, добиваются взаимности исключительно благодаря своим нравственным качествам: Полемон - своим чистосердечным раскаянием, Фрасонид - редким душевным благородством. Конечно, определенную роль играет во всех случаях спасительное узнавание, которое делает Стратофана полноправным афинским гражданином, а Гликеру и Кратию - дочерьми свободных родителей, но важно подчеркнуть, что решающее слово принадлежит именно женщинам, а не их отцам, - ситуация, совершенно невероятная в афинской жизни и не частая на афинской сцене³³⁾.

В связи с женскими образами Менандра заслуживает упоминания полное переосмысление образа гетеры, наиболее очевидное в "Третьей суде" и "Самиянке". Комедийный стереотип давал, как правило, образ алчной жрицы любви, не выпускающей из своих хищных лап попавшего в них юношу³⁴⁾, - так обстояло дело, в частности, в плавтовских "Вакхидах" (в какой мере достоверно они именно в этой части воспроизводят менандровский оригинал, сказать трудно). Правда, уже в средней комедии и в современной Менандру новой наряду с гетерой-хищницей появляется гетера поневоле, добрая и сердечная девушка, оправдывающая свое название "подруги"³⁵⁾. Такая переоценка, возможно, была связана с тем, что афинские поэты и их зрители знали, сколько семей оказалось в IV в. разбросанными в результате бесконечных военных операций и сколько осиротевших девушек осталось без средств к жизни. Как бы то ни было, менандровские Габротонон и Хрисиды представляют собой полный отказ от типажа алчной гетеры-разлучницы.

Первая из них, вместе того, чтобы шантажировать Харисия с помощью его перстня и вымогать деньги для своего выкупа на волю, берет на себя главную роль в поисках отца и матери подкинутого ребенка. Хрисиды в "Самиянке" с самого начала готова сделать все от нее зависящее, чтобы на время прикрыть связь Мосхиона с Планго, а затем, став жертвой непонятного ей гнева Демей, по-прежнему самоотверженно защищает доверенного ей ребенка. Таким образом, обе женщины оказываются своего рода добрыми гениями для мужчин, которые вошли в их жизнь.

Особого рассмотрения заслуживает целиком переосмысленный в комедии Менандра образ воина. Мы привыкли судить об изображении воина в новой комедии по плавтовскому Пиргополинику, между тем как попытка возвести *Miles gloriosus* непосредственно к Менандру остается в достаточной степени спорной³⁶⁾. В театре Менандра единственной, надежно засвидетельствованной фигурой хвастливого воина является Биант в *Κόλαξ*, которому, однако, противостоят и чистосердечный Полемон, и благородный Стратофан, и, особенно, трогательно несчастный Фрасонид³⁷⁾. Влюбившись в купленную им рабыню Кратию, Фрасонид тяжело страдает от того, что девушка отвергает все его подарки и мольбы, так как подзревает в воине убийцу ее брата. Естественно, что девушка не хочет связывать свою судьбу с таким человеком; менее естественно, что Фрасонид, не зная причины ее отказа, выказывает такую душевную чуткость по отношению к своей рабыне, которую едва ли можно было заподозрить в рядовых афинянах: для всякого было ясно, что молодая и красивая невольница должна стать наложницей хозяина. Тем не менее Фрасонид ведет себя совсем иначе, и чуткость, проявленная им по отношению к Кратии, сто лет спустя дала основание Хрисиппу воспользоваться примером нашего воина, чтобы показать истинную сущность любви: она стремится *μὴ εἶναι συνουσίας, ἀλλὰ φιλίας*³⁸⁾. Употребляемое Хрисиппом понятие *φιλία*, составляющей основу супружеского союза, возвращает нас самым прямым путем к учению о дружбе, разработанному применительно к семейным вопросам Аристотелем в "Никомаховой этике": в основе союза мужчины и женщины должно находиться не одно лишь стремление к деторождению, присущее всем живым существам, а дружба, являющаяся одним из видов *ἀρετή*. Ставить вопрос о том, как должен муж жить с женой, все равно, что рассуждать о том, как надо блюсти законы справедливости³⁹⁾.

Здесь мы оказываемся перед многократно обсуждавшимся вопросом об отношении комедии Менандра к философии перипатетиков⁴⁰⁾; однако я хотел бы коснуться его не совсем с той стороны, с которой до сих пор подходили исследователи. Обычно спор идет о том, является или нит поведение персонажей Менандра или их отдельные высказывания прямым откликом на положения Аристотеля или Феофраста. В нашем же случае соотношение между философией и комедией Менандра представляется не столь важным в деталях, сколько в их принципиальном жизнеотношении, и здесь, на мой взгляд, очевидна значительная близость в мировоззренческом плане.

В самом деле, весь жанр новой комедии возникает, в сущности, на пересечении двух противоположных тенденций: с одной стороны, вполне объяснимый в эпоху падения гражданской активности интерес к индивидуальному миру рядового человека, находящегося в повседневных, обыденных отношениях со своим окружением; с другой, - порожденная общественной неустойчивостью этого же времени неизбежность иллюзорного разрешения жизненного конфликта, которая создает определенный стереотип драматургического мышления, отдаляющий комедию от реальных проблем действительности. К числу таких элементов, подготавливающих иллюзорное разрешение конфликта, следует отнести:

Непременное опознание в подброшенных некогда младенцах детей достаточно обеспеченных родителей, которые без всякого затруднения устраивают их дальнейшую жизнь (исключение - Филумена в "Сикионце", но здесь богатый Стратофан несколько не заинтересован в приданом);

Опознание в гетере свободнорожденной из состоятельной семьи; к тому же девушка, хоть и встала на опасный путь, еще не успела пойти по рукам и придерживается одного любовника, который берет ее в жены ($\Sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha\iota$ - плавтовская *Cistellaria*; *Rudens* - по Дифилу);

Готовность богатых молодых людей и их отцов взять в жены бедную девушку, поскольку добрый нрав дороже денег. Так поступают в "Самиянке" Демей, в "Щите" Хэрестрат, в "Дисколе" Каллипид; в "Земледельце" состоятельный Клезнет готов жениться на бедной девушке, сестре Горгия.

В результате получается, что финалы менандровской комедии оказываются не менее утопичными, чем у Аристофана; только там утопия охватывала общество в целом, эдез она распространяется на узкий круг лиц, ограниченный пределами одной-двух семей. Тот же разрыв между действительностью и идеалом характеризует в последние десятилетия IV в. теоретические построения философов и возможность их практического применения.

Аристотель, обследовавший государственное устройство более чем 150 греческих полисов и давший детальную классификацию различных свойств человеческого характера, пришел к выводу о необходимости отдать предпочтение - в общественной и индивидуальных сферах - $\mu\epsilon\sigma\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$; между олигархией и охлократией, между богатством и бедностью, между крайними проявлениями человеческой природы. Так, посередине между страхом и дерзновением находится мужество; благоразумие является серединой по отношению к наслаждениям; те, кто предаются избытку гнева, искажают сущ-

ность этого справедливого чувства⁴¹⁾. Ровесник Менандра Деметрий Фалерский, прошедший вместе с ним школу Феофраста, пытался применить теоретические положения перипатетиков о "среднем строе" к действительности⁴²⁾ и после 10 лет правления должен был спастись бегством из Афин, а воздвигнутые в его честь 300 или 360 статуи свергли в течение одной ночи⁴³⁾. Реальные классовые противоречия в Афинах опрокидывали идеальные построения философов.

В комедии Менандра такому решительному разрешению конфликтов, присущих реальной жизни, противопоставляется иллюзорная гармония, возникающая не без помощи удачного стечения обстоятельств, но коренящаяся, в конечном счете, в той же логике "перевернутых отношений". Два обстоятельства предопределяют благополучное завершение комедий Менандра: традиция жанра, восходящего к фольклорно-ритуальному действу, с одной стороны, и поиски успокоения от тревожностей времени в кругу идеализированных семейных отношений, - с другой. В древней аттической комедии, где исходной точкой сюжета с самого начала были фантастические идеи и планы, утопическое разрешение конфликта не находилось в противоречии с требованиями жанра. В новой комедии, которую принято считать комедией бытовой, иллюзорное решение конфликта свидетельствует о несовместимости общественного и нравственного идеала с реальными жизненными условиями. Совестьливый молодой человек, охотно берущий на себя последствия насилия над девушкой; отец, обеспокоенный тем, чтобы только скрыть от людей оскорбление, нанесенное ему приемным сыном; суровый воин, готовый скорее покончить с собой, чем принудить к сожительству собственную рабыню; гетера, отказывающаяся от возможности обогащения ради счастья ее прежнего возлюбленного, - все это персонажи, которым едва ли можно было найти широкое соответствие в реальной жизни афинян. Типы Менандра при всей их близости к бытовой повседневности несомненно идеализированы. Несмотря на внешнее правдоподобие менандровской комедии, не выходящей за пределы двух-трех соседних домов, в ней создаются достаточно условные, в сущности, утопические предпосылки для постановки нравственного конфликта, и его решение ведет к не менее иллюзорной в своем роде развязке. Традиционные для древней комедии "перевернутые отношения" снова "переворачиваются", но результатом этой операции становится не простое возвращение к повседневной действи-

тельности, а установление иллюзорной гармонии⁴⁴⁾, соответствующей аристотелевскому представлению об идеале как середине между двумя крайностями.

Москва

NOTES

1) Quint. Inst. or.X.1.69; Plut. Compar.Aristoph.et Men.epitome 853.2; Hermog. Περὶ ὁμοίων II.36 (Test.38.41.44 Körte).

2) Most frequently quoted is M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, Oxford, 1941, 166. Cf. also G. Méautis, *Le crépuscule d'Athènes et Ménandre*, Paris, 1954. A more differentiated approach to this problem is to be found in Cl. Préaux, 'Ménandre et la société athénienne,' *Chronique d'Egypte* 32 (1957) 84-100; M. Treu in *Menander Dyskolos*, Munich, 1960, 97-100; S. Perlman, 'Menander, Dyskolos 13-20...', *RFIC* 93 (1965) 271-277; W.G. Arnott, 'Menander, qui vitae ostendit vitam,' *G&R* 15 (1968) 1-17.

3) Fr. Wehrli, *Motivstudien zur griechischen Komödie*, Zurich-Leipzig, 1936.

4) L.A. Post, *AJP* 80 (1959) 407 f.; И.М. Тронский, 'Новонайденная комедия Менандра "Угрюмец"', *ВДИ* 1960, 4, 70; W. Kraus, *AAW* 26 (1973) 38.

5) Compare (as early as in 1911) W.Sc. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London, 79; 91; W.W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilisation*, London, 3rd ed. 1952, 273 (same as in the 1st ed., 1927); *Kulturgeschichte der Antike: 1. Griechenland*, Berlin (Akademie-Verlag), 1976, 459. The "plausibility" of the New Comedy is argued from the aesthetical point of view by W. Görler, 'Ueber die Illusion in der antiken Komödie,' *AA* 18 (1972) 41-57.

6) T.B.L. Webster, 'Woman hates soldier: structural approach to New Comedy,' *GRBS* 14 (1973) 287-299. Compare earlier G. Murray in *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature*, II. Series, 1929, 15 f.; 'Ritual elements in the New Comedy,' *CQ* 37 (1943) 46-54.

7) *Klio* 22, No.4 (1929) 405-431. Compare H. Kenner, *Das Phänomen der verkehrten Welt in der griechisch-römischen Antike*, Klagenfurt, 1970, esp. 65-94.

8) М. Бахтин, *Творчество Франсуа Рабле и народная культура средневековья и Ренессанса*, Москва, 1965, особ. 8-20; А.А. Белкин, *Русские скоморохи*, Москва, 1975, 95-97, 129-132, 137-38, 155-58; Д.С. Лихачев, А.М. Панченко, *"Смеховой мир" Древней Руси*, Ленинград, 1976, 16-26, 57-68.

9) В.Н.Ярхо, *Социальная утопия в комедиях Аристофана*, Москва, 1947, 17-43.

10) Fr.4 Edm. (FAC II 604). Cf. T.B.L. Webster, *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, Manchester U.P., 2nd ed., 1970, 23-31; 37-56; W.G. Arnott, 'From Aristophanes to Menander,' *G&R* 19 (1972) 69-71.

11) Text of Menander is given throughout according to the edition of F.H. Sandbach, *Menandri reliquiae selectae*, Oxford, 1972.

12) Antiph. fr.199; Alexid. fr.210; 257; Timoth. fr.1; Timocl. fr.9; Apollod. Caryst. fr.24 Edm. (FAC II 264, 474, 496, 576, 608; III 194).

13) O.J. Todd, *Index Aristophaneus*, Cambridge, 1932; Hildesheim, 1962, s.v.

14) *Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta*, ed. Colin Austin, Berlin, 1973, No.239.

15) E.g., Sosip. fr.1; Diphil. fr.17, 43; Dionys. fr.2; Strato fr.1; Alexid. fr.174 (FAC III 280, 104, 114; II 534 s., 582, 460). For detail see A. Giannini, 'La figura del cuoco nella commedia greca,' *Acme* 13 (1960) 135-216; H. Dohm, *Magēiros*, Munich, 1964.

16) Asp.216-233; Col. fr.1; Phasma 73 s.; Epitr. fr.1-5.

17) A. Theuerkauf, *Menanders Dyskolos als Bühnenspiel und Dichtung*, Diss. Göttingen, 1960, 85-111; esp. 102, 104, 106-111.

18) E.g., Diodor. fr.2; Antiphan. fr.195 (FAC III 220; II 262).

19) Epitrep., Samia, Peric., Heros, Fab. incerta, Cithar., Perinthia, Pap. Antinoop.15.

20) Dysc., Aspis, Misum., Sicyon., Phasma, Colax, Dis exapat., Pap. Ghöran II.

21) Compare the brief message of Davus (Peric.305) against the detailed orders of Trygaeus (Pax 842-44; 868-70; 886-904). Similarly, the impatience of Polemon is expressed in a single sentence (Peric. 997 f.), in contrast to an entire scene dedicated in *Lysistrate* to the love-sufferings of Cinesias. Compare also Chaerea's reticence in his dialogue with Antipho, in Terence's *Eunuchus* 604-06, going back to Menander.

22) Cf. Asp.290 and Her.41 s.: neither Davus nor Chaerea seek secret intimacy with the beloved girl.

23) Cf. Misum. 307 ἀνὴρ ἐκλήθη.

24) As, e.g., in *Rudens*.

25) Sam.726 s.; Dysc.842-44; Peric.1031 s.; Misum.444 s.; Fab. inc.29 s.

26) Sam.50-54; Georg.15-21; Cithar.96-101.

27) Peric.819-27; 985 s.

28) Sicyon. 309 s.

29) Cf. Plato com. fr.178 (FAC I 546).

30) Frr.71-74 (FAC I 234).

31) Cf. W.Th. MacCary, 'The comic tradition and comic structure in Diphilos' *Kleroumenoi*,' *Hermes* 101 (1973) 194-208; J.M. Cody, 'The senex amator in Plautus' *Casina*,' *Hermes* 104 (1976) 453-476.

32) For more detail see В. Ярхо, '"Самиянка" Менандра или "Ипполит" неизвестны,' ВДИ 1977. No.3, 35-52.

33) Cf. Pap. Didot I 34 s.: The woman defending before her father the right to remain with her husband nevertheless admits that the choice of her future husband is her father's responsibility.

34) E.g., Anaxil. fr.22; Alexid. fr.98 (FAC II 340, 416-418). Webster, *Studies* (note 10), 22 f.; 63 f.

35) Antiph. fr.212 (FAC II 274).

36) Cf. K. Gaiser, 'Zum Miles gloriosus des Plautus: eine neuerschlossene Menander-Komödie und ihre literaturgeschichtliche Stellung,' *Poetika* 1 (1967) 436-461. With a supplement, in *Die römische Komödie: Plautus und Terenz*, Darmstadt, 1973, 205-248. (Cf. *Gnomon* 48, 1976, 247 f.).

37) For more detail see В. Ярхо, 'Комедия Менандра "Ненавистный",' ВДИ 1979, No.2, 24-41 (there the earlier bibliography).

38) Diog. Laert.VII.130.

39) Aristot. EN VIII.14, 1163 a 16-31.

40) From the rich literature on this problem compare: T.B.L. Webster, *Studies in Menander*, Manchester, 2nd ed. 1960, 195-219; I.M. Tronskij (note 4), 60 f.; S.I. Luria, 'Menander kein Peripatetiker und kein Feind der Demokratie,' in *Menanders Dyskolos als Zeugnis seiner Epoche*, Berlin, 1965, 23-31; A. Barigazzi, *La formazione spirituale di Menandro*, Turin, 1965, esp.46-115; 135-217; K. Gaiser, 'Menander und der Peripatos,' *Antike*

und Abendland 13 (1967) 8-40; Menandro, *Le Comedie*, ed. a cura di D. Del Corno, Milan, 1967, 37-44; M. Gigante, 'Menandro e il Peripato,' in *Philomathes: Studies in Memory of Philipp Merlan*, The Hague, 1971, 461-484; M. Marcovich, 'Euclio, Cnemon, and the Peripatos,' *ICS* 2 (1977) 197-217.

41) Aristot. EN IV.11, 1125 b 26 - 1126 a 13.

42) *PWRE* 4 (1901) 2827 f.; W.Sc. Ferguson, 'The Laws of Demetrius of Phalerum and their Guardians,' *Klio* 11 (1911) 268-71; 273; D. Cohen, 'De Demetrio Phalereo,' *Mnemosyne* N.S. 54 (1926) 92-96 ("Vitam mediam Dem. quaesivit"); S. Dow, and A.R. Travis, 'Demetrius of Phaleron and his Law-giving,' *Hesperia* 12 (1943) 144-159. 43) Diog. Laert. IV.77.

44) While in the "topsy-turvy" world of the Old Comedy the most fantastic hopes and dreams (past, present and future) are fulfilled quite "spontaneously," ἀπὸ ταύτοϋτου (cf. Aristoph. Ach. 978; Cratin. fr. 161; Cratet. fr. 15.7; Telecl. fr. 1.3; Pherecr. fr. 108.6; 130.3; Metag. fr. 6.2 Edm. [FAC I 74, 158, 182, 246, 254, 840]), in the comedy of Menander it is the conflicts and troubles of his characters' family life that are solved in this way (cf. Epitrep. 1108; Sam. 55; 163 s.; Frr. 394.4; 420.3 Körte).

ON THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN THE COMEDIES OF MENANDER

V.N. IARKHO

The traditional theme of "the reversed social order" (in which the last become the first), involving an illusory, utopian solution of the play's plot, is present in almost every Aristophanic comedy. But the dénouement of the Menandrean comedy proves to be equally illusory and utopian, with the only significant difference that in Aristophanes the utopia extends to the entire society, while in Menander it is limited to the interests of two or three families.

Now, in Aristophanes utopian solutions may have been encouraged by the nature of the traditional literary genre itself. But in Menander such an "illusory harmony" only attests to the incompatibility between the fresh -- mostly peripatetic -- social and ethical ideals, and the surrounding reality. In brief, Menander's characters are not real Athenians but rather idealized models. The poet consistently re-examines the traditional characters in an effort to transform them into more humane, conscientious, noble-minded, self-denying, ideal human beings. Such is the case with the hetaera and with the professional soldier, while the traditional abuse of the parasite and the cook is reduced to a minimum. Accordingly, the traditional theme of "the acquisition of the bride" is also re-evaluated, usually ending in a legitimate matrimony.

Finally, there are no real antagonistic forces in action in a Menandrean comedy: Chance is everybody's fiend or friend. She creates misunderstanding, confusion and conflict, and she usually brings them to a happy solution.

The author substantiates these remarks with many examples from Menander.

University of Moscow

(Abstract by the Editor)

LUCRETIUS AND CALLIMACHUS

ROBERT D. BROWN

Literary histories tend to present Lucretius as an isolated figure, his poem as something of an anachronism. Unlike the work of Catullus or the Augustans, whose variety and contemporaneity stimulate the study of influence, development and interrelationship, the *De Rerum Natura* has seemed to stand apart from its historical and literary context. This impression is encouraged by the poet himself, when he preaches withdrawal from the follies of contemporary public life (e.g., in the proem to Book 2) and elevates the poem's practical aim above its merely aesthetic value (l.93lf.).

Nevertheless, this isolation has been much exaggerated. Firstly, both the Epicurean subject matter and the poetic genre of the *De Rerum Natura* mirror contemporary tastes. Epicureanism, which had been known at Rome since at least 154 B.C., or maybe 173 B.C.,¹⁾ reached a height of popularity in the late Republic,²⁾ partly in response to a growing disillusionment with the public scene which Lucretius depicts with such abhorrence (e.g., 3.59f.), much like Sallust in the next generation. Prose authors catered to this interest³⁾ and Epicurean doctrine is conspicuous in Cicero's philosophical oeuvre. The idea of expounding such technical material in verse was an original stroke but by no means anachronistic, for indications exist that the didactic genre, revived in the Hellenistic era, was beginning to enjoy a vogue in Lucretius's day.⁴⁾ Apart from Cicero's translation of Aratus, known to Lucretius,⁵⁾ one might mention the *De Rerum Natura* of Egnatius (Frs 1-2 Morel), the *Empedoclea* of Sallustius (Cic. *ad Quint.* 2.10.3) and certain didactically flavoured fragments of Valerius Soranus (Fr. 4 M) and Q. Cicero (p. 79 M); in the next

generation came the *Chorographia* and *Epimenis* (?) of Varro Atacinus (Frs 14-22 M).

Another area of exaggeration concerns the poet's alleged neglect by his own and subsequent ages. Yet he is mentioned with praise by Cicero in a celebrated letter (*ad Quint.* 2.10.3) and there are many parallels to suggest that Cicero drew upon him also in his philosophical works (despite the often accepted view to the contrary).⁶⁾ Catullus too introduced clear Lucretian reminiscences into his most ambitious poem⁷⁾ and probably shared with him the patronage of Gaius Memmius. In later literature there are specific references to Lucretius in Nepos (*Att.* 12.4), Vitruvius (9, praef. 17), Ovid (*Am.* 1.15.23, *Trist.* 2.425), Velleius (2.36.2), Seneca (*Tranq. Anim.* 2.14, *Ep.* 58.12 etc.), Pliny the Elder (*N.H.*, index lib. 10) and Younger (*Ep.* 4.18.1), Statius (*Silv.* 2.7.76), Quintilian (1.4.4, 10.1.87 etc.), Tacitus (*Dial.* 23.2), Fronto (*Ep. ad Marc. Caes.* 4.3.2, p. 62 N etc.) and many later authors;⁸⁾ more significantly, he left an indelible print upon most subsequent poets, especially Virgil.⁹⁾

These data suggest that Lucretius wrote about a relevant topic, employed a fashionable genre and was read by contemporaries and posterity. But there remains a final argument of those who have stressed Lucretian isolation, which represents him as an arch-conservative clinging to the antique style and ethos of Ennius in opposition to innovative trends variously styled Neotericism, New Poetry or Alexandrianism.¹⁰⁾ This old-fashioned Lucretius, immune to the influence of Hellenistic poetry and lacking contact with the Catullan circle, used to be a familiar figure,¹¹⁾ but has happily disappeared from most modern criticism. No doubt those critics of Ennius whom Cicero characterized (some years after Lucretius's death) as *novi poetae* and *cantores Euphorionis* (*Orat.* 161, *Tusc.* 3.45) disapproved of Lucretian archaism; no doubt the experimental poetry of Catullus evinces a disassociation from poems so long and so deeply rooted in early Latin as the *De Rerum Natura*. But this hardly amounts to a rigid polarization of attitudes and styles. The absence of any other successful model made imitation of Ennius prudent and inescapable, once Lucretius had decided upon a large hexameter poem. However, this fact

should not be allowed to obscure his independence and modernity. Suffice it to observe here that Lucretian veneration for Ennius is tinged with criticism of his philosophy¹²⁾ and competitive emulation of his poetic achievement.¹³⁾ Moreover, a mechanical list of Lucretius's numerous archaisms does little justice to the quite un-Ennian range of sophisticated effects for which he employs them.

Another way of qualifying too narrow a view of the literary influences which molded Lucretius is to demonstrate the multiplicity of his Greek models. Traces of Homer, Hesiod, Sappho, Aeschylus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Euripides, Thucydides and Plato, not to mention Epicurus, testify to the broad reading and culture of the poet. Furthermore, it is becoming clear that, despite previous statements to the contrary, Lucretius was acquainted with the Hellenistic poetry which inspired young contemporaries like Catullus. Scattered parallels have been noted since Lambinus, but the first serious discussion came in L. Ferrero's overstated but unjustly neglected book on Lucretius and New Poetry,¹⁴⁾ which stresses the common literary climate of Lucretius and Catullus. In recent years several other authors, especially E. J. Kenney, have made useful contributions to this aspect of Lucretian background.¹⁵⁾ The intention of the present article is to explore further the extent and significance of Lucretius's debt to the most important of the Hellenistic poets, Callimachus. Not that Callimachus was a late Republican discovery, for Ennius almost certainly knew his work and he was translated by Q. Lutatius Catulus (Fr. 1 M).¹⁶⁾ But since he played a key role in inspiring the fresh impetus of Alexandrianism which we observe in Catullus and his friends, any contacts with Lucretius become doubly interesting.

Roman poets were intrigued by the poet-critic combination in Callimachus and eagerly adopted his canons of style and subject matter in their programmatic poems. This kind of Callimacheanism is familiar to us from Catullus and the Augustans;¹⁷⁾ there has been less discussion of the series of programmatic passages in Lucretius, many of which bear unmistakable traces of Callimachus, both in their general self-consciousness and also their specific images and slogans. Let

us begin with the famous digression in Book 1 (1.921-50), where we will be chiefly concerned with the first half proclaiming the poem's originality (921-34).

The remarkable richness and variety of imagery which pervades these lines should warn us from the outset against seeking a single source of influence: clearly this is an original synthesis of motifs, relating not only to external models, but also to the proem of Book 1 and the surrounding context.¹⁸⁾ Nevertheless, some of the threads composing this closely woven texture can be unravelled by reference to Lucretius's predecessors. For instance, in the opening lines he has drawn upon two conventional Greek concepts of the poet, those of the divinely possessed devotee (*thyrsos*, 923)¹⁹⁾ and the Muses' friend (*amorem/Musarum*, 924-5).²⁰⁾ Here he may have recalled the eloquent account of poetic inspiration in Plato's *Ion* 534a, where the idea of divine possession is followed by a comparison of poets with honeybees, according to which they are said to derive their songs from honeyed fountains in the gardens of the Muses (compare the sequence of ideas in Lucretius).²¹⁾ It is noteworthy, however, that Lucretius has converted these originally religious motifs into personal symbols of ambition and ecstasy, stripping away the reference to external inspiration which was conventional in a 'Dichterweihe' of the Hesiodic kind.²²⁾

Having established a tone of exultant pride and individualism, Lucretius now describes his originality through a series of three metaphors - untrodden path, untouched springs, fresh flowers for a garland (926f.). Much here is reminiscent of the beginning of the *Theogony* (the Muses, their gift to the poet, the natural setting and, later, the sweetness of song), but Lucretius probably had Ennius mainly in mind. The reconstruction of the proem to the *Annales* is highly controversial, but an excellent case can be made for supposing that Ennius, in imitation of Callimachus's dream in the *Aetia*, traversed the realm of the Muses, drank from an inspiring spring and won a garland, just as Lucretius does in metaphorical terms.²³⁾ By repeating these motifs and simultaneously stressing newness (*avia, nullius ante..., integros, novos, unde prius nulli...*), Lucretius manages to convey both indebtedness and originality.

However, it is going too far to state that these lines are 'no more than an elaboration in the imagery of Ennius',²⁴⁾ for the terms in which Lucretius expresses his originality are irresistibly reminiscent of Callimachus. Lines 926-7, as Pfeiffer recognized,²⁵⁾ recall the road imagery of *Aet. Fr.* 1.25-8;²⁶⁾

πρὸς δέ σε] καὶ τόδ' ἄνωγα, τὰ μὴ πατέουσιν ἄμαξαι
τὰ στεῖβε, ἢν, ἑτέρων ἵχνια μὴ καθ' ὁμὰ
δίφρον ἐλ]ῆν μηδ' οἶμον ἀνά πλατύν, ἀλλὰ κελεύθους
ἀτρίπτου]ς, εἰ καὶ στεῖλ]γοτέρην ἐλάσεις.

Indeed, if the supplement ἀτρίπτους is correct, the parallel extends to verbal detail (*loca nullius ante/trita solo*). Moreover, the role of springs as a source of poetic inspiration (927), an unclassical idea which Callimachus's dream in the *Aetia* may have popularized,²⁷⁾ reminds one here by its emphasis on freshness of the *Hymn to Apollo*, where Apollo is said to approve a καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράαντος... ὀλίγη λιβάς (*Hymn* 2.111-2).²⁸⁾ Despite his general debt to Callimachus's dream, there is no evidence that Ennius formulated his claim to be the first real Roman poet²⁹⁾ with such specifically Callimachean emphasis on novelty of theme; indeed, had he done so, Lucretius would surely have avoided a repetition both weak and subversive of his own claim. A more plausible explanation is that Callimachean influence on Ennius's proem was restricted to the dream passage, while Lucretius has borrowed from elsewhere in Callimachus (including the later preface, which can hardly have been congenial to the Roman epicist) in order to underline his own independence from Ennius.

These reminiscences raise two important questions, which must be answered if we are to assess their significance correctly. Firstly, even if they were not derived from Ennius, is it possible that they were channelled from Callimachus to Lucretius by an intermediary source, or that they had attained the status of commonplaces by his time? The evidence tells against the latter, inasmuch as the images of unworn path and pure spring are uncommon in Hellenistic poetry and, to judge from later imitations (e.g., Virg. *Georg.* 3.291f., Hor. *Carm.* 1.26.6), received from Lucretius their first definitive statement in Latin. The former possibility, that Lucretius took his cue from an imitation of Callimachus, is more serious, since the unworn path appears in an epigram by Antipater, *A.P.* 7.409.5-6 (εἰ τὰν ἄτριπτον καὶ ἀνέμβατον ἀτραπὸν ἄλλοις / μαίεαι), which Lucretius is likely to have known on the basis of other parallels,³⁰⁾

and pure springs are used in another epigram by Alcaeus of Messene, *A.P.* 7.55.5-6 (έννέα Μουσέων / ὁ πρέσβυς καθαρῶν γευσάμενος λιβάδων), to describe the inspiration of Hesiod. Whether or not Lucretius knew the Callimachean originals directly must therefore remain a matter of judgement, although it seems to me highly probable in view of other echoes of Callimachus which I hope to establish later.

Secondly, do these reminiscences - direct or indirect - imply any adherence to Callimachean stylistic canons, above and beyond their primary function of expressing Lucretius's originality? Kenney suggests that the emphasis Lucretius lays upon clarity (e.g., 1.136-45, 921-2, 933-4) may go beyond an Epicurean concern for σαφήνεια (*D. L.* 10.13) and share something with Callimachus's repeated insistence upon fine-drawn art.³¹⁾ One could add that the notion of poetic sweetness (936-50, esp. 945-7) is prominent not only in the opening of the *Theogony* (39-40, 69, 83-4, 97) but also the *Aetia* preface (*Fr.* 1.11, 16) and the epigram praising Aratus (*Ep.* 27.2); moreover, Lucretius repeats the cliché in a strikingly Callimachean statement at 4.180 and 909 (*suavidioris potius quam multis versibus edam*), which I suspect to have been inspired by an epigram of Asclepiades (*A.P.* 7.11) that describes Erinna's tiny output as γλυκὺς... πόνος, οὐχὶ πολὺς μὲν... ἀλλ', ἐτέρων πολλῶν δυνατώτερος. However, very little can be made of such vague parallels, based as they are upon ideas which were prevalent not only in Callimachus but Hellenistic literature in general and even earlier Greek poetry. To return to the question posed above, we must answer that Lucretian assertions of thematic novelty (926-30) and lucid style (933-4) do not amount to a statement of allegiance to Callimachean poetics in the narrow sense of Catullus 95 or the Augustan *recusationes*. This clearly emerges from a contrast between Lucretius's expansive handling of the path and spring images and the ironic, allusive treatment of Callimachus.³²⁾ Callimachus was revitalizing an old and jaded art by his insistence on refined exclusivity; Lucretius was exploring the potential of a relatively new one and conveys the exhilaration of a poetic pioneer and missionary.

However, the fact that programmatic Callimachean ideas influenced a segment of Lucretius's most personal statement remains significant in itself, and receives confirmation from echoes in other self-conscious passages of the poem. Perhaps next in importance as a personal utterance stand the lines on the difficulty of rendering obscure Greek discoveries in Latin (1.136-45), where, as in 1.921-34, the contrast of light and

dark acts as a frame for reflections on the nature of the poem. Here Lucretius states that the hope of friendship persuades him *quemvis efferre laborem* (141) and *noctes vigilare serenas* (142). The second phrase obviously reproduces a proverbial idea of working late into the night, with which one can compare the use of the verb *lucubrare*³³⁾ and our own saying 'to burn the midnight oil'. However, I doubt whether it is coincidental that Lucretius's formulation of the idea in terms of staying awake (*vigilare*) puts one in mind of the sleeplessness which Callimachus ascribes to Aratus, as a token of his astronomical research and perfectionist artistry (*Ep.* 27.3-4):³⁴⁾

χαίρετε λεπταί
ῥήσιες, Ἀρήτου σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης.

That this epigram was familiar to the Catullan circle may be inferred from the dedicatory poem attached to a gift by C. Helvius Cinna (*Fr.* 11 M):

*haec tibi Arateis multum invigilata lucernis*³⁵⁾
carmina, quis ignis novimus aetherios.

As a didactic poet following in the tradition of Aratus, Lucretius may have felt a particular affinity to the epigram; one may even sense a hint of Aratus's star-studded sky in the epithet *serenas*,³⁶⁾ apart from its important psychological significance.³⁷⁾ In harmony with this interpretation, of Lucretius's sleeplessness, the poet's *laborem* (141) can be compared with the Alexandrian ideal of painstaking craft,³⁸⁾ for here (and in the oxymoron *dulci... labore*, 2.730, 3.419) the word seems to refer less to the effort of Epicurean research than to that of committing it to verse.³⁹⁾ A concern for careful artistry also emerges from his use of the verb *pango* (1.933) and the revealing statement about *politis/versibus* (6.82-3).⁴⁰⁾ Again, however, the similarities to Callimachus must not be overstressed. Most importantly, the sleeplessness, labour and polish of Lucretius have a practical end, and by emphasizing them he wishes to engage our attention, not to praise art for art's sake.

Another programmatic statement occurs in 4.909-11,⁴¹⁾ where Lucretius promises to explain sleep *suavidicis potius quam multis versibus* (a line already mentioned earlier), and favourably compares the *parvus... canor* of swans to the diffuse *clamor* of cranes. Lines 910-11 are a close adaptation of an epigram

by Antipater (*A.P.* 7.713.7-8).⁴²⁾ Line 909 can hardly be called an imitation of Callimachus (I compared it before with Asclepiades, *A.P.* 7.11), but certainly derives ultimately from his celebrated rejection of ἔν δαίσιμα διηγεκέξ...ἐν πολλὰῖς... χιλιάδων (*Aet.* Fr. 1.3-4 and passim; cf. Frs 465, 398, *Hymn* 2.105f., *Ep.* 28.1).⁴³⁾ In the light of this flagrantly Alexandrian sentiment (even the compressed incongruity sounds authentically Callimachean), it may be legitimate to suppose that pedagogical claims of *brevitas* elsewhere in Lucretius (1.499, 2.143, 4.115, 723, 6.1083) also contain an artistic motivation.⁴⁴⁾

Furthermore, it is interesting that Lucretius substitutes cranes for Antipater's jackdaws in his adaptation. To be sure, *gruun* is a more tractable word than *graculorum*, but in such a self-conscious and literary passage he is unlikely to have hit upon the replacement by accident. Pfeiffer originally conjectured that both poets worked independently from a common source in the *Aetia* preface,⁴⁵⁾ but the recovery of lines 15-16 disproved a close imitation by Lucretius. Rather, he modelled his passage primarily upon Antipater but returned to the *Aetia* preface for the illustration of cranes, which there represent tedious epic, by contrast with the 'little nightingales' preferred by Callimachus. If this analysis is correct, we have concrete evidence here for the coalescence of two separate Hellenistic poems in Lucretius's creative imagination. Once again, however, we should note that ideas which Callimachus used to clarify his aesthetic standards are appropriated by Lucretius for the different role of alluring his audience (912-15).

Together, these echoes testify to the contemporary pull exerted by Callimachean poetics, although it is sometimes difficult to tell whether Lucretius was responding directly to Callimachus or his Hellenistic imitators. I turn now to a few miscellaneous resemblances which permit a more confident decision in favour of direct inspiration. The first example has gone unnoticed hitherto and occurs within Lucretius's praise of Empedocles (1.716f.). This powerful passage pays homage to the Sicilian's achievements as philosopher and poet through a vividly imaginative description of his island's natural wonders, implicitly linking the ruggedness and grandeur of Sicily with the philosopher's majestic verse.⁴⁶⁾ Two areas of the encomium are verbally indebted to Callimachus's

Hymn to Delos (4), which in a similar fashion approaches the tale of Apollo's birth with praise of his island birthplace.

The first of these is the beautiful description of Sicily's seaboard in 718-19:

*quam fluitans circum magnis anfractibus aequor
Ionium glaucis aspargit virus ab undis,*

These lines are an adaptation of the picture sketched by Callimachus of the sea around Delos (*Hymn* 4.13-14):

ὁ δ' ἀμφὶ ἐ πούλῳς ἐλίσσω
'Ικαρίου πολλὴν ἀπομάσσειται ὕδατος ἄχνην. 47)

To press the point, *quam fluitans circum magnis anfractibus* answers roughly to ἀμφὶ ἐ πούλῳς ἐλίσσω, ⁴⁸⁾ *aequor/Ionium* to 'Ικαρίου... ὕδατος *aspargit virus* to ἀπομάσσειται... ἄχνην; in addition to verbal correspondence, *Ionium* and *aspargit* stand at the identical point in the line. ⁴⁹⁾ Of course, Lucretius has also transformed the original, both in detail, e.g., the substitution of 'brine' for 'foam' and the addition of the ornamental detail *glaucis*, and in tone, which is rather more elevated than in Callimachus, thanks largely to the resounding periphrasis in 718.

A second echo of the same hymn occurs a little later, where Lucretius praises the revelations of Empedocles above those of the Delphic oracle (738-9):

*sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur,* ⁵⁰⁾

The commentators offer parallels for the expression 'from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus' (e.g., Eur. *Or.* 329, *I.T.* 976, Arist. *Plut.* 39), refer to the proverbial notion, contradicted by Lucretius, of speaking as truthfully as Apollo's oracle ⁵¹⁾ and mention an epigram by Athenaeus (not Epicurus, as Bailey says) which praises Epicurus as having learnt a certain fact from the Muses or the Delphic tripod (D. L. 10.12). Only Munro has recognized that the clever idea of speaking more accurately than the Delphic oracle derives from the humorously prophetic words of the unborn Apollo in Callim. *Hymn.* 4.90-94, esp. 94: ⁵²⁾

οὐπω μοι Πυθῶνι μέλει τριποδήλιος ἔδρη,
οὔδε τί πω τέθνηκεν ὄφρις μέγας, ἀλλ' ἔτι κεῖνο
θηρίον αἰνογένειον ἀπὸ Πλειστοτοῦ καθέρπον
Παρνησὸν νιφόνετα περιστέφει ἑννέα κύκλοις·
ἀλλ' ἔμπης ἔρέω τι τομώτερον ἢ ἀπὸ δάφνης·

A comparison with the Lucretian lines will show that Callimachus's reference to the Pythian tripod (90) has been conflated with the joke about speaking more clearly than 'from the laurel' (94), in order to create a single, cogent idea. Significantly, Lucretius has turned the thought against Apollo and foreknowledge in general,⁵³⁾ whereas Apollo's words in Callimachus are unprejudicial to the veracity of his future oracle (he simply implies that firsthand prophecy is better than secondhand).

It seems reasonable to conclude on the basis of these echoes that Lucretius had read the whole hymn with some care. Perhaps this reading supplied him with some of the inspiration to praise Empedocles through the medium of his island birthplace and in terms of a latter-day god,⁵⁴⁾ (although the poetic statements of Empedocles himself are likely to have provided the chief impetus).⁵⁵⁾ This larger claim may be insupportable, but it helps towards a clearer appreciation of the plan and purpose of this striking digression, which can be seen as a demythologized hymn, removing true superhumanity from the realm of superstition to that of *ratio* and scientific discovery. As such, the passage may be compared with the 'hymns' to Epicurus (3.1f., 5.1f.), in which hymnic formulae of praise are applied to the enemy of superstition, partly for polemical reasons, partly to turn around ingrained religious attitudes and divert them into constructive channels.⁵⁶⁾

Another imitation of Callimachus is found in the virtuoso and complex digression on Cybele (2.600-660). Here, at the climax of the ritual procession he is describing, Lucretius paints a lively picture of the dancing attendants named Curetes, who recall the Dictaeon Curetes who drowned Jupiter's infant cries. After an ironic gesture to tradition (*feruntur*, 634)⁵⁷⁾ Lucretius reports the story of the latter's dance in 635-9:

*cum pueri circum puerum pernice chorea
armati in numerum pulsarent aeribus aera,
ne Saturnus eum malis mandaret adeptus
aeternumque daret matri sub pectore vulnus.*

The first half of this tableau seems to echo Callimachus's treatment of the same story in the *Hymn to Zeus* (1.52-4):⁵⁸⁾

οὔλα δὲ Κούρητές σε περὶ πρύλιν ὥρχησαντο
τεύχεα πεπλήγοντες, ἵνα Κρόνος οὔασιν ἡχῇ
ἀσπίδος εἰσαΐοι καὶ μὴ σεο κουρίζοντος.

Aside from rough correspondences of verbal detail (*circum*/περί, *permice chorea*/οὔλα⁵⁹)... ὥρχησαντο, *armati*/πρύλιν,⁶⁰ *pulsarent*... *aera*/τεύχεα πεπλήγοντες, *ne Saturnus*/ἵνα Κρόνος... μὴ⁶¹), Lucretius has imitated the etymological play upon words in Callimachus: he, of course, connects Κούρητες and κουρίζοντος ('crying like a boy'), while Lucretius more subtly suggests the derivation of Κούρητες from κοῦροι by emphasizing the words *pueri*... *puerum* (635);⁶² yet another pun appears in 643 (*parent*... *parentibus*). As usual, he has also made substantial changes to suit his anti-mythological purpose, particularly through an exaggerated use of alliteration and the ironically mock-epic development of 638-9, where he parts company entirely with Callimachus.

A small item of supporting evidence for direct imitation of the *Hymn to Zeus* here may be supplied by the first verse of the digression on Cybele (*hanc veteres Graium docti cecinere poetae*, 600). One would dearly like to know what poets Lucretius has in mind⁶³ and how they relate to his subsequent account of Cybele worship.⁶⁴ But, leaving aside these difficult problems, it is reasonable to suppose that Lucretius disapproved of the way in which these poets personalized the insentient earth (albeit allegorically), thus opening the door for superstition. That the tone of 600 is sarcastic may be confirmed by the similar references in 5.405 (*scilicet ut veteres Graium cecinere poetae*), where he dismisses the legend of Phaethon, and 6.754 (*Graium ut cecinere poetae*), where the myth about crows being banished from the Acropolis is ridiculed. This being so, it seems possible that the allusion to 'old poets' was inspired by Callimachus's rejection of an unbelievable story in the *Hymn to Zeus*, only a few lines after the description of the Curetes (1.60):⁶⁵

δηναιοὶ δ'οὐ πάμπαν ἀληθέες ἦσαν ἀοιδοί·

Of course, Pindar contradicts his predecessors in a similar way (Ol. 1.36),⁶⁶ but a closer analogy exists between Callimachus's phrase δηναιοὶ⁶⁷)... ἀοιδοί and *veteres*... *cecinerere poetae*; as for the charge of falsehood, one could compare the sweeping rejection of the whole Cybele cult which Lucretius makes later in 644f. Nevertheless, a ready contrast between the two authors is again available, in that Callimachus is rejecting a particular myth told by ancient poets, while Lucretius is hostile to the mythologizing tendency of poetry in general.

The next passage for consideration is similar, for it once again involves the invocation and rebuttal of a Greek poetic source. In the

course of Book 6 Lucretius discusses *Averna... loca* (738), i.e., pestilential areas which were observed to poison overflying birds. After mentioning the famous place near Cumae (747-8), he turns to the location on the Athenian Acropolis which was traditionally believed to be shunned by birds, particularly the crow (749-55):⁶⁸⁾

- est et Athenaeis in moenibus, arcis in ipso
 750 vertice, Palladis ad templum Tritonidis almae,
 quo nunquam pennis appellant corpora raucae
 cornices, non cum fumant altaria donis.
 usque adeo fugitant non iras Palladis aeris
 pervigili causa, Graium ut cecinere poetae,
 755 sed natura loci opus efficit ipsa suapte.

Not content with a reference to the simple fact, Lucretius mockingly alludes to the legendary explanation of how a crow had reported to Athene the disobedience of the daughters of Cecrops in opening the chest containing the infant Erichthonius which had been entrusted to their care by the goddess, who angrily banished the crow from the Acropolis in return for its unwelcome interference.⁶⁹⁾

As in the Cybele passage (2.600), Lucretius refers here to a poetic tradition (*Graium ut cecinere poetae*, 754), and again one would like to know of whom he is thinking. No doubt the story was well-established in folklore long before Callimachus, but it is interesting to note that the sole known pre-Lucretian treatment in poetry comes in the influential short epic *Hecale*, where it is narrated by an old crow (Fr. 260.17f.). If, as appears likely, Lucretius has Callimachus primarily in mind when he mentions *poetae*,⁷⁰⁾ it may also be possible to identify a verbal reminiscence in the mannered phrase *iras Palladis aeris* (753), which echoes recognizably the words of the old crow in *Hec.* Fr. 260.41 (βαρὺς χόλος ... Ἀθήνης).⁷¹⁾ A less obvious allusion to the Callimachean source may possibly be detected in the epithet *Tritonis* (750), which in Greek first occurs in Callimachus (*Iamb.* 12, Fr. 202.28) and Apollonius (1.109, 3.1183),⁷²⁾ in Latin first in Lucretius (later in, e.g., Virg. *Aen.* 2.226, Ov. *Met.* 3.127).⁷³⁾ One of the commonest interpretations of Athene's title Τριτογενής explains it by reference to the Libyan lake Triton (or Tritonis) near which she was said to have been born;⁷⁴⁾ this will naturally have commended itself to Callimachus, the native of Cyrene, for whom the name Tritonis may have had a special meaning and attraction.⁷⁵⁾ Perhaps, then, Lucretius borrowed a *recherche* title from Callimachus (the context of the *Hecale* under discussion?) in order to sharpen his sarcastic mention of the legend. For, like the description of the Curetes, this passage offers a fine example of his ability to denigrate a mythical

tradition. Note how the sentence ascends from the epic formula *est...* (749) by an elegant tricolon to the impressive cult-title of the goddess (750), only for the elevated tone to be deflated methodically in the following lines (751-5).

If Lucretius remembered the legend of the crow from the *Hecale*, maybe he recalled elsewhere the story of the raven who was turned from milky white to pitch black for telling Apollo about the adultery of Coronis, as briefly told by Callimachus soon after the passage on the crow (Fr. 260. 55-61). For, during his series of proofs that atoms lack colour, Lucretius uses an illustration involving white ravens as a *reductio ad absurdum* (2.822-5):

*conveniebat enim corvos quoque saepe volantis
ex albis album pinnis iactare colorem
et nigros fieri nigro de semine cygnos
825 aut alio quovis uno varioque colore.*

This whimsical notion may easily have been drawn from the poet's own imagination or proverbial expressions,⁷⁶⁾ but it is not unlikely that the myth was at the back of his mind, and, if so, it is worth pointing out that the version in the *Hecale* is our first source for the detail about a change of colour.⁷⁷⁾

Lucretius's probable use of the poem to Aratus, which was discussed earlier, encourages the search for other connections with the epigrams of Callimachus. The general influence of Hellenistic erotic epigrams upon the end of Book 4 has been fruitfully explored by Kenney⁷⁸⁾ and there is no need to repeat his findings. Suffice it to say that the love epigrams of Callimachus share with countless others the favourite images of wound/sickness (*Ep.* 43, 46), fire (*Ep.* 43, 44) and hunting (*Ep.* 31) which Lucretius selected for satirical exploitation. In addition, three possible instances of specific imitation may be suggested. Firstly, in the arresting phrase *vulgivaga... Venere* (4.1071), which commentators wrongly attempt to elucidate by the title Πάνδημος Ἀφροδίτη, for *Venus* here is simply a metonymy for sex. If a Greek model is necessary, the adjective is more likely to have been inspired by the word περίφοιτος, used by Callimachus in his rejection of the promiscuous beloved (*Ep.* 28.3, cf. 38.2).⁷⁹⁾ If so, Lucretius has managed a piquant reversal, for promiscuity is precisely what he recommends. Secondly, the euphemism *Charitonia* (4.1162), which is absent from the models in Plato (*Rep.* 474d-e) and Theocritus (10.24f.), may derive from Callimachus's flattering conceit of adding Berenice to the number of the Graces (*Ep.* 51.1-2), though it could have reached Lucretius through one of the later imitations.⁸⁰⁾ Thirdly,

the tableau of the *exclusus amator* (4.1177f.), a composite picture indebted to Hellenistic epigram, introduces a detail which lies outside the general run of serenade literature when it mentions the kissing of the doorposts (1179). Observation from life cannot be ruled out as the inspiration, but the literary parallel in Callimachus's paraclausithyron epigram (*Ep.* 42.5-6)⁸¹⁾ is surely significant.

This concludes the examination of Callimachus's miscellaneous poetic influences on Lucretius (though other incidental resemblances can be found).⁸²⁾ But we should remember that he was also the scholar who produced a famous catalogue of the Alexandrian library and wrote many works on subjects such as winds, rivers and birds.⁸³⁾ Among these was an encyclopaedia of marvellous natural phenomena (*Frs* 407-11), comprising information drawn from a multitude of previous writers (e.g., Aristotle, Theopompus and Theophrastus). This work laid the foundation for the popular genre of paradoxography taken up by such authors as Antigonus of Carystus.⁸⁴⁾ The influence of such writings can be seen in Book 6 of Lucretius, particularly in the sections on *Averna loca* (738-839) and extraordinary springs (840-905). Naturally, it is difficult to decide whether he used Callimachus directly or a later doxography partly based upon Callimachus (such as that of Antigonus, to whom we owe the main fragment of the former's work); additionally, Lucretius may have drawn some information from original sources (like Aristotle) or Epicurean studies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that noxious areas like the *Averna loca* of Lucretius were recorded by Callimachus (*Fr.* 407, xxiv, xxxi, xxxii), with emphasis duly placed upon the death of birds as in Lucretius (6.740f., 818f.). As for springs, Callimachus also records fresh water bubbling up in the ocean (*ibid.* i, cf. *Lucr.* 6.890f.), the ignition of objects placed above water (*ibid.* xx, cf. *Lucr.* 6.879f.) and puzzling phenomena of hot and cold water (*ibid.* v, xxxi, cf. *Lucr.* 6.840f.), including the famous spring of Hammon which was cold at day and warm by night (*ibid.* xvi, cf. *Lucr.* 6.848f.);⁸⁵⁾ this wonder was recorded by Herodotus (4.181.3), but Lucretius probably discovered it in a doxography.

To conclude, I hope to have demonstrated that Lucretius shows the direct or indirect influence of several Callimachean works. In particular, Callimachean motifs appear in certain programmatic statements of his poetic aims and attitudes, just as they do in those of Catullus (albeit with much more depth and significance). Furthermore, we have seen how various other details in Callimachus inspired Lucretian

reminiscence by their verbal dexterity or pictorial charm. These echoes are not extensive or especially dramatic, but they help to dissipate further the myth of Lucretius's literary isolation and to indicate the necessity for more study of his poetic art, which is less divorced from Catullus than is generally recognized.⁸⁶) Lucretius was not Callimachean in the sense of being an aggressively modernistic poet, but he was sensitive to the invigorating winds of change which were effecting a transformation of the contemporary literary climate.

Columbia University

NOTES

1) Depending upon which consulship is referred to by Athenaeus (xii, 547a): P. Boyancé, *Lucrèce et l'Epicurisme* (Paris 1963) 7-8.

2) For Epicureanism at Rome see O. Tescari, *Lucretiana* (Turin 1935) 101f., E. Bignone, *Storia della letteratura latina* 2 (Florence 1945) 173f., A Dalzell, "A bibliography of work on Lucretius, 1945-1972", *CW* 67 (1973-1974) 83, T. Mantero, *L'ansietà di Lucrezio e il problema dell'inculturazione dell'umanità nel "De rerum natura"* (Genoa 1975) 15-62. For Lucretius in relation to his times see J. Masson, *Lucretius: Epicurean and Poet* (London 1907) 1-33, Bignone, *op. cit.* 114-48, A. Traglia, *Sulla formazione spirituale di Lucrezio* (Rome 1948) 9-31, E. J. Kenney, "Lucretius", *Greece and Rome*, New Surveys in the Classics No. 11 (Oxford 1977) 3-8, P. Grimal in "Lucrèce", *Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique, Entretiens*, Tome 24 (Geneva 1977) 233-62.

3) Amafinius (Cic. *Fam.* 15.19.2, *Acad. Post.* 1.5-6, *Tusc.* 4.6-7), Catus (*Fam.* 15.16.1-2, 19.1-2), Rabirius (*Acad. Post.* 1.5): Boyancé, *op. cit.* 8f., Mantero, *op. cit.* 41f.

4) Bignone, *op. cit.* 168f., Taglia, *op. cit.* 40-42, H. Bardon, *La littérature latine inconnue* 1 (Paris 1952) 335, E. Pöhlmann, "Charakteristika des römischen Lehrgedichts", *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, ed. H. Temporini, 1.3 (Berlin and New York 1973) 848 (with n. 212).

5) Munro on *Lucr.* 5.619, K. Büchner, *RE* 7A (1939) 1242f.

6) C. Martha, *Le poème de Lucrèce* (Paris 1885, 4th ed.) 351-2, Masson, *op. cit.* 37-8, G. C. Pucci, "Echi lucreziani in Cicerone", *SIFC* 38 (1966) 70-132.

7) For Lucretius and Cat. 64 see Munro on *Lucr.* 3.57.

8) Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* 1 (Munich 1927) 282, *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura* ed. K. Büchner (Wiesbaden 1966) xxxii-xxxvii.

9) For Lucretius's 'Fortleben' see Schanz-Hosius, *op. cit.* 280-84, Boyancé, *op. cit.* 316-27, Dalzell, *loc. cit.* 101f., L. Alfonsi in "Lucrèce",

Fondation Hardt etc. (n. 2) 271-315. Against the idea of Augustan suppression see A. Traina, "Lucrezio e la 'congiura del silenzio'", *Dignam dis* (a Giampaolo Vallot) (Venice 1972) 159-68.

10) The first two expressions are based upon Cicero's notorious remarks (*Att.* 7.2.1, *Orat.* 161) and are unlikely to have a very broad significance: see N. B. Crowther, *CQ* N.S. 20 (1970) 322-27; on 'Alexandrianism' see J. K. Newman, *Augustus and the New Poetry* (Collection Latomus LXXXVIII [Brussels-Berchem 1967]) 31-60. For a recent attempt to define neoteric poetry see R. O. A. M. Lyne, *CQ* N.S. 28 (1978) 167-87.

11) See, e.g., H. A. J. Munro, *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* 2 (Cambridge 1893, 4th ed.) 8, J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome from the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age* (London 1909) 275, 277-78, 303, W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart 1924) 86, U. v. Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung* 1 (Berlin 1924) 230, J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London 1931) 283.

12) Esp. 1.117f., where the sincere praise of Ennius is followed by implicit criticism of his inconsistency (*etsi praeterea...* 120), and perhaps of the whole idea of supernatural revelation, as E. J. Kenney argues in his article "Doctus Lucretius", *Mnemosyne* Series IV, 23 (1970) 373-80. Maybe the Iphigenia passage, drawing possibly on Ennius as well as Greek models (L. Rychlewska, "De Ennii Iphigenia", *Eos* 49 [1957-8] 71-81), is an indirect foretaste of criticism; but Ennian influence is denied by Grimal in "Lucrece", *Fondation Hardt* etc. (n. 2) 195.

13) Esp. 1.921f., which, as will be discussed later, probably contains Ennian motifs, and 6.95, where Lucretius's hope for a garland recalls the garland won by Ennius (1.118).

14) *Poetica nuova in Lucrezio* (Florence 1949).

15) J. K. Newman, "De verbis canere et dicere eorumque apud poetas Latinos ab Ennio usque ad aetatem Augusti usu", *Latinitas* 13 (1965) 99-105, A. Grilli, *Lucrezio* (Milan 1970) 58-61, 99f., 121f., Kenney, *loc. cit.* (n. 12) 366-92, G. Tarditi, "Sulla soglia della poetica lucreziana", *Studi classici in onore di Quintino Cataudella* 3 (Catania 1972) 85-93. Mantero, *op. cit.* 90-109.

16) That Callimachus's dream in the *Aetia* influenced the proem of the *Annales* is controversial, but very likely: see O. Skutsch, *Studia Enniana* (London 1968) 7-9, J. H. Waszink, "The proem of the *Annales* of Ennius", *Mnemosyne* Series IV. 3 (1950) 215-40; for further bibliography see "Ennius", *Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique, Entretiens*, Tome 17 (Geneva 1972) 120 n. 2. Lucilius, and maybe Ennius, knew the *Iambi*: M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt am Main 1949). Late Republican interest in Callimachus may have been stimulated by Parthenius: W. Clausen, "Callimachus and Latin Poetry", *GRBS* 5 (1964) 181-96.

17) The standard work is W. Wimmel, "Kallimachos in Rom", *Hermes Einzelschriften* 16 (Wiesbaden 1960).

18) Note, e.g., the following parallelisms: 922/136, 924/19, 925-6/74, 929/118, 934/28, and see L. Lenaghan, "Lucretius 1.921-50", *TAPA* 98 (1967) 221-51.

19) Cf. Democritus, B 17-18, 21 DK, Plato, *Apol.* 22b-c, *Phaedr.* 245a, *Leg.* 719c, and see Kroll, *op. cit.* 24f., E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 217f.

20) For a general account of the relationship see Kroll, *op. cit.* 26f. By stressing his own love rather than that of the Muses Lucretius seems to

invert the usual emphasis.

21) Grilli, *op. cit.* 96-7. Lucretius compares himself with honeybees in 3.11f., and his allusion in 6.910f. to a magnetized chain of rings provides further evidence that he knew the Platonic passage (cf. *Ion*. 533d-e).

22) For a convenient list of the conventional elements, see M. L. West's commentary (Oxford 1966) on Hes. *Theog.* 22-34.

23) Waszink, *loc. cit.* passim. For the Muses' realm cf. Enn. *Ann.* 215, together with later evidence for an experience on Helicon (Lucr. 1.117f., Prop. 3.3.1f.) and/or Parnassus (schol. Pers. prol. 2); for the draught from a spring (doubtless Hippocrene) cf. Prop. 3.3.6, in combination with Lucil. 1008 M and Enn. *Ann.* 217, where the object of *reserare* may have been *fontes* (Waszink, *loc. cit.* 225-6, comparing Virg. *Georg.* 2.175); for the garland, presumably parallel to the laurel branch received by Hesiod (*Theog.* 30-31), cf. Lucr. 1.118, Prop. 4.1.61, and, in addition to Waszink, *loc. cit.* 232-3, see W. Suerbaum, "Untersuchungen zur Selbstdarstellung älterer römischer Dichter", *Spudasmata* 19 (Hildesheim 1968) 310-11, Kenney, *loc. cit.* 371 (with n. 2). I am unconvinced that Lucretius was chiefly inspired here by the garland which Hippolytus brings to Artemis from an inviolate meadow (Eur. *Hipp.* 73-87), as is claimed by G. Berns in "Time and Nature in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*", *Hermes* 104 (1976) 490-91, though it cannot be ruled out that he knew the passage. The notion of a poetic garland is Hellenistic (e.g., Antipater, *A.P.* 7.14.4) and the association of flowers with poetry is an old one: A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* 2 (Cambridge 1965) 593-4, A. A. R. Henderson, *Latomus* 29 (1970) 742.

24) J. H. Waszink, "Lucretius and Poetry", *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*, N.R. 17 (1954) 251; cf. Suerbaum, *op. cit.* 59 n. 186, 227 n. 664.

25) R. Pfeiffer, "Ein neues Altersgedicht des Kallimachos", *Hermes* 63 (1928) 323, and *Callimachus* 1 (Oxford 1949) on *Aet.* Fr. 1.27f. The parallel has often been mentioned since: e.g., by Bignone, *op. cit.* 170-71, P. Giuffrida, *L'epicureismo nella letteratura latina nel I sec. av.* *Cristo* 2 (Turin 1950) 46, O. B. Niccolini, "De T. Lucretio Caro", *Latinitas* 3 (1955) 286, I. Cazzaniga, *Lezioni su Lucrezio* (Milan 1966) 44f., Lenaghan, *loc. cit.* 222, E. Pasoli, "Ideologia nella poesia: lo stile di Lucrezio", *Lingua e Stile* 5 (1970) 380, Kenney, *loc. cit.* 370, Tarditi, *loc. cit.* 89, Mantero, *op. cit.* 98f. Lambinus had already recognized the parallel in Oppian, *Cyn.* 1.20-21, together with some Latin imitations of Lucretius.

26) For which see Wimmel, *op. cit.* 103-11, esp. 106; cf. also Callim. *Ep.* 28.1-2, adduced in connection with Lucretius by E. Fraenkel in *Das Problem des Klassischen und die Antike*, ed. W. Jaeger (Leipzig and Berlin 1931) 63, also O. Regenbogen, "Lukrez. Seine Gestalt in seinem Gedicht", *Neue Wege zur Antike* 2.1 (Leipzig and Berlin 1932) 24. For the possible origin of the image in a Pythagorean saying, see Pfeiffer on *Aet.* Fr. 1.25f., and cf. also Parm. B 1.27 DK.

27) Kroll, *op. cit.* 28-30 (suspecting, as others have done, the precedence of Philetas), E. Reitzenstein, in *Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein* (Leipzig and Berlin 1931) 54f, Waszink, *loc. cit.* (n. 16) 216f., 239, A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik* (Heidelberg 1965) 98-102, 110f.; Pfeiffer is cautious about assuming the presence of the motif in the *Aetia* (*op. cit.* 11).

28) Fraenkel, *loc. cit.* 63, Ferrero, *op. cit.* 22 n. 2, 44, Kenney, *loc. cit.* 370. Callimachus's rejection of a public spring in *Ep.* 28.3-4 is also comparable.

29) For the 'primus-Motiv' in relation to Ennius see Suerbaum, *op. cit.* 269f. Lucretius repeats his claim to novelty in 5.335f.

30) The unworn path parallel is mentioned by Munro, *ad. loc.*; for the other reminiscences (3.1037-38, 4.912) see Grilli, *op. cit.* 102-3, 118.

31) *Loc. cit.* 371; cf. Mantero, *op. cit.* 103-4. It is tempting to speculate whether Lucretian and Catullan insistence on *lepos* (Lucr. 1.28, 934, Cat. 1.1, 6.17, 16.7, 50.7), remarked upon by, e.g., Ferrero, *op. cit.* 38f. and Newman, *loc. cit.* 102, has anything to do with the Callimachean catchword λεπτός (*Aet.* Fr. 1.11, 24, *Ep.* 27.3, and see Reitzenstein, *loc. cit.* 25-40, on the history of the word). Several points discourage the idea - e.g., translation of λεπτός by *tenuis* elsewhere (Lucr. 4.42 etc., Cat. 51.9), contemporary use of *lepos* in literary criticism (e.g., *Rhet. Herenn.* 4.32, Cic. *de Orat.* 1.213, 3.206), differences in sense - but ears so attuned to etymological connections as were those of the Romans might well have discerned an association; cf. S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace* (New Haven and London 1962) 39 n. 85, V. Buchheit, "Sal et lepos versiculorum (Catull. c.16)", *Hermes* 104 (1976) 338 n. 41.

32) For instance the *thyrsus* image (923) lends a sense of Bacchic abandon to the whole passage; moreover, there is a significant difference between Callimachus's narrow path (*Aet.* Fr. 1.27-8) and the remote haunts of Lucretius (926); also between the trickling Callimachean spring (*Hymn* 2.111-12) and the more robust-sounding *fontes* of Lucretius (927: cf. the mention of *largos haustus e fontibus magnis* in 1.412, which seems notably un-Callimachean, *pace* Ferrero, *op. cit.* 22).

33) Cf., e.g., Cic. *Parad.* 5, Varr. *L.L.* 5.9, *Men.* 219, *O.L.D.* s.v.

34) Ferrero, *op. cit.* 21 n. 2, Cazzaniga, *op. cit.* 25f., Grilli, *op. cit.* 123-4 (suggesting an Epicurean provenance also, on the basis of Epict. *Diss.* 2.20.9 and Him. *Or.* 3.17), Tarditi, *loc. cit.* 88; see also Kroll, *op. cit.* 38 (with n. 34), R. O. A. M. Lyne's commentary (Cambridge 1978) on *Ciris* 46.

35) Apparently a conflation of the idea of sleeplessness with the metaphor *lucubrare* (n. 33), as in Auson. 19.1.5-6 Peiper (*damnosae... musae, / iacturam somni quae parit atque olei*). With *Arateis... lucernis* compare Juv. 1.51 (*Venusina... lucerna*).

36) 'Seems merely a poetical epithet' (Munro). D. West, in *The Imagery and Poetry of Lucretius* (Edinburgh 1969) 81, remarks that '*noctes vigilare serenas* is the phrase of a man who enjoyed the solitude and serenity of working at night, and who couldn't keep away from the window'.

37) Leonard and Smith, *ad loc.*, J. P. Elder, *TAPA* 85 (1954) 105.

38) Cf. Philetas's description of the poet as πολλὰ μογῆσας (Fr. 10.3), Call. *Ep.* 6.1, Asclepiades, *A.P.* 7.11.1, Leonidas, *A.P.* 9.25.5, Theoc. 7.51, with Gow's note, Kroll, *op. cit.* 38, Piwonka, *op. cit.* 125f., 139 n. 2.

39) See Lyne's note on *Ciris* 99, adding Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.224, *A.P.* 291.

40) For the metaphor cf., e.g., Cic. *Opt. Gen.* 12, *Brut.* 326, Ov. *Pont.* 1.5.61; its Alexandrian quality is illustrated by Cat. 1.2, where *expolitum* is more than literal. The Lucretian passage continues with a self-conscious use of *canere* (6.84), which Newman believes was a catchword for neoteric poets (*loc. cit.* 98f., esp. 101-2), though he is opposed by C. Griffiths in *PVS* 9 (1969-70) 7f.

41) Identical to 4.180-82, but with extra verses integrally attached (912-15).

42) As Lambinus noticed. I have discussed the imitation in my D. Phil. thesis, *A Commentary on Selected Passages of Lucretius IV* (Oxford 1977) 194f.

43) Ferrero, *op. cit.* 23, Tarditi, *loc. cit.* 89.

44) Cf. Ferrero, *op. cit.* 17ff., but it is hard to see how the *De Rerum Natura* could escape the charge of being ἐν αἰσμο διηγεῖς.

45) *Loc. cit.* 316; cf. Newman, *loc. cit.* 100-101, F. Bornmann, *Maia* 19 (1967) 44f. For this type of animal comparison cf. Pind. *Ol.* 2.87-8, Call. *Aet. Fr.* 1.29-30, Theoc. 5.136-7, 7.41, Lucr. 3.6f., Virg. *Ecl.* 9.36, Prop. 2.34.83-4.

46) Bignone, *op. cit.* 200, L. Mackay, *Latinitas* 3 (1955) 210; a similar technique of encomium is applied to Epicurus in 6.1f.: cf. F. Giancotti, *Il preludio di Lucrezio* (Messina and Florence 1959) 79.

47) Cf. Hom. *Il.* 4.426, Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* (n. 11) 2.64 n. 2.

48) *anfractibus* refers to the wheeling sweep of the sea around the twisting coastline of Sicily (cf. its use in 5.683), not to the coastline itself as Bailey's note seems to imply.

49) It is interesting to observe that line 14 of the *Hymn* is a pure Golden Line. Unfortunately, the Lucretian line can only be construed as such by taking *Ionium* with *virus* instead of *aequor*, which is unnatural. Nevertheless, Lucretius has preserved something of the interlocking arrangement by the separation of *glaucis... undis* (matching πολλήν... ἄχνην).

50) = 5.111-12, in reference to himself. Epicureans appear to have sometimes affected an oracular pose for polemical purposes: cf. Epic. *S.V.* 29, Lucr. 3.14f., 6.6, and see Pease's note on Cic. *N.D.* 1.66.

51) A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig 1890) 30.

52) The Lucretian parallel was first noted by O. Schneider, in *Callimachea* 1 (Leipzig 1870) 277. Munro's reference was picked up by Merrill.

53) In harmony with Epicurean doctrine: cf. D.L. 10.135, Cic. *Div.* 1.5, with Pease's note.

54) The title *Acragantinus* (716), the association with a wonderful environment and the climactic praise of his inspired discoveries all sound vaguely hymnic. However, further echoes of Callimachus are lacking, apart from certain similarities which are no doubt coincidental: e.g., between the statement that Sicily 'bore' Empedocles (*gessit*, 717) and the pervasive notion that Delos was Apollo's nurse (2.5-6, 10, 51, 264-5, 275-6); *tri-quetris* (717) could be compared with τριγλῶχιν, which is applied to Sicily in *Aet. Fr.* 1.36 and Poseidon's trident in *Hymn* 4.31, but the idea is fairly conventional (cf., e.g., Thuc. 6.2.2, Polyb. 1.42.3, Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.55. Sil. 5.489, Quint. 1.6.30); the uncommon lengthening of the first vowel of *Italiae* (721, if correct) is found in Call. *Hymn* 3.58 (cf. Norden on Virg. *Aen.* 6.61, Austin on *Aen.* 1.2, Fordyce on Cat. 1.5); the alliteration and polyptoton of 726f. are a little like *Hymn* 4.266f., though it would be unwise to postulate a model for such a common Lucretian feature.

55) Cf. his self-apotheosis in B 112.4 DK.

56) See further P. H. Schrijvers, *Horror ac Divina Voluptas* (Amsterdam 1970) 308f.

57) A typically Alexandrian feature (see Nisbet and Hubbard's note on

Hor. *Carm.* 1.7.23), though Lucretius's irony is authentically Epicurean (cf., e.g., Us. 228-29 on the master's contempt for mythological poetry).

58) The parallel was noted by Lambinus; cf. Munro on 2.635, Ferrero, *op. cit.* 131 n. 1.

59) This and *πρύλεις* were obscure words: E. Cahen, *Les hymnes de Callimaque* (Paris 1930) 28; maybe Lucretius received elucidation from an annotated text.

60) For this armed dance see W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* 2.1 (Leipzig 1890-94) 1611-12.

61) Cf. Ov. *Fast.* 4.208 (*tutus ut infanti vagiat ore puer*).

62) Roscher, *op. cit.* 1591, West, *op. cit.* 108.

63) Bailey argues for an allegorical account, which seems an unlikely subject for verse. Perhaps Lucretius has foisted an allegorical interpretation upon straightforward poetic descriptions, drawing from the same source as Varro (Aug. *Civ. Dei* 7.24) and Ovid (*Fast.* 4.215f.), which Boyancé thinks was Stoic (*op. cit.* 123). Since none of the extant descriptions of the goddess in classical Greek poetry fit Lucretius's reference, it is worth mentioning that Cybele, Attis and the Galli were a favourite Hellenistic and late Republican theme (cf., e.g., Call. Fr. 761, with Pfeiffer's note, Nic. *Alex.* 7-8, 217-20, Hermes. Fr. 8 Powell, A.P. 6.51, 217-20, 281, 9.340, Cat. 35, 63). The verbal play *docti... docentes* (600-602) suggests a learned version of the Alexandrian type, which is the assumption of W. Kranz in *Philologus* 96 (1944) 68.

64) The *poetae* seem to be in the foreground until 610, where Lucretius turns to the universal acceptance of Cybele's cult.

65) Ferrero, *op. cit.* 90 n. 2, hints at a reminiscence. Cf. also Ov. *Am.* 3.6.17 (*veterum mendacia vatum*).

66) Contrast the more respectful attitude in *Nem.* 3.52, and, later, Apollonius 1.18, Arat. *Phaen.* 637.

67) *θηναϊοί* is another word of difficult meaning: Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* 2.9 n. 1.

68) Cf. Antig. *Hist. Mirab.* 12, Philostr. *Apoll.* 2.10, Apollon. *Hist. Mirab.* 8, Ael. *Nat. Anim.* 5.8, Plin. *N.H.* 10.30.

69) For a full account of the myth see Ov. *Met.* 2.552f.

70) Schneider, *op. cit.* 2 (Leipzig 1873) 98 (arguing for the presence of the story in the *Aetia*, before the *Hecale* passage was discovered), Munro on 6.754 (4th ed.), I. Kapp, *Callimachi Hecalae Fragmenta* (Diss. Berlin 1915) 47, W. Lück, *Die Quellenfrage im 5. und 6. Buch des Lukrez* (Diss. Breslau 1932) 142 (repeating Schneider's error), Newman, *loc. cit.* 100, Tarditi, *loc. cit.* 92.

71) Pfeiffer, *ad loc.*; cf. Ov. *Met.* 2.568.

72) Cf. also Antipater, A.P. 6.159.3, Alcaeus, A.P. 8.3, and see C. F. H. Bruchmann, *Epitheta Deorum, quae apud poetas Graecos leguntur* (Leipzig 1893) 15-16.

73) C. F. H. Bruchmann, *Epitheta Deorum, quae apud poetas Latinos leguntur* (Leipzig 1902) 71.

74) Cf., e.g., Hdt. 4.180.5, Eur. *Ion* 872.

75) The lake is mentioned in *Aet.* Fr. 37.1, and cf. Fr. 584.

76) Ravens are proverbial for blackness (Otto, *op. cit.* 95, Bömer on Ov. *Met.* 2.535), swans for whiteness (Otto, *op. cit.* 104, Bömer on Ov. *Met.* 2.539). The contrast of raven and swan is present, to a varying degree, in Callimachus (Fr. 260.56), Lucretius and Ovid (*Met.* 2.539); cf., also, Mart. 1.53.8, 3.43.2, Otto, *op. cit.* 104.

77) Bömer on Ov. *Met.* 2.535.

78) *Loc. cit.* 380f.

79) Gow and Page, *op. cit.* 156.

80) Esp. Meleager, *A.P.* 5.149.2.

81) Gow and Page, *op. cit.* 163. In Theoc. 23.18 it may be a gesture of farewell rather than of sentimental adoration (see Gow's note).

82) For the sake of completeness, some of these are listed here, though direct influence is very implausible: Lucr. 1.40, cf. Call. *Hymn* 6.137 (but the prayer is an obvious one; cf., e.g., Euphorion, in the Loeb Library volume *Select Papyri*, 3 ed. D. L. Page [London and Cambridge, repr. 1970] 496 line 19, Hermocles, Fr. 1.21 Powell), Lucr. 1.125, 920, cf. Call. *Hec.* Fr. 313 ('salt tears' is probably an Ennian phrase and can be paralleled by Acc. *Tr.* Frs 420, 578 Ribbeck), Lucr. 2.196 etc., cf. Call. *Hymn* 2.4 (but also Hom. *Il.* 7.448, Arat. *Phaen.* 733), Lucr. 3.957, cf. Call. *Ep.* 31.5-6 (a proverbial idea: see Kenney *ad loc.* and Gow on Theoc. 11.75), Lucr. 5.1f., cf. Call. *Hymn* 1.92-3 (Enn. *Ann.* 174 is closer), Lucr. 5.256, cf. Call. *Ep.* 44.4 (Hor. *Carm.* 1.31.8 is a much more likely imitation).

83) R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford 1968) 124f.

84) Lück, *op. cit.* 140-41, Pfeiffer, *op. cit.* (n. 83) 134-5; for a history of the genre see *RE* 18.3 (1949) 1137f.

85) Cf. Diod. Sic. 17.50.4-5, Ov. *Met.* 15.309f., Plin. *N.H.* 2.228, Curt. Ruf. 4.7.22, Arr. *Anab.* 3.4.2, and see Lück, *op. cit.* 147.

86) For instance, Lucretius makes artistic use of several so-called 'Alexandrian' features, such as epanalepsis, spondaic fifth foot and interlocking word order, though not of course to the same extent as Catullus. It is noteworthy that Nepos, the dedicatee of the Catullan *libellus*, pairs Lucretius with Catullus as the best poets of their age and implies that both were *elegantes* (Att. 12.4); see further Alfonsi, *loc. cit.* (n. 9) 276-77, and compare Cicero's well-known appraisal of Lucretius in terms of *ars* as well as *ingenium* (*ad Quint.* 2.10.3).

CATULLUS 64 AND THE HEROIC AGE: A REPLY

JAMES H. DEE

One of the prominent trends in recent criticism of Catullus 64 is the insistence of many interpreters that Catullus is taking a moral stand, not only against the immoralities of his own day, as indicated in the epilogue (384-408), but also against the vices and brutalities of the Heroic Age. In this paper I shall attempt to show that Catullus does not express any especially strong disapproval of the tales he elaborates in poem 64 and also that it is far from certain that the epilogue is as serious an attack on late Republican *mores* as many have thought it to be. In this demonstration I shall concentrate on what I consider some weaknesses and errors of this moralizing type of interpretation, in particular as it is applied to the section on Achilles, the Heroic and Golden Ages, the role of Jupiter and divine justice, and the epilogue. In a few parts of this essay I am inevitably following Giuseppe Giangrande, whose challenging article on this poem deserves wider recognition.¹⁾

In certain works of the last two decades a virtual consensus appears to have emerged on the section of poem 64 concerning Achilles (323-381). For example, Michael Putnam states that the Song of the Fates, which "*should be* designed to elaborate the future happiness of Peleus and Thetis," instead identifies Achilles with the "bloody brutality of war."²⁾ Leo Curran raises a possible objection to this approach, only to set it aside; he states that the magnitude of Achilles' slaughter in lines 348-360

was an accepted, indeed glorified, part of the heroic code. But even if Homer or his heroes could accept such a simple view of life (and in fact they did not), after Euripides and after the Alexandrians no poet, least of all a sophisticated and urbane poet like Catullus, could describe such conduct from an uncritical point of view. We can be confident that Catullus regarded Achilles' brutality as we would.³⁾

This is very near to asserting an identity of Catullus' attitudes with the critic's and it therefore invites our skepticism. Curran's idea that

Euripides and the Alexandrians exhibit a new revulsion against battlefield bloodshed and brutality needs demonstration. Further, one may wonder where to seek the "heroic code" if Homer and his heroes have already outgrown it and whether "sophistication" and "urbanity," as they would have been understood in the ancient world, have any necessary relation to high moral standards or to humane and compassionate sensibilities of the sort that Curran requires. Finally, J. C. Bramble, in what is often called the best recent discussion, says that certain details of the Fates' Song, namely blood, impiety, and destruction, "derogate from the initial atmosphere of heroism;" he describes the sacrifice of Polyxena as "an act of unwarranted barbarity," and says of the prophecy in general, "blood and slaughter are the keynotes, not heroism and virtue."⁴) But the ethical connotations of "heroism" and "virtue" are misplaced here. Blood and destruction are quite characteristic of those figures called *hêrôes* in Greek, and so is a fair amount of impiety. And it has not been demonstrated that Catullus in particular regarded "blood and slaughter" as inherently reprehensible or that his concept of *virtus* involved an ethical sense - Werner Eisenhut has after all argued that *virtus* in Catullus is entirely traditional, i.e. non-ethical, in meaning.⁵)

A reply to this apparent consensus is in order. We might note first that these writers often use "loaded terms" to help guide our responses; "bloody brutality," "unwarranted barbarity" and the like express the critic's feelings without providing evidence that Catullus felt the same way. How indeed can we know that Catullus would, for example, automatically have condemned the deeds of some mythical warrior, simply because they brought misery to the victims' mothers or because of the bloodshed involved? The sensibilities revealed in the remainder of the Catullan corpus do not seem to have been very delicate in such matters. Kinsey (925, note 3) faces this problem briefly: he says that Catullus "does not elsewhere admire soldiers," referring to poem 11, where in his opinion the mention of *Caesaris... monumenta magni* is not serious, and to poem 68.89-90 and 99, where Troy is reproached for causing so many deaths. But these passages have nothing to do with views on soldiers or "the military." Catullus' apparent dislike of Caesar has no direct relationship to his being a "man of the military," and even the intensity of language in poem 68 may have been prompted as much by the fact that Catullus' brother happened to die near there as by any outrage at the slaughters of the Trojan War. Interpretation of poem 68 is notoriously difficult, but it may be suggested that Catullus is more concerned to emphasize the pathos of the

loss of so many *good* men (*virum et virtutum... cinis*, 90) than to criticize those warriors for killing each other.

Let us now consider the matter of Achilles and Polyxena in greater detail, for there are specific grounds for doubting these critics' evaluation of this episode. They assume that the sacrifice must be taken as a perverted marriage or as an example of the rapacious brutality of warriors, and so must lead the reader, ancient or modern, to condemn the code of behavior that demanded or permitted such an act. This seems to me a simplification of the complexity of the sources on Polyxena and of the ancient attitudes toward the heroes.

The surviving evidence does not force any single interpretation of the Polyxena story upon us; rather, the assignment of motive and responsibility is as varied as our knowledge of other Greek myths would lead us to expect. A brief survey of these sources, based on Ernst Wüst's treatment, may help.⁶⁾ Among the earliest known literary accounts, the *Cypria*, the *Iliupersis*, Stesichorus, Ibycus, and Simonides are all aware of Polyxena's death. In the *Cypria* (frag. XXVI OCT), she was wounded by Odysseus and Diomedes during the city's capture, died, and was buried by Neoptolemus. Proclus' summary of the *Iliupersis* (OCT p. 108) says that the Greeks sacrificed her (*sphagiazousin*) at Achilles' tomb; this clearly brings Achilles and Polyxena together but leaves the motive unspecified. Achilles' ghost appeared in the *Ilias parva* and in the *Nostoi*, but without any connection to the sacrifice. The ghost also appeared in Sophocles' *Polyxena* (480 N²=523 Pearson & Radt) and this time the sacrifice was clearly at issue. Euripides' *Hecuba* is the first unambiguous literary source for the ghost's express demand (line 40), yet the same play has other accounts. The chorus mentions Achilles' staying of the fleet and his complaint that his tomb was *ageraston*, and Neoptolemus invites the ghost to come and drink Polyxena's blood (lines 111-15 and 536-37). A few late sources bring in the quasi-romantic theme of a love relationship and a possible marriage; in the first three, Achilles was killed from ambush when he came to negotiate for Polyxena's hand, so the motive for the sacrifice could have been love or revenge.⁷⁾ Thus the posthumous marriage, sometimes taken for granted and interpreted *in mal. part.*, is quite rare in our texts. The vase paintings listed by Wüst confirm the early appearance of the sacrifice, without providing evidence for the motive or for the audience's attitudes.

There are then as many as four possible reasons for Polyxena's death:

- (1) she was offered as a *geras* to Achilles, with or without a demand from

the ghost; (2) she was used to appease the ghost and end the staying of the fleet; (3) Achilles loved her and demanded a marriage in death; (4) he required her death as punishment for her involvement in his murder. One's judgment of Achilles might vary with the version chosen, so we must observe that Catullus is content to label Polyxena a *praeda* and a *testis* to Achilles' *virtutes*, which implies the first motive, and that he does not attempt to specify whose decision it was that Polyxena be sacrificed.

There is also a general consideration which may illuminate the problem from a different angle. Simply put, the question is this: what is the origin of the story of Polyxena? Few would argue that the sacrifice really occurred as described, although some commentators speak of it as if it were as verifiable as some modern atrocity. Ernst Wüst sees in the name Polyxena a faded chthonic goddess of death and concludes that in the original form of the tale Apollo and Polyxena must have combined to kill Achilles. This might be thought to explain Achilles' "hostility" toward Polyxena, but it seems to me unnecessarily clever. It raises more questions than it answers and there is inevitably no literary or artistic evidence to support it. Instead of regarding the tale as a distorted reflection of a much older conception, we may be closer to the truth if we take it as a development which is typical of the post-Homeric Epic Cycle. The differences between Homer and the Cycle have been well explored by Jasper Griffin, who notes especially the element of perverse romanticism in the tales of Iphigenia, Penthesilea, Polyxena, and Helen: "The conception of the hero in the *Iliad* is... more heroic - the warrior does not war on women.... In the Cycle both heroism and realism are rejected in favour of an over-heated taste for sadistically coloured scenes."⁸) This argument may lead to a curious conclusion. If we accept Griffin's restriction of the term "heroic" to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, a restriction I am not sure the ancients would have recognized, then the "heroic code" and the "warrior ethos" are not responsible for Polyxena's death. Rather, the "blame" for her demise should be laid at the doors of those poets who concocted such scenes, following their own or their audiences' tastes for the strikingly melodramatic. This pleasant paradox, that the poets, not the soldiers, were the "brutal" ones, is perhaps forced; but it draws attention to the central question: how did the ancients (and how should we) regard the acts attributed to the *hêrôes* in the Greek mythological tradition? The exponents of the moralizing approach do not mince words in their condemnation of Achilles and the "heroic code" in connection with the sacrifice. At the other end of the spectrum is Giuseppe Giangrande (142-43),

who offers a vigorous defense of the "rights" of a "true hero of the Homeric type" to have his quasi-divine status honored and his need for a wife fulfilled. But Giangrande's main authority is Quintus Smyrnaeus, who is surely amalgamating the old tradition of the *geras*-offering with the idea that Achilles was a *theos* among the gods after death, an idea quite foreign to the severe outlook of *Odyssey* 11. Similarly, Giangrande oversimplifies considerably in his belief that Achilles, in being *ameiliktos* toward Polyxena, was merely displaying that laudable lack of sentimentality which is typical of Homeric heroes. After all, *Erbarmungslosigkeit* is treated in Homer as blameworthy, not laudable.⁹⁾ The truth, for Catullus and for us, probably lies between these extremes. The ancient legends concerning the *hêrôes* were full of spectacular misdeeds, and it does not appear that ancient authors felt compelled to treat them all as factual and to take a moral stand for or against. Catullus' own attitude is not easily estimated, but one might observe that Greek myth is in fact surprisingly rare in his surviving works. Only poems 34, 63, 64, and 68 have extended borrowings, and fewer than 20 other allusions, most not very recondite, are found elsewhere. Such comparative indifference, a contrast to his oft-noted Alexandrianism, suggests that Catullus did not ponder deeply on the subject. More specifically, the tone of the passage on Polyxena in poem 64 does not seem to me to hint at serious outrage; Esmé Beyers' remarks (89) on the meaning of the word-arrangements in these lines confuse an attempt to create pathos with an intent to express condemnation. This confusion, as I call it, will recur in our examination of recent discussions of the Theseus episode.

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There are several other points, raised by certain critics, which call for consideration here. They involve alleged "flaws" in the Heroic Age, the relation of the Heroic and Golden Ages, and the portrayal of Jupiter in the Theseus - Ariadne episode. Since the poem deals with two tales from what we usually label the Heroic Age, quite a few scholars have concluded that Catullus must have meant to "say something" about that age. In general, they believe that he meant to demonstrate the immoral and unedifying features of that supposedly glorious period, so that the poem does not simply play upon the contrast of the better past and the degeneracy decried in the epilogue but subtly reveals that a similar corruption was already inherent in the very standards of the Heroic Age itself. A few examples must suffice. Bramble (38) declares that when the reader discovers that there is "a flaw in the Age of Heroes,... he then realises

that even the time at which Peleus and Thetis first met was not free from ambivalence." Harmon (318 and 320 - emphasis his) says that Catullus "makes a statement about the nature of the heroic ideal... through the characterization of Theseus" and concludes from Theseus' "preference" for his *patria* over Ariadne that "the heroic code, as it is presented in 64, actually *encourages* extreme cruelty."¹⁰⁾ In reply, I would observe that we are not obliged to assume that every recorded act of a *hêrôs* must exemplify or be in accord with some undefined "heroic code" or even with generally acceptable moral standards. If all the *hêrôes* had been as modest and virtuous as Peleus and Philemon, many of the tales in Greek myth would never have come into being. If this view is correct, then to seek for revelation of a "flaw" in the Heroic Age or in heroic *virtus* is misguided. The common opinion, held throughout antiquity, that the Heroic Age was a wonderful period, better than our own, and also full of undeniable atrocities, may seem odd to some, but the ancients were quite willing to entertain such apparent inconsistencies.¹¹⁾ Similar problems arise concerning the "heroic code," which we have seen both excoriated and exonerated in the case of Polyxena. As Jasper Griffin's paper makes clear, we need a full study of what is properly "heroic" in Homer and the epic tradition - and we should remember that Greek has no exact equivalents for our "hero" group of words.¹²⁾

The second point to be discussed is a tendency of several critics to speak of the Heroic Age as if it were a golden age, even The Golden Age. Bramble (38 - emphasis mine) describes lines 38-42 as "in some ways, reminiscent of treatments of the Golden Age," and he argues that since Catullus "*cheats* the reader of the *expected* description of nature's automatic beneficence toward man," he must intend to show that "the evil potential of civilisation has already started to manifest itself." He adds that line 42, *squalida desertis rubigo infertur aratris*, "suggests wholesale dereliction" of the land and that Catullus is intimating that "at the time of the wedding man was being seduced by luxury and opulence away from his hardy agricultural existence."¹³⁾ But what are the "seduced" Thessalians to be imagined as doing after they leave the palace (lines 267-68 and 276-77), if not going back to their toil in the fields? And in any case, a reader who knew his mythology would not feel cheated if a description of the Golden Age did not follow lines 38-42, for the wedding of Peleus and Thetis in most accounts assures Zeus's eternal rule on Olympus - and Zeus rules over all ages *except* the Golden.¹⁴⁾ That Catullus knew this story is clear from his treatment of Prometheus in lines 294-97. Less cautiously,

Phyllis Forsyth speaks of "that supposedly Golden Heroic Age" and declares that Catullus means that "man has not altered his character; even the traditionally golden age of the heroes had its flaws and failures."¹⁵⁾ But an examination of the sources on the Golden and Heroic Ages shows that the qualities predicated of men in the Golden Age have nothing in common with those of the men of the Heroic Age: the purity and simplicity of life regularly attributed to the Golden Age can hardly square with the memorable crimes and punishments which dominate the Heroic Age.¹⁶⁾

The third point is the matter of Jupiter's role and divine justice. Here again, the search for a moralizing interpretation runs into difficulties. Kinsey (919-22) effectively paints himself into a corner in his discussion of Jupiter's behavior. He observes that, by agreeing to Ariadne's prayer for vengeance, Jupiter becomes "responsible" for Theseus' forgetfulness, and he finds it "unsatisfactory" that Aegeus, an innocent victim, should be punished by death, not through a fault in Theseus' character, but through Jupiter's intervention. He concludes that the "apparently inept decision of Jupiter" may be merely ironic, and he refers us to other supposedly humorous treatments of Jupiter in Catullus, namely the phrase *Iovis aestuosi* (7.5) and the "disrespectful" mention of his *amores* in 68.138-40. In his recent riposte to Giangrande, T. P. Wiseman (*LCM* 3, 1978, 22) approaches the problem differently. He says of Ariadne, "her insistence that her complaint is a just one (64.190 and 198) is not enough in itself to make us accept her version, but the matter is put beyond question when Jupiter grants her prayer.... The point is that for Catullus in this poem the gods are characterized by *iustificata mens* (64.406)." There is quite a distance between these two views, but they agree in assuming that uniform moral sense ought to emerge from the story, either in itself or through Catullus' deliberate retelling. Yet the striking thing about many Greek myths is an irreducible element of amorality; they frequently do not yield a simple moral calculus because their tellers, in Ben Edwin Perry's phrase, "viewed things separately" and saw no need to make their tales into theodicies. After all, what sense does it make to reward a mortal with immortality and a divine marriage simply because of her brief aid (or her "fidelity") to Theseus, or to punish an innocent father with death for his son's transgression against that most unserious of oaths, the lover's sworn promise?¹⁷⁾ Is that the *iustificata mens* of the gods?

Such questions make clear the difficulty facing interpreters, that Catullus' version proves to be not very edifying if we must insist upon

working out its moral implications to the end. Kinsey's approach has the merit of recognizing the virtual incoherence of Catullus' narrative in this respect, but he errs in retreating to the explanation that Catullus was being ironic. It is simpler to say that Catullus was primarily interested in literary and emotional effectiveness in each part of his poem, without worrying whether the gods were just or whether Theseus and Ariadne "got what they deserved," whatever that might be. Scholars sometimes forget that audiences, and even well educated readers, can enjoy a fine story without trying to puzzle out the ultimate moral meaning of it all - and that this is frequently the tacit assumption of both author and audience in the ancient world.

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We turn now to the epilogue, which many have regarded as a serious and perhaps autobiographical piece. L. P. Wilkinson has said that it was the product of a "mature, more reflective, Catullus," who was "depressed by the decadence of the contemporary world."¹⁸⁾ Kenneth Quinn agrees that Catullus took his moralizing seriously, though he denies him much maturity: "As moral statement it is clumsy.... Like many young men, Catullus has little talent for moral analysis."¹⁹⁾ The major difficulty here is that, except for the word *nobis* in 406, there is no indication that Catullus means us to think particularly of his own time in the epilogue - and even *nobis* seems in context more likely to be general in meaning ("from all of us mortals") than specific ("from me and my contemporaries"). Although the examples of the crimes that drove Justice from the world may reveal a Catullan trait in their emphasis on *family*-centered outrages, scholars have found it hard to cite instances from the Roman Republic, or even from Greek myth, in which those specific crimes are attributed to humans.²⁰⁾ In other words, a Roman reader would not necessarily take Catullus' text as referring to his own time.

Another approach has been offered. Giangrande's article attempts to prove that Catullus was directly influenced by such Hellenistic poets as Rhianus, who, reacting against Apollonius' removal of the heroic element from epic, continued unhesitatingly to celebrate the martial glory of warriors. His final paragraph seeks to clinch the argument that Rhianus in particular was Catullus' model by pointing to a similarity between the epilogue of 64 and Rhianus, fragment 1 Powell. The pessimistic condemnation of present-day morals in Catullus could not come, he says (146), from a court poet like Callimachus, so Rhianus, "in his splendid isolation, safely away from Alexandria," is the most likely candidate. This is

appealing, but doubts persist. The passage from Rhianus is in fact not really parallel to Catullus' epilogue. In the fragment, Rhianus says, "We humans are all *hamartinooi* and we bear the gods' gifts *aphradei kradiê*." As examples, he contrasts the man who, lacking a livelihood, complains against the gods and the man who, receiving prosperity and power, cannot control himself and tries to be an equal of the gods. *Atê* pursues the latter and eventually makes him pay the price, thereby serving Zeus and Justice. This summary of the 21 lines should suffice to show how different the passages are: Rhianus is not describing a drastic change in human morals but uttering familiar commonplaces about man's innate folly (for which, cf. *Odyssey* 18.130-42). Further, the references to Justice and the punishment of the arrogant do not sound "pessimistic." And since most of the remarks in the fragment are commonplaces, we are not required to regard them as political polemic against the "new royal courts," although some eminent scholars have said that they are.²¹⁾ The example in line 14, the courting of Athena, may indeed be an allusion to the megalomania of the Thracian Cotys, but it is stated in general terms and is little more than a commonplace itself, as the parallels in Alcman (1 PMG) and Cercidas (17.38 Powell) show. In fact, the text of Athenaeus (12.531F) which preserves Theopompus' narrative about Cotys marrying Athena (*FGrHist* 115 F 31) seems to me to share only the name of Athena with the text of Rhianus. These reservations about the fragment should keep us from using it as evidence that Rhianus could not have lived in Alexandria; as W. Aly observed long ago, *pace* Jacoby, the surviving material does not permit a clear decision on that question.²²⁾ In sum, Rhianus can be, at present, no more than a hypothetical source for the epilogue.

In view of the weaknesses of the foregoing explanations, a new proposal may be ventured, which will attempt to account for one important feature of Catullus' epilogue. It is possible that it presents an ingenious combination of two previously independent mythical motifs. From Homer, *Odyssey* 3.419-20 and 7.199-206 and Hesiod, fragment 1 M-W, there was a tradition that the gods had once walked among mortals and attended the banquets of certain *hêrôes*. The wedding of Peleus and Thetis illustrates the motif, as do the banquets of Tantalus and Lycaon and the gathering at Mecone. Alongside this tradition, apparently unrelated to it, was another, that at some point in human history the gods had departed the earth because of the wanton criminality of humans, Justice

or a similar goddess being the last to leave. This tradition occurs in Hesiod (*Works and Days* 197-201), Theognis (1135-50), and Aratus (*Phaenomena* 129-34), where *Aidôs/Nemesis*, *Elpis* and *Dikê* respectively are involved. This second theme is a familiar moralizing refrain, taken with varying degrees of seriousness. I suggest, then, that in the epilogue Catullus (or his Hellenistic source²³) joined an element from the moralizing tradition about human degeneracy to the non-moralizing theme of the Peleus - Thetis marriage. That is, to the folk-motif, "The gods once appeared among men," there is added a sort of continuation, "They no longer do *because* (*quare*, 407) human vice drove them from the earth." The insertion of the causal connection is the novelty.

To sum up, I have tried to show that the emerging consensus in recent writings on Catullus 64 is in error in several important respects. I hope to have made clear the difficulties attendant upon any attempt to derive a consistent and serious morality from the surface of Catullus' narrative. If my view is correct, that Catullus, like other ancient authors, felt free to develop episodes from the myths without judging them, then a certain quantity of commentary on the poem is well meant but over-subtle. The differences of opinion in this paper reflect fundamentally divergent assumptions about the nature of literature in antiquity. The view for which I have argued here accepts the possibility of a form of "detachment" of an author's personal moral judgment from the subject matter of his writings. Such a detachment seems to me an essential part of the experience and appreciation of many types of literature, for, almost paradoxically, it makes possible the emotional effects that so many ancient poets sought. This view, in my opinion, accounts for what we find in poem 64 and allows us to understand the work in the way Catullus would have expected.

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

NOTES

1) "Das Epyllion Catulls im Lichte der hellenistischen Epik," *AntClass* 41 (1972), 123-47 - hereafter Giangrande. For a spirited controversy on

the subject, cf. T. P. Wiseman, *LCM* 2 (1977), 177-80; Giangrande, *ibid.*, 229-31; and Wiseman, *ibid.*, 3 (1978), 21-22. My disagreements with Giangrande will be evident from the discussion.

2) "The Art of Catullus 64," *HSCP* 65 (1961), 165-205, esp. 192 (emphasis mine). Cf. also T. E. Kinsey, *Latomus* 24 (1965), 911-31 - hereafter Kinsey.

3) "Catullus 64 and the Heroic Age," *YCS* 21 (1969), 171-92, esp. 191. Giangrande (138-39) takes issue with this remark, but his method of refutation differs from mine.

4) "Structure and Ambiguity in Catullus LXIV," *PCPS* N.S. 16 (1970), 22-41, esp. 25-26 - hereafter Bramble. For similar condemnations of Achilles, cf. E. E. Beyers, *Acta Classica* (S. Africa) 3 (1960), 86-89 - hereafter Beyers; D. P. Harmon, *Latomus* 32 (1973), 311-31 - hereafter Harmon; M. B. Skinner, *Pacific Coast Philology* 11 (1976), 52-61; and D. Konstan, *Catullus' Indictment of Rome: The Meaning of Catullus 64* (Amsterdam, 1977) - hereafter Konstan.

5) *Virtus Romana* (Munich, 1973), 43-44.

6) "Polyxena," *RE* 21.2 (1952), 1840-50.

7) *Alloi* in Schol. Eur. *Hec.* 41, *alii* in Serv. *Aen.* 3.322, Hygin. *Fab.* 110, Quint. Smyrn. 14.254, a papyrus "epyllion" of Nonnian date (Packl 1428 = Pack² 1803), and Mythogr. Vatic. 1.140 and 2.205. Giangrande, *Eranos* 60 (1962), 154, note 4, observes that there must have been an Alexandrian model for the papyrus epyllion; if so, it would be the earliest source for the romance theme.

8) "The Epic Cycle and the Uniqueness of Homer," *JHS* 97 (1977), 29-53, esp. 45.

9) Cf. M. Hoffmann, *Die ethische Terminologie bei Homer, Hesiod und den alten Elegikern und Jambographen* (Tübingen, 1914), 15-18.

10) Comparable expressions in Kinsey (916) and Konstan (46), who says that Theseus' *oblivio* "marks the breakdown in the traditional concept of *virtus*."

11) Cf. M. L. West, *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford, 1978), 176, on "the general Greek view of the past... [that] there was indeed a time of heroes stronger (but not longer-lived or more righteous) than ourselves" (emphasis mine). On the acceptance of inconsistency, cf. B. E. Perry, "The Early Greek Capacity for Viewing Things Separately," *TAPA* 68 (1937), 403-27.

12) An example from a different field may illustrate the problem. Gilbert Lawall, *YCS* 19 (1966), 158, states, concerning Jason's cloak at *Argonautica* 1.721-67, "charm is recommended rather than strength, and treachery is recommended and justified.... The scenes teach success and survival - distinctly unheroic goals." But charm, in its various manifestations, is certainly not considered worthless in a speaker in the Homeric poems, and only to a modern, schooled in the ethical sense of "heroic," could success and survival be classed as unheroic. Arthur Adkins, in his various writings, can hardly be altogether wrong to assert that there is an important connection between success and *aretē* in Homer.

13) Similarly, S. E. Knopp, *CP* 71 (1976), 211, states that these lines "suggest a society which abandons duty to indulge passion" and quotes line 42 as if it demonstrated this proposition.

14) This consideration disposes of two Hesiodic fragments (1 and 204 M-W) which might appear to have a different version. Of the latter, Martin

West once observed, *CQ* N.S. 11 (1961), 133, that the *Catalogues* had no place for the metals scheme of the *Erga* and that "the heroic age is not distinguished from the golden age of the *Erga*." He is more circumspect in his commentary (above, n.11), saying only that "the heroes' world resembles that of Hesiod's Golden men (fr.1.6-13)." But since Zeus is presumed to be the king of the gods in both fragments, it cannot be the *epi Kronou bios*. The same point should check the tendency to see portrayed in Catullus' epilogue a "decline from a primitive Golden Age" (Fordyce on 384-407).

15) "Catullus 64: The Descent of Man," *Antichthon* 9 (1975), 41-51, esp. 44 and 51 - hereafter Forsyth.

16) The major text is Bodo Gatz, *Weltalter, goldene Zeit und sinnverwandte Vorstellungen* (Hildesheim, 1967), esp.216-32, which contain a *conspectus auctorum* with over 480 fontes and a *conspectus locorum* with most of the topoi on the subject.

17) On the complexity of Greek ideas of divine justice, cf. K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley/Oxford, 1974), 257-61. On lovers' oaths, cf. A.D. Skiadas, "Periuria amantum," in *Monumentum Chiloniense. Studien zur augusteischen Zeit*, ed. E. Lefèvre (Amsterdam, 1975), 400-18. On p.414, Skiadas discusses Hesiod, fr.124 M-W, in which the proverbial impunity of an *aphrodisios horkos*, in that case sworn by Zeus himself, is already well established. Furthermore, the view that Theseus could be guilty of "criminal *Treulosigkeit*" (conceded by Giangrande, *LCM* 2, 1977, 230) or of *impietas* (Forsyth, 43) cannot stand. No law in antiquity covered a broken promise to *elope*, and the relationship between Theseus and Ariadne was not one of those embraced in the usual definitions of *pietas* (for which see Fordyce ad 76.2).

18) *L'influence grecque sur la poésie latine de Catulle à Ovide* (Vand-oeuvres-Genève, 1956), 54.

19) *Catullus: An Interpretation* (New York, 1973), 263. Less plausibly, Forsyth (47) suggests that Catullus deliberately contradicts himself in the epilogue in order to force the reader to rethink the entire poem.

20) There is one parallel which seems to have been overlooked. The story of a mother deliberately having intercourse with her son (403f.) is found also in Parthenius, *Erōtika pathēmata*, 17; the subject is the Corinthian tyrant Periander and the tale serves to explain his insanity.

21) Cf. F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* III a, Comm., p.199; Giangrande, *AntClass* 39 (1970), 48-56.

22) "Rhianus," *RE* I A 1 (1914), 782. Jacoby (above, n.21) declares the idea impossible, basing most of his argument on this frg. Wilamowitz, *Die hellenistische Dichtung*, I (Berlin, 1924), 225, takes the same approach; but we should note that Gow and Page, *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams*, II (Cambridge, 1965), 503, ignoring the controversy, say simply, "his Homeric criticism [suggests] that he had worked within range of a library and other scholars, presumably at Alexandria." Jacoby's somewhat romanticized portrait of Rhianus escaping the power of the courts and re-creating the old type of wandering rhapsode deserves a cautious reception.

23) Giangrande (140, n.93) provides a learned argument to prove that Catullus' *putrida pectora* (v.351) must be an allusion to *Iliad* 18.121-25, with *bathykolpos* (v.122) taken to mean, as in Hesychius, *archaia*, *palaia*, *koilē*, and thus that Catullus was indeed translating a Hellenistic poem. But (1) the allusion to the *Iliad* is possible, not certain, for the details of the two passages are quite different, and (2) *putrida* may simply be a native Latin expression, as in Horace's *mmae putres* (*Epod.* 8.7); cf. also *putidus*, "old, withered," at Plaut. *Bacch.* 1163; Cat. 42.11-12; Hor. *Epod.* 8.1.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF HORACE, ODES 1.17

PETER G. TOOHEY

I. *Odes* 1.17, like many other Horatian odes, may be examined from four different standpoints.¹⁾ These are: 1. What is the concrete scene, occasion, or excuse for the ode? 2. What are its "philosophical" ramifications? 3. What significance does the ode have within the poetical or aesthetic conceptions of the *Odes*? 4. What significance does the position of the ode entail? In the following pages I propose to demonstrate how Horace "answers" these questions.

First a few words in general. It is stating nothing new to maintain that a poem can mean more than one thing. That Horace could have embodied "answers" to these four questions in a single ode is not *a priori* improbable. Most of Horace's odes are based on a concrete scene or occasion; this needs no stressing. Few would deny that this can be consistent with either questions two, three or four. That "answers" to questions two and three can on occasion be found in the one poem has been recognized by critics such as Mette and Cody:²⁾ Horace's Epicurean preference for simplicity fits well with a Callimachean aesthetic theory opting for the restraint and, often, simplicity of the *genos leptaleon*, the *genus tenue*. To link the fourth point with the second, or third is perhaps more difficult. An example of a particularly fecund attempt at linking points three and four (albeit without recognizing my categorization) can be found in C. P. Jones' discussion of *Odes* 3.26.³⁾ Here, he suggests, Horace attempts, by the union of martial and amatory imagery, to extend "notions of the lyric poet to embrace all (Horace's) lyric *oeuvre*." And at the same time 3.26 may be intended to recall 1.5 thus suggesting that the collection of Books 1-3 is coming to an end.

How does 1.17 fit this schema? The answer to the first question may be stated briefly. The ostensible reason for the poem is to invite Tyndaris to Horace's Sabine farm. It is an *Einladungsgedicht*. This calls for little amplification.⁴⁾ The "answers" for points two, three, and four are less obvious. It is with these that the bulk of this paper will be taken up.

II. Before examining the second, third, and fourth propositions, we must deal with a small textual crux in *Odes* 1.17.14. Whether one reads *hic* or *hinc* in this verse is of considerable importance for an interpretation of the ode. The problem is, I realize, a tedious one. Hopefully the remainder of this paper will demonstrate its significance and excuse my travelling over such well-worn ground. The majority of modern editors and commentators support *hic*: amongst others we find Page, Wickham, Wickham-Garrod, Klingner, Villeneuve, Tescari, Syndikus, Kiessling-Heinze, Nisbet and Hubbard. The intrepid scholars who support *hinc* can be counted on one's fingers. The few I know of are Keller-Holder, Gow, Plessis, Lenchantin de Gubernatis-Bo.

A glance at Klingner's *apparatus criticus* will show that the ancient commentators, Porphyrio and the author of one MS of Pseudo-Acro, plus the majority of manuscripts support *hinc*. The authority of *hic* rests entirely on D and π . The best manuscript family for the *Odes* is E; Ψ is the next best; the third is Q, a mixed family, whose derivation appears to be E and Ψ . The manuscript D, unfortunately destroyed in the nineteenth century, falls into Q, the least respectable family; π falls into the second best family Ψ , but has been contaminated from E. Thus *hic* lacks the support of almost all the manuscripts. What it does have comes from two inferior, contaminated manuscripts.

The most common justification for *hic* is that the scribal abbreviations for *hic* and *hinc* are easily confused. This may be true, but it presupposes that the "error" was made at a stage in the manuscript tradition prior to the postulated archetypes E and Ψ . This is surely an assumption of unnecessary complexity. The major reasons for accepting *hic* are three: i. *hinc...hic...hic* disrupts an otherwise neat chain of anaphora.⁵⁾ ii. the three clauses beginning *hinc/hic...hic...hic* form a tricolon structure whose movement is disrupted by the asymmetrical *hinc*.⁶⁾ iii. *hinc* would mean something in order of *ob mea pietatem*; thus the connection of the first clause is with what precedes, not with what follows; therefore the ode's symmetry is destroyed.⁷⁾

Reasonable objections, however, can be made against each of these

points: i. Technically speaking *hinc...hic...hic* destroys the anaphora.⁸⁾ But aurally, at least, it seems to partake of the qualities of anaphora. The *sound* of *hinc* will associate it with the two following *hic*'s. The usage is not without parallels - see, for example Horace *Odes* 1.34.14 and 16 (*hinc...hic*) and Virgil, *Georgics* 2.145-6-9 (*hinc...hic...hic*).

ii. Tricolon is not necessarily disrupted; there is an aural link between *hinc* and *hic*. But what perhaps vitiates the tricolon theory is that the first element here is abstract or general. More expected would have been a concrete first element leading towards a summarizing abstract. To this reader the transition from the generality of the first clause to the concreteness of the two following is harsh.

iii. Perhaps the most telling objection is that *hinc* must refer to what precedes. (Bentley suggested that it would mean *ob meam pietatem*).⁹⁾ Not that *hinc* in this sense is unparalleled (compare *Odes* 3.6.5-7: *dis te minorem quod geris, imperas; hinc omne principium, huc refer exitum*), rather it necessitates taking v.14b-16 with v.13-14a instead of v.17-28. Critics and editors have preferred this progressive orientation of v.14b-16 because a/ they feel that *hinc*, syntactically speaking, is awkward, while *hic* b/ creates the tricolon and anaphora, and c/ allows the poem to fall into two neat halves, v.1-14a and v.14b-28.

Bentley as stated, felt that *hinc* would mean *ob meam pietatem*. But why must one be so specific? Surely *hinc* will embrace 1/ the gods' protection, 2/ Horace's *pietas*, and 3/ Horace's *Musa*. I will attempt to outline below that *hinc*, read thus, makes perfectly reasonable sense in the overall logic of the poem. That *hinc* disturbs the anaphora and tricolon is, as we have seen, not vital. That it will not allow a bipartite symmetry is unfortunate, but not, as I hope to show, irredeemably so. It is fair to say, therefore, that the conservative position - the acceptance of the best manuscript reading - is the most justifiable one. In v.14 we ought to read *hinc*.

Hinc does negate the view which sees *Odes* 1.17 as composed of two approximately fourteen verse sections. However an equally symmetrical arrangement replaces it. Stanzas 1-3, with their "Golden Age" peace, form the first sense-block. Stanza 4, with its generalities, will form a second, stanzas 5-7, a mix of pastoral and erotic themes, form a third. The resulting tripartite structure with three followed by one followed again by three stanzas is not unattractive. This pattern, of a centrally placed stanza surrounded by two equal, longer ones, is reasonably common in Horace. It will be recalled that Williams in his commentary to Book 3 of the

Odes took pains to emphasize it.¹⁰⁾ Some possible parallels are 3.10 (2+1+2); 2.14 (3+1+3); 3.8 (3+1+3); 3.14 (3+1+3); 3.11 (4+1+4 provided v.25-8 are genuine); 4.9 (6+1+6). The symmetry in *Odes* 1.17 may extend further. The two three stanza sense-blocks are both arranged into a pattern of 1+2 stanzas where, to some extent, the single stanza summarizes what the second and third stanzas make more explicit.

There are certain elements which reinforce this symmetry:¹¹⁾ *aestatem* (v.3) in the first sense-block picks up *aestus* (v.18) in the second sense-block; *impune*, v.5, picks up *innocentis*, v.21; there are also *metuunt*, v.8, and *metues*, v.24, *fistula* v.10, and *fide*, v.18. Among the repetitions which, while not occurring in a responsive position, none the less link the two sections, there are *defendit*, v.3, and *vitabis*, v.18; *Martialis*, v.9, and *Marte*, v.23; *nec*, v.9 and *nec*, v.22 and 24.

III. Let us now return to the main argument. The "philosophical" significance of *Odes* 1.17, if I may put it baldly, is an oblique product of its rejection of elegy, particularly the elegiac poetry of Albius Tibullus. I will not attempt to demonstrate an Horatian antipathy to elegy here. This has been convincingly done elsewhere.¹²⁾ Suffice it to say that I believe that Horace took his Lucretius, particularly the concluding sections of the *DRN* 4, quite seriously.¹³⁾ In rejecting the elegiac conception of love, Horace is demonstrating his Epicurean orthodoxy. This is the poem's "philosophical" significance. But first of all elegy. Where are the references to it? Nisbet and Hubbard have demonstrated the pastoral background of *Odes* 1.17.¹⁴⁾ The hyperbolic claim to a visit from Faunus, for example, seems an established *topos* in pastoral poetry.¹⁵⁾ Similarly the cornucopia.¹⁶⁾ The more realistic *locus amoenus* of stanzas 5 to 7 again seems indebted to the pastoral.¹⁷⁾ Into this pastoral world however, intrudes an erotic element of a type perhaps more readily seen in an urban environment. This erotic intrusion is perhaps the most telling indication that elegy is being referred to. The best parallels for this blend of erotic and pastoral are to be found in elegy: Nisbet and Hubbard compare Propertius 2.5.21, Tibullus 1.10.61f., and Ovid, *Amores* 1.7.47.¹⁸⁾ It is most probable, as Nisbet and Hubbard recognize, that the blending of pastoral and erotic themes is a direct reference to elegy.

It is perhaps more contentious to maintain that Tibullus

may be being singled out in *Odes* 1.17. There are, however, certain indications which make this view probable. I would emphasize, primarily, two points 1) the blend of pastoral and erotic themes, a hallmark of Tibullan style, and 2) resemblances between 1.17 and 1.33, the latter in all likelihood addressed to Albius Tibullus. A third more contentious point is the use of *pietas* in v.13. But I will reserve discussion of this until the next section of my paper.

Consider the rejection of erotic violence in Horace's "pastoral" landscape. Or the rejection of elegiac behaviour from Horace's "pastoral" poetry. What is Horace up to? Is it possible that the rejection of erotic themes may constitute a reference to the work of Horace's friend Albius Tibullus? And further that the rejection of erotic violence may constitute a gentle criticism of Tibullus' work?

To some critics Tibullus' poetry is an unholy alliance of pastoral and elegiac (amatory) themes.¹⁹⁾ Elder has maintained that "the key to pastoral poetry lies in the implied or suggested contrast between the created Arcadian world of goodness and our own actual world of virtues and vices."²⁰⁾ Tibullus does not create Arcadia, but he does form an idealized portrait of the country. Where, to follow Elder, we might find a contrast between Arcadia (the ideal) and the present (reality), we have a contrast between the country (the ideal - the pastoral element) and the city (reality - the "normal" milieu of the elegist). This contrast is at the core of many of Tibullus' poems: 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.10, 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5. Tibullus exploits this dichotomy in amatory contexts. For lovers the city is a place which breeds discord. Conversely, the country is a place which breeds concord.

A brief example. In Tibullus, 1.5.19-40 the poet had imagined a *felix vita* for himself in the country with his sweetheart Delia. She would help with the running of the farm (v.21ff.) and would entertain Tibullus' friends (v.31). But something went wrong. His plans were frustrated (v.35-6) and now he finds himself the *exclusus amator* (v.39). The contrast is obvious: the country was the ideal but unreal locale for Tibullus' love; instead he finds himself in the city and

unloved.

The rural vision of Tibullus is an ideal which does not exist in reality. Contrast the position in *Odes* 1.17. A peaceful and secure life is, Horace vaunts, quite possible in the country. He banishes the possibility of tangled, urban amours.²¹⁾ Horace's vision, though intimately related to Tibullus', though utilizing the same contrasts as Tibullus', seems to entail a negation, a rejection of Tibullus' amatory conceptions. Where Tibullus grudgingly admits the impossibility of idealized rural love, Horace rejects its urban counterpart and unreservedly commends the efficacy of the country.

At this point we ought to compare *Odes* 1.33 which is addressed to an Albius generally taken to be Albius Tibullus.²²⁾ It is usually accepted that Horace is parodying Tibullus' poetry here. Three aspects of this ode deserve attention 1) although emphasizing the *ronde de l'amour*, the fickleness of love, the stress is on triangular relationships; 2) the name Cyrus appears; 3) the *adunaton* of wolves mixing peacefully with goats occurs. These three elements may also appear in *Odes* 1.17. Horace's invitation to Tyndaris is surely to be taken in the amatory sense;²³⁾ if this is accepted, then the violent urban paramour of Tyndaris, Cyrus, is a rival; thus we have an amatory triangle. The name Cyrus appears four times in Horace. In *Odes* 2.2.17 and 3.29.27 it is used of the Persian King; its other appearances are in *Odes* 1.17 and 1.33. This strongly suggests a parallel between the two poems. The *adunaton* of 1.33.7-8 suggests, to some extent, 1.17.9. What are we to make of these parallels? I do not think that Horace is concerned to have us read 1.17 and 1.33 as a pair. Rather they suggest that we are not wrong to see Tibullus in *Odes* 1.17. The philosophical justification for Horace's rejection of the Tibullan position and, certainly, elegy, deserves reiterating. Horace's Epicureanism precluded any real sympathy for the elegiac mode.

IV. The third approach to 1.17 was in terms of poetry: what significance does the ode have within the poetical conceptions of Horace in the *Odes*? The foregoing sections, which attempted to demonstrate an Horatian rejection of Tibullan elegy and elegiac love, will go part of the way towards

answering this question. We can, however, approach the question from another angle.

In v.14 of *Odes* 1.17 I have argued that we should read *hinc* rather than the more generally accepted *hic*. This reading, as I have indicated, considerably alters the meaning of stanza 4. If we were to paraphrase stanza 4 accordingly, it would run like this: the gods protect me; my piety and poetry are dear to them; because of this, Tyndaris, you will see "plenty" lavishing fertility. Whatever else this stanza may imply, therefore, at base it is a vaunt praising the powers Horace's own poetry, one comparable to the vaunts of odes such as 1.1, 2.20, and 3.30.

Here, perhaps, we should pause briefly to consider the significance of the word *pietas*. It seems, in other contexts, to have had a technical literary meaning.²⁴⁾ The lyric poet was *pius* by virtue of his devotion to the Muses; in elegy he is *pius* by his devotion to Venus and Amor. Use of both of these senses can be seen in Horace. In *Odes* 3.4.6 the metaphorical landscape of poetic inspiration is described as *pios lucos*. (Indeed all of the second stanza of 3.4 is of relevance to 1.17.) The use of *pius* here is clearly technical. In *Odes* 1.22 the word *pius* is not actually mentioned. The conceit of the ode, however, functions about an implied *pius* or *pietas*. Stanzas 1 and 2 of 1.22 describe how the *pius* man has the protection of the gods; in stanzas 3 and 5 the conceit is exploited: the *pietas* is not the result of religious devotion, but of the amatory poet's devotion to Venus and Amor.

Pietas in v.13 of 1.17 is quite possibly used in this technical sense. That *hinc* turns Stanza 4 into a vaunt praising Horace's own poetry makes this even more likely. (We should note in passing that Horace may be pulling Tibullus' leg here. The concept of the *pius amator* may be a Tibullan invention).²⁵⁾ It is probable, moreover, that the *di* of v.13, while of course including Faunus, may also include those other *plebes superum*, the *Musae*. (The protection of the Muses, it will be recalled, is demonstrated in *Odes* 3.4.9-24.) *Pietas*, then, is a *double-entendre* - it explains the visit of Faunus as a result of Horace's religious "piety" and his poetic "piety." Interpreted thus, it renders the likelihood of stanza 4 functioning as an instance of *Selbstlob* even more convincing.

But let us return to the main concern. Two dominant motifs in *Odes* 1.17 are the transformation of Greek into Roman, and juxtaposition of fantasy and reality. If we examine the

deployment of these themes in *Odes* 1.17, I think that the significance of the poem within Horace's poetical conceptions will become more apparent.

The transformation of Greek into Roman is one of the better known self-advertisements of Horace (see *Odes* 3.30, 13-14: *princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos/ deduxisse modos*). I think that we can see this emphasized in 1.17 through the theme of the transformation of Greek into Roman. Consider these examples: Pan leaves the Arcadian Mt. Lycaon and, becoming Faunus, locates himself in an Italian locale - the countryside about Horace's Sabine farm. The addressee of the ode is possessed of a Greek name, Tyndaris. Instead of simply singing on the lyre, she sings on an Anacreontic (*Teia* v.18) lyre. The wine drunk is not the more normal Italian, such as Caecuban or Alban, but the more expensive Lesbian (which, appearing after *Teia lyra*, must inevitably set Sappho and Alcaeus in the reader's mind).²⁶⁾ Bacchus and his mother are not designated by their more comprehensible Latin forms, but in their solemn Greek metronymics, Semeleius and Thyoneus. The bothersome paramour of Tyndaris is given a Greek name, Cyrus. But all of this in the Sabine countryside.

This theme, as stated, is of importance throughout the *Odes*. However, consider the poems surrounding 1.17.

- 1.12 Begins with a quote from Pindar (*O.* 2.1ff.)
- 1.13 Seems to be modelled on Sappho 31 LP
- 1.14 Based on Alcaeus' "ship of state", e.g. 326 LP
- 1.15 Based on a lost ode of Bacchylides
- 1.16 Based on Stesichorus' palinode 192 PMG
- 1.18 Begins with a quote from Alcaeus 342 LP

Although many other odes have direct Greek models, 1.12 to 1.18 is perhaps the most clear-cut series based recognizably on Greek forebears. It seems to me, at any rate, startling and significant, that an ode, so manifestly concerned with poetry, should emphasize this aspect of Horace's art at so obviously relevant a time.

The blend of fantasy and reality in 1.17 is in some ways too obvious to need mentioning. Contrast Faunus' visit with the smelly goats; Mt. Lycaon with Mt. Lucretilis; the cornucopia with the more realistic setting in *reducta valle*; the *reducta vallis* with Tyndaris' urban affairs. What is the purpose of this blend? the answer is straight-forward - humour.

But why humour? This question may be answered without recourse to other odes, but it is worthwhile and instructive to make the comparison.

In *Odes* 1.1, at the close of a long selection priamel, we find the stately effect of the vaunt of Horace's role as lyric poet undercut by these lines (35f.):

*quodsi me lyricis vatibus inseres,
sublimi feriam sidera vertice.*

In 3.30, after the hyperbolic vaunt of v.1-9, we find (10-12):

*dicar, qua violens obstrepit Aufidus
et qua pauper aquae Daunus agrestium
regnabit populorum...*

Eternal fame in Horace's natal Apulia is hardly a stunning claim. Similarly the transformation of the poet into a swan in *Odes* 2.20 has been labelled, if not grotesque, at least tongue-in-check.²⁷⁾ In each of these cases the extravagance of the vaunt is undercut (but in fact undiminished). The humour resulting from the blend of fantasy and reality in 1.17 must perform the same function. It undercuts the pomposity of Horace's poetic vaunt.

Does *Odes* 1.17 have any significance in respect of Horace's conceptions of poetry? We have already interpreted stanza 4 as a vaunt praising Horace's own poetic abilities. What relation do the other stanzas have? The blend of fantasy and reality, particularly within the first three stanzas, is so pronounced as to rule out literal interpretation. It is improbable that Horace's proprietorial pride was such as to allow him this hyperbolic description. Two aspects are of paramount importance: the first, the literary (i.e. pastoral) nature of the "visit" of Faunus; the second, the consistent juxtaposition of Greek and Roman. The conclusion seems inescapable, stanzas 1-3 are a symbolic description of, as Comager put it, "the world of art."²⁸⁾ Not of anybody's art, but, as the transformation of Greek into Roman intimates, of the art of Horace. Stanza 4, thus, following as a vaunt in praise of Horace's own poetic abilities assumes a much greater importance.

What of stanzas 5-7? I have already mentioned their relation to the standardized *locus amoenus*. Is it possible that we have a reference to the *gelidum nemus Nympharum*?²⁹⁾ The emphasis on the valley's being withdrawn (compare Virgil, *Aeneid* 8, 609) and on its shade may hint at this - compare *Odes* 1.1.30-31,

Virgil, *Aeneid* 1.154ff., Horace, *Epistles* 2.2.77 (*scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbem*) and the description of the grove of the Muses in Tacitus, *dialogus de oratoribus* 9.6. But above all compare *Odes* 3.4.5-8 where *pios lucos* are the metaphorical landscape of poetic creation. There is ultimately no proof of this contention. The parallels are suggestive, however, of the relation stanzas 5-7 may have to the traditional depiction of poetic creativity.

V. The fourth question was: what is the significance of the position of the ode? Among the functions which I have attributed to 1.17 is a programmatic "description", for want of a better term, of one side of what Horace considered as his poetic mode in the *Odes*. It seems eminently possible that *Odes* 1.16 can be fitted into the same schema. It can be linked to 1.17 by several internal and external similarities.

First of all, is it likely that Horace would have allowed this type of pairing? The answer must be yes. In Book 1 of the *Odes* one might compare 1.1 and 1.38, 1.2 and 1.37, 1.3 and 1.36.³⁰⁾ Within the collection some argue that pairs exist in 1.26 and 1.27, 1.32 and 1.33,³¹⁾ 1.34 and 1.35.³²⁾

Perhaps the two most important external similarities between *Odes* 1.16 and 1.17 are metre and length. Consider the metres by which they are surrounded: 1.13 Third Asclepiad.³³⁾ 1.14 Fifth Asclepiad. 1.15 Fourth Asclepiad. 1.16 Alcaics. 1.17 Alcaics. 1.18 Second Asclepiad. 1.19 Fourth Asclepiad. The lesser frequency of the Asclepiadic metres within *Odes*, Books 1-4 must throw the more common Alcaic metres into prominence and, at the same time, perhaps artificially link them. The length of both odes, seven stanzas, is equally significant. Other examples of clear-cut tetrastichic odes of the same length are: 1.24 and 1.25 (4th Asclepiad, Sapphic), 1.32, 1.33, 1.34 (Sapphic, 4th Asclepiad, Alcaic), 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 (Sapphic, Alcaic, Sapphic), 2.8, 9, 10, 11 (Sapphic, Alcaic, Sapphic Alcaic), 3.17, 3.18 (Alcaic, Sapphic), 4.12, 4.13 (4th Asclepiad, 5th Asclepiad). It will be noted, therefore, that 1.16 and 1.17 are the only two contiguous poems of the same length and same metre in the *Odes*. It would be an act of hybris to ignore this fact.

Further, the structure of both odes is similar. 1.16 is

arranged in sense-blocks of 3+1+3 stanzas. In the first sense-block there is a movement from the personal (stanza 1) to the general (stanzas 2-3); stanza 4, the second sense-block, is best taken as a parenthesis. (The continuity between stanzas 3 and 4 is indicated by the anaphora of *irae* v.9 and *irae* v.17.) In the final sense-block, stanzas 5-7, there is a movement from the general to the personal.

Perhaps the most startling internal parallel between the two odes is the looming spectre of Helen of Troy.³⁴⁾ The ancient commentators inform us that 1.16 is based on Stesichorus' palinode. Nisbet and Hubbard³⁵⁾ suggest that 1.16.1 is taken from Stesichorus' poem (we have no corresponding fragment) and that the verb *recantare*, v.27, may have been coined by Horace as a Latin equivalent of the Greek *palinodein* to indicate the parentage of the ode. Certainly 1.16 is an apt description of Helen.

However, to maintain, as do Nisbet and Hubbard, that the name Tyndaris in 1.17 "may strike a pastoral note" is to dissimulate. Although the name may have been common in pastoral its primary referent must be Helen of Troy. The word is used of Helen in Lucretius, *DRN* 1.464, 473; Virgil, *Aeneid*, 2.601, 569; Propertius, 3.30.31, 4.7.30; Ovid, *Ars Am.* 1.746. If one attempts to suggest that Tyndaris does not imply Helen in 1.17 then the onus is on that critic to show why, in the face of this evidence, not. Clear reference to Helen of Troy, therefore, appears in both odes. We may accept this as another decisive link between 1.16 and 1.17.

It is not my intention to conjure up hoary old ghosts by maintaining as, for example, do the scholiasts that the *pulchra filia* of 1.16 is the *eadem meretrix*, Tyndaris that is, of 1.17.³⁶⁾ Stern comments from Fraenkel have laid this wraith to rest.³⁷⁾ Rather it seems possible that one level of meaning in 1.16 is poetry itself. Examine v.22-26:

*me quoque pectoris
tentavit in dulci iuventa
fervor et in celeres iambos
misit furentem; nunc ego mitibus
mutare quaero tristitia...*

We have already noted the multilayered texture of 1.17. This is a constant feature of the Horatian ode. Granted, as Nisbet

and Hubbard maintain, that 1.16 may be a *dissuasio* against anger,³⁸⁾ granted even that it may have been the *pulchra filia* whose iambs are committed to the elements in stanza 1.³⁹⁾ No interpretation of stanzas 1-5, however, should distract us from the fact that v.22-26 are referring to an iambic, epodic poetry which the author of *Odes* 1.16 had utilized but has now abandoned.⁴⁰⁾ Horace, it seems thoroughly probable, is referring to his own adoption and abandoning of the epodic genre.

Thus *Odes* 1.16 is a *recantatio*, a palinode, but only in the most general sense. It need not refer to an actual biographical event which gave rise to poems of either Horace or the addressee. It refers, rather, to the epodic *oeuvre*. Seen as a deliberate reference to the now abandoned epodic style 1.16 fits very neatly with 1.17. In the latter we have, on one level, a programmatic description of Horace's new themes, in the former a reference (though hardly a programmatic one) to the now abandoned style. *Odes* 1.16 complements and expands the relevance of 1.17. Such a reading of 1.16, I hasten to add, will explain almost all of the problematic parallels between the two odes. It will also explain why 1.17 appears where it does.

VI. One might observe, by way of a conclusion, how closely intertwined the "answers" to questions two, three, and four are. All are related to poetry. Horace obliquely affirms an Epicurean philosophy of love by rejecting the poetry of a most unepicurean poet. He provides us with a programmatic "description" of one side of his poetic mode in the *Odes*. And finally, by pairing 1.16 with 1.17, he contrasts symbolically his new style of the *Odes* with the now abandoned epodic style. These "answers" make up what some would term the "po-etological" significance of *Odes* 1.17.

But one ought not be too procrustean. Much more emphasis may be placed on the "answer" to point one. The amatory nature of the poem could be stressed - either, as Pucci maintains,⁴¹⁾ it depicts a triangular love relationship where Horace sees himself as threatened by Cyrus, or, as Quinn more convincingly maintains,⁴²⁾ it is an urbane and ironic invitation for Tyndaris to leave Cyrus and to come and "spend the

weekend" with Horace. Neither of these readings, however, need vitiate nor be incompatible with mine. If one thing is true of Horace it is that his odes can have more than one meaning.

University of New England,
Armidale, New South Wales

NOTES

1) My thanks for help in the composing of this paper to Prof. K. H. Lee, Mr. A. Treloar, and, above all, to Prof. K. F. Quinn who has read and commented on it at more than one stage. My views should in no way be held to be a reflection of theirs.

2) H. J. Mette, "*Genus tenue* und *mensa tenuis* bei Horaz," *MH*, 18 (1961), 136-9, and J. V. Cody, *Horace and Callimachean Aesthetics* (Bruxelles, 1976).

3) C. P. Jones, "*Tange Chloen semel arrogantem*," *HSCP*, 75 (1971), 81-3. Note, however, that this interpretation depends on what one makes of 3.27. If one follows Quinn, *Latin Explorations* (London, 1963), 253-66, then 3.27 is the last amatory ode of Books 1-3; thus the neat parallel between 1.5 and 3.26 will not stand.

4) Note, however, my remarks in Section VI of the text.

5) See, for example, R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book 1* (Oxford, 1970), 222; E. C. Wickham, *The Odes of Horace*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1877), 60.

6) Suggested to me by Quinn whose views should receive amplification in his forthcoming commentary on the *Odes*. Some possible examples of anaphora in tricolon:

1.2.33-(35)-41	<i>sive</i> - (<i>sive</i>) - <i>sive</i>
2.13.1-5-8	<i>ille et</i> - <i>ille et</i> - <i>ille</i>
2.16.1-5-6	<i>otium</i> - <i>otium</i> - (<i>otium</i>)
3.21.13-17-21	<i>tu</i> - <i>tu</i> - <i>te</i>
4.2.(10)-13-17	<i>seu</i> - <i>seu</i> - <i>sive</i>
4.9.5-9-13	<i>non</i> - <i>nec</i> - <i>non</i>

Perfect symmetry, of course, is not vital. Compare *Odes* 1.29.5, 8, 10, or 1.8.5, 8, 13 where the change to *quid* from *cur* signals modulation. One would expect, however, the variant element to appear last.

7) See, for example, Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 222.

8) A useful discussion of anaphora in Horace's *Odes* may be found in K. Büchner, "Zur Form und Entwicklung der Horazischen Ode und zur *Lex Meinekiana*," repr. in *Studien zur Römischen Literatur: Horaz* (Wiesbaden, 1962), 52-101, 57ff., and K. E. Bohnenkamp, *Die Horazische Strophe* (Hildesheim, 1972), 122-150.

9) Quoted by Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 222.

10) G. Williams, *The Third Book of Horace's Odes* (Oxford, 1969), 22f., and *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford, 1968), 122f., 601. On the importance of the central stanza in Horace's *Odes* there is L. A. Moritz, "Some 'Central' Thoughts on Horace's *Odes*," *CQ*, 18 (1968), 116-131.

11) On the symmetry see A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus: Oden und Epoden* (Berlin⁸, 1955), 86, and E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1958), 204ff.

12) A useful discussion of Horace's attitude to elegy may be found in Quinn, *op. cit.* in note 3, 154-162.

13) Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 4.1058ff.

14) See notes 15, 16, 17, and 18 below.

15) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 219, compare among others Theocritus (?), 24.86f., Virgil, *Eclogues* 4.22 (cf. *Epodes* 16.51f.), *Eclogues* 2.32f.

16) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 222f., for parallels.

17) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 223ff., for parallels.

18) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 216, stress this point.

19) F. Solmsen, "Tibullus as an Augustan Poet," *Hermes*, 90 (1962), 295-325, 302f., cautions against viewing Tibullus as a pastoral poet. However, one would have to wear blinkers not to recognise and admit the presence of many pastoral ideas in his poetry. For example, J. P. Elder, "Tibullus: *Tersus atque Elegans*," *Critical Essays on Roman Literature*, ed. J. P. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 65-105, and G. Lawall, "The Green Cabinet and the Pastoral Design: Theocritus, Euripides, and Tibullus," *Ramus*, 4 (1975), 87-100, have both allowed the presence of pastoral elements in his poetry.

20) Elder, *op. cit.* in note 19, 79.

21) Lucretius, *DRN* 2.20-33 ought to be compared. Horace, an Epicurean, may have inherited much of his rural vision from Lucretius. His clear belief in the efficacy of the country is something quite alien to the rural ideal of Tibullus.

22) On *Odes* 1.33 one might consult Quinn, *op. cit.* in note 3, 155-8 and M. C. J. Putnam, "Horace and Tibullus," *CP*, 67 (1972), 81-88.

23) So Pucci, *op. cit.* in note 29, and Quinn: see note 42.

24) A. A. R. Henderson, "Tibullus, Elysium, and Tartarus," *Latomus*, 28 (1969), 649-653, 651.

25) See Henderson, *op. cit.* in note 24, 651nl.

26) On this topic one might consult H. G. Edinger, "Horace, *C.* 1.17," *CJ*, 66 (1971), 306-11, esp. 310f.

27) Humour in *Odes* 1.1, 2.20, and 3.30 is discussed briefly by M.O. Lee, *Word, Sound, and Image in the Odes of Horace* (Ann Arbor, 1969), 91.

28) S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace: A Critical Study* (Bloomington and London, 1962), 348-352.

29) P. Pucci, "Horace's Banquet in *Odes* 1.17," *TAPA*, 105 (1975), 259-281, 260-261, feels that this indicates a preference for the Callimachean *genos leptaleon*. Note the objections to this type of approach made by Brink in *Gnomon*, 51 (1979), 60-62, 61.

30) So W. Wili, *Horaz* (Basle, 1948), 154 and followed by Cody, *op. cit.* in note 2, 34.

31) R. S. Kilpatrick, "Two Horatian Proems. *Carm.* 1.26 and 1.32," *YCS*, 21 (1969), 215-239. Kilpatrick links 1.26 with 1.27 and 1.32 with 1.33.

32) E. A. Fredericksmeier, "Horace, *C.* 1.34. The Conversion." *TAPA*, 106 (1967), 155-176, suggests that *Odes* 1.34 acts as a preparatory poem to 1.35.

33) The designations of the Asclepiad metres are those used by D. S. Raven *Latin Metre: An Introduction* (London, 1965).

34) Helen also appears in 1.15. This need in no way, however, weaken the link between 1.16 and 1.17.

35) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 204.

36) L. A. MacKay, "*Odes* 1.16 and 1.17: *O matre pulchra... Velox amoenum...*," *AJP*, 83 (1962), 298-300.

37) Fraenkel, *op. cit.* in note 11, 208f.

38) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 203.

39) So M. Dyson, "Horace, *Odes* 1.16," *AUMLA*, 30 (1968), 169-179.

40) Compare *Epodes* 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 12.

41) See *op. cit.* in note 29.

42) This position will be further clarified in his forthcoming commentary (cf. note 6 above). Prof. Quinn kindly communicated this view to me in private correspondence.

ART AND ETHICS IN THE DRAMA:
 SENECA "PSEUDOTRAGEDY" RECONSIDERED*)

ANNA LYDIA MOTTO and JOHN R. CLARK

Praeter sapientem autem nemo unum agit, ceteri multifformes sumus. Modo frugi tibi videbimur et graves, modo prodigi et vani. Mutamus subinde personam et contrarium ei sumimus, quam exuimus.
 (Except for the wise man, however, no one plays one role; the rest of us have many faces. Now we will seem to you thrifty and serious, now extravagant and idle. We continually change our *persona* and put one on contrary to that which we have taken off.) Seneca, *Ep.* 120.22

Too many critics argue that Seneca wrote his tragedies to expound his philosophic doctrines. They postulate - what has ever been in some quarters suspected - that the plays by the Stoic Philosopher are fundamentally Stoical. One critic¹⁾ has gone so far as to propose that these "philosophical propaganda-plays" constitute in fact a single "set" of tragedies which should be studied in the sequence and order they occupy in the Codex Etruscus, beginning and concluding with a Hercules play.²⁾ Thus the plays must be read altogether, *en masse*, as a single "Stoic treatise" which may be designated "as a sort of glorified Essay on Man."³⁾ There are, she believes, unrelieved horrors and gloom, uncontrolled passions, and an evil fate operative throughout the series - until the reader comes at last to the final play, the *Oetaeus*, where Stoic virtue is finally rewarded.

This critic's overall hypothesis has been largely discounted for a number of very good reasons. We have absolutely no evidence nor inkling that Seneca himself "arranged" the ordering of his plays; indeed, we have no information about their original "publication" whatsoever. Again, we have not one iota of evidence that would lend credence to the suggestion that the ordering of the Codex Etruscus is to be preferred to the ordering

of A or any other recensions. In addition, the *Phoenissae* is admittedly an incomplete fragment, and many critics question the authorship of the *Hercules Oetaeus*.⁴⁾ Finally, until the era of Proust, no one had encountered the ennealogical structure; a Greek audience had enough to do to sustain its attention-span when faced with the performance of a trilogy (together with a satyr-play); a nine-headed monster would have overwhelmed it. Whatever one might say to the contrary, it was never Seneca's practice to keep his readers suspended for some five hundred pages before granting them respite - and enlightenment. As Jonathan Swift once remarked, "Going *too long* is a Cause of Abortion as effectual, tho' not so frequent, as Going *too short*..."⁵⁾ If Seneca were as eager to inculcate philosophical doctrine as this critic appears to believe, his astonishingly outstretched sequence of plays would contribute mightily to the loss of instruction entirely. No; such a critic's conjectures simply have not been able to pass muster because they are so free-wheeling and insubstantial.⁶⁾ C. D. N. Costa, for example, finds such a theory "most unlikely;" "it needs a good deal of special pleading to infer Stoic teaching from all the plays...."⁷⁾

Although such a conjectural thesis has been, in large measure, shunted aside, it is important to come to terms with a beguiling and rather widely-held opinion concerning the presence of overt Stoicism in the Philosopher's drama and with the popularly received notion that there is or ought to be explicit didacticism and moral teaching in works of literature, particularly the drama. We are told, for example, that Seneca's plays constitute "a piece of neo-Stoic propaganda," and are primarily dedicated to "the teaching of philosophy;"⁸⁾ hence, this critic believes that the Senecan plays are "pseudotragedies," utilizing dramatic form as deceptive "sugar-coating." Accordingly, "from a purely aesthetic point of view much in [these plays] deserves the most severe strictures."⁹⁾ Needless to say, the very term "pseudotragedy" is pejorative, suggesting the synthetic, the counterfeit, and the second rate. Such a critic's emphasis upon Stoicism stems from the "effort to determine Seneca's object in writing the plays ...;"¹⁰⁾ we might suggest that such criticism is guilty of "The Intentional Fallacy."¹¹⁾ For we can never predicate an author's intentions with certainty, and when we then proceed to locate the effects of that postulated intention in his writings, our argument becomes hopelessly circular; such criticism, as Wimsatt observes, "... begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological *causes* of the poem and ends in biography and relativism."¹²⁾

It is also interesting to note that so many modern critics endorse a kind of unwritten "law of literary specialization:" a philosopher cannot write plays, etc. Rigidly applied, this criterion would prevent a Caesar from writing memoirs or plays, a Plato from writing poetry, any poet from writing criticism, any doctor, lawyer, or priest from writing fiction.

Indeed, for many a critic, it is the philosophical content in Senecan drama that counts and that saves his plays from total condemnation. Hopefully, the reader at this point will be seriously dismayed to observe how congenially such criticism sacrifices "mere aesthetic" in works of art in favor of solid moral teaching. Certainly, as in all great literature, Seneca's plays abound in deep thought and in psychological understanding of human nature but one can hardly argue that he employed the tragic genre primarily to impart philosophic concepts.

To be sure, the whole question of literature's "utility" and "moral purpose" has been a recurrent and vexing problem in literary criticism for two thousand years. The exertions and requirements of moralizers never diminish, and many a theorist becomes frankly ambivalent. Thus W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. insists that he tends to side with those who would separate art from morality; yet later he admits that, for him, the greatest poetry will *not* be immoral or indifferent, but "morally right."¹³⁾ Perhaps such ambivalence cannot ever be eliminated.

Both art and morality have an ideal... but the ideals are not the same... Morality aims at eradicating and abolishing evil..., whereas the aesthetic contemplation of life recognizes [evil] as an element necessary to vivid and full interest... I do not think that this opposition can be altogether overcome.¹⁴⁾

Elder Olson, the neo-Aristotelian critic, draws a distinct line between works of aesthetic beauty and works of rhetoric and didacticism - the work of Homer as opposed to the work of Dante, "one... concerned with beauty of form, and the other with the inculcation of doctrine."¹⁵⁾ Already, the liberal reader should be uncomfortably wincing: are we to concede, willy-nilly, that there is no "philosophy" in the pages of Homer? no "aesthetic beauty" in the cantos of Dante? Somehow, such twin Procrustean beds of art and ethics threaten ruthlessly to cleave, to curtail, and to savage the writings of two of the world's major literary figures.

And indeed, the problem is more extensive and compromising even than it first appears. For these are two age-old categories, distinguishing works that strive to persuade an audience, seeking to influence its thought or its action, juxtaposed with works that "nothing affirm,"

imitations that strive to create a complete poetic whole, "a perfect pattern."¹⁶⁾ Such a distinction indicates, in effect, that rhetoric is a "useful" art, while poetics or poesis is a "fine" art.

Useful art, employing nature's own machinery, aids her in her effort to realize the ideal in the world around us, so far as man's practical needs are served by furthering this purpose. Fine art sets practical needs aside; it does not seek to affect the real world, to modify the actual. By mere imagery it reveals the ideal form at which nature aims in the highest sphere of organic existence, - in the region, namely, of human life...¹⁷⁾

Or, according to the distinction more recently enlarged upon by Susanne Langer, rhetoric is discursive; poetry, presentational.¹⁸⁾ For rhetoric is a *means* to creating "action" in the real world; whereas poetry is an *end* in itself, the creating of a complete and imitative "action" - not in the real world, but - in the world of art.

And yet, these two categories have been difficult to maintain in rigorous isolation. As Aristotle himself concedes, all men - artists among them - employ rhetoric at all times:

... all men in some way partake of both [rhetoric and dialectic]; for all men to some degree attempt to examine and to support an argument and to speak in defense of it and to speak against it.¹⁹⁾

In addition, boundaries between the two kinds - useful and fine art - have continually been broken down, allowing and even encouraging the two to become confused. It would prove foolhardy to insist that an artist in his work overtly propound moral precepts *or*, at the opposite extreme, scrupulously expunge every moral quality whatsoever from his work. The artist, frankly, can satisfy neither of these immoderate ends. Typically, for instance, Mark Twain, like many a first-rate author, perceived very clearly the paradox that morality must never predominate in art, although such morality must never be entirely absent: "humor must not professedly teach, and it must not professedly preach," he writes, "but it must do both if it would live forever."²⁰⁾

Moreover, we should note that literary drama - even Senecan drama - is by its very nature mimetic; yet many periods in history simply make no distinction between the mimetic and the didactic. Regardless of genre, *all* eighteenth-century works of art, it has been pointed out, were to some degree consciously directed to an audience: "... the poet's task, like the orator's, was to arouse in his audience certain emotions about the subject of his poem."²¹⁾

Indeed, conscious of the censures of Plato in the *Republic*, all literary criticism for some twenty-two hundred years tended to defend art by proposing that it was *always* didactic. Horace in the *Ars Poetica* affirms that all poetry desires "*aut prodesse... aut delectare*," to teach or to delight.²²⁾ Scaliger, in his *Poetice* (1561), agrees "that the poet teaches moral habits through actions. 'Action is therefore a mode of teaching; and the moral habit is what we are taught to apply.'"²³⁾ Similarly, Sir Philip Sidney's *Apologie for Poetrie* (1583) claims that poetry's end is "to teach and delight," and that "Poetry ever setteth virtue... out in her best colours."²⁴⁾

Furthermore, by a quirk of history, the analysis of poetry was cast primarily into the hands of rhetoricians for some two millenia. It was authors like Longinus and Cicero and Quintilian and their commentators who influenced medieval and Renaissance thought. Only in the 1940's and '50's did the vogue of the New Criticism, focusing its attention upon the literary work itself, commence to distinguish once again, as Aristotle had done, between works of didacticism and of aesthetic. But it has been by no means a prevailing tradition.

What in our time has been labelled "the didactic heresy" was the basic theory of literature for some twenty-two centuries. Renaissance critics and poets have little to say about self-expression or the agonies of creation, but they are never weary of insisting that literature is philosophy teaching by examples, that it moves men to the love and practice of virtue and the abhorrence of vice. Thus the aim of literature is identical with the aim of education, virtuous action.²⁵⁾

In general, then, over the centuries moralism and didacticism in literary criticism has tended to prevail. We might well answer critics' "discovery" that Seneca is philosophizing and moralizing in his dramas by reminding them that Sophoclean or Aeschylean or Euripidean drama is all too frequently comprehended in precisely the same instructional light.

Indeed, most dramatists in some sense employ ideas in their plays, and this is particularly true of the ancient Greek playwrights. William Arrow-smith, for example, has argued that both Aeschylus and Sophocles use their contemporary cultural situation "as framing dramatic ideas" in their plays, and he goes on to urge that Euripides especially was the experimentalist who literally creates a theater of ideas.²⁶⁾ There was something of a hue and cry when Eric Bentley's *The Playwright as Thinker* first appeared in 1946, but Bentley has stood by his general thesis: that the major dramatists of the modern era (Wagner, Ibsen, Strindberg, Shaw) have fostered

ideas in their dramas.

Yet the difficulties with a predominant didacticism should become apparent. Far too frequently, for instance, in such a climate, the literary work is yanked and pulled and distorted by *allegorizing*, in order to force it to yield up its acceptable modicum of lesson and message.²⁷⁾ At its most silly, such message-mongering leads a critic like Thomas Rymer to discern two "morals" in Shakespeare's *Othello*:

... a caution to maidens of quality how, without their parents' consent, they run away with black-amoores... [and] a warning to all good wives that they look well to their linen.²⁸⁾

Still more importantly, a regnant moral didacticism is tempted to become "militant," demanding that religious and philosophical instruction in the literary work be made pikestaff clear and overt. At its worst, such criticism is recurrently moved to advocate censorship (necessitating just as repeatedly that authors counter with their *Areopagiticas*). Such rigid moralizing criticism commences by doubting whether good poetry can ever be written by "bad" men.²⁹⁾ Where it cannot censure, it attempts to prescribe what sort of literature is "acceptable."³⁰⁾ Over the years, for example, this practice led to the development of the concept of "poetic justice" in the drama of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - that doctrine which called overtly (as at the tacked-on conclusion of the Book of Job) for the on-stage punishment of vice and the remuneration of rectitude (and may be perceived in the curious pabulum of Richard Steele's sentimental plays or in Richardson's novel, *Pamela* or Virtue Rewarded [1740]).³¹⁾ By such a standard, only a limited number of "cheerful" plots would be admissible. Tragedy would be virtually ham-strung (unless the protagonist be vicious); satire would prove unruly (refusing in tone, word, and deed to "suffer fools gladly"); and comedy would only be permitted to trifle and jest at the expense of the morally reprehensible. Lest these reflections seem extreme and at any rate unnecessary in our own enlightened era, let us remind the reader of the frequency with which Tennessee Williams has been chastized for dwelling so frequently in his dramas upon the unsavory and the depressing,³²⁾ and recollect as well Kenneth Tynan's strictures of Eugene Ionesco's plays for failing to be "affirmative."³³⁾ Such ethical vigilantes are ever upon the alert. Furthermore, it has become commonplace in recent years for the occasional moralist to raise his voice against our own period's literature for celebrating decadence, violence, pornography, obscenity, and vice - the most recent instance being Mr. John Gardner's *On Moral Fiction* (1978).³⁴⁾

The truth of the matter is that we cannot, even if we wanted to, prescribe what we will accept as suitable to world literature. In the epic, in the novel, in much poetry, and especially in the drama - in all of these fictional modes the author simply is not present *in propria persona*. Nor will normative literary conventions allow him to break in upon the scene. It is indeed true that readers of a particular cast of mind wish fully to "know" what an author "means" by a certain character or a certain event. (We constantly hope to learn to "know" as much about the perplexities and incidents of life.) Yet it is virtually impossible for fictional genres to satisfy this obsession fully to know. Given such a frustration, too many readers (who after all do not wish to read fictions, but yearn instead for lectures, editorials, and cablegrams) are tempted to discover the author hidden beneath the mantle of one or another character *within* the creative work, as if fictional portrayal were merely a game of hide-and-seek. After such experiences, the bewildered author often has to deliver, outside his fiction, something of a disclaimer: characters and scenes, he might feel constrained to inform us, in his book are wholly fictional, and any resemblance to actual places or persons - living or dead - is strictly coincidental. Milton was once moved to explain himself in just this vein:

One is not to regard what the poet says, but what person in the play speaks, and what that person says; for different persons are introduced, sometimes good, sometimes bad; sometimes wise men, sometimes fools; and such words are put into their mouths, as it is most proper for them to speak; not such as the poet would speak, if he were to speak in his own person.³⁵⁾

One need not be a demon to create the figure of Satan, a madman to devise a Quixote, a fool to generate a Falstaff, a chatterbox or cynic to conceive a Thersites - although many a reader has faltered in comprehending that this is so. In opposition to such a view, which he designates "the personal heresy," C. S. Lewis urges that such critics act as if all poetry "must be the expression of [the poet's] personality," that such poetry "is *about* the poet's state of mind." Critics, Lewis notes, are guilty of this fallacy even when dealing with the drama, for their major premiss [is] that the cynicism and disillusionment put into the mouths of some Shakespearean characters are Shakespeare's."³⁶⁾ It is in this light that many a critic comprehends Senecan drama - as exclusively the expression of Seneca's own personality, of Seneca's own ideas.

In short, an author can never be assessed ethically by the numbers of good or evil characters he invents; on the contrary, if the artist's

vision of good and of evil is overwhelming, that is merely a testimonial to his creative force, and not at all an indicator of the level of his immaculateness or the certification of his creed. Yet the characters an author creates can hardly be judged *without* taking morality into account. In Aristotle's words, for instance,

... tragedy is... an imitation of... action, of life, of happiness and unhappiness... and the end is a certain action, not a quality; men are what they are as a result of their character, they are happy or unhappy as a result of their actions.³⁷⁾

Whenever a fictional creation makes a choice of speech or action, he reveals (as do people in life) his moral character. He cannot help it; his actions bespeak his morality - and *any* behavior is in some sense moral. Henry James once entirely dismissed a critical squabble that sought to distinguish two literary kinds: novels of character and novels of incident.

There is an old-fashioned distinction between the novel of character and the novel of incident... It appears to me... little to the point... There are bad novels and good novels, as there are bad pictures and good pictures; but that is the only distinction in which I see any meaning, and I can as little imagine speaking of a novel of character as I can imagine speaking of a picture of character. When one says picture, one says character, when one says novel, one says incident, and the terms may be transposed at will. What is character but the determination of incident? What is either a picture or a novel that is *not* of character? What else do we seek in it and find in it? It is an incident for a woman to stand up with her hand resting on a table and look out at you in a certain way; or if it be not an incident I think it will be hard to say what it is. At the same time it is an expression of character.³⁸⁾

Hence, an author may well brilliantly express action and character in literary works of art, but he cannot express himself; he cannot express his morality or his philosophy. We obtain only a hint of these latter by the breadth, the particularity, the assurance, and the intensity of his creativity. We cannot be certain of the discursive meaning of Seneca's plays (we cannot be certain of such meaning of *any* plays - and debates over interpretations of *Hamlet* and the *Oedipus Tyrannos* are relevant here), but we can indeed be certain of the force and intensity of much of Seneca's achievement - the gloomy atmosphere of the *Oedipus*, the furious ragings of a Medea, an Atreus, or a Juno, the witty asperity of a Megara's rejoinders to the tyrant Lycus, the frustrated clairvoyance of a Cassandra,

the desperate sufferings of the mother Andromache, the poisoned physical torments of a Hercules, the insane loves of a Phaedra. We cannot in all honesty label these works "pseudotragedies" or thank our stars that they are without aesthetic interest - lest with the art we toss out the artifact, and there be nothing left!

If we set aside hypotheses about instruction and philosophizing for a time and examine squarely into Seneca's plays, we ought to discern those features that lend them psychic power and dramatic force. For one thing, his plays are austere etchings and rich mood-pieces, as Herington has observed. Herington stresses in Seneca a tone of "almost religious fervor" and a "terrible moral sensitivity" realized by the playwright's "concrete, pictorial imagination" and brilliant painter's eye for "fantasy."³⁹⁾ Prescient choruses keen and brood, and grotesque images recur with a fatal insistence. Such features lend an intensity to scenes of suffering, as Regenbogen has particularly remarked and astutely explored.⁴⁰⁾ Further, of course, such settings and distorting scenes suggest the nightmarish, almost hallucinatory visions that bespeak a lurid and perceptive psychological presentation presentation enhanced by his characters' soliloquies, dramatic laments, and "self-apostrophes."⁴¹⁾

To add to this psychiatric milieu, characters speak with stichomythic and almost shot-gun tenseness and unreal clarity, as violent emotions build. Moreover, scenes tend to be isolated, blocked off, separate - even disjunct. Jo-Ann Shelton speaks of temporal repetitions in the *Hercules Furens* and the *Thyestes* and of the playwright's presentation of "simultaneous events linearly;"⁴²⁾ but what is achieved is a staccato-effect in the dreamlike tracing not of clock but of psychic time. For example, in the *Thyestes* when Tantalus curses the House of Atreus, characters in the play are *already infected*, and subsequently edged and jarred and caromed onward into a mainstream of emotional fever pitch and taut melodramatic posturing and performance. Needless to say, such a psychological theater of extremity and cruelty was particularly attractive to Elizabethans and Jacobean. As Michael Higgins notes,

... the Stoic revival of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a symptom of a general dis-

solution of established beliefs and institutions. This atmosphere of chaos, of moral and intellectual disintegration, is reflected in the tragedies of the Jacobean era.⁴³⁾

Seneca's theater clearly reflected crises of a mass urban society and of the rising dictatorships of first-century Rome. The Neronian world of chaos, foreboding, fantasy, and the grotesque are perhaps best exemplified in his *Oedipus*.⁴⁴⁾ Moreover, such characteristics are again in the twentieth century a particularly relevant dramatic form of art.

Seneca's influential, psychologically charged, and violently emotional theater is hardly tragic or cathartic in the traditional Aristotelian sense - characters in his plays are too frenzied and furious in their violence and obsessions; and a suppurating flux of evil prevails. As the Chorus in the

Phaedra (978-82) gloomily intones:

Fortune in disarray governs human affairs
and blindly scatters her gifts,
favoring the foul;
dreadful lust conquers blameless men,
fraud in the lofty palace prevails.

Nor is *Fortuna* even so innocently blind; for spirits like *Tantalus* and deities like *Juno* actually intrude in behalf of savagery and mayhem. But, most importantly, despite all of the fury and destruction, Senecan drama is pervaded by a large and persistent irony. Vice triumphs - but is never gratified. *Phaedra's* revenge, after all, includes her own destruction and the slaughter of her beloved *Hippolytus*. *Medea's* righting of the balance betwixt herself and *Jason* includes the murder of her own children; her final claim that she has been restored to chastity and innocence is perceived as being outrageously and pathetically deluded.⁴⁵⁾ *Atreus*, for all of his towering fury, continues frustrated and insecure even at the moment of his most horrible victory over *Thyestes*: his jealousy, suspicion, and ire are pitched at such an extremity that they can never be satisfied or allayed.⁴⁶⁾ Similarly, in a broad historical sense, *Clytemnestra's* and *Aegisthus's* vengeance upon *Agamemnon* is but the helpless accomplishment of recompense to *Cassandra* and the dead of *Troy*; and, to be sure, the play concludes with no resolution or pause in the train of crimes and reprisals, and the mad *Cassandra* has the last prophetic word

with Agamemnon's assassins: "*veniet et vobis furor*" (1012) - upon the destroyers shall mad destruction be yet to descend. Even beyond the human realm, the spirits of Thyestes and Achilles, the shade of Tantalus, cry for cruelty and vengeance. Even the deity Juno is rabidly incensed. Whether among humans, among spirits, or among the gods themselves, Senecan theater merely presents a brutal *ethos* of continual slaughter. His pervasive, secular irony merely attests to the ignobility of gods and heroes alike that borders upon - nay, that topples over into - insanity. Ultimately, such characters stand revealed as puppets in the universe, for their freedom and self-realization and self-expression has been totally lost to mania and passion.

It is erroneous to argue that Seneca composed such intense, original, and powerful dramatic visions merely to inculcate philosophic thought. Yet, to be sure, such thought abounds in his plays. Needless to say, all major literary works that have been presumably admired are replete with intellectual content. A true classic is remembered for its distinction in content as well as in form. It is virtually impossible to insist that Seneca wrote these tragedies merely to formulate a syllogism or a maxim. He is rather endowing us with a poetic, creative, new tragic invention - one that envisions a livid, ruinous world where evil characters rant and rave, perpetrating the destruction of themselves and of others. His brilliantly darkened world-picture can hardly be reduced or construed as torts and orts of instruction for little Marcus-es and Juliuses. Rather he has created for us an unreasoning universe, a second world closely set beside our own, a nightmare neighborhood where passion and frenzy are forever in fullest flower. If he touches us profoundly, it is because his neighborhood, after all, is dangerously near to our own. Such is his gift to us of a genuine literature.

"What?" we might question: "Seneca a maker of 'literature'?" It is quite true that Seneca, in his philosophical writings, appears to give pure literature a second-row seat. The Stoics naturally placed philosophy above the other "arts"; thus Seneca claims philosophy is the only art that investigates good and evil and contributes to the perfection of the soul.⁴⁷⁾ Yet we know of his impressive familiarity with Ovid, Homer,

and Vergil from the great number of times he mentions or quotes from them.⁴⁸⁾ As he makes clear in one passage, it is not so much that he ignores literature, as that he approaches it - not as the philologist or the grammarian - but as the philosopher;⁴⁹⁾ his chief concern is how to live and how to die, how to obtain strength to practice virtue, to strive for intellectual perfections, and to be borne, as it were, aloft toward the gods. Seneca knew that outstanding literary achievement, whatever its genre, guaranteed for the writer immortal glory. At one point he quotes from Vergil: *Optima quaeque dies miseris mortalibus aevi/ prima fugit*⁵⁰⁾ (For wretched mortals, the best days of life are the first to flee). Overcome with emotion and response to the poet's painful insight, Seneca observes: *Clamat ecce maximus vates et velut divino ore instinctus salutare carmen canit.*⁵¹⁾ (Behold the greatest bard exclaims and as if inspired with divine words sings a salutary song.) In his studies, Seneca regularly honors the great minds of every genre, the grand geniuses of every age: ... *sed cum optimo quoque sum; ad illos, in quocumque loco, in quocumque saeculo fuerunt, animum meum mitto.*⁵²⁾ (... but I am with all the best; to them, in whatever place, in whatever century they have been, I send my own soul.) And he, like them, escaped the oblivion of time, not only through his philosophic Letters and Dialogues but through his Tragedies as well.

University of South Florida

NOTES

*) The authors wish to make grateful acknowledgment to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton for inviting them to spend the Summer of 1979 in residence, where the present paper was completed.

1) Berthe Marti, "Seneca's Tragedies. A New Interpretation," *TAPA* 76 (1945), 216-45. She has been especially influential (although he has reservations) upon Norman T. Pratt, Jr. See his "The Stoic Base of Senecan Drama," *TAPA* 79 (1948), 1-11; Pratt does not analyze image-patterns in the Senecan plays but "massive systems of words expressing abstract ideas" and believes this peculiar usage to stem from the playwright's "fusion of rhetoric and Stoicism" in the plays ("Major Systems of Figurative Language in Senecan Melodrama," *TAPA* 94 [1963], 199-234).

2) *Hercules Furens, Troades, Phoenissae, Medea, Phaedra, Oedipus, Agamemnon, Thyestes, Hercules Oetaeus.*

3) Marti (above, note 1), pp. 222-223.

4) Some of this scholarship on the authenticity of the plays is summarized in Virginia Iorio, "L'autenticità della tragedia 'Hercules Oetaeus'".

di Seneca," *RIGI* 20 (1936), 1-59; terse comments are provided in Eugene M. Waith, *The Herculean Hero in Marlowe, Chapman, Shakespeare and Dryden* (New York, 1962), p. 204, n. 30 and in C. J. Herington, "Senecan Tragedy," *Arion* 5 (1966), 467, n. 61. R. J. Tarrant, for instance, in his authoritative edition and commentary of Seneca, *Agamemnon* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 16, 198, 206, 286, *passim*, assumes that the *Oetaeus* is an imitation in the Senecan manner.

5) "The Conclusion," *A Tale of a Tub*, in *A Tale of a Tub, to which is added the Battle of the Books and the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit*, ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith (Oxford, 1958), p. 206.

6) Much the same may be said for the hypothecations in Marti's "The Prototypes of Seneca's Tragedies," *CP* 42 (1947), 1-16, that suggest Seneca's indebtedness to a tradition of "philosophical" or "pseudo-" tragedy that includes such authors as Diogenes and Varro. It is probably true that Antisthenes developed the Socratic "dialogue" even before Plato, and that a number of Cynics and Stoics - Diogenes, Crates, Persaeus, Herillus of Carthage, Timon of Phlius - wrote dramas of a sort, not to mention the mock-dramatic Bionian and Menippean diatribes of the kind found in the work of Lucian. But these "plays" are not extant, and it is impossible for us to determine how much they are like or unlike the dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, or of Seneca. It can even be said that there is virtually no question but that upon Seneca there was *some* influence exerted; we simply cannot in the least posit what sort of influence it happened to be.

7) "The Tragedies," in *Seneca*, ed. C. D. N. Costa (London, 1974), pp. 108-109. Some critics go too far in either direction. There are those like F. Egermann ("Seneca als Dichterphilosoph," *NJbb.* 3, [1940], 18-36) who perceive the primary function of the plays to be the teaching of Stoic philosophy. On the other hand, there are those like Joachim Dingel (*Seneca und die Dichtung* [Heidelberg, 1974]) who see the plays as lacking in philosophical meaning and even running counter to Stoic philosophy.

8) A number of such studies are conveniently cited in William H. Owen, "Commonplace and Dramatic Symbol in Seneca's Tragedies," *TAPA* 99 (1968), 291, n. 2. On the prevalence of Stoic content in the plays, see also Clarence W. Mendell, *Our Seneca* (New Haven, 1941), Ch. IX, and H. MacL. Currie, "Seneca as Philosopher," in *Neronians and Flavians* (Silver Latin I), ed. D. R. Dudley (London, 1972), pp. 52-54. In his classic study, O. Regenbogen, "Schmerz und Tod in den Tragödien Senecas," *Vortr. Bibl. Warburg*, 1927-28 (Leipzig-Berlin, 1930), 167-218, recognizes that suffering and death are topics of Stoic interest, but he goes beyond a mere Stoicism thesis by studying the dramatic impact of scenes of excessive pain and emotion in the plays.

9) Marti (above, note 1), pp. 221, 219, 216. Elsewhere, Dr. Marti is explicit about what she means by Senecan "pseudo-drama." Devoted, as such a form is, she believes, "to expound[ing] his own brand of Stoicism," it is "Totally lacking in anything dramatic... It can hardly be said to have a plot but consists rather in a series of monologues and duologues which tell a pathetic story and proceed to moralize it. All is told, nothing acted. The only clash of personalities is a cold and argumentative debate... All is static exposition, without progress, growth, or crisis." Such works are "deliberately composed... as the imitation of drama" ("Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* and *Octavia*: A Diptych," *AJP*, 73 [1952], 28-29).

10) Marti (above, note 1), p. 216.

11) W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, *The Verbal Icon: Studies*

in the *Meaning of Poetry* (New York, 1958), pp. 3-18.

12) Wimsatt (above, note 11), p. 21.

13) "Poetry and Morals: A Relation Reargued," *Thought* 23 (1948), 281-99.

14) Henry Sidgwick, "The Pursuit of Culture," *Practical Ethics* (London, 1909), pp. 233-34. A comprehensive and useful treatment of this dilemma is well presented in Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup's "Art and Morals," *Art and Human Values* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), pp. 212-34.

15) "A Dialogue on Symbolism," in *Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern*, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1952), p. 59.

16) Sir Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry or the Defense of Poesy*, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd (New York, 1965), pp. 123, 110.

17) S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, with a Critical Text and Translation of the Poetics*, intro. John Gassner, 4th ed. (New York, 1951), p. 157.

18) Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art* (New York, 1948), esp. Chap. IV, "Discursive and Presentational Forms," and the discussion of a poem's "significant form" in Chap. IX. See also her *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key* (London, 1953).

19) *Rhetoric* I.1 (our translation).

20) "When a Book Gets Tired," *Mark Twain in Eruption*, ed. Bernard DeVoto (New York, 1940), p. 202.

21) Ian Jack, *Augustan Satire: Intention and Idiom in English Poetry, 1660-1750* (Oxford, 1952), p. 98. Even the latest study still argues that satire is predominantly didactic and rhetorical, inculcating virtue, inducing rectitude or reformation (Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom, *Satire's Persuasive Voice* [Ithaca, N.Y., 1979]).

22) *Ars Poetica*, line 333; see also 343, "omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci."

23) VII.iii; quoted in *Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden*, ed. Alan H. Gilbert (New York, 1940), p. 317, n. 28.

24) Sidney (above, note 16), p. 111.

25) Douglas Bush, "The Isolation of the Renaissance Hero," in *Reason and the Imagination: Studies on the History of Ideas, 1600-1800*, ed. J. A. Mazzeo (New York, 1962), p. 59. Bush elsewhere wryly observes that "Aestheticism has been merely an occasional ripple on the surface of the broad deep stream of the didactic faith which has flowed from the beginning of literature to the present" (*The Renaissance and English Humanism, The Alexander Lecture, 1939* [Toronto, 1962], p. 46).

26) "A Greek Theatre of Ideas," *Ideas in the Drama: Selected Papers from the English Institute*, ed. John Gassner (New York, 1964), pp. 1-41.

27) The allegorical interpretation of major literary works was commonplace in the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance worlds. On such a tradition, consult Joshua McClennen, "On the Meaning and Function of Allegory in the English Renaissance," *The University of Michigan Contributions in Modern Philology*, no. 6 (April 1947), 1-38, and Donald Lemen Clark, *Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance* (New York, 1922), pp. 139-61. If anything, the Renaissance's and Reformation's new emphasis upon the individual threatened enormously to proliferate private allegorizing; see Abraham Bezanker, "An Introduction to the Problem of Allegory in Literary Criticism,"

unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1955, pp. 2, 184-6, 209-10.

28) *A Short View of Tragedy* [1692], quoted in *Literary Criticism in England, 1660-1800*, ed. Gerald Wester Chapman (New York, 1966), p. 130.

29) Albert Guérard observes that in the "[Neo-] classical age" "It was a commonplace of criticism that no bad man could be a good writer," and he refers particularly to passages in Milton and Boileau (*Art for Art's Sake* [Boston & New York, 1936] p. 161). The question has been raised about profligates like Petronius and Byron, and, in our century, about the racist Roy Campbell and the deranged fascist Ezra Pound.

30) As an example of enlightened aspiration, Eliseo Vivas sets out to harmonize and reintegrate the disparate views that separate a formalistic and aesthetic comprehension of art from the moralizing and instructive conception that perceives art as "knowledge". But, amusingly enough, his schemes for reunification break down and his moralism prevails; for, after considering Louis-Ferdinand Céline's novel, *Voyage au bout de la nuit* (1932), he finds its "presuppositions" stemming from "hatred" and the book itself the product of a "perverted mind," and consequently providing an art and a knowledge that is "objectionable" and "open to condemnation": ("Literature and Knowledge," *Essays in Criticism and Aesthetics* [New York, 1955], pp. 115-116).

31) *Vid.* M. A. Quinlan, *Poetic Justice in the Drama: The History of an Ethical Principle in Literature* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1912). See also Jack L. Rudé, "Poetic Justice: A Study of the Problem of Human Conduct in Tragedy from Aeschylus to Shakespeare" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1934), and Richard J. Murphy, Jr., "Poetic Justice: A Study of the Critical Concept in the Early Eighteenth Century" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Berkeley, 1977; see *DAI* 38 [1978], 4849A-4850A).

32) Critics emphasize the immorality of William's protagonists, his "unpleasantness," his presentation of reality as a "modern hell," with "little good or decency in the world," his negativism and defeatism. Consult Esther Merle Jackson, *The Broken World of Tennessee Williams* (Madison & Milwaukee, Wisc., 1966); Francis Donahue, *The Dramatic World of Tennessee Williams* (New York, 1964), esp. p. 209; Signi Lenea Falk, *Tennessee Williams* (New York, 1961), Ch. 7, esp. p. 166. For a general survey from Ibsen to Miller and Williams that perceives what a critic takes to be an increasingly disconcerting trend espousing negativism and defeatism, consult Joseph Wood Krutch, *"Modernism" in Modern Drama* (Ithaca, New York, 1953).

33) *Vid.* The (London) *Observer*, June 22 and 29, July 6 and 13, 1958, which include Ionesco's replies. It is quite common for critics of Tynan's ilk to search in literature for "the power of positive thinking." We have often heard the layman inquire why authors have to write tragedies: isn't there enough misery and depression, they inquire, in everyday life? Why give us any additional pessimism at all?

34) For other recent examples, see Duncan Williams, *Trousered Apes: Sick Literature in a Sick Society* (London, 1971); George P. Elliott, *Conversions: Literature and the Modernist Deviation* (New York, 1971); Robert M. Adams, *Bad Mouth: Fugitive Papers on the Dark Side* (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1977).

35) "A Defense of the People of England, in Answer to Salmasius's Defense of the King," anon. trans. of *Defensio pro Populo Anglicano*, in *The Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. J. A. St. John (London, 1848), I, 126.

36) E. M. W. Tillyard and C. S. Lewis, *The Personal Heresy: A Controversy* (London, 1939), pp. 2,3.

37) *Poetics*, VI.12 [our translation].

38) "The Art of Fiction," *Partial Portraits* (London, 1911), pp. 392-93. Nor can the artist avoid *presenting* moral actions; as James observes elsewhere: "When it is a question of an artistic process, we must always mistrust very sharp distinctions. ... It is as difficult to describe an action without glancing at its motive, its moral history, as it is to describe a motive without glancing at its practical consequence. Our history and our fiction are what we do..." ("Guy de Maupassant," *The Future of the Novel: Essays on the Art of Fiction*, ed. Leon Edel [New York, 1956], p. 203).

39) C. J. Herington, "Senecan Tragedy," *Arion* 5 (1966), 422-71. See esp. pp. 431, 428, 436, 439, 443.

40) Otto Regenbogen, *Schmerz und Tod in den Tragödien Senecas* (above, note 8).

41) Consult Wolfgang Clemen, *Die Tragödie vor Shakespeare: Ihre Entwicklung im Spiegel der dramatischen Rede* (Heidelberg, 1955), 187-256 on "Klagerede," and esp. 209-11 on "Selbstapostrophe."

42) "Problems of Time in Seneca's *Hercules Furens* and *Thyestes*," *CSCA* 8 (1975), 257-69, esp. 261.

43) "The Development of the 'Senecal Man': Chapman's *Bussy D'Ambois* and Some Precursors," *RES* 23 (1947), 24.

44) Consult Anna Lydia Motto and John R. Clark, "*Violenta Fata*: The Tenor of Seneca's *Cedipus*," *CB* 50 (1974), 81-87, and "There's Something Wrong with the Sun': Seneca's *Cedipus* and the Modern Grotesque," *CB* 54 (1978), 41-44.

45) On the *Phaedra* and the *Medea*, see A. L. Motto and J. R. Clark, "Senecan Tragedy: Patterns of Irony and Art," *CB* 48 (1972), 69-77.

46) For extended discussion of this play, consult A. L. Motto and J. R. Clark, "Seneca's *Thyestes* as Melodrama," *RSC* 26 (1978), 363-78. Too frequently, the term "melodrama" is automatically used as a term of disapprobation; but see Clark & Motto, "Gasps, Guffaws, & Tears: A Modest Defense of Sentimentality, Bathos, and Melodrama," *Thalia* 1 (1978), 61-70.

47) *Ep.* 88.28; see also *Epp.* 85.32, 90.26, 95.8-9.

48) Concerning Seneca's special devotion to Vergil, the poet, see A. L. Motto and J. R. Clark, "Philosophy and Poetry: Seneca and Vergil," *CO* 56 (1978), 3-5.

49) *Ep.* 108.24-30.

50) *Georgics* III.66-67.

51) *De Brev. Vit.* IX.2; Seneca likes these lines about time's winged chariot well enough to quote them again in *Ep.* 108.24.

52) *Ep.* 62.2.

PLUTARCH AND ANAXAGORAS

JACKSON HERSHBELL

In Plutarch's *Lysander*, *Nicias*, and especially his *Pericles*, a fair amount is found on the life and teachings of Anaxagoras. There is also biographical and doxographical material in the *Moralia*, including two fragments, B18 and B21b, cited only by Plutarch.¹⁾ In contrast with Aristotle or Simplicius, Plutarch is not a major source for Anaxagoras. Yet what he preserves has value not only for understanding more fully the tradition about Anaxagoras, but also for understanding Plutarch's own philosophical beliefs and working methods. These will be explored in this study which will examine the ways in which Plutarch's own Platonic convictions helped to select and to shape the Anaxagorean material preserved by him. Attention will also be given to Plutarch's sources, and to his overall interpretation of Anaxagoras' thought. In short, it is hoped that a comprehensive account of Plutarch on Anaxagoras will emerge.

Now a notable example of Plutarch's use of biographical material on Anaxagoras to express his own convictions is found in *Pericles* (ch. 8, where Plutarch recounts the story of a one-horned ram brought to Pericles from his country place. The oddity is first explained by Lampon, the seer (μάντις), who regards it as a sign (σημεῖον) that the mastery of Athens would finally pass to Pericles, and not to Thucydides, son of Melesias. Anaxagoras, however, performed an autopsy on the ram's head, and explained the phenomenon scientifically.²⁾ The story is told after Plutarch's unfavorable contrast between superstition (θεοσιδωλουσία) and natural philosophy (φυσικὸς λόγος), in which superstition's ignorance of causes (αἰτίαι) is criticized. After the story's narration, however, Plutarch claims that both the φυσικὸς (Anaxagoras) and μάντις (Lampon) may have been right: the former correctly discerned the cause (αἰτία) and the

latter, the purpose (τέλος). Both "natural" and teleological explanations are justified; indeed, the significance or meaning of any phenomenon deserves as much attention as the immediate cause.

There seems little doubt that ch. 6 of *Pericles* contains Plutarch's "eigene Gedanken," and readers of his *De superstitione* will recognize them.³⁾ Yet Plato's influence is also apparent, for at *Phaedo* 97Bff. (DK, A 47), Socrates expresses disappointment that Anaxagoras made no use of *Nous* in the ordering of things, but simply accounted "mists and air and water and many other strange things causes" (98C).⁴⁾ Certainly Socrates' distinction between "teleological" and "mechanistic" explanation seems to underlie Plutarch's remarks in *Pericles* 6, and whether the incident was historical or not, it shows Plutarch's own interest in both kinds of explanation.⁵⁾ Moreover, Pericles' association with Anaxagoras, and the latter's influence on the Athenian, are first found in the *Phaedrus* 269E (DK, A 15).

Probably the story of the one-horned ram should be connected with two other passages in Plutarch's *Lives* dealing with the theme of superstition. One is also found in *Pericles* (ch. 35) where Plutarch recounts Pericles' success in overcoming his crew's superstitious fears by explaining an eclipse of the sun. The story was apparently known in philosophical circles (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς λέγεται τῶν φιλοσόφων), and though Anaxagoras is not mentioned, his influence on Pericles can be presumed.⁶⁾

In *Nicias* (ch. 23), the theme of superstition is again introduced when Plutarch tells of the terror Nicias and his army experienced at an eclipse of the moon.⁷⁾ Though solar eclipses were somewhat understood, those of the moon were not: "men thought it uncanny - a sign sent from God in advance of divers great calamities."⁸⁾ Plutarch then interrupts his narrative somewhat abruptly with an excursus on Anaxagoras' contributions to the study of the moon: he was the first to "put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines about the changing phases of the moon" (περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς), literally, its "shinings" or "illuminations," and "shadow" (or "eclipse").⁹⁾ But since he was not an ancient or highly regarded authority, his views won only slow and cautious acceptance;¹⁰⁾ in fact, his theory was kept secret (ἀπόρρητος), and was known only to a few. For natural philosophers were then regarded with suspicion and considered "star gazers" (μετεωρολόσχας); (cf. *Per.* 5 where Pericles is filled with μετεωρολογίας καὶ μεταρσιολεσχίας as a result of his association with Anaxagoras). Protagoras

was exiled, and Anaxagoras rescued from prison by Pericles. The excursus culminates with praise of Plato who subordinated (ὑπέταξε) physical necessities (τὰς φυσικὰς ἀνάγκας) to divine and more important or sovereign principles (ταῖς θεαίαις καὶ κυριωτέραις ἀρχαῖς). This seems to correspond closely to Plato's critique of Anaxagoras at *Phaedo* 97Bff. cited above.

Plutarch's admiration for Plato is here obvious. That much of his interest in and criticism of Anaxagoras, at least in *Nicias* and *Pericles*,¹¹⁾ stem from his own Platonic convictions is well illustrated by *De def. orac.* 435F-436 where Plutarch discusses his own beliefs about the divine. With remarks reminiscent of both *Per.* 6 and *Nic.* 23, he writes:

I shall defend myself by citing Plato as my witness and advocate in one (μάρτυρα καὶ σύνδικον ὁμοῦ). That philosopher found fault with Anaxagoras, the one of early times, because he was too much wrapped up in the physical causes (φυσικαῖς αἰτίαις), and was always following up and pursuing the law of necessity as it was worked out in the behaviour of bodies, and left out of account the purpose and the agent (τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὑφ' οὗ), which are better causes and origins. Plato himself was the first of the philosophers, or the one most prominently engaged in prosecuting investigations of both sorts, to assign to God, on the one hand, the origin of all things that are in keeping with reason, and on the other hand, not to divest matter of the causes necessary for whatever comes into being... (Babbitt's translation)

Plutarch's Platonism, as will be seen, further explains much of his interest in details of Anaxagoras' life. For the moment, however, since the report in *Nicias* is important for understanding Anaxagoras' astronomical contributions, what value can be placed on it? Is it historically correct to maintain, as Plutarch does, that Anaxagoras was the first to explain the moon's changing phases, including eclipses? The question has recently been revived by H. Görgemanns and D. O'Brien, and merits discussion.¹²⁾ The *Nicias* passage should probably be considered in conjunction with Plutarch's report on Anaxagoras at *De fac. orb. lun.* 929B, according to which Anaxagoras believed that: ἥλιος ἐντίθησι τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ λαμπρόν (B 18, one of the two fragments preserved by Plutarch).¹³⁾ Now behind both 929B and *Nicias* 23 is probably a remark of Socrates in *Cratylus* (409A) according to whom Anaxagoras recently (νεωστύ) maintained the moon's illumination by the sun.

Certainly the *Crat.* passage was known to Plutarch as is clear from *De E* 391A-B, though here Plutarch apparently understood Socrates to mean recent *and* first.¹⁴⁾ And at *De fac. orb. lun.* 929B the moon's illumination by the sun is referred to as the "very proposition" of Anaxagoras (τοῦτο δὴ τὸ 'Αναξαγόρειον).

A major problem with the *Nic.* report, however, is that there is evidence attributing theories about the moon's illumination by the sun, and presumably lunar eclipses, to thinkers before Anaxagoras, e.g. Anaximenes, Parmenides, and Empedocles (?). Even Plutarch himself in *De fac. orb. lun.* refers to Anaxagoras' theory that the moon derives its light from the sun, right after attributing what would seem to be the same theory of Parmenides.¹⁵⁾ In view of such evidence, Görgemanns has maintained that Plutarch's report can be accepted only with "Einschränkungen" and that Plutarch tried to reconcile the inconsistencies ("die überlieferte Priorität des Anaxagoras mit den konkurrierenden Ansprüchen") by adding that Anaxagoras' doctrine was initially kept secret (ἀπόρητος).¹⁶⁾ This may be correct, though it should also be noted that in *Nic.* 23 Plutarch claims only that Anaxagoras was the first to put his views *in writing* (εἰς γραφὴν καταθέμενος), and in his zeal to prove Anaxagoras' "temporal" priority over Empedocles, O'Brien dismisses the remark perhaps too quickly.¹⁷⁾

All things considered, however, Plutarch does not seem especially well informed about Anaxagoras' views on the moon, despite his assertions in *Nicias* and *De fac. orb. lun.* For example, he seems to know nothing of Anaxagoras' belief that the moon was made of earth ("es scheint fast als hätte er nicht davon gewußt"),¹⁸⁾ and though Plutarch reports at *De fac. orb. lun.* 932B that the moon is, according to Anaxagoras, the size of the Peloponnesus, he says nothing about the latter's reasons for the belief.¹⁹⁾ A report such as this was probably taken from secondary sources, and there seems to be no good reason for thinking that Plutarch had first-hand knowledge of Anaxagoras' beliefs either about the moon's size or about its nature other than its illumination by the sun.²⁰⁾

At *Lysander* 12 there is also a digression on Anaxagoras' views similar to *Nicias* 23.²¹⁾ When remarking on Lysander's defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotamoi (404 B.C.), Plutarch notes that some say the fall of a stone

from the sky was a "sign" (σημεῖον) of this event, and:

Anaxagoras is said to have predicted²²⁾ that if the bodies fastened in the sky (τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐνδεδεμένων σωμάτων) should be loosened by some slip or shake (ὀλισθήματος ἢ σάλου), one of them might be torn away and might plunge and fall to earth; none of the stars is in its natural place, for since they are heavy and stony, they shine by the resistance and twisting round (ἀντερείσει καὶ περικλάσει) of the aither. They are dragged about by force, being tightly held by the whirl and tension (δίνῃ καὶ τόνῳ) of the revolution, just as at the beginning, they were prevented from falling on earth when cold and heavy things were being separated from the whole (τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ βαρέων ἀποκρινομένων τοῦ παντός).

Guthrie believes that by this report, Plutarch "usefully fills a gap in our knowledge of Anaxagoras' theory," and that τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐνδεδεμένων σωμάτων is even reminiscent of Anaximenes.²³⁾ Lanza, however, is suspicious of Plutarch's information, especially since the expression τῶν... ἐνδεδεμένων σωμάτων belongs to the Aristotelian theory of the "fixed stars" (cf. *De cael.* 289b 33), and in Anaxagoras' cosmology there seems to be no such conception (see DK, A 42). Lanza thus thinks it possible that Plutarch's report goes back to an intermediate source, probably Peripatetic.²⁴⁾

Now some of Plutarch's report certainly seems to be couched in Anaxagoras' language (e.g. τῶν ψυχρῶν... ἀποκρινομένων, the latter term being quite characteristic; cf. B2, B4, and B6), but because of the expression "Anaxagoras is said" (λέγεται) by which Plutarch introduces his report, it can be inferred that it is based certainly not on Anaxagoras' own writings, but on secondary sources. The story of the fall of the stone at Aegospotamoi was well known in antiquity (see Pliny, *Nat. hist.* II, 149f. (DK, A 11) and Diog. Laert. 2, 10);²⁵⁾ also Anaxagoras' theory that the whole sky was made of stars, the rapidity of their rotation causing them to stay in place (συνεστάναι), seems to have been general knowledge in antiquity (see Diog. Laert. 2, 12 who quotes the 3rd cent. B.C. historian Silenus as his source). In *Lysander*, however, Plutarch never mentions his sources for Anaxagoras' astronomical doctrines. After presenting them, he later (also in ch. 12) refers to Daimachus' books on piety (τῷ δ' Ἀναξ-αγόρᾳ μαρτυρεῖ... ἐν τοῖς περὶ εὐσεβείας), but in view of the reference's context, it seems unlikely that Plutarch took Anaxagoras' views from Daimachus.²⁶⁾

Now from *Pericles*, *Nicias*, and *Lysander*, it is clear that Plutarch was interested in Anaxagoras' astronomical doctrines,

if only because he considered the latter an enemy of "superstition." For at *De superst.* 169E, in querying why superstition is no less impious than atheism, Plutarch reports that Anaxagoras was brought to trial for impiety (ἀσέβεια) because he said the sun is a stone (λίθος). The Cimmerians, however, are not called "impious" because they do not believe at all in the sun's existence. Indeed, superstitious beliefs about the gods, e.g. that they are fickle, vengeful, and cruel, are worse than "atheism." Again, Platonic influence on Plutarch's critique of superstition, seems clear (see *Rep.* 367Eff.), and à propos the remark on Anaxagoras' trial, Babbitt noted that Plutarch "probably drew from the well-known passage in Plato's *Apology*, p. 26D."²⁷⁾ Plutarch, however, accepts Anaxagoras' position, as we have seen, in explaining natural causes. But he considers it a one-sided, perhaps even impious view, insofar as the teleological side remains neglected. For Anaxagoras did not really employ the concept of *Nous* in explaining the natural world, and thus in Plutarch's (and Plato's) eyes, he failed to provide teleological insights.²⁸⁾

Yet Anaxagoras, the natural philosopher, was for Plutarch not only an astronomer, but also a geometrician. At *De exil.* 607F, when illustrating his own contention that no place can remove either well-being (εὐδαιμονίαν), virtue or understanding (οὐδὲ ἀρετὴν οὐδὲ φρόνησιν), Plutarch cites Anaxagoras and his devotion to geometry as an example: while in prison he was "busied with squaring the circle" (τὸν τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμόν ἔγραφε). The report has caused a fair amount of discussion about its meaning and historical value,²⁹⁾ but again, the influence of Platonic tradition on Plutarch is likely, for that the report was known in Platonic circles is suggested by Proclus (*Eucl.* 65. 21. A9) who says that Anaxagoras "applied himself to many geometrical problems."

For Plutarch, not only was Anaxagoras a student of astronomy, but also of the earth's natural phenomena. Several of Plutarch's references to Anaxagoras show interest in his beliefs about terrestrial happenings. One at *Quaest. nat.* 911D (DK, A 116) is quite brief. In a discussion of why sea water does not nourish trees, Plutarch asks whether it may not be for the same reason that it provides none for animals "seeing that Plato, Anaxagoras, and Democritus think that a plant is an animal fixed in the earth" (ζῷον γὰρ ἔγγαιον τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι).³⁰⁾ In itself, the report is of little value, but the mention of Anaxagoras (also Democritus)

together with Plato, suggests Plutarch's esteem for Anaxagoras as a student of the natural world. At *Quaest. conv.* 722A_f., Plutarch and his Platonic teacher, Ammonius,³¹⁾ when discussing why sounds carry better at night than during the day, seem well informed about Anaxagoras' belief that sounds are muffled in day time by the hissing of air in the sunshine.³²⁾ Plutarch here cites Anaxagoras as claiming that:

the air is moved by the sun with a quivering, vibrating motion, as is clear from the little bits and fragments always dancing in the air, which some call motes (τῶλας). Anaxagoras says that these, hissing and buzzing in the heat, by their noise make other sounds hard to hear in the daytime, but that at night their dancing and their noise abate.
(Minar's translation)

In DK, A 74, the report is given with (Aristot.) *Probl.* XI 33, 903a 7, but Lanza noted that the testimonies are not wholly identical, and that the movement of bodies dancing in the air "which some call motes," is reminiscent of Democritus (cf. *Lucr.* II, 116-120). Thus, according to Lanza, Plutarch's testimony is inserted in an Epicurean context ("il contesto in cui la testimonianza plutarchea è inserita è epicureo").³³⁾ But whatever its source, the report shows that Anaxagoras' views on sound were of interest to Plutarch and to his teacher Ammonius, and thus to Platonists of the 1st cent. A.D.³⁴⁾

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Thus far, these scattered reports on Anaxagoras may not add up to much. Anaxagoras is the astronomer, the geometrician, the student of nature. He is also the teacher of Pericles. Was there any connection in Plutarch's mind between these facets of Anaxagoras' activity, or was his interest wholly doxographical? In my opinion, there is a connection by Plutarch's emphasis on associating Anaxagoras with Pericles: it lies in Plutarch's Platonic conviction that philosophers have the responsibility of entering political life, for at 777A of *Maxim. cum princip.*, Plutarch maintains that a philosopher's influence is expanded and perpetuated, not by his effect on private persons, but on rulers and statesmen:

but if these teachings (those of philosophy) take possession of a ruler, a statesman, and a man of action and fill him with love of honour, through one he benefits many, as Anaxagoras did by association with Pericles, Plato with Dion, and Pythagoras with the chief men of the Italiote Greeks.
(Fowler's translation)

Plato's involvement with Dion is, of course, well known from the VIIth Epistle, and underlying this involvement is the famous conviction that unless "philosophers" become kings, or kings "philosophers," there can be no cure for the ills of society (*Rep.* 472Ef.). Now Plutarch's familiarity with both the VIIth Epistle and the *Republic*, is clear from his own *Life of Dion* and passages throughout the *Moralia*.³⁵⁾ And it is at *Rep.* 521Cff. that Plato outlines his education program for the guardians of society. Within this program, γεωμετρία and ἀστρονομία have a place of prominence. Thus, in view of the anecdotes about and doctrines of Anaxagoras reported by Plutarch, it seems likely he considered Anaxagoras a precursor of the Platonic ideal: though not himself a "king" or ruler, Anaxagoras was able to influence Pericles by his life and teachings, a life devoted to astronomy, geometry, and exploration of the nature of things. But despite this influence, there really remains a basic difference between the life of a philosopher and that of a statesman.

Such a summary of Plutarch's attitude to Anaxagoras, also helps to explain many of the other anecdotal or biographical incidents preserved by him. For example, at *Pericles* 16 Plutarch reports that the statesman's parsimony in economic matters (the doing of Pericles' servant, Evangelus) was not in accord with Anaxagoras' σοφία since "that philosopher actually abandoned his house and left his land to lie fallow for sheep-grazing, owing to the lofty thoughts with which he was inspired. But the life of a speculative philosopher (θεωρητικοῦ φιλοσόφου) is not the same thing, I think, as that of a statesman (πολιτικοῦ)." Diels speculated that the anecdote was taken from the historian Ion, but Meinhardt correctly noted that there is no evidence that Ion mentioned Anaxagoras' relationship with Pericles.³⁶⁾ Moreover, the same story is found in *De vit. aer. al.* (831F) right after Plutarch mentions the Cynic Crates. That Plutarch's report had a Cynic source is likely, though a number of anecdotes circulated in antiquity (e.g. Diogenes Laertius, Valerius Maximus, Clement of Alexandria) showing that Anaxagoras had become a symbol of the "theoretical life" (βίος θεωρητικός).³⁷⁾ Also in *Pericles* 16, another incident is mentioned about Anaxagoras starving himself to death, and Plutarch introduces it with "they say" (λέγουσιν). The subject of λέγουσιν cannot be determined, but it is not amiss to speculate that this as well as the previous anecdotes, formed part of a tradition on the theoretical

life which ultimately went back to Plato.³⁸⁾

Since Anaxagoras' life as a philosopher was closely connected with Pericles' own political fortunes, it is not surprising that Plutarch gives a fair amount of attention to Anaxagoras' trial. One of the reports at *De superstitione*. 169E, as noted earlier in this study, probably goes back to Plato's *Apology*. 26D. The *Apology* is, of course, the earliest extant source for Anaxagoras' trial, and though Socrates' remarks in his own defense leave some doubt as to whether Anaxagoras was actually tried,³⁹⁾ the ancient tradition is unanimous that such a trial took place. Problems arise, however, concerning the historical details, e.g. when it occurred and the names of the accusers. Most studies begin with the report in Diog. Laert. 2, 12 that different accounts of Anaxagoras' trial are given (περὶ δὲ τῆς δίκης αὐτοῦ διάφορα λέγεται),⁴⁰⁾ and Plutarch's version in *Per.* 32 deserves attention:

Diopieithes brought in a bill providing for the public impeachment of such as did not believe in the gods (τὰ θεῖα), or who taught doctrines regarding the heavens, directing suspicion against Pericles by means of Anaxagoras.

(Perrin's translation)

According to Plutarch, however, Anaxagoras' trial presumably did not take place, for Pericles fearing for Anaxagoras, sent him from the city (ἔξεπεμψεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως).

Now there seems to be scholarly agreement about Plutarch's sources for *Per.* 32: a) the *psephism* of Diopieithes (for which Plutarch is the only ancient authority) was probably taken from Craterus' ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή;⁴¹⁾ and b) Ephorus perhaps provided the basic schema for Plutarch's report, namely, that Anaxagoras' accusation was only a pretext to attack Pericles who, fearful of his own position, helped to create the Peloponnesian War.⁴²⁾ Aside from reconciling *Per.* 32 with other ancient versions, however, there is also the problem of reconciling it with Plutarch's references to Anaxagoras' persecution elsewhere. At *De superstitione*. 169F, for example, Anaxagoras is said to be a defendant in a trial for impiety (δίκην ἔφυγεν ἀσεβείας). Other reports at *De prof. in virt.* 84F (εἰργμὸν Ἀναξαγόρου), *De exil.* 607F (ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ), and *Nicias* 23 (εἰρχθέντα) place Anaxagoras in prison, though according to the last version, Pericles rescued Anaxagoras with difficulty (μόλις). To return briefly to Diogenes Laertius, it is clear that different versions of Anaxagoras' trial circulated in antiquity. According to Sotion (D. L. 2, 12), for example, Pericles defended Anaxagoras who was fined five talents and banished (φυγαδευθῆναι; cf. ἔξεπέμψεν in *Per.* 32); Hermippus

of Smyrna reports that Anaxagoras was in prison (καθείροχθη ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ) awaiting execution, but Pericles convinced the Athenian people to release Anaxagoras. Hermippus' work was known to Plutarch and it is possible that his accounts of Anaxagoras' imprisonment were taken from him.⁴³⁾ Speculation about Plutarch's sources for Anaxagoras' trial and imprisonment, however, remains an uncertain endeavor owing to the confusion of his own and other ancient sources.

Some of Plutarch's sources for Anaxagoras seem, of course, to have been of a "traditional" nature, e.g. the λέγεται of *Lysander* 12 (cf. *Per.* 35, ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς λέγεται τῶν φιλοσόφων), or the λέγουσιν of *Per.* 16, 7. At *Consol. ad Apoll.* 118D, assuming the work is by Plutarch,⁴⁴⁾ the incident of Anaxagoras' son's death along with the philosopher's remark, ἡδεῖν ὅτι θνητὸν ἐγέννησα, is reported as a "traditional" story (παρειλήφαμεν).⁴⁵⁾ In reference to the same story, Plutarch cites a specific source, and that is at *De coh. ira* 463D where he writes that Panaetius mentions somewhere (ὡς ποῦ) that we should make use of (χρησθαι) Anaxagoras' saying on the occasion of his son's death. It would seem rash, however, to conclude that Panaetius was Plutarch's only source, for if the reference proves anything, it is that the story was known among Stoic, and possibly other philosophical circles.

Aside from such anecdotal material, the source(s) of which one can only conjecture, a major question is: did Plutarch have access to Anaxagoras' book? Though some scholars maintain that copies of it did not exist after the 3rd cent. B.C., there is evidence that they were available at least until the 2nd cent. A.D., and that one was in the imperial "Schatzkammer" at Rome.⁴⁶⁾ It is also possible that Simplicius, who wrote in the 6th cent. A.D., made use of a copy at Athens.⁴⁷⁾ Assuming, then, that Anaxagoras' work was extant at Rome and Athens, Plutarch would have had opportunity to make use of it. Unfortunately, however, though Plutarch is informed about Anaxagoras' life, and even some of his doctrines, there is little to prove first-hand knowledge of Anaxagoras' book. Plutarch in referring to Anaxagoras seems to remain in the topics of the Academic-Stoic tradition.

But according to the Diels-Kranz edition, two fragments of Anaxagoras are preserved only by Plutarch. B 18 at *De fac. orb. lun.* 929B concerning the moon's illumination by the sun, was considered previously in this study. The other, B 21b

at *De fort.* 98F, is as follows:

... in all these matters we are less fortunate than beasts; yet we use experience and memory and intelligence (σοφία) and skill (τέχνη) which according to Anaxagoras are our very own, and we take honey, and draw milk, and having gathered them together we lead and drive them, so that in this there is nothing of chance, but wholly prudence and forethought (τῆς εὐβουλίας καὶ τῆς προνοίας).

The citation appears in ch. 3 where Plutarch argues that the human senses,⁴⁸⁾ e.g. sight and hearing, are not the result of chance (τύχη), but of reason (λογισμός); it is because of reason that humanity is superior to animals who are otherwise better equipped physically τύχη γε καὶ φύσει γενέσεως. Many animals are, for example, swifter and stronger than humans, yet mankind remains the master of all things. According to Ziegler, many conceptions in *De fort.* are "zweifellos stoisch,"⁴⁹⁾ even though it is impossible to find a specific source for the treatise. In the chapter, however, in which Anaxagoras is mentioned, there are two specific references to Plato, *Tim.* 67B at 98B, and *Prot.* 321C at 98D. There are also quotations of Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Greek dramatists. Thus, in view of the number of quotations, it would not be amiss to speculate that Plutarch is drawing from his own *hypomnēmata*, though the ultimate source for his quotation of Anaxagoras cannot be determined.⁵⁰⁾ That it came from Anaxagoras' book is possible, but unlikely.

The purposive activity of nature (φύσις) is also stressed by Plutarch at *De frat. amor.* 478Df. (cf. *De fort.* 98B-C) where Anaxagoras' views are again mentioned. In a discussion of how nature has made many bodily parts double, e.g. hands, feet, eyes, for mutual support and preservation (à propos the treatise's theme of the nature and benefits of brotherly affection), Plutarch cites Anaxagoras as believing that the reason for man's intellectual skill is the possession of hands (τὴν αἰτίαν τίθεσθαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως). But, according to Plutarch, the opposite seems true: "it is not because man acquired hands that he is the wisest of animals; it is because by nature he was endowed with reason and skill (φύσει λογικὸν ἦν καὶ τεχνικόν) that he acquired instruments of a nature adapted to these powers." That this passage

should be understood in conjunction with Arist. *Part. an.* 687a 7, seems clear.⁵¹⁾ Aristotle writes:

Anaxagoras says that man is the wisest of animals because he has hands, but it is reasonable to suppose that he received hands because he is the wisest. The hand is a tool, and nature like a wise man allots each tool to the one who is able to use it.

That this passage was Plutarch's source is possible, but more important, it shows in conjunction with *De frat. amor.* 478D, that whatever Plutarch's source was, one of his main criticisms of Anaxagoras was the latter's lack of teleological explanation. That this critique ultimately derives from Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo*, was argued earlier in this study.

On the whole, there is no conclusive evidence that Plutarch's knowledge (and criticism) of Anaxagoras was based on primary sources. Neither the quotation at *De fort.* 98F (B 21b) nor the passage at *De frat. amor.* 478D, reveals first-hand acquaintance with Anaxagoras' work. But perhaps the clearest proof that Plutarch made use of secondary sources is found at *Pericles* 4. The passage is worth quoting *in extenso*:

but the man who most consorted with Pericles... was Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, whom men of that day used to call "Nous," either because they admired that comprehension of his, which proved of such surpassing greatness in the investigation of nature; or because he was the first to enthrone in the universe, not Chance (τύχην), nor yet Necessity (ἀνάγκην), as the source of its orderly arrangement, but Mind (Nous) pure and simple, which distinguishes and sets apart, in the midst of an otherwise chaotic mass, the substances which have like elements (τὰς ὁμοιομερείας). (Perrin's translation)

At first glance, the report seems based on fragments of Anaxagoras' work, e.g. *nous* is pure (καθαρός), and mixed with nothing (see B 12, for example), but the term ὁμοιομερείαι suggests strongly that Plutarch is drawing from a Peripatetic summary of Anaxagoras' thought, for it was Aristotle who apparently first attributed the doctrine of *homoiomereē* to Anaxagoras.⁵²⁾ Since Theophrastus was certainly a source for Plutarch's *Pericles*, it would not be amiss to conclude that a passage such as this was based partly on Theophrastus' φυσικῶν δόξαι.⁵³⁾ In the absence, however, of reference to Theophrastus, a specific source for Plutarch's report cannot be determined.

In conclusion, there is little or no evidence that Plutarch had direct access to Anaxagoras' book, and whatever his sources (secondary) were, cannot easily be determined. A fairly consistent impression arises, however, that much of Plutarch's interest in and knowledge of Anaxagoras was probably based on a Platonic-Aristotelian-Stoic tradition. For example, Plutarch's interest in details of Anaxagoras' life is explainable because of the Clazomenian's association with Pericles, an association which seems to have anticipated Plato's own relationship with Dion, and, of course, Plato's conception of the philosopher king. The biographical anecdotes preserved by Plutarch show Anaxagoras as one interested primarily in the intellectual life, a life devoted to the study of celestial and terrestrial phenomena. Because of Plutarch's own personal interest in the workings of nature, it is not surprising that he has regard for Anaxagoras' views as is clear, for example, from *Quaest. conviv.* and *De fac. orb. lun.* where he preserves some valuable information on Anaxagoras. In Plutarch's eyes, Anaxagoras was also a precursor of his own fight against superstitious explanations of the world's happenings. But however sympathetic Plutarch may have been to Anaxagoras' beliefs, the latter's views did not really explain the purposive activity of nature, a doctrine dear to both Plutarch and to his master Plato.⁵⁴⁾

University of Minnesota

NOTES

1) See K. Ziegler's brief summary of Plutarch's treatment of Anaxagoras in his *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*² (Stuttgart 1964) 282. A list of passages on Anaxagoras is in W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (London 1957) 3, s.v. "Anaxagoras."

2) On the incident, see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* II (Cambridge, England 1965) 287 who refers in n. 2 also to D. L. 2, 7. The incident, however, is not mentioned by Diogenes; it is reported only by Plutarch. For further discussion, see E. Meinhardt, *Perikles bei Plutarch* (Frankfurt 1957) who believes Pericles' relation with Lampon "findet durch Aristot. *rhet.* 1419a 2... eine Bestätigung und dürfte somit ebenfalls zum Philosophen-Überlieferungsgut gehören, das bis zu Plutarch manche Variationen erfahren haben mag." For bibliography on Lampon, see E. Derenne.

"Les Procès d'impiété intentés aux philosophes à Athènes au Vme et au IVme siècles avant J.-C.," *Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, XLV (1930), 16 n. 2.

3) Meinhardt, *Perikles*, 27. See also R. Flacelière and F. Chambry, *Plutarque Vies: Périclès-Fabius Maximus - Alcibiade-Coriolan*, III (Paris 1964) 12: "Les lecteurs des *Moralia* reconnaîtront là une des positions fondamentales de sa doctrine."

4) R. S. Bluck's translation, *Plato's Phaedo* (London 1955).

5) See, for example, D. Lanza, *Anassagora: testimonianze e frammenti*, Biblioteca di studi superiori, LII (Florence 1966) 28 n. on A 16: "Non si può stabilire con sicurezza la veridicità della notizia..." See also Derenne, *Les Procès d'impiété*, 21-22: "l'histoire du béliet unicorne, si elle n'est pas historique, est du moins née du souvenir de l'opposition très réelle qui ne pouvait que se manifester entre le naturaliste et le devin." Or J. A. Davison, "Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras," *CQ* 47 (1953) 42: "if we believe the story of the one-horned ram, Anaxagoras had returned to Athens before the ostracism of Thucydides (probably in the spring of 443)."

6) Flacelière, *Vies*, III, 55 n. 1 remarks that "Plutarque, d'ailleurs, ne se porte nullement garant de l'authenticité de cette anecdote, 'racontée dans les écoles des philosophes'."

7) See also *De superstit.* 169A, where without reference to Anaxagoras Plutarch reports the Nicias incident: "it would perhaps have been the best thing in the world for Nicias... to have got rid of his superstition... rather than to be affrighted at the shadow on the wall in eclipse and sit inactive while the enemy's wall was being built around him..." (Babbitt's translation). Plutarch then explains eclipses of the moon as an "obstruction of light caused by the earth's coming between sun and moon..." On the incident in *Nicias*, see R. Flacelière and E. Chambry, *Plutarque Vies: Cimon-Lucullus - Nicias-Crassus*, VII (Paris 1972) 136 and 298 (n. on p. 177). See also Guthrie, *History*, II, 308.

8) B. Perrin's translation, *Plutarch's Lives* III in *The Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge, Mass. repr. 1958). Here and elsewhere the translation of Plutarch, unless they are mine, are from the LCL, and the translators' names are placed in brackets behind the quotations.

9) D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," *JHS* 88 (1968) 107 writes: "in the context περί σελήνης καταυγασμών καὶ σκιάς clearly meant to include the correct explanation of the moon's eclipse."

10) Plutarch's reference to Anaxagoras as οὐτ'αὐτός ἦν παλαιός at *Nic.* 23 seems inconsistent with *De def. orae.* 435F and *De frat. amor.* 478E where Anaxagoras is referred to as παλαιός. The "inconsistency" is explained probably by Plutarch's historical awareness: at the time of Nicias' campaign in 413 B.C. Anaxagoras was not yet "ancient"; by Plutarch's time (ca. 100 A.D.) he was.

11) The Platonic influence on Plutarch in the *Pericles* is great; e.g. in chaps. 1-2, inspired by Plato, he develops a moral theory of imitation or *mimēsis*, and several times he refers to the "divine" Plato, e.g. 7, 8; 15, 2; and 24, 7. See also Flacelière and Chambry, *Plutarque Vies*, III, 6 and 11 for further references and discussion. Except for ch. 23, however, Plato's influence on Plutarch in the *Nicias* is much less obvious.

12) See D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," *JHS* 88 (1968) 93-113, esp. 106-09, and "Derived Light and Eclipses in the

Fifth Century," *JHS* 88 (1968) 114-127, esp. 125-26. Also H. Görgemanns, *Untersuchungen zu Plutarchs Dialog De facie in orbe lunae* (Heidelberg 1970) 35-37.

13) According to Guthrie, *History* II, 306, "Plutarch is possibly quoting the philosopher's actual words when he speaks of 'the proposition of Anaxagoras that the sun imparts the brightness to the moon'." See also Lanza, *Anaxagoras*, 240, n. on B 18.

14) Though the *Crat.* passage is cited as A 76 in DK, no reference is given to Plutarch's *De E* 391A-B. For the interpretation of Plutarch's meaning given in the text, see O'Brien, *JHS* 88 (1968) 107.

15) O'Brien, *ibid.*, 107, argues that Empedocles wrote later than Anaxagoras. See also *ibid.* 118, where he notes that "there is nonetheless a variety of evidence that attributes derived light for the moon to a number of thinkers before Anaxagoras."

16) Görgemanns, *Untersuchungen* 35, n. 67.

17) O'Brien seems to overlook recent studies, e.g. E. Havelock's *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963) or J. Hershbell, "Empedocles' Oral Style," *CJ* 63 (1968) 351-57, which give reasons for believing that Presocratics prior to or roughly contemporary with Anaxagoras, composed their works orally. Plutarch's report provides evidence for an oral tradition, and Anaxagoras' *written* book may well have been a novelty among the "philosophical" works of the fifth century B.C.

18) Görgemanns, *Untersuchungen*, 35.

19) In the Loeb Classical Library, XII of *Plutarch's Moralia* (Cambridge, Mass. repr. 1968) H. Cherniss observes on p. 121, n. c that Plutarch's "statement here concerning the moon is missing from Diels-Kranz." The "traditional" report is that the sun, not the moon is larger than the Peloponnesus according to Anaxagoras. Thus, Görgemanns writes, *Untersuchungen*, 135, "bekannt ist, dass Anaxagoras die Sonne für grösser erklärte als die Peloponnes: 59A1, 8.42, 8.72 D.-K. All diese Zeugnisse gehen auf Theophrast zurück (s. die Zusammenstellung bei Diels, *Dox.* S. 138)."

20) At 923C-D Plutarch reports that the moon is kept from falling because of its motion, a view similar to that of Anaxagoras mentioned in *Lysander* 12 (see Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia*, XII, 59 n. d). But this possible reference to Anaxagoras as well as the report at 932B and the fragment at 929B, are not enough to prove Plutarch's direct acquaintance with Anaxagoras' work.

21) In R. Flacelière and E. Chambry, *Plutarque Vies: Pyrrhos-Marius - Lysandre-Sylla*, VI (Paris 1971) it is observed, 170, n. 2, that this discussion at *Lys.* 12 "qui a trait à des questions de sciences physiques peut être rapprochée notamment de celle qui, dans la *Vie de Paul-Émile*, 14, concerne l'origine et la formation des eaux souterraines." A closer parallel, however, is with the *Nicias* passage where Anaxagoras' astronomical views are also discussed. The *Lysander* passage bears, moreover, similarity to *Per.* 6 where, although the subjects are different, both chapters end with almost the same remark: in *Per.* 6 - ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὥς ἑτέρας ἐστὶ πραγματείας; in *Lys.* 12 - ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἑτέρῳ γένοι γραφῆς διακριβωτέον.

22) The word predicted (προειπεῖν) has caused discussion. O. Gilbert, *Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums* (Leipzig 1907) 689, n. 1, remarked: "wenn Plut. *Lys.* 12 und Diog. L. 2, 10, berichtet wird, Anaxagoras habe den Fall vorhergesagt, so heisst das nur, daß

der Fall die Bestätigung der Lehre des Anaxagoras von der Natur der Meteoriten sei." Gilbert's view has been adopted by Guthrie, *History* II, 304, who writes "the belief that Anaxagoras had actually foretold the fall of the meteorite is fairly obviously a particularization, easy in a credulous age, of his general statement that the sun and stars were heavy bodies held aloft by force, so that it was natural to expect that occasionally something of them would fall."

23) *Ibid.*, 303 n. 1: "here again the language is reminiscent of Anaximenes. See vol. I, 135."

24) Lanza, *Anaxagoras*, n. on A 12, 22-23.

25) For a discussion of the sources, see Flacelière-Chambry, *Plutarque Vies*, VI, 170-71. See also Gilbert, *Meteorologie*, 642 and n. 1.

26) For bibliography on Daimachus, see Flacelière-Chambry, *Plutarque Vies*, VI, 320, n. on p. 188.

27) F. C. Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, II, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. repr. 1971) 482, n. 2.

28) On Plutarch's teleology and belief in a providential ordering of the world, see, for example, P. Geigenmüller, "Plutarchs Stellung zur Religion und Philosophie seiner Zeit," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 47 (1921) 251-70, esp. 258ff. See also E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2 (Leipzig 1881)³ 178ff.

29) For a summary of previous discussion, see Guthrie, *History*, II, 270. See also Lanza, *Anaxagoras*, 43-44, n. on A 38, who referring to Luria, concludes it is probable that Plutarch "intende ἔγραφε come imperfetto di conato: 'zu konstruieren versuchte' (γράφειν = konstruieren è derivato da E. Sachs, *Die fünf platon. Körper*, Berlin 1917, 77)."

30) On this passage, see Guthrie, *History*, II, 316, n. 2. It is likely that Plato's view at *Tim.* 77A-B that a plant is a ζῷον, and thus akin to human nature (φύσις), underlies Plutarch's report.

31) On Ammonius, see Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 15-17.

32) O'Brien, *JHS* 88 (1968) 109, considers this report evidence of "a knowledge of the detail of Anaxagoras' system."

33) Lanza, *Anaxagoras*, 133, n. on A 74.

34) Ammonius further remarks that night has, in and of itself, nothing to cause movement in the air, but day has one important thing: the sun, as Anaxagoras himself said (τὸν ἥλιον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας εἶρηκεν).

35) For a listing of Plutarch's numerous references to Plato's letters, see Helmbold and O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* 57; references to the *Republic* are on 60-1.

36) See DK, A 13, and Meinhardt, *Perikles*, 47.

37) See Lanza, *Anaxagoras*, 24-25, n. on A 13.

38) Meinhardt, *Perikles*, 47, refers only to a "philosophische Überlieferung" without mentioning Plato. Yet as Gauthier and others have noted, "c'est Platon qui a le premier élaboré l'idéal d'une sagesse non plus seulement théorique, mais contemplative..." and "Anaxagore était pour l'Académie le type de la vie contemplative"; see R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, II (Paris 1959) 487 and 885. Certainly the anecdotes in Plutarch about Anaxagoras should be compared with those in Aristotle (see DK, A 30), and they remind one of Plato's story about

Thales at *Theaet.* 174A.

39) See, D. E. Gershenson and D. E. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics* (New York 1964) 348, who believe that Socrates' question at his trial as reported by Plato, "Do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus?", was taken "as an allusion to a historical event, rather than as an outraged protest at the absurdity of accusing *him* of corrupting the youth through doctrines everyone knew to be *Anaxagoras'* and not his."

40) The bibliography on Anaxagoras' trial is fairly extensive, and consists mainly of attempts to reconcile the ancient reports. According to Diogenes L. (2, 12-13), the versions are: Sotion reports Anaxagoras was indicted by Cleon on a charge of impiety, defended by Pericles, fined five talents and banished; Satyrus says Anaxagoras was prosecuted by Thucydides, son of Melesias, on charges of Medism and impiety, and sentenced to death by default. Thus J. A. Davison, "Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras," *CQ* 47 (1953) 39ff., followed by R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 435ff., tried to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent reports by arguing for *two* trials of Anaxagoras (ca. 456 by Thucydides and ca. 433 by Cleon). For other assessments of the evidence, see A. E. Taylor, "On the Date of the Trial of Anaxagoras," *CQ* 11 (1917) 81-7, who argues in favor of Satyrus' testimony and Derenne, "Procès d'impiété," 11-41 who claims that Anaxagoras was accused by *both* Thucydides and Cleon.

41) On Craterus as a source for Plutarch, see Meinhardt, *Perikles*, 61 and n. 195; also Derenne, "Procès d'impiété," 22 and n. 2.

42) According to Meinhardt, *Perikles*, 60, "Ephoros (bei Diod. 12, 39, 2)" is Plutarch's "Gewährsmann." M. Casevitz, *Diodore de Sicile*, XII (Paris 1972) xiii, however, observes that "Ephore n'est nommé, comme source pour les causes de la guerre du Péloponnèse, qu'en 41 et, dans ce récit, il semble que tout ne soit d'Ephore."

43) There are several references to Hermippus Smyrnaeus in the *Lives*; see Helmbold and O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations*, 34.

44) J. Hani, *Plutarque Consolation à Apollonius* (Paris 1972) esp. 27-43, has argued extensively for Plutarch's authorship of this treatise.

45) There is no mention of Plutarch at DK, A 33; only Galen is quoted who also refers to the story as παρείληφεν. Hani, *Plutarque*, 189 n. 3, remarks that "l'exemple d'Anaxagore était particulièrement utilisé dans les écoles de philosophie: Val. Max. 5, 10, 3 (le ch. 10 de V. M. est entièrement consacré à ce sujet); *Tusc.* 3, 14; apprécié de Chrysippe (ap. Galien, voir ch. 21, comm. du fragment de *Thésée* d'Euripide); de même par Panaitios (Plut., *de coh. ir.* 16-463D), qui en étendait l'usage à la répression de la colère; Epict., *Entr.* 3, 24; D. Chr., *Or.* 37 (464D); Sen., *ad Pol.* 30."

46) See Gershenson and Greenberg, *Anaxagoras*, 370 who doubt the authenticity of the fragments in Simplicius. According to them, Anaxagoras' book was "most probably" lost before the end of the third cent. B.C., and so Simplicius did not have a copy. Contrary to such a claim, D. Sider in a paper read before the Society for Ancient Philosophy, U.S.A., "Anaxagoras on the Composition of Matter" (p. 6 of mimeographed copy) maintains that Anaxagoras' book was extant until at least the 2nd cent. A.D.: "Ibn abi Usabia (8th century) records, in a work that has been translated into German ('Uyunu l'anb' fī tabaqāti l'atibbā, ed. A. Müller (Cairo 1882) vol. I, pp. 84. 31-85.2) that Galen 'sagte in seinem Buch (Π. ἀλυσίως, not extant), daß in der grossen königlichen Schatzkammer der Stadt Rom zahlreiche Bücher und Wertgegenstände verbrannt seien. Einige der verbrannten Exemplare waren von der Hand (αὐτόγραφα for ἀντίγραφα?) des Aristoteles,

des Anaxagoras, und des Andromachus." If this report is correct, Plutarch because of his visits and official duties in Rome, would have had every opportunity to see Anaxagoras' book. On Plutarch's connections with Rome, see C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971), especially 13ff.

47) See Guthrie, *History* II, 269, who says simply "a copy was still available to Simplicius in the sixth century A.D."

48) *Ibid.*, 316 n. 3: "The passage of Plutarch (*De fort.* 98f) given by DK as fr. 21b can hardly be said to add anything to Anaxagoras' opinions about human superiority to the beasts in mental faculties, owing to the difficulty of deciding how much is to be referred to Anaxagoras." For a similar view, see Lanza, *Anassagora*, 248 n. on B 21b who believes "il frammento è conservato da Plutarco e probabilmente è stato tratto da una summa dossografica o gnomologica; perciò è assai difficile stabilire i limiti della citazione, vuoi di Plutarco rispetto al dossografo, vuoi di questo (o della sua fonte) rispetto al testo originale."

49) Ziegler, *Plutarchos*, 88.

50) On Plutarch's use of *hypomnēmata*, see H. Martin, Jr., "Plutarch's Citation of Empedocles at *Amatorius* 756D," *GRBS* 10 (1969) 69-70.

51) Guthrie, *History* II, 316, quotes this passage of Aristotle and refers (n. 3) to *De fort.* 98F.

52) See, for example, *ibid.*, 282.

53) On Theophrastus as a source, see Meinhardt, *Perikles*, 10 and 12. For references to Theophrastus in the other Lives, see Helmbold and O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations*, 70.

54) I thank the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung for helping to make this research possible. I am further indebted to Prof. Dr. Ernst Vogt and Dr. Gerhart Schneeweß, University of Munich, for their helpful criticisms. I bear the responsibility for the remaining faults.

INSCRIPTIONAL EVIDENCE AS A SOURCE OF SPOKEN LATIN

PAUL A. GAENG

In his now classic article, on "The Reconstruction of Proto-Romance," Robert A. Hall, Jr. remarked that "it is incumbent on Romance scholars to analyze and interpret their exceptionally full stock of linguistic material, using all methods of study at their disposal, working both backward and forward in time. Only thus will Romance linguistics be enabled to do what others expect of it; to serve not only as an end in itself but as a model and training-ground for workers in all fields of historical linguistics."¹⁾ What the researcher in the history of the Romance languages is faced with is, on the one hand, the schemes of reconstruction (based on the principles of the historical comparative method) and the often puzzling testimonies of reality. Put in other terms, he has the choice of working with an abstract system represented by astericized Latin forms that do not belong to any real language, or the *reality* of the mass of mainly post-classical written records that have come down to us to be analyzed and sifted through with a view to discovering evidences of trends toward Romance in phonology, morpho-syntax, and vocabulary; and while there are no doubt materials whose meaning in terms of future evolution of the Romance languages is difficult, if not impossible to discover, there is an abundance of those that prelude the future. It is the attention to the future that, I believe, can give reality and life to the large number of forms collected from inscriptions, late writers, and other sources of "Vulgar", that is non-literary or non-classical Latin.

A little more than a hundred years ago, Hugo Schuchardt published the third volume of his *Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins* which he had begun in 1866. This epoch-making event marked the beginning of documentary research in the field of Romance Philology, the first concerted attempt at sifting out Romance features from non-literary written sources, inscriptions, manuscripts, glossaries, and remarks by grammarians. The novelty of the *Vokalismus*, however, did not merely consist of the linguistic

analysis of the direct sources of this non-literary - call it popular, spoken, colloquial Latin (what the Germans call *Umgangssprache*, as opposed to *Schriftlatein*, and the French call *langue courante*), or by the now consecrated term "Vulgar Latin", or *le latin tout court* to use Ferdinand Lot's expression ("le latin en usage dans toutes les classes de la société, en haut comme au bas de l'échelle") (quoted in Reichenkron *Historische Latein-altromanische Grammatik* (1965) p. 58) but also in Schuchardt's *a priori* belief that the *sermo plebeius* he was dealing with must have been locally differentiated from the earliest times on, though he himself had to admit, albeit reluctantly, that this rustic Latin appeared on all monuments of all regions as essentially the same.²⁾ Indeed, the axiom of a locally differentiated Latin, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the testimony of post-classical texts that seem to show a unified language with no appreciable local variations is one of the fundamental problems that has dominated Romance studies ever since.

The question, in other words, is this: do linguistic features that differentiate Romance languages and dialects correspond to dialectal differences already in existence in Latin?³⁾ A landmark attempt to show the existence of dialectal variants in colloquial Latin on the basis of evidence garnered from Late Latin authors and some inscriptional material was undertaken by Karl Sittl in his 1882 study on local differences of Latin, with special reference to African Latin.⁴⁾ In this work, which at the time had aroused quite a stir, Sittl tried to show that linguistic, particularly syntactic peculiarities in some Late Latin authors like Fronto, Apuleius, Tertullian were due to their *Africitas*, their African origin, and that these should be interpreted as good evidence for African dialectal variants of spoken Latin. Sittl's critics were quick to point out, however, that the alleged local differences and, specifically, his thesis of an *Africitas* were little more than a figment of his imagination⁵⁾ and that which Sittl had characterized as "African," "Gaulish," and "Hispanic" Latin were, in reality, post-classical syntactic peculiarities not delimited regionally. It is not generally known that in a subsequent research report on Vulgar and Late Latin Sittl retracted his thesis and admitted that even a close scrutiny of literary texts did not reveal local speech differences, but he predicted that once the inscriptional materials from all areas of the Roman Empire would be made available through the monumental *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* - which had barely begun publication in his days - these differences would become quite apparent.⁶⁾ For, had not the founder of the *Corpus* himself, the great

German historian Mommsen, said that the language of inscriptions was more closely connected with that of ordinary life than with that of literature?⁷⁾ And is it not axiomatic that the language of daily life, the living language of the people is locally and socially differentiated?

Sittl's importance for those of us who scrutinize Late Latin documents with a view to picking up every scrap of information that would help to deduce linguistic reality from their often baffling inconsistencies resides in the fact that he set the tone for a research program that has occupied Romance scholars for the past century.

The question of local speech variations in Latin of the imperial and both pre- and post-imperial periods and the treatment of Latin as a real language rather than an abstract system of relationships has given rise to a great deal of discussion and theorizing. It is not my purpose to review the history of the debate. For this, I can refer to Silva Neto's study *História do latim vulgar* (Rio de Janeiro, 1957), Antonio Tovar's "Research Report on Vulgar Latin and its local variations," (*Kratylos*, IX [2] 1964, 113-134), or G. Reichenkron's concise summary in his *Historische Latein-altromanische Grammatik* (Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 70). Suffice it to say that ever since W. Meyer-Lübke modified his rigid neo-grammarian stance around the turn of the century by substituting a chronologically, socially, and regionally differentiated *Volkslatein* (the term he preferred to *Vulgärlatein*) for a homogeneous, unitary Vulgar Latin language existing separately from and independently of literary Latin⁸⁾ the thesis of a vertically (socially) and horizontally (geographically) differentiated Latin has become generally accepted by Romanists, who have thus come to regard Vulgar Latin as a real language, an authentic *historisches Volkslatein* rather than a reconstructed Romance Latin (*romanisches Konstruktionslatein* - as Meyer-Lübke's critics referred to his earlier conception of Vulgar Latin). It is the degree of regional differences which, in the present state of our knowledge, is still and, presumably, will continue to be a matter of controversy, for there remains the vexing problem of reconciling linguistic differentiation of a living Latin spread over the vast area of the Roman Empire with the evidence of the available written monuments that reveal an essentially uniform Latin, giving little or no clear indication of local variations.

Let me then turn to the purpose of my paper and attempt to show in what way we can utilize inscriptional material as a source of spoken Latin and evidence of its regional differentiation. Be it said at the outset that there is no, there

cannot exist such a thing as a text written in the *sermo vulgaris*, i.e., a text in so-called Vulgar Latin. The best we can hope for is to find hints, to catch an occasional glimpse as to the true nature of the spoken language through inadvertences and unconscious mistakes of the writer, since, as Palmer has pointed out, "the chisel of the stonemason, the pen of the loquacious nun, and the chalk that scribbles on the wall, disregard the tongue and move self-willed in traditional patterns,"⁹⁾ and Einar Löfstedt reminds us that "even the most uneducated person, as soon as he begins to write, if it be only a letter or a few words on a plastered wall, is directly or indirectly influenced by innumerable literary precedents or reminiscences."¹⁰⁾

It is generally admitted that private, that is, non-official inscriptions, particularly prose inscriptions of the funerary type, constitute a valuable source of spoken Latin because they very frequently deviate from the orthographic and grammatical norms of literary Latin and that many of these deviations are not fortuitous but, indeed, are prompted by spoken language habits that find eventual expression in one or the other Romance language. The validity of Veikko Väänänen's claim, for instance, that the 5,000 Pompeian graffiti "constituent un monument unique de la vie ordinaire" has been proven by the general endorsement of his monograph originally published in 1937, now in its third edition.¹¹⁾ And once the influence of the spoken language is acknowledged, there is no reason to assume that such an influence should be limited to phenomena that are common to all of Romania, to the exclusion of special features that are characteristic of a particular region.

"Inscriptions are a most important source of attestations of the changes that have occurred in early Vulgar Latin," said Gerhard Rohlfs, one of the most distinguished and thoughtful Romanists of our time.¹²⁾ Seeing that they are localized and, in many instances, even datable with some accuracy, inscriptions yield information that can only exceptionally be gleaned from literary sources during the early post-classical stages of Latin. To illustrate his point, Rohlfs adduces the following example: in inscriptions from southern Italy and Rome (*CIL* vols IX and VI) one occasionally comes across the term *tata* in the meaning of 'father'. This term has survived to this day as the more usual one to designate this

member of the family, particularly when speaking of one's own father; thus, in the Calabrian dialect *tata oje non vene* corresponds to a Latin *tata hodie non venit*. The form *tata* also attested on inscriptions from the Danubian Provinces has replaced Lat. *pater* in Rumanian.¹³⁾

No one will quarrel with Rohlf's as far as localizing lexical items is concerned. The problem arises when one wants to investigate dialectal differences as they may be reflected in the language in which inscriptions are couched. As Tovar pointed out "there are irregularities in the materials whose meaning in connection with the future evolution of Romance languages is impossible to discover; there are others in which the future announces itself. Attention to the future is what can vivify the swarm of forms collected from inscriptions, late writers, and the rest of the sources for "Vulgar Latin."¹⁴⁾ If, indeed, misspellings can show important trends toward later Romance development, as Tovar claims, then we must ask ourselves just how much value we may attach to "mistakes" due to the negligence or ignorance of the stonecutter so as not to read into them more than we are entitled to. More specifically, to what extent are we authorized to draw conclusions based on an isolated occurrence or even a group of geographically delimited inscriptions, such as the Pompeian *graffiti*?

Take the oft-quoted example of *imudavit* found on an inscription from Mérida in the Baetica that Hübner, the editor of volume II of the *Corpus* (devoted to Hispania) had interpreted as a "misspelling" for *immutavit*. The inscription, which includes an entreaty to Proserpina to avenge the theft of various objects, reads, in part: *Proserpina per tuam majestatem te rogo oro obsecro uti vindices quot mihi furti factum est; quisquis mihi imudavit, involavit, minusve fecit...*¹⁵⁾ Some scholars proposed to interpret the controversial *imudavit* as standing for *immundavit* (from a Lat. *immundare* "to make unclean"), a likely interpretation phonetically but semantically rather doubtful in the given context; more recently, Väänänen advanced the hypothesis of an *emundavit* with the slangy meaning of "cleaned out".¹⁶⁾ Under the impetus mainly of Carnoy's study on the language of inscriptions from Spain,¹⁷⁾ Hübner's interpretation has been perpetuated by some Romanists and considered by many to be evidence of an early sonorization of intervocalic voiceless stops. Even Carnoy's dating of this form as the second century A.D. has found its way into standard manuals.¹⁸⁾ No less a scholar than von Wartburg used this example for his

demonstration of the early rift of Romania into an eastern and a western portion.¹⁹⁾ Not until quite recently has it been shown that there is no real evidence to push back the date of the inscription on which *imudavit* is found to the second century of our era (the only *terminus ad quem* being that it is a pagan epitaph and, hence, probably composed before the fifth century) and that Carnoy's interpretation rests on a misreading of the editor's comment.²⁰⁾ Also, if Väänänen's proposed reading of *imudavit emu(n)davit* is correct, the question of sonorization remains moot.²¹⁾

From a philological point of view inscriptions have not escaped the critic's eye and limitations placed on their value have been pointed out more than once. For one thing, the variety of language is quite restricted and, except for metric inscriptions which are influenced to a large extent by literary and poetic traditions, they very often are made up of little more than traditional formulae, proper names, abbreviation, etc. Yet, even the severest critics admit that with a sufficient body of material it is often possible to cull some interesting information as to the state of the spoken language.²²⁾ Be it said in passing that critics of inscriptional material as valid evidence of the state of the Latin language at a given time, as well as being a source of information concerning specifically local features, have not spurned citing isolated inscriptional examples to support their theories.

Another limitation placed upon the value of inscriptional material - which, incidentally, it shares with other documentary evidence - is that certain spellings may not at all represent actual pronunciation but may rather be due to stereotyped orthography, much the way French *eau* represents the phoneme /o/ in the modern language, while reflecting a former stage of the language.

Lastly, we must be on our guard concerning inscriptions found in one locality but actually composed in another, seeing that some stonecutters may have got around in the world.²³⁾ This is particularly true of verse inscriptions and those of a more learned nature. Vives, editor of Christian inscriptions of Roman and Visigothic Spain, mentions the fact that the epitaph for a certain abbot Victoriano of the monastery of Asan, Huesca, was written by Venantius Fortunatus of Gaul.²⁴⁾

In this case, of course, the linguistic phenomenon would not be characteristic of the locality where the inscription was found; but these are exceptional cases.

All things considered and granted the shortcomings, limitations and caveats, scholars generally agree that inscriptions, particularly Christian prose inscriptions, are a valid source of spoken Latin, provided we do not draw hasty conclusions about phonological and morphological phenomena from single occurrences of a "misspelling" (though even a single occurrence of a given phenomenon may be significant) but conclusions based on the *frequency* of occurrence of certain "mistakes" within the context of classical Latin standards. Since linguistic inquiries into particular regions, such as those of Pirson on the language of Gaul²⁵⁾ and Carnoy already alluded to and the more recent study by Mihăescu on the language of the Danubian Provinces²⁶⁾ have yielded little if anything in terms of regional characteristics, it would seem that if we really want to learn something about local variations in spoken Latin we can only do so by means of a comparative *étude d'ensemble* on the language of Roman Italy and its Provinces, such as the one advocated by Sittl about 80 years ago.

My first study involving inscriptional material which saw the light exactly ten years ago is an attempt at just such an *étude d'ensemble*. For this investigation I chose Diehl's edition of Christian Inscriptions²⁷⁾ as well as the Vives collection as a supplement to Diehl. The advantage of working with Christian epitaphs, excepting official and verse inscriptions for reasons already stated, is that they are generally written by more or less literate people, that they are localized and that many of them are dated with some measure of accuracy. With a corpus of about 4,000 items from the Western Roman Empire, I divided my material into four main regions following the topographical classification of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, namely (a) the Iberian Peninsula (subdivided further into *Baetica*, *Lusitania*, and *Tarraconensis*); (b) Gaul (divided into *Narbonensis* and *Lugdunensis*); (c) Italy (subdivided into Northern, Central, and Southern Italy); and (d) Rome. The separate treatment of the capital of the Roman world seemed to be justified by the abundance of material. In addition, because of the high percentage of dated material (better than 80% in Iberia; ca. 46% in Gaul; over 40% in Italy; and 42% in Rome) I was also able to establish chronological divisions into, roughly, the fourth,

fifth, and sixth centuries.

In accordance with my belief that significant data could be obtained only by determining the frequency of occurrence of deviations in one region as against another, I made a count of vowels and diphthongs in both stressed and unstressed positions according to classical Latin standards and deviations therefrom. For the sake of chronology, the numerical analysis is based only on dated material, but examples of deviations also include non-dated inscriptions both to illustrate further a particular phenomenon observed in dated material and to supplement it. On the basis of comparative percentage figures given wherever the number of examples seemed to justify this procedure, I was able to show that despite the strongly formulaic nature of inscriptional material and the fact that deviations from the classical Latin norm appear to be more or less identical in all areas of the former Empire, it *is* possible to detect certain features that occur more frequently in one area with respect to another, thus pointing to regional differentiations during the period of latinity covered by the monuments investigated.

Here are a few examples taken at random:

1. *Stressed Vowels*: a. Latin /ē/ and /ĭ/ are frequently represented by *i* and *e*, respectively, in all areas; however, a statistical analysis seems to show that by the fifth century this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Gaul, with a better than 15% differential over most of the Italian and Iberian areas.
- b. The *u* and *o* spelling for cl. Latin /ō/ and /ŭ/, respectively, is much less frequent and, in any case, not significant before the sixth century, except for the *Central Italian* area, suggesting that in the latter the back vowels may have merged at an earlier time than in the other areas.
- c. A comparative statistical analysis of the relationship between cl. Latin /ō/ and /ŭ/ and /ē/ and /ĭ/ suggests that the front vowels did not universally merge before the back vowels in the areas under investigation, as has generally been suggested by Romance scholars.
2. *Unstressed Vowels*: a. While Latin vowels in the initial syllable appear to be quite stable, Latin /ē/ in the area of Rome is frequently spelled with *i*.²⁸⁾

- b. In the intertonic and penult positions the *e* and *o* spelling for cl. Latin /ĭ/ and /ŭ/, respectively, appears most frequently in *Gaul* and *No. Italy*, and to some extent also in the *Iberian* area, probably reflecting a weakening of these vowels into a *schwa* as a first step towards total disappearance by syncope and preluding, at the same time, an important phonological rift within the so-called Western Romance languages, namely the pro-paroxytonic versus paroxytonic word structures.

Among phenomena with important morphological implications, let me mention the following:

1. The extension of the plural accusative *-is* ending of *i*-stem nouns and adjectives to the nominative plural in the *Italian* area, supporting the hypothesis advanced by some scholars to the effect that the /i/ plural ending of the third declension in modern Italian may indeed be the continuator of the classical Latin plural accusative *-is* ending. (I developed this hypothesis in an earlier study.²⁹⁾)

The extension of the *-is* ending to the nominative of third declension nouns and adjectives is also quite evident in the *Lugdunensis* area of Gaul, while *Narbonensis* hangs on to the accusative in *-es* (and even changes *-is* of *i*-stems to *-es*), much like the Iberian area where there is a trend to a generalized *-es* ending, reflecting subsequent developments.

2. The frequent *-as* ending for the Latin first declension feminine plural *-ae* also in the Italian area, and particularly in Rome, suggesting also that modern Italian feminine *-e* plural may derive from a popular *-as* ending rather than the classical *-ae*.³⁰⁾ The *-as* nominative plural ending is not attested in inscriptions from Iberia or Gaul, but studies on later Latin documents from these regions suggest that this sigmatic nominative reached them also, this morphological innovation (a reflex of the Oscan substratum?) having spread from south to north and west.³¹⁾

Here is another example that, I believe, will show what careful inscriptional reading may reveal. This particular example has interesting etymological implications: I have recorded forms like *lunis*, *mercuris*, (used with *dies* or *die*) from inscriptions from Spain and Italy, contradicting those scholars who would derive the corresponding Spanish and Italian forms from the Cl. Latin *lunae* and *mercurii*, adding an analogical *-es* ending in the case of Spanish, as for example, Menéndez Pidal who derives Sp. *lunes* from a hypothetical *lunae-s*.³²⁾ Elcock states that the Latin basis of It. *lunedì* is *Lunae diem*.³³⁾ García Diego, while proposing

a Lat. *lunis* etymon for Sp. *lunes*, claims that the Latin form is not attested.³⁴⁾ (He just did not look long enough!) I did not find any attestation of either *lunae* or *lunis* in the area of Gaul, but I suggest that if I had, chances are it would have been *lunis* also, seeing that OFr. *lunsdi* can only derive from a sigmatic form.³⁵⁾

Väänänen has once defined Vulgar Latin as "l'ensemble de certaines tendances du latin que les monuments écrits nous révèlent sur tout le long de l'évolution de la langue."³⁶⁾ I hope I may have convincingly pointed to such trends on both the phonological and morpho-syntactic levels, suggesting certain regional characteristics. The material that is available for catching further glimpses of these "tendances" is far from exhausted but to sift through all the records in search for the real living Latin requires painstaking research that is, at best, very time-consuming. The choice between tracking down evidence of the unrecorded speech of our Latin speaking ancestors through these records or to reconstruct from existing Romance forms starred Latin forms that belong to an abstract system rather than any real language is a matter of taste and point of view. Of course, we have no idea how the Romans spoke, except by inference,³⁷⁾ but whatever scrap of information we are able to cull from linguistic monuments that have come down to us, particularly those written by the man-in-the-street is, to my mind, worth every ounce of effort.

University of Illinois at Urbana

NOTES

1) *Language*, 36 (1950), p. 27.

2) *Vokalismus*, I, Leipzig, 1866, p. 77.

3) Cf. also Antonio Tovar, "A Research Report on Vulgar Latin and Its Local Variations," *Kratylos*, 9, No. 2 (1964), pp. 113-134.

4) *Die lokalen Verschiedenheiten der lateinischen Sprache mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des afrikanischen Lateins*, Erlangen, 1882.

5) W. Kroll, "Das afrikanische Latein," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 52 (1897), pp. 569-590.

6) "Jahresbericht über Vulgär-und Spätlatein 1884-1890," *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 67 (1892),

p. 226.

7) Quoted in the preface to C. M. Kaufmann's *Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik*, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1917.

8) As first advocated in his "Die lateinische Sprache in den romanischen Ländern," in Gröber's *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, I, pp. 451-497. For his subsequent change of heart, cf. *Einführung in das Studium der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft*, Heidelberg, 1920,² par. 99, pp. 120-121.

9) *The Latin Language*, London, 1954, p. 149.

10) *Late Latin*, Oslo, 1959, p. 15.

11) *Le latin vulgaire des inscriptions pompéiennes*, Berlin, 1966³.

12) My translation of the original German: "Wichtigste Zeugnisse für Veränderungen im frühen Vulgärlatein sind die Inschriften," in "Die lexikalische Differenzierung der romanischen Sprachen," *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Jahrgang 1954, (No. 4), p. 10.

13) Rum. *tată*. In the languages that extend between southern Italy and Rumania the word for 'father' derived from Lat. *tata* is also attested, e.g., Old Dalm. *tata*, *têta*, Vegliote *tuota*, and Alb. *tate*. Rohlfs, *loc. cit.*, cf. also REW #8596 (1935³).

14) Tovar, *art. cit.*, p. 119.

15) *CIL*, II, #462, (ed. E. Hübner).

16) Veikko Väänänen, "Autour du problème de la division du latin. Ap- point des sources écrites, en particulier des inscriptions," in *Travaux de linguistique et de littérature*, Strasbourg, Centre de philologie et de littératures romanes, 1968, p. 145.

17) A. Carnoy, *Le latin d'Espagne d'après les inscriptions*, 2nd ed., Bruxelles, 1906.

18) "*Imudavit* remonte au second siècle et se trouve dans une inscription renfermant plusieurs vulgarismes et constituant un bel échantillon de la langue populaire de l'Empire," Carnoy, *op. cit.*, p. 119. Among Romanists who have perpetuated this view, let me randomly mention: (a) R. Menéndez Pidal who states that "este cambio [i.e., the sonorization of intervocalic voiceless stops] comienza a estar atestiguado en España en el latin imperial: *imudavit* inscripción del siglo II en Mérida..." (*Gramática*, Madrid, 1958¹⁰) p. 129; (b) R. Lapesa: "*imudavit* por *immutavit*" (*Historia de la lengua española*, Madrid, 1959⁵) pp. 30 and 58; (c) W. Entwistle: "inter- vocalic -p- -t- -k- are frequently voiced (*imudavit* for *immutavit*)..." (*History of the Spanish Language*, London, 1962²), p. 52. Also repeated in the Spanish edition of his book (Madrid, 1973), p. 75; (d) C. H. Grand- gent adduces *imudavit* as evidence of early sonorization (*Introduction to Vulgar Latin*, Boston, 1907), par. 256; (e) G. Devoto: "lenizione delle consonanti intervocaliche documentata in Ispagna da un esempio della fine del II sec. d.C." (*Profilo di linguistica italiana*, Florence, 1953), p. 11.

19) "Seit dem 3. Jahrh. finden sich Schreibungen wie *pudore* für *putore*, *lebra* für *lepra*, *migat* für *micat*, im 2. Jahrh. sogar schon ein *imudavit* für *immutavit* in Spanien" (*Die Ausgliederung der romanischen Sprachräume*, Bern, 1950), p. 31. Except for a *terminus a quo*, von Wartburg gives no indication as to precise or even approximate dating of his three examples. I found the form *lebra* on a Lusitanian inscription dated A.D. 589 (cf. J. D. Vives, ed., *Inscripciones cristianas de la España Romana y Visigoda*, Barcelona, 1942, No. 47).

20) Hübner's comment on this particular inscription reads, in part:

Tabella marmorea... versus finem proximi saeculi infixa muro lacus artificialis... ('a marble table... which toward the end of the last century [i.e., the 18th with respect to the 19th century in which *CIL* II was edited] was encased in the wall of an artificial lake..." Arrigo Castellani, in a note on the controversial *imudavit* (in *AGI*, 40 (1955), pp. 81-83), argues that Carnoy, while studying the inscriptions of Spain, misunderstood Hübner's comment and translated it as: "... encased in the wall of an artificial lake at the end of the second century."

21) Cf. H. Weinrich, "Sonorisierung in der Kaiserzeit," *ZRPh*, 76 (1960), pp. 205-216, in which he refutes examples of sonorization found in inscriptional material and other sources dating back to the time of the Empire, i.e., before the early fifth century. "Wir müssen feststellen, dass es bisher im ganzen Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum und in anderen Quellensammlungen keinen gesicherten Beleg für eine Sonorisierung in der Kaiserzeit gibt" (p. 218).

22) Thus, for example, W. Kroll, *art. cit.*, p. 573.

23) "Die Schreiber und Steinmetzen mochten viel in der Welt herumkommen" (Schuchardt, *op. cit.*, p. 92).

24) Cf. Vives, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

25) J. Pirson, *La langue des inscriptions latines de la Gaule*, Bruxelles, 1901.

26) H. Mihăescu, *Limba latină în provinciile dunărene ale imperiului roman*, Bucarest, 1960.

27) E. Diehl (ed.), *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres*, 3 vols, Berlin 1924-31. 2nd ed., revised, Berlin, 1961. *Supplementum* edited by J. Moreau and H. I. Marrou, Berlin, 1967.

28) The pattern of orthographic *i* for Lat. /ē/ in this position with respect to other Italian and Western Romance areas is so consistent that Rome may well be considered as the focal point of this phenomenon. For the /i/ outcome in modern Italian, cf. M. Pei, *The Italian Language*, New York, 1954, p. 36.

29) P. Gaeng, "The Plural *i*-Ending of Third Declension Masculine Nouns in Italian," in J. Fisher and P. Gaeng, *Studies in Honor of Mario A. Pei*, Chapel Hill, 1972, pp. 105-114.

30) For an extensive discussion of this problem with bibliographical references, cf. my *A Study of Nominal Inflection in Latin Inscriptions*, Chapel Hill, 1977, pp. 46-51.

31) *Ibid.*, p. 51.

32) *Gramática*, p. 187.

33) W. D. Elcock, *The Romance Languages*, London, 1960, p. 169.

34) V. García de Diego *Gramática histórica española*, Madrid, 1951, p. 204. Let us also add Entwistle (*op. cit.*) to this list who claims that Sp. *lunes* and *miércoles* derive from Lat. *lunae* and *mercurii* plus *-es* (p. 69) and that they are analogical formations. Analogical in Spanish or in Latin already? He does not say.

35) Cf. *REW* #5164.

36) "Le nominatif pluriel en *-ās* dans le latin vulgaire," *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 35 (1934), p. 81.

37) Cf. E. Pulgram, "Spoken and Written Latin," *Language*, 26 (1950), pp. 458-466.

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ILLINOIS
CLASSICAL
STUDIES

VOLUME VII.2
Fall 1982

Miroslav Marcovich, *Editor*

SCHOLARS PRESS

ISSN 0363-1923

ILLINOIS CLASSICAL STUDIES

VOLUME VII.2

STUDIES IN MEMORY OF
ALEXANDER TURYN (1900–1981)
PART FOUR

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Scholars Press
101 Salem Street
P.O. Box 2268
Chico, California 95927

PREFACE

Professor Alexander Turyn passed away on 26 August 1981. He read only Part I of the present *Festschrift* in his honor (ICS VI.1). Parts II-IV (ICS VI.2 & VII.1-2) appear now as Studies in memory of this great classical scholar. *Ave, pia anima.*

At the end of the first *hebdomad* of its life -- to speak with Solon --, *Illinois Classical Studies* has achieved wide national and international recognition. Volumes I-VII (1976-1982) include a total of 135 scholarly contributions -- over 2100 printed pages -- by classicists from fifteen different countries writing in English, German, French, Italian or Russian. An Index of authors and titles to Vols. I-VII is to be found at the end of this issue. It shows a strong input of senior scholars of international renown, along with a fair share of contributions by junior classicists both male and female.

The founding editor of this journal now feels that ICS has established itself and that the time has come for him to step down. I trust I was successful in keeping a middle course between too high scholarly standards and tolerance. As an old German saying goes, too often "*ein Ordentlicher sagt nichts Ausserordentliches, ein Ausserordentlicher sagt nichts Ordentliches.*"

My successor is Professor John Kevin Newman. It is a pleasant duty for this editor to express his sincere appreciation to contributors and subscribers to ICS, to generous donors, and to two publishers -- Illinois U.P. and Scholars Press.

Urbana, 1 March 1982

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH, *Editor*

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HERACLITUS: SOME CHARACTERISTICS*)

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH

I

Back in 1938, Hermann Fraenkel had suggested that geometrical proportions ($a : b = b : c$) made a characteristic "thought pattern" ("Denkform") in Heraclitus.¹⁾ The idea was met with approval by Karl Reinhardt (1942),²⁾ G. S. Kirk (1954),³⁾ Charles H. Kahn (1979),⁴⁾ and others. Three Heraclitean fragments are usually adduced as the clearest examples of such geometrical proportions: B 79, B 83, and A 13 DK (= Frs. 92, [92b], and 65 M).⁵⁾ I shall argue here -- as I did in the past⁶⁾ -- that geometrical proportions are not likely to be a characteristic "thought pattern" of Heraclitus. I think Fraenkel's interpretation of B 79 is wrong, B 83 is most probably spurious, while A 13 may be more plausibly explained without recurring to geometrical proportions.

B 79 reads: Ἄνθρωπος νήπιος ἡκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος, ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός. "Man is called foolish by God, just as a child is by a man." Now, already E. Petersen (back in 1879) had interpreted the saying as a mathematical proportion: "A boy stands to an adult man in the same ratio as does an adult man to God" (παῖς : ἀνὴρ = ἀνὴρ : δαίμων).⁷⁾ Unaware of Petersen's article, Fraenkel interpreted the saying as follows: "For the sake of convenience, we call this pattern by the name of the geometrical mean and transcribe it by formulae such as $God / man = man / boy$, using mathematical language rather loosely and disclaiming mathematical strictness... There are three planes: the levels of God, man, and child (A, B and C). The degree of perfection decreases, and the degree of imperfection increases, in equal measure in the transitions from A to B and from B to C ($A / B = B / C$)" (p. 314 = 258).

In my view, however, the saying expresses a *fundamental difference* between God and Man in respect to "true knowledge, insight or wisdom," -- not a difference *in degree* only. For, first, since Homer νήπιος means "foolish, silly, childish" (LSJ, s.v., II.1), and the implication of our saying is that "the knowledge" a small child may possess is no knowledge at all. Second, my interpretation is strongly supported by B 78 (90 M), "Human nature has no insight, but the divine has." As a matter of fact, Heraclitus follows in B 78 and B 79 an old folkloric motif *contrasting* divine wisdom to a total lack of such in mortals: compare, e.g., *Iliad* 2.485 f.; Pindar *Paean* 6.51 ff.; *Nem.* 6.1 f.; Alcmaeon B 1; maybe Xenophanes B 23-25 vs. B 34; Theognis 141 f.; LXX Isaiah 55:8-9.⁸⁾

In brief, B 79 would mean: "In God's eyes, Man is as far from having a true insight as is a child in the eyes of an adult man." The means employed is not a geometrical proportion, but rather a traditional *simile* (cf. ὁκωσπερ), in which the *tertium comparationis* between "adult man" and "child" is νηπιότης, "foolishness:" *both* of them are equally "childish" as compared to God's wisdom or insight.

B 83 reads: Ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίῃ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν (Ps.-Plato *Hippias maior* 289 b 4). Now, according to Fraenkel,⁹⁾ the saying would express the following geometrical proportion: πίθηκος : ἄνθρωπος = ἄνθρωπος : θεός. But, as Paul Wendland (back in 1903)¹⁰⁾ and W. Zilles¹¹⁾ had pointed out, B 83 is not likely to be a genuine fragment but rather derives from B 79. As a matter of fact, since the times of Semonides (7.71-82 West) monkey is known as a personification of *ugliness* (7.73, αἷσχιστα μὲν πρόσωπα), not of stupidity. If so, then πίθηκος in our text has nothing to do with σοφίῃ and, most probably, was introduced by the author of *Hippias maior* who is dealing with the topic of τὸ κάλλος. Compare 289 a 3, Πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν (= B 82).

What is more important, from Eusebius *De theophania* 1.73 (p. 74.5 Gressmann) it becomes clear that the word σοφίῃ in our text had replaced the word νήπιος ("childish") and that the saying originally read: Ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν νήπιος,

which is no more than a paraphrase of B 79, ἄνθρωπος νῆπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος (so Wendland). But even if B 83 were an independent saying, still it would not support the theory of geometrical proportions. For, once the word πύθκος is exposed as an intruder into the text, "the third level" of Fraenkel will have disappeared.

Finally, A 13 deals with the astronomical "great year" of Heraclitus, consisting of 10,800 solar years. Now, since Paul Tannery (back in 1887)¹²⁾ the figure of 10,800 has been usually explained by means of "a human generation," which according to Heraclitus A 19 (108 M) consists of 30 years -- $1 : 360 = 30 : 10,800$. I.e., "One day stands to one solar year in the same ratio as does one human generation to a "great year." Apparently, in this interpretation the *magnus annus* is understood as "one generation of the universe."

One may, however, ask: What has "a human generation" to do with the merely *astronomical* term of *magnus annus*? As a matter of fact, one human generation of Heraclitus is based upon an old folkloric -- *hebdomadai* -- belief: It is the least space of time for a grandson (say, Nicomachus) to become a grandfather (Nicomachus), assuming that a man becomes procreative at the earliest age of *fourteen* and that the time from engendering till birth is one year. Accordingly, $2 \times (14 + 1) = 30$ years.

On the other hand, as B.L. van der Waerden had pointed out,¹³⁾ *magnus annus* is an old astronomical term reducible to Babylonian *sars* (one *sar* is equal to $60^2 = 3,600$). If so, then Heraclitus' great year of 10,800 solar years is equal to three Babylonian *sars*, Berosus' world-period of 432,000 years (Fr.29 Schnabel) -- to 120 *sars*, the great year of the great India of 4,320,000 years -- to 1,200 *sars*. Incidentally, the *Platonicus annus* of 12,960,000 days (*Republic* VIII, 546 bc) would be then an ideal "super-sar" ($= 3,600^2$).¹⁴⁾ In any case, no geometrical proportions are needed.

II

If mathematical proportions are not likely to be a "thought pattern" of Heraclitus, what then might we call his characteristic means of expression, if any? I would like to suggest that such a habit of the Ephesian consists of: (1) the *paradox*; (2) the employment of countless *folkloric motifs*; (3) the use of *traditional wisdom* (proverbs, etc.); (4) of popular vivid *similes*; (5), finally, of *metrical forms* as well.

(1) *The Paradox*. Heraclitus' use of the paradox seems to be inconsistent. Namely, (A) most of the times the paradox appears as an objective and *necessary* phenomenon, reflecting the underlying essence of things which is paradoxical itself. That seems to be true of both his major teachings -- the theory of a divine, everliving *Fire* as the underlying essence of all things, operative in his cosmology, psychology and theology; and the theory of an objective, universally valid *principle* called Logos, according to which two opposites form a *continuum* within every given thing. (The former teaching I call briefly *Physics*, the latter -- kind of *Metaphysics*.)

So we read, e.g., in B 84a (56a M), μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται. "It is in *changing* that it (Fire ?) finds its *rest*." Or take the necessary paradox in B 36 (66 M), "For souls it is *death* to become water, for water it is *death* to become earth. And nevertheless, it is out of earth that water *comes-to-be*, and out of water, soul." (In other words, "origin" and "death," "beginning" and "end" coincide, which may be paradoxical but is so by necessity.) Or else, B 32 (84 M), "Ἐν, τὸ σοφὸν μόνον, λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα. "One (being), the only (truly) Wise, is *both* unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus."

Moving to Heraclitus' *Logoslehre*, the idea of a παλίντονος ἀρμονίη, ὅκωπερ τόξου, "a back-stretching connection, like that of a (strung but resting) bow," B 51 (27 M), a *rerum concordia discors* (Horace *Epist.* 1.12.19), is paradoxical enough. For the traditional Anaximandrian and Pythagorean (?) opposites are at variance with each other. But now we learn that they of necessity form a *continuum*, connection or unity.

The idea was strange enough, and Heraclitus himself had to admit that "people do not understand *how* (ὅπως) what is being brought apart nevertheless comes together with itself (reading with Plato in B 51 (27 M), οὐ συνιᾶσιν ὅπως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ συνφέρεται).

There is an *underlying* unity or connection, a hidden single *continuum* between two opposites (or extremes) within every given thing -- between a straight and a crooked path; the way up and the way down the hill; beginning and end; the purest and the foulest water; living and dead, life and death, young and old, the waking and the sleeping; day and night; warm and cold, dry and wet; disease and health, hunger and satiety, weariness and rest; justice and injustice; light and darkness; immortals and mortals; Hades and Dionysus; (yellow) gold and (yellow) straw; barley and wine (in a barley-posset); (honey) and bitter vetch, and so on. This universal principle or rule (Logos) is a *necessary paradox*, and Heraclitus expresses this *coincidentia oppositorum* in paradoxical statements.

Possibly, to the same *Logoslehre* belong such paradoxical sayings of the Ephesian as these: B 48 (39 M), "The *name* of the thing called bow (βίος) is *life* (βίος), its *work* is *death*" -- implying that the opposites "life" and "death" are two halves of a thing (here, "the bow"), as inseparable and essential for the thing as are its "name" and its "function." Or take the enigmatic B 12^a (40 M), "The *name* (so Seneca) of the thing called 'river' (say, Cayster) is always *the same*, its *content* (here, water), however, is each time *different* (*other*)" -- in other words, the opposites "the same" and "other" form one single *continuum* in the same way in which "the name" and "the content" of a thing are its two inseparable and essential parts. Or else, B 21 (49 M), "*Death* is all we see when awake, *life* is all we see when asleep" (reading ὕπαρ for Clement's misinterpretation ὕπνος, for the text as transmitted, "...and all we see when asleep is sleep," is nonsensical to me).

As though this paradox of the universal *coincidentia oppositorum* were not enough, Heraclitus keeps producing striking paradoxical statements on every occasion, each time reflecting

the *paradoxical essence* of things. B 54 (9 M), "*Invisible* (underlying) connection is stronger than visible (tangible)" (ἄρμονίῃ ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρείττων). B 80 (28 M), "*Strife* is Justice (or "the normal and fair course of affairs," not Peace). B 53 (29 M), "*War* is father of all and king of all" (not Zeus, as Homer would have us believe). B 30 (51 M), "(Strange as it may look,) this world-order *is* an everliving *fire*." B 96 (76 M), "Corpses should be thrown out sooner than *dung*" (instead of being honored with a burial rite). B 52 (93 M), "Human age is a *child* at play..." B 6 (58 M), "Every day there is a *new sun*." B 3 (57 M), "The sun is the size of a human *foot*" (i.e., the sun is a σκάφη, a basin for washing *feet*, serving as a focus in which the hot sea-exhalation ignites every morning).

(B) Alas, the force of this *objective and necessary* paradox in the surrounding world is, so to say, undermined by Heraclitus' employment of the paradox as a consequence of men's *ignorance*. Once this ignorance is dispelled -- by the light of Heraclitus' instruction, -- men's paradoxical behavior will disappear.

Here are a few examples of this *unnecessary* paradoxical behavior of men. B 1 (1 M), "Although this Logos (principle) is *real* (ἔών, compare Herodotus 1.95.1; 1.116.5; Aristoph. *Frogs* 1052), men constantly (αἰεὶ) fail to comprehend it...;" B 17 (3 M), "Most men do not notice things they encounter (i.e., which are right before their eyes)...;" B 28^a (20 M), "What the most renowned man (among the Greeks, such as Pythagoras, Homer or Hesiod) knows and maintains is but *fancies*;" B 56 (21 M), "Men are mistaken in the recognition of obvious things, just as Homer was, although he was considered wiser than any other Greek...;" B 2 (23^b M), "Although this Logos (principle) is common to all (i.e., universally valid), most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own;" B 20 (99 M), "Once born, they (the multitude) want to live and have their dooms. (What is worse,) they leave children behind them, so that (new) dooms may come into being" ("...damit der Tod nicht aussterbe," Reinhardt); B 125a (106 M), "May *wealth* never fail you, men of Ephesus, so that your *wickedness* may be manifestly proven (exposed)!" B 124 (107 M), "(For them) the *fairest* world-order is but a *heap of sweepings* piled up at random;" B 72^a (4 M),

"They are at odds with their most constant companion;" B 5 (86 M); B 104 (101 M), and many others.

How may we explain the combination of (A) and (B) in Heraclitus? The fact that the paradox appears as an *objective necessity* and, at the same time, as an *unnecessary* consequence of human *ignorance*? I would suggest, by the maverick, intransigent, rebellious personality of the thinker himself. Doubtless, Heraclitus was a strong individuality, selfconscious of his role as an Enlightener -- compare, e.g., the $\epsilon\gamma\omega$ in B 1 (1 M), 55 (5 M), 101 (15 M), 108 (83 M). As is known, Heraclitus is the Presocratic philosopher who names most names -- less often with approval (Homer, Thales, Bias, Hermodorus), more often with rebuke and derision (Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus; Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus).

The political plight of this intransigent aristocrat with his fellow-citizens of Ephesus transpires from such sayings as B 121 (105 M), 125a (106 M), 29 (95 M), 104 (101 M). What is more important, Heraclitus' debt to his philosophical predecessors is never acknowledged. No matter how much he owed to Xenophanes or Pythagoras, he attacked them mercilessly. Take the case of the close similarity between Xenophanes' and Heraclitus' theology -- one "impersonal" god, reaching everywhere in the cosmos. In spite of that, Heraclitus will state in his B 108 (83 M), "Of all those whose teachings I have learned, *no one* has reached the point of recognizing that the Wise (being) is *different* from anything else."

In brief, the indiscriminate use of the paradoxical statement by Heraclitus may well reflect his own nonconformist, maverick personality. After all, in this authoritarian *Sturm- und Drang* period of the early Greek thought, were the self-proclaimed Enlighteners Pythagoras and Xenophanes much different?

III

But there is more to that. Contrary to what he was preaching, Heraclitus was well aware of the fact that his *radical and novel* teachings were far from being accessible and easily understandable to a common audience. A universal principle (Logos) *hidden* within every given thing; an everliving Fire as the *underlying* substance of all things; the principle of con-

stant measures (or *quanta*) regulating the qualitative change of the basic matter (fire); a God fundamentally different from anything else; an equally universal principle of War as the cause of differentiation in society and nature -- such doctrines were far from being obvious to an ordinary man.

That Heraclitus' principles were not present "on the surface," manifest and easy to grasp, we may learn from his own words: B 123 (8 M), "The (real) constitution of a thing *is used (or likes) to hide*" (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ); B 18 (11 M), "Unless one *expects the unexpected* (ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον), he will not find it, for it is difficult to trace and grasp." And I think we learn something about the audience's *negative* reaction to Heraclitus' strange teachings from such outbursts of the teacher's frustration as these: B 34 (2 M), "People who remain without comprehension (even) after they have been instructed, resemble the *deaf*. It is to them that the saying applies: 'Present in body, absent in mind'." B 87 (109 M), "A stupid man is wont to get stunned at every (new) teaching he hears." B 97 (22 M), "*Dogs* (not men) bark at those they do not know" (i.e., attack every new doctrine without coming to know it first). In brief, not without reason was Heraclitus called "obscure" and "riddler" already in the times of Socrates and Aristotle. Anyway, one would think, if his teachings were clear enough, they would not have been that easily misunderstood and misinterpreted by his pupil Cratylus (ap. Aristotle *Metaph.* 1010 a 7 ff.).

Now, in order to make his radical doctrines accessible to the common man, in order to gain the minds and hearts of his audiences, the Enlightener goes out of his way to present them as something not contradicting but rather being *based upon traditional wisdom*. That is why Heraclitus so freely employs countless traditional folkloric motifs, popular sayings and proverbs, catchy vivid similes, and even metrical form. Here are a few examples of each category.

(2) *Folkloric Motifs*. B 9 (37 M), "Gold" and "Straw" brought together: Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature*, D 475.1.20; D 451.5.6; Grimm, *Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, s.v. "Häckerling": "Der Mann, der das Wenn und das Aber erdacht, / Hat sicher aus Häckerling Gold schon gemacht." -- B 15 (50 M), Dionysus *is* Hades: compare Dionysus'

epithet μελαναίγυς and Aeschyl. fr.228 N. (377 Mette). -- B 24 (96 M): cf. Plato *Rep.*V, 468 e, et al. -- B 28^b (19 M), The goddess of Justice is slow in coming, but will eventually prevail: Euripid. fr.979 N. -- B 30 (51 M), The divine origin of the "everliving" Fire: cf., e.g., Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 306 τὸ πῦρ...ζῆ; L. Radermacher, "Lebende Flamme," *Wiener Studien* 49 (1931) 115-18; M.L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford 1971) 170 ff. -- B 36 (66 M), Human flesh is earth (clay), human blood is water: *Iliad* 7.99; Hesiod *Opera* 61; Xenophanes B 29 and 33; A 50; Apollodor. *Bibl.* 1.7.1. -- B 45 (67 M), The "bonds" (πεῖρατα) of the soul: *Iliad* 7.102, et al. -- B 63 (73 M), Heroes as guardians of men: Hesiod *Opera* 122 f.; 252 f.; Plato *Crat.* 398 a; *Rep.* V, 469 a. -- B 66 (82 M), Fire as the last judge. -- B 78 (90 M), B 102 (91 M), B 79 (92 M), B 52 (93 M), God alone possesses wisdom, man's lot is to remain ignorant: *Iliad* 2.485 f. (and the instances quoted above, ending with note 8). -- B 85 (70 M), θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν, "It is hard to fight against the heart's desire:" Plato *Legg.* IX, 863 b 3; *Rep.* II, 375 b 1; Euripid. *Medea* 1079 f.; fr.257 N., et al. -- B 85 (70 M), ψυχῆς τι ὀνεῖσθαι, "To buy something at the price of soul:" Longinus *De sublim.* 44.9; Euripid. *Medea* 968; Xenophon *Cyrop.* 3.1.36; Isocrat. 6 (*Archidamus*). 109; A.G. 7.622.6; Persius 6.75. -- B 88 (41 M), "Dead" changes round to "Living," "Old" to "Young:" Melissus B 8.3; Plato *Phaedo* 70 c 9. -- B 94 (52 M), The "bounds" of Helios, and Dike in charge of cosmic events: cf. G. Vlastos, *C.P.* 42 (1947) 156-78 (esp. 164-68). -- B 117 (69 M), B 118 (68 M), A drunken soul is a wet soul; a dry (sober) soul is wisest and best: Xenophon *Symp.* 2.24; Aristoph. *Knights* 96 = 114. -- B 119 (94 M): Theognis 161-64; Menander fr.714 Körte; Phocylides fr.16 Diels; Plato *Legg.* V, 732 c; VII, 804 a; IX, 877 a; *Phaedo* 107 d; 108 b; 113 d; *Rep.* X, 617 de; 620 de; *Tim.* 90 a; 90 c. -- A 19 (108 M), The time-span from the begetting of a grandparent to that of his grandchild makes a complete cycle of human life, or one generation of thirty years -- $2 \times (14 + 1) = 30$. The human life-span consists of *hebdomads*: Solon fr.27 West, et alibi.

(3) P o p u l a r s a y i n g s. B 2 (23^b M), δεῦ ἔπεσθαι τῷ Ξυνῷ: compare θεῶ ἔπου (DK appar. ad I, p.62.18; Marcus Aurel. 10.11.4); ἔπεο νόμῳ Herodot. 5.18.2; Thucyd. 2.35.3; Cleanthes *Hymn. Iovis* 24 ff. -- B 11 (80 M): cf. Plato *Critias* 109 bc, et al. -- B 13 (36 M): Semonides fr.7.2 ff. West; *NT 2 Petri* 2:22; Epictet. 4.11.29 and 31; Aristid. *Orat.* 33.31; Lucian *Anachars.* 1; Horace *Epist.* 1.2.26; Hippolyt. *Refut.* 9.7.3; A.G. 14.106.3; *Panoem. Gr.* I, p.376; II, p.705, et al. --

B 18 (11 M): Archiloch. fr.122.1 West, χρημάτων ἀελπτον οὐδέν ἐστιν. Euripid. fr.761 N.; Ps.-Linus ap. Stob.5.46.1. -- B 22 (70 M). -- B 33 (104 M): cf. *Iliad* 2.204. -- B 34 (2 M), παρεόντας ἀπειναι: Aristoph. *Knights* 1119 ff.; *TG* fr. adesp. 517 N.; *Paroem. Gr.*I, p.446; II, p.766. -- B 43 (102 M): Herodot.5.77.4 (Simonid. fr.100.3 Diehl); Plato *Legg.* VIII, 835 e; Herodot.8.77.1. -- B 44 (103 M): Cicero *N.D.* 3.94; *Acad.*II 137; *Tusc.*4.43. -- B 56 (21 M): eleven instances in Marcovich, *Eraclito*, ad fr.21. -- B 58 (46 M): Diog. Laert.3.85; Aeschyl. *Agam.*849; Plato *Gorg.*456 b; 479 a; 480 c; 521 e--522 a; *Rep.*III, 406 d; IV, 426 b; *Prot.* 354 a; *Tim.*64 d; 65 b; *Polit.*293 b. Xenophon *Memor.*1.2.54. -- B 72^a (4 M): Lysias 14.44, τοῖς οἰκείοις διδάφορος. -- B 74 (89 M), ὡς παῖδας τοκεῶνων: cf. Aristot. *Soph.EL.* 174 b 2; *E.N.* 1164 b 22; Muson. Ruf. fr.16 (p.82 Hense). -- B 92 (75 M): five instances in Marcovich, *Eraclito*, ad fr.75. -- B 93 (14 M), σήματα of the Pythian Apollo. -- B 95 + 109 (110 M): see Marcovich ad fr.110. -- B 97 (22 M): cf. *Odyssey*20.15; 16.4 ff. -- B 100 (64 M): cf. Plut.*De def. orac.*416 A; *Cypria* fr.4.3 Allen; *Odyssey* 9.131; Xenophon *Anab.*1.4.10; *Cyneg.*5.34; Aristid.*Or.* 32.25; 26.11; 44.16; Marcus Aurel.4.23; 9.3; Iulian *Or.* 2, 101 C; *A.G.*9.51; Verg.*Ecl.*9.51. -- B 101a (6 M): Herodot.1.8.2; Thucyd.1.73.2; Philo *passim*; Dio Chrysost. 12.71; *Paroem.Gr.*II, p.744, et al. -- B 104 (101 M): Diog. Laert.1.88; DK I, p.65.2; Cleanthes fr.100 Pearson; Herodot.3.81.1.

(4) *C o m p a r i s o n s*. Out of some ninety Heraclitean fragments consisting of more than three words only, comparison occurs no less than *eleven* times: B 1 (1 M), 56 (21 M), 114 (23^a M), 51 (27 M), 90 (54 M), 67 (77 M), 5 (86 M, twice), 79 (92 M), 29 (95 M), 44 (103 M). Similes comprise all his teachings -- the *Logoslehre* and Theology (four instances in each), Ethics (twice) and Cosmology (once). Doubtless, Heraclitus' picturesque similes play much the same role as his countless concrete illustrations of the abstract but universal Logos -- both are devised to make his novel doctrine accessible to the ordinary man. As for the number of examples taken from daily life to illustrate Logos, already Philo was forced to give credit to Heraclitus: "...Heraclitus wrote books on nature, getting his opinions on opposites from our theologian (i.e., Moses) and adding a great number of laborious arguments to them" (*Quaest. in Genesim* III.5; *Quis rerum divin. heres* 214).

Incidentally, it is worth mentioning with what insistency does Heraclitus employ one and the same example. Adult man is compared to (even identified with) an unfledged boy no less than *five* times among the extant

fragments -- four times to the disadvantage of the adult man: B 56 (21 M), 117 (69 M), 52 (93 M), 121 (105), 79 (92 M). As for the coincidence (or, at least, a single *continuum*) between the opposites "Life" - "Death;" "Immortality" - "Mortality," it had become a real obsession for the Ephesian: he employs it no less than *eight* times in the available, scarce evidence: B 53 (29 M), 48 (39 M), 88 (41 M), 62 (47 M), 26 (48 M), 21 (49 M), 15 (50 M), 36 (66 M).

(5) *H e r a c l i t u s P o e t i c u s*. That Heraclitus' rhythmical prose consists of well balanced and elaborate clauses, is common knowledge (that is why the fragments are printed this way in my editions of Heraclitus). In addition, metrical forms seem to be detectable in some of his sayings. For example, second half of a hexameter is present in the following fragments:

B 5 (86 M): - υ υ - υ υ - οὐδ' ἥρωας, οἵτινές εἰσι.

B 100 (64 M): - υ υ - υ υ - ὥρας, αἶ πάντα φέρουσι.

B 3 (57 M): - υ υ - υ υ - εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπέου.

If that is true, then later versifiers of Heraclitus -- such as Cleanthes, Scythinus, Ps.-Linus, the poet of Orph. fr.226 Kern -- had only to follow the example of the master. Hence the imitations:

[B 136] ([96^b] M): ψυχαὶ ἀρηίφατοι καθαρώτεραι ἢ ἐνὶ νοῦσοις.

[B 137] ([28^d¹] M): - υ υ - υ υ - εἰμαρμένα πάντως.

Moreover, complete iambic trimeters seem to hide in three genuine sayings and in one imitation:

B 78 (90 M): ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνῶμας,
θεῖον δὲ ἔχει. (As transmitted).

ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον οὐ γνῶμας ἔχει,
θεῖον δ' ἔχει. (Scripsi post Gu. Heidel).

B 33 (104 M): νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἐνός. (As transmitted).
νόμος <δὲ> καὶ βουλῇ<σι> πείθεσθαι ἐνός. (Conieci).

B 49 (98 M): εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ᾦ. (As transmitted).
εἷς μύριοί μοι <γ' ἔστιν>, ᾦν ἄριστος ᾦ. (Conieci).

[B 47] [113 M]: μὴ εἰκῇ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλόμεθα. (Transmitted).
μὴ εἰκῇ μεγίστων ἀμφὶ συμβαλλόμεθα. (Conieci).

Finally, there is a *lecythion* in B 100 (64 M): οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός
(- υ - x - υ -). Maybe the form Διός -- for the expected Ζηνός
from B 32 (84 M) -- was employed by Heraclitus *metri gratia*.¹⁵⁾

IV

Λόγος, one of the key-words in Heraclitus, appears in two different senses among the extant fragments -- "*principle*, (rule, law)," and "*proportion*, (ratio, measure)." Now, I think these two meanings are indicative of the presence of two different major doctrines in Heraclitus, which may overlap but are distinguishable enough. One teaching is dealing with the universal *principle* of *coincidentia oppositorum* -- on a rather logical or metaphysical level; the other addresses itself to the equally universal substratum Fire, covering the fields of physics, theology and psychology.

To be more specific, the word λόγος occurs 12 times among the preserved sayings. Three of these instances may be discarded at once, as belonging to spurious fragments. B [126a] ([118] M), a late forgery, had been rejected already by Diels. In B 72^a (4 M), the words λόγῳ, τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, have been recognized as an explanation introduced by Marcus Aurelius (4.46) already by Bywater (in 1877). As for B 115 (112 M), ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὖξων, I had argued¹⁶) that the saying is most probably spurious, on the following grounds: (1) It is transmitted under the name of Socrates, not Heraclitus. (2) The statement, "Soul has a (numerical) ratio that increases itself," is highly reminiscent of the concept of soul advanced by Xenocrates Academicus (fr.60 Heinze) -- soul is a number capable of increasing itself: ἀριθμὸν... αὐτὸν αὖξοντα τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς), Plotinus 6.5 (23).9.13; Plut. *De animae procr.* 1012 D; Aristot. *De anima* 404 b 29; 408 b 32; Aetius 4.2.3-4. And (3), "measure" is something constant, fixed and unchangeable in Heraclitus (cf. B 31 (53 M), μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν...): a "measure" capable of *increasing itself* cannot be paralleled in Heraclitus.

In the next three instances of λόγος, the word has insignificant philosophical import. B 87 (109 M), "A stupid man tends to get stunned at every (new) word (or *teaching*) he hears." B 108 (83 M), ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι..., "Of all those whose *teachings* I have heard, no one reaches the point of recognizing that..."

B 39 (100 M), 'Εν Πριήνῃ Βίας ἐγένετο ὁ Τευτάμεω, οὗ πλέων λόγος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων, "In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutames, who is of more account (*esteem*) than the rest" -- a common Ionian idiomatic phrase, as, e.g., in Herodotus 2.89.1.

The rest of six instances is split in two different technical meanings: *principle* -- in B 1 (1 M, twice), B 2 (23^b M), and B 50 (26 M); *proportion, measure* -- in B 31 (53^b M) and B 45 (67 M). The former four cases obviously deal with the *Logoslehre*, the latter two with the *Feuerlehre*.

To take the latter two first, the term λόγος seems to serve as a synonym of the term μέτρα. So much is clear by comparing B 31 (53^b M) -- "⟨Earth⟩ is liquefied as sea, and *is measured* in the same *proportion* as existed before it became earth," ⟨γῆ⟩ θάλασσα διαχέεται, καὶ μετρεῖται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ, -- to B 30 (51 M) -- "This world-order... always was and is and will be: an ever-living fire, being kindled *in measures* and going out *in measures*," ... πῦρ αἰέζων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. The saying B 45 (67 M) is less clear, but the sense "proportion, measure" (i.e., of the qualitative change "blood-water" into "soul-fire") seems to be the most likely one: "If you start looking for the "bonds" (beginning and end) of the soul, you will not find them, even if you travel over every path (i.e., in every *horizontal* direction): so *deep a measure* the soul has" -- i.e., hidden in the depth of the body, in the hot exhalation from blood: compare B 36 (66 M), "...and out of water soul comes-to-be." In both cases λόγος refers to the qualitative change of matter (fire, water, earth), i.e., to physics.

On the contrary, λόγος in B 1 (1 M, twice), B 2 (23^b M), and B 50 (26 M) refers to a *logical principle*-- to the unity of two opposites within every given thing. This universal principle (ἕξυδος λόγος) was the great discovery of Heraclitus, and he elevated it to the rank of an *objective*, universal law, operative in the surrounding world of our daily experience. This *objectivization* of a logical principle (rule or statement) must have been Heraclitus' own innovation.

Now, that the Logos exists *outside* the human mind, can be seen both from B 1 and B 50. The opening sentence of B 1 reads:

"Men constantly prove to be void of comprehending this *real* Logos -- both *before they have heard it* (sc. from me) and once they have heard it" (τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἄξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον). The phrase, "both before they have heard it and...", makes it clear that men are expected to grasp the universal, omnipresent Logos *by themselves* -- from the surrounding world of their daily experience -- "Most men do not notice things they encounter...", B 17 (3 M). -- And B 50 reads: "If you have heard, *not me but the Logos*, it is wise (i.e., it is logically necessary) to agree that all things are one" (οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἐστὶν ἓν πάντα εἶναι). Here again, the opposition, "not me but the Logos," is best explained as implying: "You need not believe me: convince yourselves through your own experience. For the Logos is present (operative) in every thing around you."

This simple explanation, however, has been challenged by serious scholars. M. L. West, for example, sees in the saying a contrast between Heraclitus' personal authority and the force of his argument: " 'Don't listen to me but to what I'm saying...' Heraclitus is telling men that they should be persuaded not by his personal authority but by the autonomous authority of his argument."¹⁷ To leave aside the improbability of such a "split personality," of a contrast between two parts of the same person, we may well ask, "And just where is this 'personal authority' of the lonely Ephesian? In the extant fragments, he speaks of himself as of one talking to the deaf -- B 34 (2 M), B 87 (109 M), B 97 (22 M), -- and as a loser in the eyes of his fellow-citizens -- B 121 (105 M), 125a (106 M)

C. H. Kahn sees in B 50 a contrast between Heraclitus and the Logos *in the listeners' souls*: "The thought will be: listen not to *me* but to the discourse within your soul, and it will tell you all."¹⁸ He refers to B 45 (67 M), "the deep Logos of the soul." This interpretation is not likely either. For, (1) it still leaves unexplained the phrase of B 1, "Men remain uncomprehending of the Logos both *before they have heard it* and once they have heard it (sc. from me)." And (2), the word *κείρατα* -- "bonds (beginning and end) of the soul" -- in B 45 witnesses to the fact that the phrase, οὕτω βαδὺν λόγον ἔχει

(sc. ψυχῇ), in the same fragment, must refer to the very *nature* of the soul (such as "a regulated hot exhalation from blood"). And that is very far from the idea of "a discourse within your soul."

In brief, any attempt to see in λόγος one single sense covering all extant fragments -- expressed, e.g., by Ewald Kurtz, "Jede Betrachtung des heraklitischen Logosbegriffes muss von zwei Tatsachen ausgehen: dass λόγος nur einen Bedeutungsaspekt hat und..."¹⁹⁾ -- should be resisted as misleading and contradicting the evidence. And to assume -- as, e.g., G. S. Kirk does,²⁰⁾ -- that, "This Logos, in its material aspect, must be a kind of fire," is to underestimate the great metaphysical discovery of Heraclitus -- his *Logos-lehre* (recognized both by Philo and Hippolytus, *Refut.* IX.9-10).

In conclusion, one single doctrine in Heraclitus is not likely. The double role of Polemos, among the extant fragments, is indicative of the existence of more than just one Heraclitean teaching. Among some *nine* different reasons for the unity of opposites employed by Heraclitus,²¹⁾ "war, strife, war-vortex, tension, etc." appears as the most cogent one. In a strung but resting bow, it is exactly the *tension* between the two bow-arms, tending in opposite directions, that makes the instrument effective, B 51 (27 M). "The barley-posset disintegrates (sc., into its two opposite ingredients -- the solid barley and the liquid wine) unless it is stirred (i.e., unless there is an interaction or "war-vortex" between the two opposites)," B 125 (31 M). And it is "strife (not peace) that is the normal course of affairs (εἰδέ(ναι) χορὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἔοντα ζυγὸν καὶ δίκην ἔρην...), B 80 (28 M).

In brief, War appears as a cause of *unity*, and that is why both Logos and Polemos are called "common to all" or "universally valid" (ξυνός) -- B 2 (23^b M) and B 80 (28 M), -- and why the phrase, γινομένων πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, of B 1, matches the phrase, γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔρην, of B 80. In addition to being an agent of *unity*, however, Polemos appears as a cause of *differentiation* in every Greek city-state: "War is father of all and king of all, and it is he who renders some gods (i.e., heroes), others (mortal) men; it is he who makes some slaves, others free men, and so on (e.g., it is he who

makes some rich, others poor)," B 53 (29 M). Obviously, such a necessary social differentiation has nothing to do with the principle of unity of opposites, but rather an outspoken aristocratic advocate of the *ethics of war-heroes* is to be heard here -- compare, e.g., B 24 (96 M), ἀρηιφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι; B 29 (95 M), B 25 (97 M).

Heraclitus' *Logoslehre* and *Feuerlehre* may overlap, but they are still two different autonomous doctrines. For example, pairs of opposites do appear in Heraclitus' physics (B 65 (55 M); B 84a (56a M)), psychology (B 36 (66 M)), and theology (B 67 (77 M)), but the point is that, in these fragments, the philosopher is not trying to prove the unity of opposites but rather to explain the manifestations and functions of the *everliving Fire*. Presumably, Heraclitus had started explaining this world-order by means of his great discovery -- the universal principle of *coincidentia oppositorum*. But an abstract *logical* principle could not explain the *plurality and diversity* of the world-order, for the simple reason that it could not undergo *qualitative change*. Fire, however, was an ideal principle and substance for such a qualitative τροπή, μεταβολή, ἀλλοίωσις.

Hence the presence of two concurrent doctrines in Heraclitus. Logos explains the unity of this world-order by means of its *logical* universal validity or operativity, by its ubiquity, omnipresence in every particular thing. Or say Logos (Σ) is "present" in the particular thing a , and in b , c ... and z . Now, thanks to the fact that Logos is "common to all," that all things share in the same Logos, all particular things themselves are interconnected, forming one single *continuum* ($\Sigma = a$; $\Sigma = b$; $\Sigma = c$; ... $\Sigma = z$. Hence $a = b = c = \dots z$) -- οὐκ ἔμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἔστιν ἔ ν π ά ν τ α ε ἷ ν α ι, B 50 (26 M). In its turn, Fire explains the unity of this world-order by the fact that it is its universal underlying basic substance -- B 30 (51 M); B 90 (54 M). But while Logos accounts for the unity alone, Fire can explain both unity and plurality -- thanks to its constant and regulated qualitative change.

In conclusion, Heraclitus' *physical* world-order displays unity and balance. Unity -- thanks to the universal basic substance Fire; balance -- thanks to μέτρα or λόγος, i.e., a regulated qualitative change of fire into water and earth, and backwards. Heraclitus' *metaphysical* world-order also shows balance and unity. Balance -- thanks to the internal unity of two opposites within every given thing; unity -- thanks to the universal validity of this principle of *coincidentia oppositorum*, also called Logos.

University of Illinois at Urbana

NOTES

*) Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, on 30 December 1981, during the 113th Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association, held in San Francisco.

1) H. Fraenkel, "A thought pattern in Heraclitus," *A.J.P.* 59 (1938) 308-337 = *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, 2nd ed., Munich 1960, 253-283.

2) "Heraclitea," *Hermes* 77 (1942) 225 n. = *Vermächtnis der Antike*, Göttingen 1960, 72 n.

3) G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments*. Cambridge 1954 (reprint 1962), 78 ("There is no doubt that this proportional form of exposition was dear to Heraclitus, but..."); 302 ("...especially in view of Heraclitus' fondness for the proportional statement: cf. fr. 79, 82-3, 9 etc.").

4) Charles H. Kahn, *The art and thought of Heraclitus*. Cambridge 1979, 174.

5) The text of Heraclitus is quoted from M. Marcovich, *Heraclito: Frammenti*. Bibl. di Studi Superiori, Vol. 64. Florence 1978, pp. XXII + 442.

6) For example, in "Problemas Heracliteos," *Emerita* 41 (1973) 449-473.

7) "Ein misverstandenes Wort des Heraklit," *Hermes* 14 (1879) 306.

8) See Bruno Snell, "Menschliches und göttliches Wissen," in *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 3rd ed., Hamburg 1955, 184-202.

9) H. Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, 2nd ed., Munich 1962, 435.

10) P. Wendland ap. H. Gressmann, *Studien zu Eusebs Theophanie* (Texte u. Untersuchungen, 23.3), Leipzig 1903, 153.

11) *Rhein. Mus.* 62 (1907) 58.

12) P. Tannery, *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène*, 2nd ed., Paris 1930, 168.

13) "Das Grosse Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr," *Hermes* 80 (1952) 129-155; Idem, *Die Anfänge der Astronomie*. Göttingen 1966. -- For a human generation of thirty years compare Marcovich, *Eracrito* (above, note 5), 379-384, and E. Eyben, "Antiquity's View of Puberty," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 677-697.

14) Compare James Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, Cambridge 1902 (2nd ed., 1963), II, pp.202 and 283.

15) Karl Deichgräber seems to go too far in his attempt at poetizing Heraclitus: *Rhythmische Elemente im Logos des Heraklit*. Akad. Mainz, Abh. der Geistes- u. sozialwiss. Klasse, 1962, nr.9, 479-553.

16) In *Phronesis* 11 (1966) 19-30, esp.29 f.; *PW RE Suppl.X* (1965), s.v. *Herakleitos* (= Sonderausgabe, Stuttgart 1968), 266.17 ff.

17) M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*. Oxford 1971, 127.

18) *The art and thought of Heraclitus* (above, note 4), 130.

19) E. Kurtz, *Interpretationen zu den Logos-Fragmenten Heraklits*. Spudasmata, Vol.17. Hildesheim, Olms, 1971, 63 ff. -- Compare also W. J. Verdenius, "Der Logosbegriff bei Heraklit und Parmenides," *Phronesis* 11 (1966) 81-98; 12 (1967) 99-117. Fr. R. Adrados, "El sistema de Heráclito: Estudio a partir del léxico," *Emerita* 41 (1973) 1-43.

20) *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments* (above, note 3), 248.

21) Listed in Marcovich, *Eracrito* (above, note 5), Table on p.113 f.

PINDAR, SOLON AND JEALOUSY:
POLITICAL VOCABULARY IN THE ELEVENTH PYTHIAN

J. K. NEWMAN

Writing for one of his own townsmen, probably in the tense period following 480,¹⁾ Pindar seizes the opportunity to contrast right and wrong. Wrong is illustrated by the myth, which begins and ends in bloodshed (φονευομένου, v. 17; φοναῖς, v. 37). Two sisters - their names occur in the first lines of the second and third strophes, almost in metrically corresponding positions - two adulteresses, show the dire social consequences of moral irresponsibility.²⁾

With these two sisters are juxtaposed their two brothers, Castor and Polydeuces, whose selfless generosity leads them turn and turn about to Therapne and Olympus (vv. 61-64). It is with the majestic and suggestive 'Ολύμπου that the poem ends.

Pindar very carefully spells out that his myth has relevance to the message of his poem by repetition of vocabulary between the one and the other: πολῖται, ὄλβος, φθόνον (vv. 28-29) are picked up by πόλιν, ὄλβφ, φθονεροί in vv. 52-54. Some of this vocabulary is akin to language used in his political poetry by Solon.³⁾ Like Pindar later, Solon warns against an anti-social ὕβρις (fr. 4.8 and 34 Bergk / West: cf. *P.* 11.55, where the antithesis ἡσυχίᾳ / ὕβριν anticipates *P.* 8.1 and 12). He too abominates tyranny (34.7), and for the Pindaric reason that it makes life impossible for the tyrant's progeny (33.7: cf. 13.32 and *P.* 11.57-58). Since ill-gotten gains cannot last (13.16ff.: cf. *P.* 11.52-53; *P.* 3.105-06 with Turyn's note), the correct attitude for a citizen is not restless ambition, but to abide by the conventions of the banquet, the symbol of orderly social life (4.10

εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ: cf. *P.* 11.45 εὐφροσύ-
να). For both authors, ἡσυχία is a positive ideal (Solon fr.
4c. 1 ἡσυχάσαντες: cf. *P.* 11.55 ἡσυχία).⁴⁾

Verses 36-58 of Pindar's ode share these and other paral-
lels with Solon. They are most conveniently exhibited by a
list:

- v. 36 χρόνῳ (cf. χρόνῳ, v. 32): Solon 4.16 (cf. 13.8)
- v. 45 εὐφροσύνα: Solon 4.10
- v. 45 δόξα: Solon 13.4
- v. 51 ἀλικία: Solon 4.20
- v. 52 πόλιν: Solon 4.1, 5, 17 and 31
- v. 52 τὰ μέσα: cf. τῶν μέσων, Aristotle, 'Αθ.πολ. 5.3;
Politics 1296a18: ἐν μετρίοισι, Solon 4c.
3; ἐν μεταίχμῳ, Solon 37.9
- v. 53 ὀλβῳ: Solon 6.3; 13.3; 34.2
- v. 53 αἴσαν: Solon 4.2
- v. 53 τυραννίδων: Solon 32.2; 34.7: cf. 9.3; 33.6
- v. 55 ἄτα(ι): Solon 4.35; 13.13, 68, 75
- v. 55 ἡσυχία: Solon 4.10: cf. 4c. 1
- v. 55 ὕβριν: Solon 4.8 and 34; 6.3; 13.11 and 16
- v. 57 γενεᾷ: Solon 27.10: cf. γένος 13.32; 33.7
- v. 58 κτεάνων: Solon 4.12

But, although Solon's doctrine of moderation is so close
to Pindar's, we do not in fact find φθόνος or its congeners
in the extant poetic fragments. Solon believes that Athens'
problems are caused by the greed of the rich. He speaks of
διχοστασίη and ἔρις between the orders (4.37-38). Amid these
genuine grievances, there is hardly room for the assertion
that trouble-makers are sowing discord simply out of jealousy.

And yet Herodotus has no qualms about attributing to Solon
a doctrine concerning φθόνος which is of key importance in the
understanding of his entire *History*:⁵⁾ ἐπιστάμενόν με τὸ θεῖον
πᾶν ἔδν φθονερόν τε καὶ παραχῶδες ἐπειρωτᾶς ἀνθρωπίνων πρηγμά-
των πέρι. The man who recognizes this truth about the divine
nature avoids any premature claim to be ὀλβιος, and is pro-
tected by his εὐτυχίῃ from ἄτη (I.32).

Pindar is familiar with the notion of divine jealousy (*P.*
10.20; *I.* 7.39). But the majority of the 19 examples of his
use of φθονερός, φθονέω, φθόνος listed by Slater refer to
human jealousy: φθονερῶν γειτόνων (*O.* 1.47); ὄψον δὲ λόγου
φθονεροῖσι (*N.* 8.21): χρή νιν (probably ἀρετάν) ... μὴ φθονε-
ραῖσι φέρειν γνώμῃς (*I.* 1.44); παντὶ δ' ἐπὶ φθόνος ἀνδρὶ
κεῖται ἀρετᾶς (*Parth.* 1.8); κενεοφρόνων ἑταῖρον ἀνδρῶν [*sc.*

φθόνον] (fr. 212).

The existence of these two types of φθόνος, divine and human, is attested in the same context by Thucydides. In words of unbearable poignancy Nicias attempts to console his men at the end: ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ἡτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπὶ φθονοῖ ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα (VII.77.3). It is evident that his religious outlook (VII.50.4) is inspiring him to look for an old argument. Yet even here one can observe the new civic concept of φθόνος: καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιῆται, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα (VII.77.2). His many just acts towards men, antithetically set against his behavior towards the gods, are evinced by the absence of φθόνος. He has indeed behaved rather like the Peisistratids: cf. τὴν... ἀρχὴν... ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο of Hipparchus, and καὶ ἐπετῆδυσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν... (VI.54.5) and διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτῆδουσιν of Nicias (VII.86.5).⁶⁾

Because civic φθόνος was such a well known phenomenon in the life of the πόλις, Aristotle analyzes its causes and objects in book II of the *Rhetoric* (1387b22ff.). It was in Pindar's lifetime that increasing social awareness led to increasing φθόνος, as expectations rose.⁷⁾ People are jealous of their peers, says Aristotle. And, when more came to think of their neighbors as "no better than themselves," there was more scope for jealousy.

Aristotle points out that jealousy is readily found in families. Herodotus offers a fine example, relevant to Pindar. When his son Lycophron harbored a grudge over the death of his mother, fostered by his uncle, who was tyrant of Epidaurus, Periander drove him out of house and home. The young man was reduced to dire straits, and eventually his father invited him to learn (μαθών: cf. *P.* 2.25 and 72) ὅσῳ φθονέεσθαι κρέσσον ἐστὶ ἢ οἰκτίρεσθαι (Her. III.52.5). The implication is that the deeds of tyrants have to be tolerated, with all their φθόνος, if one wishes to enjoy their rewards.

H. Fränkel has rightly suggested⁸⁾ that this apophthegm had its origins as a political slogan. Pindar had earlier said to the tyrant Hiero: "If one speaks to the point,

drawing together in brief compass the strands of many themes, less blame follows from men; for weary satiety blunts their eager hopes, and what the citizens hear most vexes their mind in secret at others' successes. Still, since it is better to be envied than pitied (v. 85: κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος), you must not give up your nobility...." (P. 1.81ff.: cf. μὴ παρίει καλὰ, v. 86 with μὴ δῶξτὰ σεωυτοῦ ἀγαθὰ ἄλλοισι, Her. III.53.4). Καλὰ is a code word in this value-system.⁹⁾ Like Pericles (Thuc. II.35.2), Pindar knows that too much praise for too much success produces φθόνος. The situation of the tyrant Periander in Corinth has in fifth-century Syracuse expanded to include no longer an uncle but the ἀστοί (v. 84) in general.

It seems necessary therefore, in assessing Pindar's use of φθόνος, to take account of political developments in his lifetime.¹⁰⁾ Civic jealousy was becoming more widespread. An Alcmaeonid driven into exile could find solace in this reflection (P. 7.19: Megacles, ostracized in 486). The second *Pythian* with its themes of gratitude and ingratitude, shows that not even considerations of the mutability of human fortune can soften the attitude of the king's political enemies, who of course existed: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταῦτα νόον ἱαίνει φθονερῶν (89-90). Xenocrates of Acragas, a member of the ruling house of the Emmenidae, is advised not to keep silent about his father's excellence, in spite of jealousy (I. 2.43). But did the Emmenidae not have enemies (Empedocles)?

Φθόνος seems to play some part in the odes written by Pindar for Aeginetan patrons (O. 8.55; N. 4.39; N. 8.21; I. 5.24: cf. Bacchylides 13.200, also for a son of Lampon).¹¹⁾ No one will now believe that *Nemean* 4.39 refers to problems experienced by the poet with Simonides, as suggested by the scholiasts. *Olympian* 8.55 ("Let not Jealousy pelt me with a jagged stone") adapts a religious motif to popular "rough justice," the λεύσιμος δίκη of the tragedians,¹²⁾ which was alleged to have been carried out by the Athenian commons in Pindar's lifetime on Lycides or Cyrsilus (Her. IX.5.2: Dem. XVIII.204). Pindar knew the Aeginetans well, and he presumably also knew the tense rivalries which could prevail there, as in any Greek society.¹³⁾

He knew even better his own city of Thebes. In the first *Partheneion* the Theban Aeolidae are told that, because there are distinctions of honor among mortals, every man must endure φόβος on account of his ἀρετή (vv. 6-9). The son of Aeolidas, Pagondas, mentioned in the second *Partheneion* (v. 10) probably commanded the Theban army at Delium.¹⁴⁾ He had tactical ideas which made him an Epaminondas *avant la lettre*. Such aristocrats must surely have known what real φόβος was like.

Similarly, Pindar urges that we should not cheat, through jealousy, his countryman Herodotus of his share of praise (I. 1.44). The identification of the victor's father Asopodorus (v. 34) with the Asopodorus who wrought such havoc while fighting for the Persians at Plataea (Her. IX.69), and who was presumably afterwards punished for backing the losers, has been disputed.¹⁵⁾ Pindar's Asopodorus had certainly been in trouble, described in terms (ναυαγίας, v. 36) appropriate to a debacle in public affairs. There certainly were political troubles at Thebes after Plataea (Her. IX.86-88). Two distinguished Asopodori, both ruined at the same period in the same city? Or one, now happily enjoying a period of calm (εὐαμερίας, v. 40), but still fearful of φθονεραὶ γυνῆμα?

The eleventh *Pythian* was written for another aristocratic Theban victor. In its myth, the Atridae are the objects of malicious gossip on the part of their fellow citizens. The anachronism, like that in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, written for democratic Athens,¹⁶⁾ is colored by Pindar's knowledge of his own time and city. Later, the poet applies this lesson, using the device of the "preacher's I,"¹⁷⁾ to Thrasydaeus and the family and class he represents. In urging moderation, he uses the Solonian language he had obviously heard during his student days in Athens. But to it he adds the concept of civic jealousy, which, so far as we know, had not been employed by Solon. In warning against tyranny he could have remembered the disaster which a tyrannical government (Thuc. III. 62.3) and its medizing policy had lately wrought.

The similarities to Solon's language in this ode suggest that ἀτα(ι) must be retained at v. 55. Pindar is worried by the threat of ἄτη at Syracuse in *Pythian* 2, where we also find the φθονεροί at work (vv. 28, 82 ἄτα; 90 φθονεροί). He

expands Solon's concept to suggest that no longer so much the greed of the rich as the licence of the small-minded can destroy the community. The interrogative τίς at the start of the next sentence need not expect a negative answer. "Who has avoided dread insolence?" (i.e. "Who has avoided displaying an insolent attitude?") may simply be a religious / rhetorical call for information.¹⁸⁾

Ἄτα, dramatically placed at the beginning of its line, in metrical correspondence with χειρῶν, σφαχθεῖσα and Τρώων in the myth, is too good to be surrendered for the vacuous ἀλλ' εἰ. The parallel with *Antigone* 533, τρέφων δ' ἄτα κάπα-ναστιάσεις θρόνων, is attractive: cf. *Aga.* 1230 ἄτης λαθραίου of Clytaemnestra (so Fraenkel). Φθονεροί may be retained as a noun in its own right ("the opposition"), shortly to be modified by the powerful personification ἄται. With one small change, this is the text preferred by Alexander Turyn.

University of Illinois at Urbana

NOTES

1) The ode dates from 474, according to A. Turyn, *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis* (Oxford 1952), p. 139, with whom B. Snell and H. Maehler, *Pindarus, Pars I, Epinicia* (Leipzig 1971), p. 116, agree. Contrast C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964), pp. 402-05. - For a recent general discussion of the problems presented by the interpretation of this difficult poem see F. S. Newman, "The Relevance of the Myth in Pindar's Eleventh *Pythian*," *Hellenika* 31 (1979), pp. 44-64.

2) There are some parallels with Ixion's behavior at *P.* 2.30ff. His two sins are adultery and civil bloodshed. This is another political ode which shows affinity with both the eleventh *Pythian* and with Solon: e.g. ὄλβος, ὕβρις, ἄτη, vv. 26, 28; ἔλκος, v. 91 and Solon 4.17 (Bergk / West).

3) Echoes of Solon in Bacchylides are noted by Snell-Maehler in their edition (Leipzig 1970), p. 6 on I.160 and 168.

4) B. Forssman, *Untersuchungen zur Sprache Pindars* (Wiesbaden 1966), p. 51, note 2, proposes to retain the ms. reading here (against Hermann / Mommsen's correction ἥσυχᾶ: cf. *P.* 4.296). It is a symposium-motif (*N.* 9.48), raised to the political level by both Solon and Pindar.

5) Aristotle refutes the notion that god can be jealous by using a Solonian quotation to turn the tables (fr. 29 = *Met.* A 983a2: πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοί). The history of this type of conventional σύγκρισις βίων is investigated by F. Focke, *Hermes* 58 (1923), p. 330, but it is admitted by M. Miller, "The Herodotean Croesus," *Klio* 41 (1963), p. 91 that Herodotus' account contains "authentic Solonian material." The same author has dated Solon's archonship and reforms to 573-71: "The accepted date for Solon: precise, but wrong?" *Arethusa* 2 (1969), pp. 62-86; "Solon's

Coinage," *ibid.* 4 (1971), pp. 25-47.

6) Theopompus seems to have represented Nicias as somewhat undemocratic at heart (apud Plutarch, *Vit. Nic.* 5 and 11); cf. Xen. *Hell.* II.3.39: G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III.2 (Gotha 1904), p. 1000.

7) A. W. H. Adkins, for example, does not discuss φθόνος until p. 69 ("The Earlier Fifth Century") of his *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (New York 1972). Aristotle and Pindar agree that one is not jealous of the dead: *Paeon* 2.54-56: *Rhet.* II.1388a11. Virgil, writing for a new ruler, gives the Alexandrian *Invidia* (cf. Callimachus, *Hy. Apoll.* 105) new life in a Pindaric context (*Geo.* III.37: cf. L. P. Wilkinson, "Pindar and the Proem to the Third Georgic," in *Forschungen zur römischen Literatur*, ed. W. Wimmel (Wiesbaden 1970), pp. 289-90).

8) *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich 1955), pp. 67-68 note 3.

9) Fränkel translates *P.* 1.86: "gib trotz dem Neid dein stolzes Amt nicht preis" (loc. cit.). This alerts us to the sense of θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν at *P.* 11.50. Ἐν ἀλικίᾳ at v. 51 here is to be compared with τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γυναικῶν at Plato, *Rep.* V. 461b5. The poet is thinking of the victor, not of himself.

10) Hence a literary approach to the concept, which would find in it merely some sort of "Lobvertiefungsmotiv," is bound to be one-sided. The weakness of such an approach is seen in E. Thummer's *Pindar: die isthmischen Gedichte* I (Heidelberg 1968), p. 67 and note 40, where the injunction μὴ μάτεψε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι (*I.* 5.14) is treated as simply a glorification of the victory gained: contrast the remarks of O. Weinreich on the same passage, *Menekrates Zeus und Salmoneus* (Stuttgart 1933), pp. 82-83. We need to consider the "objective" as well as the "subjective" unity of the odes (Boeckh).

11) Although Bacchylides makes remarkably little use of the word φθόνος: only four examples in Snell-Maehler's *Index Vocabulorum*, and none of φθονέω or φθονερός. Cf. P. Walcot, *Envy and the Greeks* (Warminster 1978) 40f.

12) See E. Fraenkel's notes on *Agamemnon* 469, 762, 1616 (Oxford 1962).

13) Cf. Herodotus III.82, quoted by Adkins, *op. cit.* p. 70.

14) A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, III (Oxford 1956) p. 560, regards it as certain that he was at least of the same family.

15) By E. L. Bundy, for example: see Thummer, *op. cit.* II (Heidelberg 1969), p. 8, note 3. Adkins however (*op. cit.* p. 76, note 1) seems to favor the identification. Turyn (*Pindari Carmina*, p. 194) is in no doubt.

16) Fraenkel on *Aga.* 1030: contrast μέγα δὲ βρέμει, ὄλβιος αἰεῖ, *Eiresione* 2. See further Bowra, *Pindar*, p. 296 with note 2, though whether these parallels prove that Pindar was thinking of the *Oresteia* is another question, like that concerning the relationship of *P.* 1.21ff. and *Prometheus Vincetus* 367-72.

17) "Ad suam personam quae aliis dicit revocat, ut... *Pyth.* XI.50:" L. Dissen, *Pindari Carmina* I (Gothae et Erfordiae 1830), p. XXX.

18) The many conjectures with which scholars have assailed this passage are listed by D. Gerber, *Emendations in Pindar 1513-1972* (Amsterdam 1976), pp. 94-95. Here I follow B. A. van Groningen, "Ad Pindari *Pyth.* XI VS. 55," *Mnemosyne* ser. 3.13 (1947), pp. 230-33. To his "open" religious questions (p. 231) may be added τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πιστὸς οἰκονόμος ὁ φρόνιμος κτλ., Luke 12.42. With φθονεροὶ... ἄται may be compared διαβολιᾶν υποφάτιες... ἱκελοι in a similar passage of political abuse, *P.* 2.76-77.

RICOSTRUZIONE DEI FRAMMENTI DI STRABONE, GEOGRAFIA VII

FRANCESCO SBORDONE

È noto che gran parte del VII libro della *Geografia* di Strabone andò perduta nel testo originale, per l'estensione di un terzo circa dell'intero a partire dalla fine. Tale mutilazione ebbe luogo in entrambe le classi di codici che ci tramandano i primi nove libri: intendo il famoso codice *Paris. Gr. 1397* sec.X (= A) e l'intera classe dei cosiddetti *codices decurtati*, provenienti tutti da un originale che potrebbe risalire al sec.XII.¹⁾

Per conoscere almeno nel contenuto essenziale questa sezione perduta, che riguardava soprattutto la Tracia, l'Ellesponto, la Propontide, il Bosforo Tracio, la possibilità più ovvia ci è procurata da due epitomi, compilate prima che la grave perdita si verificasse: alludo alla cosiddetta *Epitome Palatina*, serbata nel *Palatinus Heidelbergensis Gr. 398* del sec.IX, definita anche *Χρηστομύθειαι ἐκ τῶν Στράβωνος Γεωγραφικῶν* (= Epit), e all'*Epitome Vaticana* del *Vat. Gr. 482* del sec.XIV (= E).²⁾ I brani di entrambe che provengono appunto dalla parte finale perduta del libro VII sono riportati fedelmente dalle più recenti edizioni.

Pochissimo conto tuttavia gli stessi editori tengono di una terza fonte non meno degna d'impiego: intendo dire i passi dello stesso libro di Strabone che si trovano più o meno fedelmente parafrasati nei due commenti di Eustazio di Tessalonica, quello ai libri omerici e l'altro alla *Periegesi* di Dionisio, entrambi composti prima del 1175. Il Mein. trae il solo fr. 22, p. 461, mentre il Jones ne desume inoltre il 1 c; 12 a; 15 a; 16 d; 16 e; 25 a; 44 a; 47 b; 50 a; 62; 63; 64; 65; 66.

Viceversa una ricerca ordinata ed attenta fu svolta al

principio di questo secolo da R. Kunze, che dai predetti commenti eustaziani ricavò lezioni straboniane di pregio, e più particolarmente brani utili a recuperare, sia pure saltuariamente, parti perdute dell'ultima sezione del libro VII. Ne indico qui di seguito i tre lavori:

Kunze¹ = *Zu griechischen Geographen*, "Rhein. Museum" 56 (1901),
p. 333 sgg.

Kunze² = *Unbeachtete Strabofragmente*, "Rhein. Museum" 57 (1902),
p. 437 sgg.

Kunze³ = *Strabobruchstücke bei Eustathius und Stephanus Byzantius*,
"Rhein. Museum" 58 (1903), p. 126 sgg.

Cominciamo la nostra indagine dai primi frammenti della raccolta:

Epit (fr. 1 ^a Mein.)	E (fr. 2 Mein.)	Eust (<i>ad Hom.</i> p.1760,37)
<u>φασὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν</u> <u>Μολοιτῶν καὶ Θεσπρωτῶν</u> <u>γλῶττιαν τὰς γραίας πε-</u> <u>λίας καλεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς</u> <u>γέροντας πελίους, καὶ</u> <u>ἴσως οὐκ ὄρνεα ἦσαν αἱ</u> <u>θυρυλούμεναι πελειάδες,</u> <u>ἀλλὰ γυναικες γραῖαι</u> <u>τρεῖς περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν</u> <u>σχολάζουσαι.</u>	<u>ὅτι κατὰ Θεσπρωτοὺς καὶ</u> <u>Μολοιτοὺς τὰς γραίας</u> <u>πελίας καὶ τοὺς γέρον-</u> <u>τας πελίους, [καθάπερ</u> <u>καὶ παρὰ Μακεδόσι· πε-</u> <u>λιγόννας γοῦν καλοῦσιν</u> <u>ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐν τιμαῖς,</u> <u>καθὰ παρὰ Λάκωσι καὶ</u> <u>Μασσαλιώταις τοὺς γέ-</u> <u>ροντας]. ὅθεν καὶ τὰς</u> <u>ἐν τῇ Δωδωναίᾳ δρυὶ με-</u> <u>μυθεῖσθαι πελείας φασίν.</u>	<u>ποιεῖται δὲ μνήμης καὶ</u> <u>Δωδώνης πόλεως Θεσπρω-</u> <u>τικῆς ποτε, εἰ καὶ ὕστε-</u> <u>ρον ὑπὸ Μολοιτοῖς, φασίν,</u> <u>ἐγένετο... ὁ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ</u> <u>εἰς τὰς λεγομένας μαντι-</u> <u>κὰς πελείας φησίν, ὅτι</u> <u>αἱ πέλειαι [εἰς οἰωνο-</u> <u>σκοπίαν ὑπονοοῦνται,</u> <u>καθὰ καὶ κορακομάντιες</u> <u>ἦσαν τινές.] οἱ δὲ τὸ</u> <u>παλαιὸν μὲν ἄνδρας προ-</u> <u>φητεύειν φασίν, ὕστερον</u> <u>δὲ τρεῖς ἀποδειχθῆναι</u> <u>γραίας προφητείας, ἃς</u> <u>πελείας καλεῖσθαι γλῶσ-</u> <u>σῃ Μολοιτῶν, ὡς τοὺς</u> <u>γέροντας πελείους.</u>

Le varie notazioni di questi tre brani paralleli si trovano già in parte nel testo straboniano giunto sino a noi: 1) che la città di Dodona in principio fosse tesprotica e poi passò sotto i Molossi, Strab. = VII 7,11; 7,5. 2) la presenza nel tempio di tre colombe mantiche che davano i vaticini, cioè sopra Eust. = fr. 1^a Mein.: ἴσως δέ τινα πτῆσιν αἱ τρεῖς

περιστεραὶ ἐπέτοντο ἐξαίρετον. 3) non trattasi di colombe ma di tre vecchie sacerdotesse addette al tempio (Epit), in seguito sostituitesi ai maschi secondo Eust., e invece con lo scambio contrario in Strab. IX 2,4:

"Quale fosse il vaticinio dato ai Pelasgi Eforo dice di non saperlo, ma che ai Beoti la sacerdotessa prescrisse di comportarsi empicamente se volevano successo. I messi pensavano che la sacerdotessa, volendo ingraziarsi i Pelasgi data la parentela, prescrivesse di afferrare la sacerdotessa e gettarla sulla pira, cosa che sarebbe sempre andata bene sia che fosse stata colpevole sia che innocente: se avesse vaticinato in mala fede, l'avrebbero punita, altrimenti avrebbero dato corso alla prescrizione. E i soprintendenti del tempio non se la sentirono di uccidere gli esecutori del misfatto senza processo, e per giunta in un tempio, ma ordinarono un processo e mandarono a chiamare le due sacerdotesse superstiti. E facendosi notare che in nessun luogo vigeva una legge che facesse giudicare le donne, aggiunsero altrettanti uomini alle donne. E gli uomini furono per l'assoluzione e le donne per la condanna, e a parità di voti prevalsero quelli che assolvevano. E da allora in poi per i soli Beoti i vaticini furon dati da uomini".

Ne segue che la sola novità di questi luoghi paralleli sta nelle parole κατὰ τὴν τῶν Μολοτιτῶν καὶ Θεσπρωτῶν γλῶττιαν τὰς γράας καλεῖσθαι πελίας καὶ τοὺς γέροντας πελίοις. Dunque non "colombe mantiche" ma vecchie e vecchi. Si consulti ad esempio il Boissacq: πέλεια = "pigeon sauvage" e πέλειος = "vieillard" Hesych. Forse - proporrei a mia volta - dialettale per παλαιός?

Su Corcira vigeva un certo proverbio scoptico, già noto come fr. 8 (Epit): "Ὅτι ἡ Κέρκυρα τὸ παλαιὸν εὐτυχὴς ἦν καὶ δύναμιν ναυτικὴν πλείστην εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πολέμων καὶ τυράνων ἐφθάρη· καὶ ὕστερον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἐλευθερωθεῖσα οὐκ ἐπηνέθη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ λοιδορίᾳ παροιμίαν ἔλαβεν "ἐλευθέρα Κόρκυρα, χέζ' ὅπου θέλεις." Un testo parallelo si legge in Eust. *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 309,36-43: Κορινθίων δέ ἐστι κτίσμα ἡ Κέρκυρα, καὶ ἠϋξήθη ποτέ, καὶ πολλὰς πόλεις καὶ νήσους ᾤκισε, καὶ ναυτικὸν ἔσχε πολὺ, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τῷ Περσικῷ πολέμῳ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ναῦς ἐξήκοντα ἐπλήρωσαν, ὅταν τὸ ἀμφίβολον τοῦ πολέμου εὐλαβούμενοι, οὔτε τῷ Ξέρξῃ οὔτε τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐβοήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν βοήθειαν ἀνεβάλλοντο. Ἡρημώθη δὲ αὖθις, ὥς καὶ εἰς τοιαύτην παροιμίαν πεσεῖν. "ἐλευθέρα Κέρκυρα, χέζ' ὅπου θέλεις." Particolari nuovi sono l'essere Corcira colonia di Corinto, nonché l'essere stata colonizzatrice di numerose città ed

isole, e così l'aver inviato 60 navi nella guerra persiana, senza però risolversi a tempo da che parte stare. Di qui il proverbio offensivo già menzionato.³⁾

A proposito del fiume Peneo e delle zone montagnose della Tessaglia ch'esso attraversa, il lungo fr. 14, proveniente dall'Ep. Vaticana (E) lascia intravedere da vicino la linea primitiva del testo straboniano: $\rho\epsilon\iota\ \delta'\ \delta\ \Pi\eta\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\varsigma\ \epsilon\kappa\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Pi\acute{\iota}\nu\delta\omicron\upsilon\ \delta\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\rho\delta\varsigma\ \epsilon\omega.\ \delta\iota\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{\omega}\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \Lambda\alpha\pi\iota\theta\acute{\omega}\nu\ \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \Pi\epsilon\rho\rho\alpha\iota\beta\acute{\omega}\nu\ \tau\iota\upsilon\alpha\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\mu\pi\epsilon\sigma\iota,$ παραλαβὼν πλείους ποταμούς, ὧν καὶ ὁ Εὐρώπος, ὃν Τιταρήσιον εἶπεν ὁ ποιητής, τὰς πηγὰς ἔχοντα ἀπὸ τοῦ Τιταρίου ὄρους συμφοῦς τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ, ὃ κάντεῦθεν ἄρχεται διορίζειν τὴν Μακεδονίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Θετταλίας. ἔστι γὰρ τὰ Τέμπε στενὸς αὐλῶν μεταξὺ Ὀλύμπου καὶ Ὀσσης. φέρεται δ' ὁ Πηνειὸς ἀπὸ τῶν στενῶν τούτων ἐπὶ σταδίους τετταράκοντα, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ μὲν ἔχων τὸν Ὀλυμπον, Μακεδονικὸν ὄρος μετεωρότατον, [ἐν δὲ δεξιᾷ τὴν Ὀσσαν, ἐγγύς] τῶν ἐκβολῶν τοῦ ποταμοῦ. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ ταῖς ἐκβολαῖς τοῦ Πηνειοῦ ἐν δεξιᾷ Γυρτῶν ἴδρυται, Περραιβικὴ πόλις καὶ Μαγνητις, ἐν ἧ Πειρίθους τε καὶ Ἰξίων ἐβασίλευσαν· ἀπέχει δ' ὅσον σταδίους ἑκατὸν τῆς Γυρτῶνος πόλις Κραννῶν, καὶ φασιν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ὁ ποιητής "τῷ μὲν ἄρ' ἐκ Θρήκης" (Il. N 301) καὶ ἐξῇ, Ἐφύρους μὲν λέγεσθαι τοὺς Κραννῶνους, Φλεγύας δὲ τοὺς Γυρτωνίους· ἐπὶ δὲ θάτερα ἡ Πιερία. Il testo dell'Ep. Palatina (Epit) si limita alla prima parte di questa descrizione: "Il Peneo corre dal Pindo e attraversa la valle di Tempe, passando a metà della Tessaglia e tra i Lapiti e i Perrebi; riceve quindi il fiume Europo che Omero chiama Titaresio e divide la Macedonia a Nord dalla Tessaglia a Sud. Le fonti dell'Europa partono dal monte Titario, che è attiguo all'Olimpo". Il brano finisce col notare che l'Olimpo appartiene alla Macedonia, mentre l'Ossa e il Pelio sono della Tessaglia.

In pratica i due luoghi simili iniziali giungono sino alla menzione del monte Τιτάριον, da cui discende il fiume Τιταρήσιος nominato da Omero B 751, un luogo di cui si sente la presenza in entrambe le epitomi. Confermano la coincidenza le frasi ὄρους συμφοῦς τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ (E) e ὄρους ὃ ἐστι συνεχὲς τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ (Epit), dopo le quali in Epit si registra la mancanza di p. 457,10-17 Mein. (ὃ κάντεῦθεν - τοῦ ποταμοῦ).

Le successive righe 17-23 di E (ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ ταῖς ἐκβολαῖς - Φλεγύας δὲ τοὺς Γυρτωνίους) ricompaiono quasi alla lettera nel fr. 16 (Epit): ὅτι ὑπὸ ταῖς ὑπωρεΐαις τοῦ Ὀλύμπου παρὰ τὸν Πηνειὸν ποταμὸν Γυρτῶν ἐστὶ, πόλις Περραιβικὴ καὶ Μαγνητικὴ, ἐν ἣ Πειρίθους τε καὶ Ἰξίων ἤρξαν. ἀπέχει δ' ἑκατὸν τῆς Γυρτῶνος πόλις Κραννῶν, καὶ φασιν, ὅταν εἴπη ὁ ποιητής "τὼ μὲν ἄρ' ἐκ Θρήκης" (IL.N 301), Ἐφύρους μὲν λέγεσθαι τοὺς Κρανωνίους, Φλεγύας δὲ τοὺς Γυρτωνίους.

Orbene, a ricostruire un testo continuo affine ad E e quindi senz'altro valido a confermarne la caratteristica redazione di esso, giovano i seguenti estratti di Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 333,33: ὑπὸ τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ, οὐ πολὺ ἄποθεν τοῦ Εὐρώτου [], ὃν ὁ ποιητής Τιταρήσιον λέγει... p. 337,12 πολλοὺς δεχόμενος ποταμούς... καὶ ὅτι Πηνειὸς φέρεται ἐν ἀριστερᾷ μὲν ἔχων Ὀλυμπον, ἐν δεξιᾷ δὲ Ὅσσαν (parole con cui viene integrata E). Ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς ἐκβολαῖς τοῦ Πηνειοῦ ἐν δεξιᾷ Μαγνητικὴ πόλις ἡ Γυρτῶν (cf. *ad Hom.*, p. 933,26 Γυρτῶνα δὲ πόλιν λέγει (ὁ Γ.) Μαγνητικὴν πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ Πηνειοῦ ἐκβολαῖς), ἐν ἣ Πειρίθους καὶ Ἰξίων ἐβασίλευσαν. ἀπέχει δ' αὐτῶν οὐ πολὺ πόλις Κραννῶν, ἧς οἱ πολεῖται Ἐφυροὶ ἑτερονύμως, ὥς καὶ οἱ τῆς Γυρτῶνος Φλεγύαι. È chiara dunque la particolare fedeltà con cui questa volta Eustazio ha seguito il testo straboniano.

Verso la fine del fr. 20 (E) si sottolinea una minuscola modificazione onomastica: 1' Ἀμυδῶν di Omero (B 849, Π 288) ... νῦν μὲν καλεῖται Ἀβυδῶν, κατεσκάφη δ' ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀργεαδῶν. La conferma ci viene non solo da Stefano Bizantino Ἀβυδῶν, Ἀβυδῶνος, χωρίον Μακεδονίας ὡς Στράβων, ma soprattutto da Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 360,12-14 ἡ παρ' Ὀμήρῳ Ἀμυδῶν Ἀβυδῶν ὕστερον ἐκλήθη, κατεσκάφη δέ.

Ed ancora il luogo di Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 360 (a B 850) lascia comprendere un'enigmatica correzione di Strabone ad Omero che dice del fiume Assio: Ἀξιοῦ, οὗ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδναται αἶαν. Peraltro 1'Epit (fr. 23) ci dice che 1'Assio è limaccioso (B 850), mentre è pura una fonte proveniente dall'Amidone detta Αἶα, che si mischia con esso, ragion per cui alcuni così emendano: Ἀξιοῦ, ᾧ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδναται Αἶης. Più esplicito al riguardo il passo di Eust. (p. 360,14-17): πηγὴ δὲ πλησίον Ἀμυδῶνος Αἶα καλουμένη, καθαρώτατον ὕδωρ ἐκδιδοῦσα εἰς τὸν Ἀξιον, ὃς ἐκ πολλῶν πληρούμενος ποταμῶν

θολερὸς ῥεῖ. φαύλη οὖν, ψησὶν (ὁ Γ.), ἡ φερομένη γραφή 'Αξιῶ
 κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδνεται Αἴῃ, ὡς δηλαδὴ οὐ τοῦ 'Αξιῶ ἐπι-
 κιδνάντος τὸ ὕδωρ τῇ πηγῇ ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν. I due testi coinci-
 dono ed hanno reso facile l'integrazione del passo straboni-
 ano autentico, ritrovato da poco nel *P Coln* 5861:⁴⁾ [ῥ]εῖ δ' ὁ
 'Αξιὸ[ς θολερὸς, πηγὴ δὲ πλησίον 'Αμυδῶνος Αἴα καλουμένη κα-
 θα]ρώτ[ατον]⁵⁾ ἐκιδιδούσα ὕδωρ, εἰς τοῦτον ἐλέγχει φαύλην ὃν
 πάρ[χουσαν τὴν νῦν φερο]μέ[λιν]ην γραφὴν παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ 'Αξιῶ,
 οὗ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ, ἐπικίδνεται Αἴῃ, [ἔστι] δ' ἀν[τί τοῦ
 'Αξιῶ ποταμοῦ, ἢ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδ]νεται Αἴῃς.⁶⁾

Gli ultimi righe del fr. 22: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸ τῆς Μεθώνης πε-
 δίῳ γενέσθαι συνέβη Φιλίππῳ τῷ 'Αμύντου τὴν ἐκκοπὴν τοῦ δε-
 ξιοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ καταπελτικῶ βέλει κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν τῆς πό-
 λεως vengono confermati da Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 328,41-42, che
 fornisce un nuovo particolare (il nome del feritore): Μεθώνη
 Φιλοκλήτου ἐτέρα τῆς Θρακίας Μεθώνης, ἣν κατέσκαψε Φίλιππος,
 ἔνθα δηλαδὴ καὶ ὁ 'Αστὴρ στρατιώτης οὕτω καλούμενος τοξεύσας
 ἔβλαψε τὸν Φίλιππον εἰς ὀφθαλμόν. (Eustazio poi confonde
 poiché quella espugnata da Filippo non fu la Metone di Tracia,
 ma quella di Macedonia, cf. fr. 20).

Un altro particolare onomastico figura all'inizio del fr.
 27 (Epit): ὅτι ἡ Παλλήνη Χερρόνησος, ἥς ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ κεῖται ἡ
 πρὶν μὲν Ποτίδαια νῦν δὲ Κασσάνδρεια, Φλέγρα τὸ πρὶν ἐκαλεῖτο.
 La convalida è data da Eust. *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 276,11-13: Οἶον-
 ται δὲ τινες Παλλήνην λέγεσθαι τὴν τῆς Κασσανδρείας Χερρόνη-
 σον, τῷ Αἰγαίῳ καὶ αὐτὴν παρακειμένην. Così l'attigua loca-
 lità di Τορώνη col relativo Τορωναῖος κόλπος (fr. 31 da E e
 32 da Epit = 463 M. 1,12) trova in Eust. *ad Dion. Per. ibid.*
 13-16 la sua spiegazione eziologica: ἔνθα που καὶ τόπος τις
 Τορώνη λεγόμενος, ὁμώνυμος, ὡς ἔοικε, Τορώνη τῇ τοῦ
 Θρακικοῦ Πρωτέως θυγατρὶ κατὰ Λυκόφρονα. Alla testimonianza
 di Licofrone (vv. 115-116), che certo non è straboniana, pos-
 siamo aggiungere quelle di Plinio, *n. h.* 35: *Toronaei*, e di
 Tolomeo III 13,12: Τορώνη ... τοῦ Τορωναϊκοῦ κόλπου ὁ μυχός.

Il proverbio doppio "Ἀάτος ἀγαθὼν" ὡς τό· "ἀγαθὼν ἀγαθί-
 δες" serviva certo ad illustrare la prosperità di questa
 cittadina sul litorale tracio dello Strimone. È facile risa-
 lire a Strabone dal raffronto di E (fr. 36, p. 465,21-25
 Mein.): παρὰ δὲ τὴν παραλίαν τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ Δατηνῶν πόλις

Νεάπολις καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Δάτον, εὐκαρπα πεδία καὶ λίμνην καὶ ποταμούς καὶ ναυπήγια καὶ χρυσεῖα λυσιτελῆ ἔχον, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ παροιμιάζονται "Δάτον ἀγαθῶν" ὡς καὶ "ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθίδας." Quasi lo stesso testo si legge in Epit (fr. 33, p. 464,7-11 Mein.): εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στρυμονικὸν κόλπον πόλεις Δάτον, ὅπερ καὶ ἀρίστην ἔχει χώραν καὶ εὐκαρπον καὶ ναυπήγια καὶ χρυσοῦ μέταλλα· ἀφ' οὗ καὶ παροιμία "Δάτον ἀγαθῶν", ὡς καὶ "ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθίδας." Ed eccoci finalmente ad Eust. *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 315, 34-37: Θάσος, ἥτις καὶ χρυσία εἶχε ποτε, καὶ τὸ Δάτιον συνήκισε, πόλιν ἔνδοξον περὶ τὴν τοῦ Στρυμόνος παραλίαν, ἀφ' οὗ παροιμίαν οἱ παλαιοὶ φασὶ "Δάτος ἀγαθῶν" ὡς τὸ "ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθίδες." Dalle parole iniziali di questo luogo desumiamo un' analoga tradizione paremiografica sulla prospiciente isola di Taso, che è meglio sviluppata dello stesso Eust. *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 316,32-36: τὴν δὲ Θάσον ὠκυγίνην λέγει καὶ Δήμητρος δὲ ἀκτὴν διὰ τὸ εὐδαιμον τῆς νήσου καὶ εὐκαρπον· ὅπου καὶ εἰς παροιμίαν ἔπεσε τὸ Θάσος ἀγαθῶν, ὡς εἴ τις εἴποι δάσος. Καίτοι τινὲς Δάτος ἀγαθῶν τὴν τοιαύτην παροιμίαν γράφουσι. Che presso Strabone figurasse tanto il proverbio Δάτος ἀγαθῶν quanto Θάσος ἀγαθῶν mi pare alquanto probabile. Sulla ricca documentazione di entrambi e sul rapporto d'interdipendenza cf. I. Keim, *Sprichwörter und parömiographische Überlieferung bei Strabo*, Tübingen 1909, p. 160 sgg.⁷⁾

L'accenno ai Peoni e alla Peonia come si legge all'inizio del fr. 38 (E): τοὺς δὲ Παίονας οἱ μὲν ἀποίκους Φρυγῶν οἱ δ' ἀρχηγέτας ἀποφαίνουσι, καὶ τὴν Παιονίαν μέχρι Πελαγονίας καὶ Πιερίας ἐκτετάσθαι φασὶ risulta confermato alla lettera dalla citazione di Strabone presso Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 359,41-43: ὅτι οἱ μὲν Παίονας Φρυγῶν ἀποίκους, οἱ δὲ ἀρχηγέτας ἀποφαίνουσι, καὶ τὴν Παιονίαν μέχρι Πελαγονίας καὶ Πιερίας ἐκτετάσθαι φασὶ, laddove il testo a riguardo di Epit (fr. 39) appare parecchio distanziato da alcuni particolari mitici: ὅτι ὁ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ Ἀστεροπαῖος υἱὸς Πηλεγόνος ἐκ Παιονίας ὦν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ἱστορεῖται· διὸ καὶ Πηλεγόνος υἱός· οἱ γὰρ Παίονες Πελαγόνες ἐκαλοῦντο.

Verso la fine del fr. 43 (44) E, si parla d'Ismaro città dei Ciconi: Μαρωνεῖα καὶ Ἰσμαρος, αἱ τῶν Κικόνων πόλεις· καλεῖται δὲ νῦν Ἰσμάρα πλησίον τῆς Μαρωνείας, πλησίον δὲ καὶ ἡ Ἰσμαρίς ἐξίησι λίμνη, καλεῖται δὲ τὸ βεῖθρον ἡδυ γειον·

αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ αἱ θασιῶν λεγόμεναι κεφαλαί. La lettura esatta del vocabolo lacunoso è ὁδύ[σ]σειον: la conferma di questo vocabolo e di tutto il brano riportato ci viene da Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 1615,9-11: ἡ δὲ ῥηθεῖσα Ἰσμαρος, ἡ καὶ Ἰσμάρα ὕστερον, Κικόνων φασὶ πόλις, ἐγγὺς Μαρωνείας, ἐνθα καὶ λίμνη, ἧς τὸ ῥεῖθρον Ὀδύσσειον καλεῖται· ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ Μάρων ἡρῶν, ὡς ὁ Γ. ιστορεῖ.

L'ubicazione della città di Αἶνος è così definita all'inizio del fr. 52 (51) E: πρὸς δὲ τῇ ἐκβολῇ τοῦ Ἑβρου διστόμου ὄντος πόλις Αἶνος ἐν τῷ Μέλανι κόλπῳ κεῖται, κτίσμα Μιτυληναίων καὶ Κυμαίων. L'autenticità di questo luogo si desume dalla citazione letterale di Strabone presso Steph. B. s.v. Αἶνος, πόλις Θράκης ... Ἀψινθος καλουμένη, Στράβων ζ'. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐκβολῇ τοῦ Ἑβρου διστόμου ὄντος πόλις Αἶνος, κτίσμα [Μιτυληναίων καὶ] Κυμαίων. Maggiore ricchezza di particolari soprattutto riguardo al Μέλας κόλπος si ricava da Eust. *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 323,26 sgg.: ὅτι ἐκεῖ που περὶ τὴν Τένεδον ὁ Μέλας κόλπος ἐφ' Ἑλλήσποντον ἵησιν, ἀφρὸν ἐρευγόμενος· τὴν κλῆσιν ἔχων ἀπὸ ποταμοῦ Μέλανος τοῦ καὶ ἄνω ῥηθέντος, ἐκδιδόντος εἰς αὐτόν, ἣ καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῦ βάθους πολὺ ... κόλπος δὲ Μέλας ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι λέγουσι. περὶ ὃν καὶ ἡ Αἶνος κεῖται, πόλις Αἰολική. Φασὶ γάρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ Μέλανι κόλπῳ ἡ Αἶνος πρὸς τῇ ἐκβολῇ τοῦ Ἑβρου. Che questo luogo sia tutto straboniano, ce lo conferma E, fr. 51 (52) più oltre, dove si legge: τὸν Μέλανα κόλπον καλούμενον οὕτως ἀπὸ τοῦ Μέλανος ἐκδιδόντος εἰς αὐτόν, nonché Epit., fr. 52 (53): τὸν Μέλανα κόλπον ... ὅπου καὶ ὁ Μέλας ποταμὸς ἐκβάλλει, ὁμώνυμος τῷ κόλπῳ.

Nel corso del fr. 55 (56) E, v' è un accenno a Μάδυτος, al ponte di Serse e alla cittadina di Sesto. Il passo originario si ritrova in XIII 1,22: ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀβυδος καὶ ἡ Σηστός διέχουσιν ἀλλήλων τριάκοντά που σταδίους ἐκ λιμένος εἰς λιμένα, τὸ δὲ ζευγμά ἐστι μικρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παραλλάξαντι ἐξ Ἀβύδου μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Προποντίδα, ἐκ δὲ Σηστοῦ εἰς τούναντιον. Che questo passo stesse già nel libro VII della *Geografia*, si legge poco più sotto (829,1-2 Mein.): περὶ δὲ Σηστοῦ καὶ τῆς ὅλης Χερρονήσου προείπομεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς Θράκης τόποις. Da esso ha certo attinto Eust. *ad Hom.*, p. 356,42-43: κατὰ τὸν Γεωγράφον διέχουσιν ἀλλήλων Σηστός καὶ Ἀβυδος τριάκοντά που

σταδίουσ ἀπὸ λιμένος εἰς λιμένα, nonché lo stesso *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 314,42 sgg.: Σηστός μὲν, Λησβίων ἄποικος, καθὰ καὶ ἡ Μάδυτος, ὡς ὁ Γεωγράφος φησί, Χερρονησία πόλις, Ἀβύδου διέχουσα σταδίουσ λ' ἐκ λιμένος εἰς λιμένα.

Altro frammento confermato da Eustazio è l'inizio di 57 (58) circa le varie dimensioni attribuite al vocabolo Ellesponto: ὅτι Ἑλλήσποντος οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλὰ δόξαι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγονται πλείους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅλην τὴν Προποντίδα καλοῦσιν Ἑλλήσποντον, οἱ δὲ μέρος τῆς Προποντίδος τὸ ἐντὸς Περίνθου κ.τ.λ. La testimonianza parallela è data da Eust. *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 242,4-8: ἔχει γὰρ ἀμφιβόλως ταῦτα διὰ τοὺς παλαιούς, ὧν οἱ μὲν μόνα τὰ κατὰ Σηστόν καὶ Ἀβυδὸν Ἑλλήσποντον εἶπον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλην τὴν Προποντίδα, οἱ δὲ μέρος τι αὐτῆς τὸ ἐντὸς Περίνθου ἦτοι Ἡρακλείας τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ ἀπένειμαν.

Nessuno degli editori di Strabone ha accolto nella serie dei frammenti un luogo di Eustazio *ad Dion. Per.*, p. 268,44 sgg. sul doppio nome del Danubio: Ματόας = fausto, e invece Δάνουβις (Δάνουσις) = cagione d'infortunio, secondo la lingua degli Sciti. Eppure Strabone viene espressamente citato come fonte di questo singolare αἴτιον storico: φησί δὲ ὁ αὐτός Γεωγράφος καὶ ὅτι ὁ Ἰστρος ποτὲ Ματόας ἐλέγετο, ὃ ἐστὶ κατὰ Ἑλληνας ἄσιος· καὶ ὅτι πολλάκις μὲν οἱ Σκύθαι δι' αὐτοῦ περαιούμενοι οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, συμφορᾶς δὲ ποτε αὐτοῖς ἐπεισοσύσης ἡρμηνεύθη Δάνουβις ἢ Δάνουσις, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἁμαρτεῖν ἐκείνους αἰτίαν ἔχων, τουτέστιν αἰτιώμενος διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου ὀνόματος ὑπ' ἐκείνων κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γλῶσσαν, ὡς αἴτιος αὐτοῖς δυστυχίας γενόμενος. Inoltre questo passo trova una esplicita conferma quasi letterale in Steph. B.: Δάνουβις ἢ Δάνουσις, Ἰστρος ὁ ποταμός, πάλαι Ματόας καλούμενος. συμφορᾶς δὲ τοῖς Σκύθαις ἐπιπεσοσύσης οὕτως ἐκλήθη. Ματόας δὲ λέγεται ἐς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα γλῶσσαν ἄσιος, ὅτι πολλάκις περαιούμενοι οὐδὲν ἐπεπόνθεισαν. ὁ δὲ Δάνουβις ἐρμηνεύεται ὥσπερ τοῦ ἁμαρτεῖν ἔχων αἰτίαν. Il testo di Stefano praticamente è identico a quello d'Eustazio, salvo che la frase συμφορᾶς-ἐκλήθη va trasferita dopo ἐπεπόνθεισαν, come già suggeriva il Meineke in nota alla sua edizione. Chi finora non ha voluto ammettere che i passi paralleli di Eustazio e di Stefano derivino dalla comune fonte straboniana, si è visto costretto ad ammettere

che Eust. derivi da Steph. (Bernhardy proponeva un errore degli scribi da eliminare correggendo ὁ γεωγράφος presso Eust. da ὁ ἐθνικογράφος = Steph., e Müller postulava una svista dello stesso Eustazio).⁸⁾ Eppure la persistente presenza di citazioni parallele di Strabone tanto in Stefano Bizantino quanto nei commentari eustaziani, anziché suggerire arbitrarie congetture, è argomento più che valido per far rientrare il luogo in esame nel racconto straboniano di Dario che passò il Danubio alla volta degli Sciti e rischiò di morire di sete con tutto l'esercito (fr. 14, p. 419, 11 sgg. Mein.).

Università di Napoli

NOTE

1) Cf. la mia edizione, vol. I, Roma, Lincei 1963, pp. XIX, XXV sgg.

2) *Ed. cit.*, pp. XLI-XLII.

3) Cf. D. K. Karathanasis, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten des Altertums in den rhetorischen Schriften des Michael Psellos, des Eustathios und des Michael Choniates sowie in anderen rhetorischen Quellen des XII. Jahrhunderts*, Diss. München 1936, pp. 51, 75.

4) La prima edizione a cura di B. Krebber, *ΝΑΥΣΤΟΛΟΓΟΙ bei Strabon, ein neues Papyrusfragment*, "BZE" 23 (1976), pp. 204-221, la seconda si trova nei "Kölner Papyri" I = "Papyrologica Coloniensia" VII, Opladen 1975, pp. 27-31, n. 8.

5) L'integrazione ὁ Ἀξιό[ς] θολερός, πηγὴ δὲ πλησίον Ἀμυδῶνος Αἶα καλουμένη καθα]ρώτ[ατον] è mia e s'ispira ad Eust., l. c.

6) La doppia lezione finale οὗ ... Αἴη (αἶαν) conforme alla *vulgata* omerica, confermata da Eust., contro φ ... Αἴης secondo la proposta di Strabone, che critica il passo, è anch'essa un mio suggerimento, tratto ovviamente da Epit (fr. 23).

7) Le raccolte paremiografiche che appartengono questo proverbio a Δάτος sono Zenob. III 11, Harpocr. 52,9, Apost. V 83, Arsen. 176, a Θάσος il codice dell'Athos II 20, di cui riporto una caratteristica precisazione: Θάσος ἀγαθῶν· Καλλίστρατος γὰρ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκπεσὼν, Ἀθηνηθεν ἐπεισε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν ἀντιπέραν γῆν οἰκῆσαι, λέγων ὅτι καὶ χρυσὰ μέταλλα ἔχει καὶ γῆν ἀφθονον καὶ ὕλην ἀρίστην, καὶ ὅλως θάσον ἀγαθῶν τὸν τόπον ἐκάλει. Ὅθεν ἡ παροιμία ἐκράτησεν ἐπὶ τῶν εὐδαίμονα καὶ λαμπρὸν ἀποδείξαί τινα ἐπαγγελλομένων. Analogamente nel *Laur.* II 3 si legge Θάσος ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθίδες, con accentuata somiglianza alla formulazione straboniana del singolare proverbio.

8) Kunze², p. 441 sgg.

PLUTARCH AND ARISTOTLE

F. H. SANDBACH

Plutarch believed (*Sulla* 26) that Sulla acquired the library of Apellicon of Teos, which contained most of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' books, at that time still imperfectly known to the public, and brought it to Rome, where it passed into the care of Tyrannion, who supplied Andronicus of Rhodes with copies. Andronicus made available what he received and drew up the lists current in Plutarch's time. Plutarch adds that the earlier Peripatetics were accomplished and scholarly men, but their acquaintance with Aristotle's and Theophrastus' writings was limited to a few works and was superficial¹⁾ (οὐτε πολλοῖς οὐτ' ἀκριβῶς ἐντετυχηότες), because the estate of Neleus of Scepsis, to whom Theophrastus had left the books, fell into the hands of men without ambition or interest in philosophy.

Whatever may be the truth in this, the activity of Andronicus²⁾ made possible, or at least easier, the serious study of Aristotle's philosophy. He seems to have listed, arranged, and made available what had previously been neglected, speaking generally, namely the scripts which were the basis of Aristotelian lecture-courses and which go to constitute the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. It will be of interest to enquire what use Plutarch made of this opportunity. He was not a professional philosopher in the sense of one who gave his whole life to the subject. But he was keenly interested, he seems to have directed the studies of young men at Chaeronea, and he wrote a considerable number of books on philosophical topics. He was a Platonist, who frequently quoted the master's writings and could interpret them with originality. He was well-versed in Stoicism and to some it seems probable that he read

widely in the stylistically unattractive work of Chrysippus.³⁾ So there would be no cause for surprise if he turned to the study of this new material. Yet that he did so turn must not be taken for granted without putting the question whether his writings show a knowledge of the works of our *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

The answers of modern scholars to this question are strikingly divergent.

I

In *Plutarchos von Chaironeia* (1949) 284, = *RE* XXI.1.922, K. Ziegler wrote 'of course Plutarch knew Aristotle well. All sorts of important reports about him are in the *Lives*, particularly that of Alexander; *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Topica*, *De caelo*, *De anima*, *Ethics*, *Politics*, 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία are cited, but the *Problemata* (regarded by him as genuine) with particular frequency and once the *Mirabiles auscultationes*. Knowledge of the *Poetics* can be traced in *De audiendis poetis*.'⁴⁾ This list is accepted without question by G. Verbeke, 'Plutarch and the Development of Aristotle', *Plato and Aristotle in the mid-fourth century*, ed. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Göteborg, 1960) 236, but he does ask whether Plutarch knew these works 'by direct acquaintance'. He never answers the question, but the repetition of the phrase 'familiar with' would suggest to the unwary that the acquaintance was direct, and once he alleges that Plutarch 'directly draws inspiration' from *EN* VI. Even more extreme is P. Merlan, *From Platonism to neo-Platonism* (The Hague, 1960), 219: 'After all Plutarch is obviously very familiar with Aristotle's writings, both those which have been preserved and others now lost'.

On the other side I. Düring wrote, in 'Notes on the history of the transmission of Aristotle's writings' *Göteborgs Högskolans Årsskrift* 56 (1950) = *Symbolae Philologicae Götoborgenses* 37, p. 41 n. 4, 'in a forthcoming study of Plutarch's quotations from Aristotle I hope to show that no passage with certainty can be said to emanate from direct study of a text similar to our text in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.' This study seems never to have appeared. In 'Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition', *Göteborgs Universitets Årsskrift* 63 (1957) 355, he says that he has not reached a final opinion, but 'we cannot doubt that he [Plutarch] knew the dialogues and the *Protrepticus*; of the treatises he knew the *Physics*, *De caelo*, *De anima*; exactly what parts of the ethical treatises and the *Politics* he knew first-hand is more doubtful. He obviously regarded the *De virtutibus et vitiis* and *De mundo* as genuine works of

Aristotle... he only had second-hand knowledge of Andronicus' edition and of the contents and purport of the *Metaphysics*.⁵⁾ P. Moraux goes even further, saying that Plutarch concerned himself as little as Cicero with Aristotle's treatises.⁶⁾

This difference of opinion can only be resolved by a study of the evidence, and this I have attempted. The result will prove to be close to Düring's first statement, a conclusion that may at first sight appear to be contradicted by H. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (Philological Monographs of the American Philological Association, no. 19, 1959), where 260 passages in the works of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* are cited, along with 32 from 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία and 92 from Rose's *Fragmenta*. In the last two classes the name of Aristotle occurs with some frequency, and I have no doubt that Plutarch knew a lost version of the *Problemata* and some of the *Politeiai*. But our concern is with the *Corpus*, and if we examine these 260 'quotations', we find that most of them fade away. A few must be eliminated because they come from works which Plutarch did not write, notably *de fato*, the essay of someone strongly affected by Peripateticism. Many more must disappear because all that the parallel passages have in common is that they allude to the same subject; there is no reason for supposing that Plutarch had read Aristotle's remarks.⁷⁾

These parallels range from matters of general knowledge or belief to instances where the two authors have quite different things to say. As an example of the first kind Plutarch had no need to go at *QC* 660 F to *Historia animalium* 532 b 3 or 556 b 16 or *Part. anim.* 682 a 25 to learn that cicadas drank dew;⁸⁾ as one of the second, at *H.A.* 586 a 2 and *G.A.* 722 a 8 Aristotle tells the story of a woman of Elis who lay with an Ethiopian and had a white daughter but a black grand-daughter; at *de sera numinis vindicta* 563 A Plutarch tells of a woman who bore a black child and was accused by her white husband of adultery, but was cleared when enquiry showed her to have had an Ethiopian great-great-grandfather.

II

Two difficulties beset an enquiry into the extent of Plutarch's knowledge of the works included in our *Corpus*, and they should be emphasised at once. We know little about the contents of Aristotle's exoteric works, at least some of which were still in circulation, but they certainly contained much

that was also in the treatises of the *Corpus*. When Plutarch ascribes something to Aristotle and that or something similar is to be found in one of the treatises, it may be asked whether he refers not to the treatise, but to an exoteric work. In what follows I have tried to be sparing in the use of this possibility, but it is one always to be borne in mind.

The other difficulty is that when Plutarch mentions Aristotle or seems to be dependent on some passage in his works, one cannot always be confident that he knew Aristotle directly and was not using some intermediate authority. Scholars have, rightly in my view, increasingly come to believe that he read widely in original sources and was no slavish copier of lost secondary writers. It is no longer an accepted principle of criticism that he had not read any authority whom he named. That was absurd, but it would be equally absurd to suppose that if he named an authority he must have read him. Even scholars of today are known to cite predecessors' opinions without any mention of the intermediary through whom they have learnt them.

I propose to begin by listing the places where Plutarch mentions Aristotle by name.⁹⁾ At once it springs to the attention that in the majority the reference is to a work not included in our *Corpus*. In a few of these the work is named: 1. Εὐδῆμος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς, *Dion.* 967 c. 2. Περί μέθης, 650 A. 3. Περί Ὀμήρου,¹⁰⁾ 1095 A, 1095 E (by Nauck's certain emendation), frag. 122 Sandbach. 4. Προβλήματα φυσικά, 734 C,D and E, cf. 735 C. 5. Τὰ Πλατωνικά,¹¹⁾ 1118 C. 6. Κτίσεις καὶ Πολιτεῖαι, 1093 C. 7. Ὀρχομενίων Πολιτεία, frag. 82 Sandbach. 8. Βοττιαίων Πολιτεία, *Theseus* 6 e. 9. Περί εὐγενείας, *Aristides* 335 c ('if genuine'). 10. Ἡ τῶν Πυθιονικῶν ἀναγραφή, *Solon* 83 f. At 773 C Μενώνεια are cited without an author's name, but it is known that a work with this title was ascribed to Aristotle.

In many more places Aristotle is cited but the work is not named. Probable guesses may however be made and I will use conjecture to assign the mentions, mostly following V. Rose, *Aristoteles fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1886).

Προβλήματα φυσικά, 133 F, 458 F, 627 A,C,D, 635 B, 652 A (assigned by Ross, *Aristotelis fragmenta selecta* [Oxford, 1955] to περὶ μέθης, by Rose to Συμπόσιον, perhaps the same work but a different title), 656 B, 659 D, 690 C, 690 F, 694 D, 696 D, 702 B, 720 D, 932 B, 949 C and, not in

Rose, 914 F, 950 B, *Lysander* 434 b. Ὀμηρικὰ ζητήματα, 32 F, 398 A (pace Rose), 977 A. Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά, 265 B, 460 C. Προτρεπτικὸς, 527 A, *Pelopidas* 279 a (both assigned by Ross to περὶ πλούτου). Ἑρωτικά, *Pelopidas* 287 d. Περί ὀρνίθων, 727 E, 981 B. Πολιτεῖαι: Ἰθακησίων, 249 D. Λακεδαιμονίων *Lycurgus* 39 e, 42 e, 43 b, 47 e, 56 e, 59 b, *Cleomenes* 808 d. Ναξίων, 254 E. Σαμίων, *Pericles* 166 d, 167 c. Τεγεατῶν, 227 B, 292 B. Τροιζηνίων, 295 E, *Theseus* 2 b. Τυρρηνίων, 460 B. Συμπόσιον, 612 D. Spurious letters, 78 D, 472 E, 545 A, 329 B (this ascribed by Ross to Ἀλέξανδρος.)

There remain as uncertain 733 C (ascribed by Rose to Εὐδημος), 734 D (ascribed by Rose and Ross to Περί παιδεύσεως), 454 C, 853 F, 978 D, frag. 53 Sandbach (the last four not in Rose), *Camillus* 140 a, *Solon* 97 a, *Pericles* 153 f (these two assigned by Rose to Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία), 434 B (if οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην is a periphrasis for Ἀριστοτέλης,) 375 C and 382 D (both assigned by Ross to Εὐδημος, but cf. *Alexander* 668).

Ἀθ. Πολ. must be treated separately, since although it is not part of the *Corpus*, it is not entirely lost. Clearly it was known to Plutarch, although he never mentions it by name. But Helmbold and O'Neil's list of quotations alleged to be detected in *Solon* is exaggerated. One only is quite certain, 92 b, προσηγορεύθησαν, ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, κύρβεις, from Ἀθ. Πολ. 7,1. Yet 85 b, 87 b, 87 f, 92 d and 96 c may well come from Ἀθ. Πολ. 2,7, 3-4, and 11,2, although Aristotle is not mentioned, and when at 78 e Plutarch says ἅπαντες ὁμαλῶς... λέγουσιν he probably includes Aristotle. But at 85 d, if Ἀθ. Πολ. was a source, μετὰ Φιλόμβροτον must come from somewhere else; similarly 86 f - 87 a contains much more than does Ἀθ. Πολ. He probably did not at 79 a derive from Aristotle a story which he tells without reservations but which the earlier author scornfully rejects (φανερῶς ληροῦσι) on chronological grounds. At 86 d-e, 90 a, 95 c-d, and 96 a his version of events is not that of Aristotle; at 85 e, 86 d, 87 d, 88 c, 88 d-e, 89 a, and 92 a dependence on Aristotle is uncertain. At 86 c, 86 e, 87 c, 88 b he quotes lines of Solon also to be found in Ἀθ. Πολ. But he certainly knew Solon's poetry in some other way; in 17 places scattered through his writings, but mostly in *Solon*, he quotes passages from that poet not to be found in Ἀθ. Πολ. So although these four are in that work he did not necessarily take them from there.

Ἀθ. Πολ. is a probable source at *Cimon* 484 d, *Pericles* 153 f, 157 a and 158 a, and *Themistocles* 117 a, and a certain one at *Nicias* 524 a, from Ἀθ. Πολ. 28.5. In all these places Aristotle is mentioned, as

he is in three other passages assigned by Rose to 'ΑΘ. Πολ.: *Theseus* 11 d, *Solon* 97 a, *Pericles* 153 f. But the last two are not paralleled in what remains of 'ΑΘ. Πολ., although that includes what appear to be the relevant contexts.

III

We will now turn to the passages, which will prove to be far fewer in number, where Aristotle is named and reference has been seen to a work of the *Corpus*. Two warnings must be entered at once. The first has already been given. We are ill-informed about the contents of the exoteric works, and there are instances where it is possible that the reference is to one of them. The second is that some of Aristotle's opinions had become part of the heritage of the Peripatetics, had passed into handbooks and doxography, and could be quoted without implying acquaintance with the work of the *Corpus* in which they had first been enunciated.

It will be convenient to arrange the material according to the Aristotelian work involved, and to examine any further evidence there may be that Plutarch knew it, namely passages where Aristotelian influence has been claimed although Aristotle himself is not mentioned.

Topica. QC 616 D. Should the host assign places at dinner? ἀλλ' οὐδ' εὐχερῆς ἡ διάκρισις ἐστι... ἀλλὰ δεῖ καθάπερ ὑπόθεσιν μελετῶντα συγκριτικὴν τοὺς 'Αριστοτέλους Τόπους ἢ τοὺς Θρασυμάχου ὑπερβάλλοντας¹²⁾ ἔχειν προχείρους οὐδὲν τῶν χρησίμων διαπραττόμενον... The punning reference appears to be to Book III of the *Topica*, which begins πότερον δ' αἰρετώτερον ἢ βέλτιον δεῦν ἢ πλειόνων, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.

That Plutarch had made a close study of *Topica* is sometimes deduced from an entry in the so-called Lamprias-catalogue, a list of writings ascribed to him, perhaps the inventory of some library. In this item no. 56 is τῶν 'Αριστοτέλους τοπικῶν βιβλία η'. That is sometimes interpreted as if it were π ε ρ ῖ τῶν etc. But the surviving work of Plutarch yields no evidence of an interest in the *Topica* which could have led to the composition of such an extensive commentary. Rather I believe the words to mean what they say, namely 'Aristotle's *Topica*, 8 books' and that the 8 books of the *Topica* (without *Soph. El.*) had in the library by some mischance been wrongly placed among Plutarch's works.

However that may be, it seems that Plutarch expected his readers to have some knowledge of the *Topica*, at the very least of the general nature of its contents, namely that it provided methods of argument in a wide range of contexts. This is in fact all that it is *necessary* he should have known himself. Now it is not improbable that the *Topica* was used and had for centuries been used in the schools of rhetoric. It was a finished work, in which Aristotle had taken pride (183 a 37 - 184 b 8) and which there was no reason for withholding from the public. Cicero says (*Topica* 1) that it was in his own library and that he had advised Trebatius to look for it in that of a teacher of rhetoric.

Cicero is, however, an uncertain witness; a little later he seems to hedge, calling the work in his possession 'Aristotelian, as I think', and his own *Topica*, allegedly based on his memory of it, is certainly not derived from the *Topica* that we possess. There may therefore have been some spurious work in circulation, falsely ascribed to Aristotle.

That is speculative, but undoubtedly Plutarch envisaged the use of Aristotle's *Topica*, or of some work which passed under that name, by rhetoricians, to whose vocabulary ὑπόθεσις (LSJ II a 4) and μελετᾶν (LSJ II 5 b) belong. It may be most likely that he had some acquaintance with the genuine work, but it is not to be asserted with complete confidence.

The only other passage adduced by Helmbold-O'Neil is *de facie* 931 F; the definition there of νόξις as σικιά γῆς does not come from 146 b 28, where Aristotle himself says that this is the current definition. There is also a passage in *de virtute morali* (442 B) which may have reference to the *Topica*. It is discussed below under the heading *De anima*.

Physics. *Plat. quaest.* 1007 A. τὸν χρόνον μέτρον εἶναι κινήσεως καὶ ἀριθμὸν κατὰ <τὸ> πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης εἶπεν. Aristotle says this at *Physics* 219 b 2 and 220 a 24. But in Plutarch the sentence comes in a list of definitions of time, those of Speusippus, the Stoics, and Pythagoras; it may be guessed that he derived them all from a handbook. It is true that none are to be found in Aetius 1, 21.22, but Aristotle's was known to Arius Didymus (Stob. 1.8. 40).¹³⁾

None of the other passages adduced by Helmbold-O'Neil suggests knowledge of the *Physics*. *De facie* 926 C concurs with 217 a 2 and 255 b 26 in stating that air can be held below water if enclosed in a bladder. This is a matter of common observation; Plutarch did not need to read

Aristotle to know the fact. At 944 τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον recalls 192 a 16, θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ; the argument of the two passages is different and the similarity of language may well be coincidental. The rest of the passages listed are from the pseudo-Plutarchean *Placita* and *de fato*.

De caelo. There are three passages in Plutarch where Aristotle is mentioned and something similar is to be found in *de caelo* and nowhere else in the *Corpus*. But in each case there is something to be said for seeing a reference not to *de caelo* but to the exoteric work Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, which is generally believed to have supplied material to *de caelo* Books I and II.

De E apud Delphos 389 F. τὸν Πλάτωνα προσάξομαι λέγοντα κόσμον ἓνα, ὥς εἴπερ εἰσὶ παρὰ τοῦτον ἕτεροι καὶ μὴ μόνος οὗτος εἷς, πέντε τοὺς πάντας ὄντας καὶ μὴ πλείονας (*Tim.* 55 c).¹⁴ οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἷς οὗτος ἢ μονογενής, ὥς οἴεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης... Aristotle argues at 276 a that there is only one κόσμος. But μονογενής is not part of his vocabulary; the phrase is Plato's: εἷς ὃδε μονογενής οὐρανός (*Tim.* 31 b 3). One may suspect the reference to be to Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, which offered an alternative to the *Timaeus*. It is known that Aristotle there maintained that the κόσμος was unique, fr. 19 a Ross, 19 Rose³, οὕτως γὰρ εἷς τε ἔσται (sc. ὁ κόσμος).

De defectu oraculorum 424 B. Having argued that there may be a multiplicity of κόσμοι, Plutarch concludes ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων οὔτε μυθῶδες οὔτε παράλογον· εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὑπόψονταί τινες ὥς φυσικὰς αἰτίας ἔχοντα· τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων ἐκάστου τόπον οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος, ὥς φησιν, ἀνάγκη τὴν γῆν πανταχόθεν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι. He then proceeds to give what can be seen as a simplified version of 276 a-b, and it may be that he had read that passage. But I doubt whether that can be asserted. The view that each element has its proper place occurred in Περὶ φιλοσοφίας (fr. 19 b Ross, 20 Rose³, τὰς οἰκείας διακληρωσάμενα χώρας), and it is possible that the view provided an argument to prove the uniqueness of the κόσμος, which was, as has been seen, maintained there. The whole of *de caelo* 276 a-b may be reworking of material originally in Περὶ φιλοσοφίας.

Ibid. 430 A. ἡ φύσις ἔοικε τῷ πέντε ποιεῖν ἅπαντα χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ, καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλεγε. The reference may be to 286 b, where it is argued that the sphere is the first and most perfect three-dimensional shape. But nothing is said there about

nature as a productive agent or of its attachment to spherical objects. Can this again in reality be a reference to *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*?

Finally there is a passage in which both Aristotle and (in all probability) *de caelo* are mentioned. It is one which may be held to imply a wide acquaintance with the works of the *Corpus* and it will require careful examination.

Adversus Colotem 1115 A. In the preceding chapter Plutarch, having ascribed to Parmenides a distinction between the unchangeable intelligible One and the shifting plurality which is the object of sensation and belief, ends by saying that Plato conveyed this distinction even more clearly in his concern with the Forms and so provided Colotes with an opening for attack. He had alleged that these doctrines of Plato (τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασιν) were followed by Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and all the Peripatetics. ποῦ γὰρ ὦν τῆς ἀοικῆτος τὸ βιβλίον ἔγραφε, ἵνα ταῦτα συντιθεῖς τὰ ἐγκλήματα μὴ τοῖς ἐκείνων συντάγμασιν ἐντύχης μηδ' ἀναλάβης εἰς χεῖρας Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ περὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, Θεοφράστου δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς, Ἡρακλείδου δὲ τὸν Ζωροάστρην, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, τὸ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶς ἀπορουμένων, Δικαιάρχου δὲ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν φυσικῶν ὑπεναντιούμενοι τῷ Πλάτῳ καὶ μαχόμενοι διατελοῦσι; There follows a paragraph about Strato, who took (it is said) a view contrary to that of Plato on motion, mind, soul, and generation, and held that the universe was not animate but was initiated by chance. Τὰς γε μὴν ἰδέας, περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ, πανταχοῦ κινῶν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων, φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφότερον ἐκ ** (1115 BC).

Some scholars insert ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς (Bignone, Pohlenz, Westman) or ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (Bernays) into the last sentence. A supplement may be right but is far from being required by the fact that Proclus in a passage about Aristotle's attacks on the doctrine of Forms (in Philoponus *de aet. mundi* II.2 p. 31 Rabe) refers to these works as well as to those mentioned by Plutarch's manuscripts. He cites *de gen. et corr.* also, but no one has suggested adding that work to Plutarch's list. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles usw.* (Berlin, 1863) 46, argued that Proclus and Plutarch drew upon a common source and this has been widely accepted. If that is true, Plutarch's words need not imply his direct acquaintance with *EN* or the *Physics* or any other work meant by τὰ

φυσικά. But they do show him to be aware at least of the existence of works that belong to our *Corpus* and to know something of their contents.

I am not so certain that the first sentence quoted does the same for *de caelo* and *de anima*, although admitting it to be very probable. My reason for hesitation is this. Plutarch's surprise that Colotes did not consult *de caelo* and *de anima* does not accord with his belief that Aristotle's library went to Scepsis, so that the later Peripatetics had access to few of his writings (*Sulla* 26). This may excite a suspicion that he is not speaking of *de caelo* and *de anima* at all. Instead of the latter he may mean the *Eudemus*, which had an alternative title *Περὶ ψυχῆς* used by Plutarch himself at *Dion* 967c and attested by Ps.-Plutarch *Cons. ad Apollonium* 115 B, *Diog. L.* 5.22, *Vita Menagiana* 10, and Proclus *in Plat.Tim.* V (III p. 23.16 Diehl). There is on the other hand no evidence that the second book of *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* was ever entitled *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ*, although it dealt with that subject (frags. 12-22 Ross). Yet possibly Plutarch intended 'what Aristotle wrote about the heavens' and expected his readers to think of *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. A motive for not so naming the dialogue but speaking of *τὰ περὶ οὐρανοῦ* might be to emphasise that part of it in which Aristotle was notably at odds with his master.

However this may be, and the interpretation of Plutarch's words as referring to exoteric works is no more than just possible, it is striking that this first sentence, in contrast with the last, which is concerned with the doctrine of Forms, does not make it clear which of Plato's doctrines were resisted by later philosophers. Plutarch seems to have in mind not merely the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, but the whole range of Platonic physics. If that is so, he needed no detailed knowledge of *de caelo* and *de anima*, if those were the works adduced; it would be enough for him to know that they were critical of Plato.

Further evidence for knowledge of *de caelo* is lacking. Helmbold-O'Neil compare *de facie* 922 C, ἡ δὲ ῥύμη καὶ τὸν ἐν λίθοις ἀέρα καὶ τὸν ἐν ψυχρῷ μολίβδῳ συνεκκαίει with 289 a 21, πέφυκε γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐκπυροῦν καὶ ξύλα καὶ λίθους καὶ σίδηρον... οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων βελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐκπυροῦται οὕτως ὥστε τήκεσθαι... Both authors refer to the heating of missiles, caused in reality by their arrest not by their flight, but this was a fact of common knowledge, for which Plutarch had no need to consult Aristotle. Their other five 'parallels' have even less evidential value.

The Lamprias-catalogue has an entry (no. 44) *Περὶ τῆς πέμπτης ούσιας, βιβλία ε'*. This is an unexpectedly voluminous treatment,

which might be thought to imply a profound study of *de caelo*. I have suggested (Loeb Moralia XV.10) that πέμπτης is a dittography (or an intruded misreading, as I would now add) of περί τῆς. If the reading is, however, as I now incline to accept, correct and the title refers to a genuine work of Plutarch (the catalogue includes a number of *spuria*), he may still have been concerned only with Περί φιλοσοφίας, in which the 'fifth substance' played an important part (Cic. *Ac. Pr.* 1.26, *Tusc.* 1.22, 1.65), or indeed not directly with Aristotle at all, but with problems traditional among Aristotle's successors and still discussed in his time. It is known that Xenarchus, a Peripatetic of the first century B.C., wrote a book entitled Πρὸς τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν (quoted by Simplicius *de caelo* 13.22-25; 21 Heiberg), in which he attacked the arguments of *de caelo* I.2. A further point is that although we today first think of *de caelo* in connection with 'the fifth substance', it was not Aristotle's invention; a theory of five elements was accepted by some members of the Old Academy and ascribed to Plato himself or to Pythagoreans (Xenocrates fr. 53, *Epinomis* 981 B, Speusippus fr. 4; M. Baltes, *Philologus* 122 (1978) 191f.).

I conclude that it is possible, but far from certain, that Plutarch knew the contents as well as the existence of *de caelo*.

De anima. Quaest. Plat. 1006 D. καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ὥρισато τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν σώματος φυσικοῦ ὁργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. This combines 412 a 27, ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος with 412 b 5, ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὁργανικοῦ. Such definitions are part of the mental furniture of students of philosophy and are as likely, if not more likely, to come from a handbook as from reading of the original. This one is to be found in Aetius 4.2.3 and in Diog. L.5.32, with the same combination of the two phrases.

De virtute morali 442 B. Ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς (sc. the Platonic tripartite division of the soul) ἐπὶ πλεόν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δηλὸν ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν· ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως, τῷ μέντοι παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ μέχρι παντὸς ὡς διαφέροντι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ χρώμενος διετέλεσεν... Interpretation of this passage is not easy and it has been much discussed.

Plutarch appears to contrast a later stage in Aristotle's thought, when the spirited and appetitive elements in the soul were amalgamated, with an earlier, Platonic, phase in which they were distinguished, but

to insist that at all times he sharply opposed the irrational elements to the rational. Since he had already substituted the bipartite division in some exoteric works (*EN* 1102 a 2) including the early *Protrepticus* (frag. 6 Ross), some scholars maintain that ἐπὶ πλεον cannot have the temporal meaning 'for a long time'. The alternative, however, 'he made much use of', adopted by D. Babut, *Plutarque de la vertu éthique* (Paris, 1969) 139, is not without difficulty, since the only place in the surviving works where Aristotle explicitly speaks of a tripartite soul as if he accepted it is *Topica* 133 a 30, οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἥ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ, λέγεται ἴδιον τὸ τριμερῆ ψυχὴν ἔχειν. (The concept is mentioned, but with disapproval, at *de anima* 432 b 5.) There are, however four other passages of the *Topica*, mentioned at various places by H. von Arnim, *SB Akad. Wiss. Wien* 205.4 (1927) 1-135, in which it is or may be implied: 113 a 35, 126 a 6, 129 a 12, 136 b 10. Bonitz' index supplies no more and von Arnim made the most of his five exhibits when he wrote that the tripartition is 'mentioned at numerous places' (an zahlreichen Stellen... erwähnt).

At a pinch it could be supposed that Plutarch had these five passages in mind, if he meant ἐπὶ πλεον to indicate 'much use', and this seems to be accepted by Düring, *ABT* 354-5, Babut, 138-9, and perhaps P. L. Donini, *Tre studi sull' Aristotelismo nel II secolo D.C.* (Turin, 1974) 69. The statement that Aristotle 'later' changed his opinion need not be understood to imply that he changed it at a late stage.

But this overlooks the fact that he did continue on occasion to use the Platonic tripartition, as at *EN* 1149 b 1, ὁ θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία οὐ and *Pol.* 1334 b 22, θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει, passages inconsistent with the view that θυμὸς is a kind of ἐπιθυμία. Moreover it became part of the accepted history of philosophy that he distinguished three δυνάμεις of the soul, αἷς ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ θυμούμεθα καὶ λογίζομεν (Galen, *Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* pp. 432.10 M, 461.5 M, 476.4 M). Porphyry even wrote παρὰ δὲ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τριμερὲς ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται εἶναι (Stob. 1.350 Wachsmuth). Accordingly I incline to think, with Düring, *ABT* 353-5, that in saying that Aristotle made much use, or long use, of the Platonic principles Plutarch was reproducing a standard view, not giving evidence of personal study of the works of the *Corpus*. This inclination is strengthened by the fact that, like this passage from *de virtute morali*, the first chapter of *de libidine et aegritudine* (which I regard as a genuine work by Plutarch, see *Rev. de Philologie* 43 [1969] 211) associates the recognition

of θυμός as a form of ἐπιθυμία with its definition as ὄρεξις ἀντι-
λυπῆσεως. That chapter operates throughout with philosophical common-
places. This suggests that the passage from *de virtute morali* also does
no more than use standard accepted beliefs and is no evidence for direct
study by Plutarch of Aristotle's treatises.

Nor is the definition of θυμός as ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπῆσεως to be
seen as directly derived in either place from *de anima* 403 a 30. It is
there said to be the usage of the διαλεκτικοί and is regarded as super-
ficial, nor is there any question of assimilating θυμός and ἐπιθυμία.
The origin of Plutarch's words must be sought elsewhere.

At *EN* 1102 a 26 Aristotle writes λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς
ψυχῆς) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια..., οἷον
τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. This is a modifi-
cation of Plato's division into λόγος, θυμός, and ἐπιθυμία. It would
not be surprising if in one of these exoteric works he had argued that
θυμός and ἐπιθυμία could be assimilated, both being included in the
wider term ὄρεξις. From such a statement there could be derived Seneca's
belief, *De Ira* 1.3, in what he calls Aristotle's definition (*finitio*): *ait*
enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi, a passage included by Rose
and Ross among the fragments of the Πολιτικὸς. This is arbitrary, but
some source in the exoteric works is likely enough.

De Libidine c. 7 <οἱ δὲ> ταύτην ἀπογνόντες φιλόσοφοί φασι
μήτε σώματος εἶναι τι μήτε ψυχῆς ἴδιον πάθος ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ·
τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἡθεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι, τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, οὐχὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. This may have some relation with *de anima*
408 b 1, φασὶν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖ-
σθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι...
(b 13) βέλτιον γὰρ ἵσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν
ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ. But Plutarch will not
have drawn it directly from that work; he knows it as Peripatetic doctrine
and ascribes it not to Aristotle but to a plurality of philosophers.

Otherwise none of the passages adduced by Helmbold-O'Neil has any
claim to be a source. E.g. at 1025 A Plutarch uses Plato's definition of
φαντασία (*Soph.* 264 b), a definition rejected by Aristotle at 428 a 24.

The conclusion must be that Plutarchean knowledge of the contents of
de anima remains very questionable.

P o l i t i c s. I can find no passage which suggests that Plutarch
knew the *Politics*. The long list of parallels in Helmbold-O'Neil is mere-
ly a list of places where both authors refer to the same fact, usually a

matter of common knowledge. The Laconian colonisation of Lyktos is a more out-of-the-way incident, but Plutarch's story is not in Aristotle (*mul. virt.* 247 E and 1271 b 28). Aristotle is mentioned twice in these Plutarchean parallels, but in each case it is clear that the reference is not to the *Politics*. *De Alexandri fortuna* 329 B. ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συν-εβούλευεν αὐτῷ. The reference is to some pseudepigraphic letter, not to 1285 a 18. *Lycurgus* 47 e Οὐ γάρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν, ἐπι-χειρήσας σωφρονίζειν τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπαύσατο, μὴ κρατῶν τῆς πολλῆς ἀνέσεως καὶ γυναικοκρατίας διὰ τὰς πολλὰς στρατείας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν αἷς ἡναγκάζοντο κυρίας ἀπολείπειν ἐκείνας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτὰς ἐθεράπευον καὶ δεσποίνας προσηγόρευον. This comes not from 1269 b 12, but from Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία, 'haud dubie', said Immisch.

G. S. Aalders, *Mnemosyne* iv series 30 (1977) 28, 'Political Thought in Plutarch's *Convivium Septem Sapientium*' concludes on p. 39 that 'the present study has made it probable that Plutarch too was well acquainted with the Aristotelian *Politics*'. The evidence on which he relies is an alleged resemblance of 147 D and 1288 a 15, 154 F and 1318 b 6, and 155 E and 1252 b 16. Except that the second pair are both concerned in their different ways with the problem of what is the best kind of democracy, I can see nothing in common between these passages whether in language, thought, or subject-matter. I hold to the conclusion reached long ago by R. Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaironeia* (Berlin, 1869) 2.23, that the *Politics* were not known to Plutarch.

N i c o m a c h e a n E t h i c s. *QC* 704 E. δοκεῖ δέ μοι (a guest is speaking) μηδ' Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίᾳ δικαίᾳ τὰς περὶ θεᾶν καὶ ἀκρόασιν εὐπαθείας ἀπολύειν ἀκρασίας, ὡς μόνας ἀνθρωπινὰς οὐσας. This may refer to *EN* 1118 a 1-26: (a 3) οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψεως... οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται... ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει... (a 23) περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστίν, ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνοῦν. It should however be noted that Aristotle does not here speak of ἀκρασία but of ἀκολασία and that elsewhere he distinguishes the two conceptions, *EE* 1231 a 25, οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι, *EN* 1146 b 21, 1148 a 13, b 12. The alteration may be due to Plutarch; on the other hand he may have in mind some passage in a dialogue or in the *Protreptics*, or even in the lost *Problemata* (see

below), to which he frequently refers. In our *Problemata*, 949 b 6 operates with ἀκρασία but does no more imply Plutarch's statement: Διὰ τί κατὰ μόνας δύο αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, οἷον ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις; 949 b 37 is slightly closer: Διὰ τί οἱ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀφῆς ἢ γεύσεως ἡδονὴν... ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται; ... (950 a 4) οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν οὐκέτι· ἢ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις;

Nothing is to be learned from the other passages adduced in Helmbold-O'Neil. At 333 F Plutarch tells in full a story to which Aristotle does no more than allude at 1164 a 15. At 165 D Plutarch says that Celts when drunk do not fear thunderbolts; at 1115 b 27 Aristotle says that they do not fear the waves and makes no mention of drunkenness. There are three allusions to well-known proverbs (619 A and 1155 a 34, 96 E and 1168 b 7, 94 A and 1156 b 27), one to an anecdote about Pittakos (155 F and 1113 b 31, also found at *Pol.* 1274 b 19, *Rhet.* 1402 b 10), a quotation in different contexts of a line from that popular play Euripides' *Orestes* (68 D and 1169 b 7). There is no similarity between 731 C and 1106 b 34. Finally it may confidently be doubted that Plutarch derived from 1177 b 31, οὐ χρὴ θνητὰ (sc. φρονεῖν) τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, the remark attributed in *Septem Sapientium Convivium* 152 B to Chilon: τὸν ἄρχοντα χρῆναι μηδὲν φρονεῖν θνητόν, ἀλλὰ πάντ' ἀθάνατα.

It has been argued that the statement in *de virtute morali* 442 B that Aristotle always continued to use the bipartition of the soul (see above pp. 217ff., under *De Anima*) shows that Plutarch had read the *Nicomachean Ethics*. I have above favoured Düring's opinion that the sentence in *de virtute morali* repeats a traditional account of Aristotle's change from tripartite to bipartite psychology and does not imply direct knowledge of that work. Nor can I put faith in the conclusions of S. G. Etheridge, who in an unpublished Harvard dissertation of which a résumé is given in *HSCP* 66 (1962) 252ff. argues that Plutarch shows direct knowledge of *EN* II and VI. His case rests on this same passage 442 B, and on *adv. Colotem* 1115 B, on the uncertainty of which see above p. 215, where I argue that the mention of *EN* (τὰ ἡθικὰ ὑπομνήματα) need not imply direct acquaintance.

Finally, D. Babut, *Plutarque de la vertu éthique* considers that 445 A suggests direct knowledge of *EN* 1107 b 6-8 and 1133 b 32-33. Plutarch, having shown that a number of virtues are means between opposed vices,

ends αὐτήν τε σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, τὴν μὲν περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια μήτε πλέον νέμουσιν αὐτῇ τοῦ προσήκοντος μέτ' ἔλαττον, τὴν δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀεὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καθιστάσαν. Babut argues that the word αὐτήν shows him to be aware of the difficulties involved in treating σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη as means; they are recognised by Aristotle, a recognition which would not, he thinks, have survived in an intermediate version: 1107 b 6 ἄλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι and 1133 b 32 ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς.

Since Plutarch ignores the difficulties expressed by Aristotle and simply assimilates δικαιοσύνη to the other virtues, neglecting Aristotle's (admittedly obscure) argument, I doubt whether direct knowledge of *EN* is to be detected. αὐτήν simply marks the importance of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη, which form the climax of the argument. The whole of this chapter is characterised by Pohlenz (ed. Teubner) as 'Aristotelis doctrina commutata', and I would see Plutarch as following Peripatetic orthodoxy of his time (cf. φασίν, 445 A 3 and P. Moraux, *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu* [Louvain and Paris, 1957] 89).¹⁵⁾

I conclude that there is no firm evidence to show that Plutarch read the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Metaphysics. *De Iside* 370 E. 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησιν, cf. 990 b, 1070 b 19, 1069 b 34, 1074 a 9, *GC* 318 b 16. Plutarch's words come in a general survey of philosophers who built their worlds from two starting points, one good, the other bad: Empedocles, Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, Plato. I suggest that this is general knowledge rather than the result of reading *Metaphysics*. Aetius 1.3.22 has 'Αριστοτέλης... ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶδος ὕλην στέρησιν. Rose and Ross include the passage from *De Iside* as an element in frag. 6 of *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, somewhat hazardously. Cf. Arius Didymus fr. 3, Diels *DG* 448, τὰς ἀρχὰς ποτὲ μὲν εἶναί φησιν 'Αριστοτέλης δύο, but for him they are εἶδος and ὕλη.

Alexander 668 C. Alexander not only heard Aristotle's ethical and political views but also shared in his secret and more profound doctrines. After invading Asia he heard that Aristotle had published some of these and wrote to protest (his alleged letter is quoted). Aristotle wrote a letter of excuse (not quoted), saying that they were both published and unpublished.¹⁶⁾ 'Ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἡ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία, πρὸς

διδασκαλίαν καὶ μάθησιν οὐδὲν ἔχουσα χρήσιμον, ὑπόδειγμα τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γέγραπται.

This shows that Plutarch knew of the existence of the *Metaphysics*: whether he had read them is another matter. I. Düring, *ABT* 286, finds it difficult to believe that the observation is based on first-hand knowledge of the *Metaphysics*. He thinks it possible that Plutarch had it from the same source as the immediately preceding spurious letters. To me it seems not impossible that Plutarch had seen a copy and decided that it was a work to be left to the specialist who could understand it.

Other passages cited by Helmbold-O'Neil offer but frail support for knowledge of the *Metaphysics*. *QC* 687 A. τροφή δὲ τῷ θερμῷ, ὡς νομίζω, ... τὸ ὑγρόν. 696 B τρέφεται μὲν γὰρ (sc. τὸ πῦρ) οὐδενὶ πλὴν ὑγρῷ. *De primo frigido* 954 E τῷ δ' ὑγρῷ τροφή χρῆται τὸ θερμόν. At 983 b 23 Aristotle suggests that Thales saw αὐτὸ τὸ θερμόν ἐκ τούτου (sc. τοῦ ὕδατος) γινόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν. This must have been a common notion,¹⁷ and it recurs in the *Problemata* in wording closer to that of Plutarch: 871 b 12, ὑγρῷ μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τὸ θερμόν and 875 a 14, τροφή μὲν γὰρ ὑγρόν τῷ θερμῷ. *De animae procreatione* 1025 E. θεωρητικῆς γε τῆς ψυχῆς οὔσης ἅμα καὶ πρακτικῆς. This has no reference to Aristotle's tripartite division at 1025 b 25, πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ, but explains the *Timaeus* by the use of a Platonic distinction, see *Politicus* 258 e 4, τὴν μὲν (sc. ἐπιστήμην) πρακτικὴν... τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικὴν. The vocabulary, however, is not that of Plato; although he uses θεωρία of the soul's intellectual activity, θεωρητικός does not appear before Aristotle, with whom it is not uncommon. But the adjective is not peculiar to him; it became part of the general philosophic vocabulary, cf. Epicurus *de natura* 15.23, 16.25, 17.4, 19.16 (Arrighetti), and Diog. L. of the Stoics. τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρακτικόν (7.125). The opposition between πρακτικός and θεωρητικός came naturally to Plutarch, cf. *Mor.* 792 D, οὐ πρακτικὰς ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὰς τέχνας ἔχοντες. *Quaest. Plat.* 1002 D, καὶ ἄλλως εὐηθές ἐστι τοῖς σωματικοῖς τεκμαίρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων. This is nowhere said in 1054 b 23-1058 a 7. Nor has 927 B any resemblance to 1075 a 14ff. - 264 A, 374 A, 388 A, 1002 A, 1012 E, 1013 A, 1018 C all belong to standard arithmetical speculation and are not to be derived from 1091 a 23-29.

Problemata. There are eight places, all but one in *Quaestiones Convivales*, where Plutarch names Aristotle as his authority (458 F, 627 C, 627 D, 656 C, 659 D, 694 D, 696 D, 720 D) and, if he be allowed

some inventiveness and some inaccuracy of memory, the reference might be to the *Problemata* of our *Corpus* (875 a 34, 933 a 18, 932 b 25, 871 a 11, 863 a 28, 888 a 1-8 and 889 a 36, 874 a 29, 903 b 14). On the other hand when at 734 C he cites Aristotle's Προβλήματα φυσικά, the reference is not to our *Problemata*; Aulus Gellius, moreover, notes (3.6) the identity of 724 E with a passage in the seventh book of Aristotle's *Problemata*, a passage not to be found in our work. Again, there are eleven places, seven of which are in *Quaestiones Convivales*, where Aristotle is named (133 F, 627 A, 635 B, 652 A, 656 B, 690 C, 690 F, 702 B, 912 A, 932 B, 949 C) and the matter is suitable to a collection of problems but is not in our *Problemata*.

Our *Problemata*, although entitled by the mss. Ἀριστοτέλους φυσικά προβλήματα, are not the work of Aristotle. H. Flashar, who added a most valuable commentary to his translation (*Aristoteles Problemata Physica* [Berlin, 1962] = E. Grumach, *Aristoteles' Werke in deutscher Übersetzung*, vol. 19), argues (pp. 357-8) that it was first put together in the Peripatetic school in the period 270-230 B.C. and later expanded. It may be guessed, although it cannot be proved, that its composers used the work known to Plutarch and Gellius as Προβλήματα φυσικά; if so, it is likely that Plutarch drew on that work only and did not supplement it from our *Problemata*. The fact that where there is a parallel with the latter he often has more or different detail is to be explained not by his own inventiveness but by abbreviation or alteration made by the Peripatetic compiler.

It remains to consider whether the work used by Plutarch and called by him Προβλήματα φυσικά was in fact Aristotle's. Better would be to ask whether it was contemporary with Aristotle, for he may have had the co-operation of pupils, just as he must have had in the preparation of his 138 *Constitutions*. That there was in his day such a collection of problems is certain; several times in his genuine works he refers to what has been said ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν (see Bonitz's Index p. 103 b), clearly indicating a book to which his hearers had access.

Flashar denies (p. 313) that Plutarch or Gellius can have known this collection; his grounds seem to me inadequate, but one must admit it to be possible that the original work was expanded by Aristotle's successors, while they maintained his name as author; in that case Plutarch could have used the expanded version. Diogenes Laertius' list of Aristotle's works includes Προβλήματα φυσικά in 70 rolls and also in 38.¹⁸⁾ Flashar asserts that Plutarch used the edition in 70 rolls, which he sees as an

expansion of the Aristotelian original. One cannot, to my mind, assert anything with confidence; it is not even impossible, if Aristotle was extensively helped by his pupils, that the original had 70 volumes.

It has here been argued that Plutarch made much use of the lost Προβλήματα φυσικά. Probably it was also his source in many places where he does not mention Aristotle. Often there can be no clue, but similarity with a passage in our *Problemata* may indicate that his material is drawn from the other work.

By its very nature a collection of problems cannot be a finalised work. New answers and new problems may always be added. Incompleteness would therefore be no obstacle to its being put into general circulation.

H i s t o r i a a n i m a l i u m. That Plutarch or a source for his *de sollertia animalium* knew this treatise is certain. Aristotle is three times adduced as an authority, and the coincidence of wording with *Historia Animalium* springs to the eye. 973 A, ἤδη πειστέον Ἀριστοτέλει... ὁφθῆναι γὰρ ἀηδὸνα νεοσσὸν ἄδειν προδιδάσκουσαν ~ 536 b 18, ὥπται καὶ ἀηδὼν νεοττὸν προδιδάσκουσα. 979 C-D, ὅπου γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν θύννον) χειμῶνος αἱ τροπαὶ καταλάβωσιν, ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ διατρίβει περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ἄχρι τῆς ἰσημερίας... (E) μάρτυς Ἀριστοτέλης ~ 598 b 25, ὅταν τροπαὶ χειμεριναὶ γένωνται, οὐκέτι κινουῦνται, ἀλλὰ ἡσυχάζουσιν, ὅπου ἂν τύχωσι καταληφθέντες, μέχρι ἰσημερίας. 981 F, ῥοφυλακοῦντες, ὡς ἱστόρηκεν Ἀριστοτέλης ~ 621 a 23, ῥοφυλακεῖ παραμένων.

A less similar pair is to be recognised in 956 C, τὰ σαρκοβόρα τῶν ζῴων, ὧν ἑνὶά φησι μὴ πίνειν Ἀριστοτέλης ~ 593 b 29 (cf. 601 a 32), οἱ δὲ γαμφώνυχες καὶ ἄποτοι πάμπαν, εἰ μὴ τι ὀλίγον γένος καὶ ὀλιγάκις. There is another possible reference in *Quaestiones Naturales* 917 D ἢ καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι 'χλούνην' Ὅμηρος ὠνόμασε σὺν τὸν μόνορχιν; τῶν γὰρ πλείστων φησὶ προσκνωμένων τοῖς στελέχεσι θρύπτεσθαι τοὺς ὄρχεις. ~ 578 b 1, Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν ἑρέψεν ἐπὶ χλούνην σὺν ἄγριον... γίγνονται δὲ τομῖαι διὰ τὸ νέοις οὖσιν ἐμπίπτειν νόσημα κνησμον εἰς τοὺς ὄρχεις· εἴτα ξυόμενοι πρὸς τὰ δένδρα ἐκθλίβουσι τοὺς ὄρχεις. But since τομῖας does not mean μόνορχις one may suspect another source, perhaps in the work Περὶ Ὁμήρου, three times quoted by Plutarch elsewhere. H. Flashar, *Aristoteles Problemata Physica* 307, suggests Προβλήματα φυσικά, since the surviving *Problemata* have at 896 a 22-24 something similar to 917 B-C, which may be derived from that other work. The suggestions are not necessarily incompatible, for

the work of Homer is sometimes called Ὅμηρικὰ ζητήματα and may have been a section of the Προβλήματα.

Frag. 72 Sandbach, on the other hand, ultimately derived from Plutarch's lost *Commentary on Hesiod*, may refer to HA: Ἀριστοτέλης δέ φησι ψευδὸς εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τοὺς πολὺποδας· αὐτοὺς γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς μὴ κατεσθίειν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν παγούρων κατεσθίεσθαι ~ 591 a 4 ὅτι δὲ λέγουσί τινες, ὥς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἐσθίει, ψευδὲς (read ψευδός with the mss. P and D^a) ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἀπεδηδεσμένους ἔχουσιν ἔνιοι τὰς πλεκτάνας ὑπὸ τῶν γόγγρων. Plutarch probably wrote γόγγρων, as he did at 978 F, and the word has been corrupted in the vicissitudes to which his note has been subjected.

There are a number of passages where Aristotle is not named, but where similarity of wording strongly suggests that HA is Plutarch's source. 978 A, τὴν γὰρ καλουμένην μύτιν ~ 524 b 14, ἣν καλοῦσι μύτιν. 970 A, ἥδη δὲ διὰ γῆρας ἀφειμένων ~ 577 b 30, ἀφειμένος ἥδη διὰ τὸ γῆρας. 981 E, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τὸν ἀνθίαν ἱερὸν εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἀνθίας ὀφθῇ, θηρίον οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ θαρροῦντες μὲν οἱ σπογγοθῆραι κατακολυμβῶσι, θαρροῦντες δὲ τίκτουςιν οἱ ἰχθύες... ~ 620 b 33, ὅπου δ' ἂν ἀνθίας, ἥ, οὐκ ἔστι θηρίον· ᾧ καὶ σημείψω χρώμενοι κατακολυμβῶσιν οἱ σπογγεῖς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἱεροὺς ἰχθύς τούτους. 979 E, ὅθεν ἐμβάλλουσιν (sc. θύννοι) εἰς τὸν Πόντον ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς γῆς ἐχόμενοι, καὶ τούναντίον ὅταν ἐξίωσιν· ἐμφρόνως πάνυ καὶ νουνεχῶς ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος φυλακὴν ἐπὶ τῷ κρείττονι ποιούμενοι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ~ 598 b 19, εἰσπλέουσι δ' οἱ θύννοι ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ ἐχόμενοι τῆς γῆς· ἐκπλέουσι δ' ἐπ' ἀριστερά· τοῦτο δὲ φασὶ τινες ποιεῖν ὅτι τῷ δεξιῷ ὀξύτερον ὀρῶσι... In Aristotle this habit of the tunny is not locally restricted, but the greater part of the chapter is concerned with entry to the Black Sea.

There are two passages in *Soll. an.* which name Aristotle but do not refer to HA. 977 A, Ἀριστοτέλης δέ φησι μηδὲν ἐν τούτοις (*Iliad* 24.80-82) λέγεσθαι σοφὸν ἢ περιττὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι κεράτιον περιτίθεσθαι πρὸ τοῦ ἀγκίστρου περὶ τὴν ὀρμιν, ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ἐρχόμενοι διεσθίουσι. A. Platt, *CQ* 5 (1911) 255, wished to replace the name of Aristotle by that of Aristarchus. But the change is not needed; Aristotle could have made the statement in his *Περὶ Ὀμήρου* or *Ὅμηρικὰ ζητήματα*. 978 D, ᾧ σοφίσματι καὶ τὴν σηπίαν χρῆσθαι φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. The source of

this is quite obscure.

HA is one of the few works of the *Corpus* to find a place in Diogenes Laertius' list of Aristotle's writings (no. 102).

Meteorologia. *QN* 911 E, ἡ γέγονεν ἄποτον καὶ πικρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ (sc. τῆς θαλάττης), ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν, ἀναμίξει κατακεκαυμένης γῆς; The only place where anything similar is to be found is *Meteor.* B 358 a 14, διὸ καὶ τὴν θάλατταν τινες ἐκ κατακεκαυμένης φασὶ γενέσθαι γῆς. One may however hesitate to see *Meteor.* as Plutarch's source. There are two other references to Aristotle in *QN*, at 912 A and 914 F; they have no parallels in his surviving work and it is plausible to see in them allusions to Προβλήματα φυσικά, of which Plutarch made much use in *Quaestiones Convivales*; with that collection *QN* has many points of contact. Accordingly I think it likely that Προβλήματα were the source of 911 E also.

Other parallels in Helmbold-O'Neil are imperfect or trivial, with one possible exception: 913 C, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ κηρίνοις ἀγγείοις ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ὕδωρ γλυκὺ διηθούμενον, ἀποκρινομένοι τοῦ ἄλυκοῦ καὶ γεώδους. A long account of this practice is given at 358 b 35-359 a 5, ending with the words ὥσπερ γὰρ δι' ἡμοῦ τὸ γεῶδες ἀποκρίνεται κτλ. There is a rather similar account at *Hist. An.* 590 a 22, but it does not display the same verbal likeness. For the rest all the passages for which a source in *Meteor.* is conceivable refer to facts of common experience, e.g. that in a double rainbow the outer bow is fainter than the inner (937 B and 375 a 31). The same may be true of *QN* 914 B and 358 b 6, not noted by Helmbold-O'Neil, both of which refer to the warmth of a rough sea.

This evidence hardly makes a strong case for knowledge of *Meteor.*, but a little weight is added by the fact that three passages of *QN* (911 E, 913 C, 914 B) have their parallels in a short stretch of that work (358 a 14-359 a 5).

*

There are four passages in which Plutarch mentions Aristotle in conjunction with other philosophers; I should myself be more inclined to see in them acceptance of current belief than evidence of his own study of original texts.

De comm. not. 1069 A ἐλήρει δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐλήρει δὲ Ξενοκράτης, ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ θεῶν, ὠφελεῖσθαι δ' ὑπὸ γονέων, ὠφελεῖσθαι δ' ὑπὸ καθηγητῶν ἀποφαινόμενοι... Nowhere in our Aristotle is this said, although the care of men by the gods is

mentioned at *EN* 1179 a 24, the love of parents for their children at 1161 b 19, and the value of teaching everywhere taken for granted. But the threefold source of help may have occurred in some exoteric work, e.g. *Protrepticus*.

De virtute morali 448 A αὐτός τ' Ἀριστοτέλης Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἔνια τῶν πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς ἀρεσκόντων ἀθορύβως καὶ ἀδῆκτως καὶ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀφεῖσαν. Unfortunately there is no clue what changes of mind Plutarch means, and it is impossible to disprove the belief of D. Babut, *Plutarque de la vertu éthique* 160-1, that he discovered them himself.

Adv. Colotem 1111 D, οὐχὶ καὶ Πλάτῳ συνέβαινε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Ξενοκράτει χρυσὸν ἐκ μὴ χρυσοῦ καὶ λίθον ἐκ μὴ λίθου καὶ τᾶλλα γεννᾶν ἐκ τεσσάρων ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων ἅπαντα;

De comm. not. 1069 E, 'πόθεν οὖν,' φησὶν (sc. Χρύσιππος) ἄρξωμαι; καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ὕλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφείς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; πόθεν δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ θεόφραστος ἄρχονται; τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; There are several places where Cicero links together Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, or four of them, as agreeing on ethical doctrine: *Fin.* 4.3, *Tusc. Disp.* 5.30; 39, 87, *De legibus* 1.37. This is no doubt the result of Antiochus' efforts to minimise differences between Academics and Peripatetics. I think that in neither of these passages do Plutarch's words imply more than acceptance of a widely-held view; they arise from current beliefs about fourth-century philosophers not from first-hand study of their works. For agreement of Aristotle and Xenocrates on nature as the starting-point for morality compare *Cic. Fin.* 4.15.

IV

We will now turn to those works of the *Corpus*, connexion with which is suggested by Helmbold-O'Neil without their citing any passage in which Aristotle is explicitly named.

Rhetoric. In most of the passages listed in *Plutarch's Quotations* the two authors differ so widely that there is no possibility of influence. Five deserve attention. At 1087 B τὸ ἕαρ ἐξαιρεῖν is shown by the addition of ὥς φασὶ to have become a proverbial phrase, not learned from 1365 a 32 or 1411 a 3; it may have been invented by Pericles, but it was already known to Herodotus, 7.162. Pittacus' law on drunkenness, quoted at 155 F, and mentioned three times by Aristotle (see above on *Nicomachean Ethics*), one of these occurrence being at *Rhet.* 1402 b 12, must have been

an item of popular knowledge; it is retailed by Diogenes Laertius 1.76. Similarly 661 D and 1404 b 20 (not listed) allude independently to common knowledge. But there are three anecdotes told by Plutarch which appear in Book III of the *Rhetoric* and nowhere else: 727 D and 1406 b 15, Gorgias and the swallow, 803 A and 1411 a 4, advice not to make Greece one-eyed, 803 A and 1411 a 15, Pericles called Aegina τὴν λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως. Whether he had them from that source or from some intermediary must be uncertain. *Rhetoric* III, which is an independent treatise, may appear in Diogenes Laertius' list as περὶ λέξεως α'β'. This is the only evidence that it was available before the time of Andronicus.¹⁹⁾

Poetics. I do not know on what grounds Ziegler declared that knowledge of the *Poetics* could be traced in *de audiendis poetis*. A. Rostagni, *Riv. fil.* 55 (1927) 159-68, argues convincingly that the source of three passages (16 C-D and 17 D) that have parallels of a sort in the *Poetics* was in fact the dialogue Περὶ ποιητῶν. D. W. Lucas, *Aristotle, Poetics* xxiii, writes 'there is no passage earlier than the fourth century A.D. of which it can be asserted with confidence that it is derived directly from the *Poetics*.' The only passage (347 A) mentioned by Helmbold-O'Neil is not to the point.

De plantis. At QC 684 C a speaker says that the fig is the only tree that has no flower. 828 b 40 states that palms, figs, and similar trees have no flowers. This provides no evidence for dependence.

De partibus animalium. No evidence here either. At QC 698 A-B Plutarch gives his source - Erasistratus, at 699 D-F it is Dioxippus. 684 C-D is quite different from 677 a 20 and *de facie* 978 A is clearly not derived from 679 a 1.

Parva naturalia. QC 663 B makes use, like 445 a 18, of the argument that a composite body will require a compound food. This is so obvious that there is no need to suppose any connection between the two passages.

Mirabiles auscultationes. *De Iside* 380 F: The Thessalians honour storks, banishing those who kill them, since they once appeared and destroyed a plague of snakes. This could come from 832 a 4. Pliny has the same story (NH 10.62) and lists Aristotle among his authorities for that book.

QC 659 C, like 834 b 28, reports that workers in copper-mines gain benefit for their eyes and regenerate lost eye-lashes, but adds an explanation, which has the appearance of belonging to the report, but which is not in Ps.-Aristotle. I think it unsafe, on this evidence, either to affirm or to deny that Plutarch knew the work.

De virtutibus et vitiis. De mundo. I do not know why Düring, ABT 355, says that Plutarch 'obviously regarded' these works as genuine.

V

My conclusion is that Plutarch or his sources knew of *Topica*, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Historia Animalium*, *Rhetoric III*, and probably of *De Caelo* and *De Anima*. Direct acquaintance with the contents is certain only for *Historia Animalium* and *Rhetoric III*, both books for the use of which before his time there is some evidence. As regards other works of the *Corpus* there is no cogent reason for belief that any were known to Plutarch or his sources. There are grounds, but they are indecisive, for seeing the influence of *Meteorologica* and *Mirabiles Auscultationes*.

By way of contrast his knowledge, direct or indirect, of works now lost was extensive. The list is given above, p.210. It is to be noted that *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* makes a somewhat uncertain appearance. But I have suggested that there may be references to that work at 389 F, and 424 B (p. 214).

Two inferences may be drawn from this contrast. The first is that even after Andronicus had called attention to the works of Aristotle which we know possess, they did not become part of the reading to be expected of a man with a serious interest in philosophy. Whether Diogenes Laertius had a serious interest in philosophy may be disputed, but it is noteworthy that he is ignorant of Andronicus' canon. The second is this. If they could be neglected after Andronicus, it is probable that they were neglected before. It is well-known that Cicero, *Topica* 3, regrets contemporary lack of interest in Aristotle: his words are *qui ab ipsis philosophis prae-ter admodum paucos ignoretur, quibus eo minus ignoscendum est quod non modo rebus... adlici debuerunt sed dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam suauitate*. The last words show that he is reproaching the philosophers with neglect of the exoteric works: the few who are excepted from his condemnation may have read these, and not the treatises. It cannot be inferred that he knew, at the date when he wrote the *Topica*, of any philosophers who were concerned with these school-works. Ignorance of them, alleged by Plutarch also in the passage of *Sulla* with which this article began and by Strabo (13.1.54 p. 608) in a parallel account,

may have been a creeping disease, a case of ever increasing neglect, or it may be that from the beginning they had by and large escaped attention. To this problem I intend to return in another article.²⁰⁾

Trinity College,
Cambridge University

NOTES

1) I think it less probable that Plutarch meant that their copies were unreliable.

2) Andronicus' date is disputed. The careful discussion in P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* (Berlin and New York, 1973) 1.45-58, comes to the conclusion that he belonged to the first half of the 1st century B.C. He drew up lists (πύνακες) of Aristotle's works (Plutarch, *Sulla* 26), sometimes at least discussed their authenticity (Ammonius, *de interpretatione* 5.24ff.), and brought together related treatises (Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 24). Scholars speak of his 'edition'; I have more cautiously rendered Plutarch's phrase εἰς μέσον θεῖναι by 'made available'. The contents of this 'edition' are unknown; it need not have been co-extensive with his lists; on the other hand there is no reason to suppose that it was identical with our *Corpus*.

3) D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1969) 28-33, 225-238, approved by H. C. Cherniss in Loeb edition of Plutarch's *Moralia*, xiii, 2, p. 398.

4) 'Selbstverständlich hat P. Aristoteles gut gekannt. Allerlei wichtige Nachrichten über ihn stehen in den Vitae, besonders der des Alexander, zitiert sind Physik, Metaphysik, Topik, De caelo, De anima, Ethik, Politik, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, besonders häufig aber die (von ihm für echt gehaltenen) Problemata, einmal auch die Mirabiles auscultationes. Kenntnis der Poetik ist in De aud. poet. zu spüren.'

5) Henceforward these two works will be referred to as Düring *NHT* and Düring *ABT*.

6) *Der Aristotelismus* usw. 1.42: 'andere Philosophen und Gelehrten wie etwa Seneca, Quintilian, Lukian oder Plutarch sich ebensowenig wie er mit diesen Schriften im Original befassten.'

7) Although Helmbold-O'Neil's title is misleading, I acknowledge a great debt to their book, without which this article could not have been written.

8) Cf. Hesiod *Aspis* 395, Virgil *E.* 5.77, and *PLG* 3.316 Bergk, μακαρίζομέν σε, τέττιξ, ὅτι δενδρέων ἐπ' ἄκρων, ὀλίγον δρόσον πεπωκώς κτλ.

9) I exclude purely biographical mentions (26 B, 53 D, 78 D, 327 E, 331 E, 472 E, 503 A and B, 544 F, 1097 B, 1126 C and F, *Alcibiades* 234 d, *Cato* 354 a, *Alexander* 667 f, 695 a, 696 d, 707 a) and passages where the name occurs in a quotation from another author (604 D and 1045 A).

10) This seems to be the same as the work elsewhere called Ὀμηρικὰ ζητήματα (see below and Vita Marciana) or Ὀμήρου (or Ὀμηρικὰ) προβλήματα (Vita vulgaris) or Ὀμηρικὰ ἀπορήματα (Phrynichus s.v. βασί-

λίσσα). For ἀπορήματα as an alternative to προβλήματα cf. ZPE 33 (1979) 9.

11) Often supposed (e.g. by Rose and Ross) to mean Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, bk i, but taken by Düring, *ABT* 68, to be the items 20-24 in Diogenes Laertius' list of Aristotle's writings. It is not clear what R. Walzer, *Aristotelis Dialogorum fragmenta* (Florence, 1924) 66, means by 'pertinent ad formam, minime ad materiam dialogorum, cf. Platonem ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς.'

12) I find puzzling the reference to Thrasymachus' Ὑπερβάλλοντες, a work not mentioned elsewhere, and about which nothing is known. There is no other evidence that his teaching on rhetoric, although recognised to have been important in its day (Cic. *Orator* 40, Dion. H. *Isaeus* 20), was still used in Plutarch's time. But Dionysius of Halicarnassus had access to one of his works, from which he quotes (*Demosthenes* 3: DK. B.1), and Plutarch may have seen Ὑπερβάλλοντες, whatever it was.

13) P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* 435-6, concludes that Arius Didymus did not use Aristotle at first hand and (443) that his sources were ignorant of the work of Andronicus.

14) Editors print this sentence with the change of εἰς to Wytttenbach's εἰς without any indication of doubt. It appears to me to lack construction. Ἰσὼς.. ὄντας an accusative absolute (Schwyzer, *Gr. Gr.* 2.402) or dependent by most unusual syntax on λέγοντα? I suspect that some words have fallen out. Mr D. A. Russell suggests to me that εἰς may be sound, εἰς πέντε meaning 'as many as five'; I should prefer to emend, not to εἰς, but to ἐστὶ. If τι disappeared before π by haplography, εὐ would easily become εἰς.

15) This has now been finally established by F. Becchi, *Prometheus* 4 (1978) 261-280, 'L'Aristotelismo fonzionale in... Plutarco', who firmly rejects the use of *EN*, *EE*, or *MM*. Direct knowledge of Aristotle is denied by P. L. Donini also, *Tre studi sull' Aristotelismo nel II secolo D.C.* (Turin, 1974), 63-80, who concludes that it must be admitted that there is no direct connection between *de virtute morali* and the ethical works of the *Corpus* (p. 80).

16) M. Plezia, *Aristotelis privatorum scriptorum fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1977) E 6a, with bibliography.

17) Cf. Aristotle *Meteor.* 354 b 33, ὅσοι τῶν πρότερον ὑπέλαβον τὸν ἥλιον τρέφεσθαι τῷ ὕρῳ.

18) The origin of this list is much disputed, but the most likely answer is that it represents the contents of the library at Alexandria and was transmitted by Hermippus, pupil of Callimachus. If so, Flashar's guess that the 70 vols. had been assembled by Andronicus must be wrong. It is more likely that Andronicus placed our *Problemata* in his canon and so secured their survival.

19) It was not known to Cicero, Düring *NHT* 38, *Aristoteles* 124, but it was read by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ep. ad Amm.* 8, *comp. verb.* 197-8). O. Angermann (Diss. Leipzig, 1904) 13-27, reprinted in *Rhetorika*, ed. R. Stark (Hildesheim, 1968, 224-238) argues convincingly that it was not directly used by Demetrius Περὶ ἐρμηνείας (of uncertain date, but perhaps first half of the first century B.C.) or by Archedemus, whom Demetrius quotes and who has been identified by a quite uncertain guess with the Stoic of the late second century (*SVF* 3 p. 262); the same view of Demetrius is taken by F. Solmsen, *Hermes* 66 (1931) 243 (*Rhetorika* 287). Doubtless Aristotelian elements were preserved and modified among Peripatetic writers on rhetoric.

20) My thanks are due to Mr D. A. Russell, to whom this article is indebted for criticisms and suggestions. He has no responsibility for its opinions or possible mistakes.

THE FIRST PROLOGUE OF BABRIUS: LINES 14-16

JOHN VAIO

One of the most important contributions to the study of the text of Babrius in this century is a footnote in Professor Turyn's *The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides*,¹⁾ in which *inter alia* he cautions any future editor of Babrius (e.g., the present writer) to collate the Athoan MS (Brit. Mus. Add. MS 22087 = A) carefully by *autopsy*. In a volume honoring this great scholar it is appropriate that the usefulness of this advice be noted.

The text in question is lines 14-16 of Babrius' first prologue, found on fol. 3 *recto* of A. The MS has suffered very serious damage here, and the original writing has been retraced by two later hands (one of them Triclinius'),²⁾ whose work is not always a guarantee of the original. Thus an editor of the *Mythiambi* needs spend many an hour examining this page in natural, artificial and ultra-violet light with the aid of various magnifying devices.

Let us begin by resuming the matter of lines 1-13. Babrius tells his dedicatee of the three ages of man, of which the Golden was witness to the ability of animals to speak like humans. Other verbal phenomena included pine trees, the leaves of laurels, fish and sparrows. "All things grew from the earth, which required nothing, and mortals consorted with gods."

The next three lines read as follows in A:³⁾

14 μαθων δ' ἄρ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχοντα καὶ γνοίης
ἐκ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἡμῶν γέροντος Αἰσώπου
μύθους φράσαντ[ος] τῆς ἐλευθέρης μούσης.⁴⁾

The main problem in line 14 is raised by μαθων δ' ἄρ (= μαθὼν δ' ἄρ'). The *editio princeps* of A⁵⁾ was based on a copy made by Mynas, which read μάθοις δ' ἄν. All subsequent editors of Babrius agree that this is A's reading. This includes Crusius,⁶⁾ who used a collation made by Eberhard,⁷⁾ and Perry,⁸⁾ who apparently used a microfilm copy of A.⁹⁾

The first dissident was Mynas himself, who wrote μαθὼν δ' αὖ in another copy he made of A (Vatopedi cod. 736 fol. 58^r).¹⁰⁾ Next comes Pius Knoell, who twice reported the correct reading,¹¹⁾ but (alas!) went unheeded first by Crusius, then by Perry. Not, however, by the present writer, who has re-examined the passage carefully in both natural and ultra-violet light, generously aided and abetted by Mr Nigel Wilson, who agrees in reading omega-nu after theta and rho before οὕτω: *sc.* μαθων.. ρ.

Between nu and rho the ink has almost entirely disappeared, but the pen strokes can still be made out on the surface of the parchment, and traces of ink are visible under ultra-violet light. Thus delta and alpha (following nu) are probable readings. Knoell read the letter following alpha as nu, though he noted rho as possible. The loop of a rho is visible, and nu may be ruled out. The original accent on omega is lost. An acute (a sharp stroke in black ink) was added probably by Triclinius, who treated δ' as enclitic.¹²⁾ Following delta traces of apostrophe, smooth breathing and grave accent justify the report given above.

In his later report Knoell states that the reading of the first hand (μαθὼν δ' αὖ or μ. δ' ᾠρ') was subsequently altered to μάθοις δ' αὖ by another hand. There is, however, no trace of -οις visible in A. Thus μάθοις should be considered Mynas' conjecture, falsely reported as A's reading and so printed by Boissonade.

A reads (with minimal restoration) μαθὼν δ' ᾠρ'. Is this acceptable? Crusius denies Babrius the use of ᾠρα, as opposed to ᾠρα.¹³⁾ But normal poetic usage (cf. Denniston, *Greek Particles*² 33-41, 44-46) and the evidence of A here are sufficient to set aside this dogma. Again, the transitional and consequential use of δ' ᾠρα (= "and so"), which suits the present passage, is found at Babrius fab. 72.19 (δ' ᾠρα) and is amply attested in writers of the Second Sophistic: cf. Philostr. *VA* 1.9, 12 (1.8.12, 11.24 Kayser); Aristid. *Panath.* 23 (1.26 Behr = 1.162.16 Dindorf); and in general, Schmid, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern* 1.183, 425; 2.304; 3.335; 4.550.

Again, δ' ᾠρ' (as opposed to δ' αὖ) permits us to take the participle as factual and temporal rather than modal: "And so having learned that this is so (*sc.* from vv. 1-13) ..." ¹⁴⁾ Καί may then be taken as adverbial, and the optative as one of wish: "... may you also come to know (this) from wise old Aesop..." The potential optative without αὖ is also possible: "... you may also come to know (this) ..." ¹⁵⁾

We next turn to line 15, where the problems are primarily metrical. As transmitted by A, the verse lacks caesura and contains hiatus.¹⁶⁾ Two such anomalies cannot stand together. Triclinius has written the letters beta, alpha and gamma (in that order) over the last three words, indicating the following transposition: γέροντος ἡμῶν Αἰσώπου. This removes hiatus and restores caesura. The genitive pronoun (better taken as enclitic ἡμῶν¹⁷⁾) makes sense as possessive: "sapientis senis nostri Aesopi" (Boissonade).¹⁸⁾

But we are still faced with a serious metrical difficulty. A long in element 9 is very rare,¹⁹⁾ and the violation of Porson's Law raises considerable doubt, especially in view of A's interpolated violations at lines 3f:

τρίτη δ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν <-> ἐγενήθη χαλκείη.
μεθ' ἣν γενέσθαι φασι θείαν ἡρώων.²⁰⁾

The remaining evidence in A regarding Porson's Law serves to increase doubt even further. For example, at the end of 103.4 A reads ἀληθῶς ἀσθμαίνων. Here the offensive long is removed by the *Suda's* ἀληθές.

Two other instances of violation occur in the metrical epimythia, which are frequently the products of interpolation.²¹⁾ One of these (13.13f) warns against incurring undeserved *hatred* by associating with wicked men. But the fable stresses the *capture* and *execution* of an innocent stork caught in a trap intended for guilty cranes (cf. 13.1f, 4, 11f). This weak summary is more likely the work of an interpolator than of Babrius.²²⁾

The case is more complicated at 82.9-11, which reads as follows:

9 Ἀρχόμενον ἄρτι τὸ θρασὺ τῶν ὑβριζόντων,
κἂν μικρὸν ἦ, κώλυε, μηδὲ συγχώρει
εὐκαταφρόνητον εἶναι σαυτὸν τοῖς φαύλοις.

At line 11 the impossible long in element 7 is eliminated by transposition (sc. σαυτὸν εἶναι).²³⁾ But we are left with a violation of Porson's Law and a suspicious "dactyl" as well.²⁴⁾ Moreover, μηδὲ - φαύλοις (10f) has little to do with the fable which precedes.

There a sleeping lion is startled by a mouse and later replies to a fox who makes fun of him for so reacting: "You wretch! It's not that I fear the mouse may scratch my hide in his escape. But he was about to make a mess on my mane." The point is that what seems small and insignificant may do real damage, and this is the message of 9f (Ἀρχόμενον ... κώλυε), but not of the rest of the epimythium. Moreover, it is precisely line 11 that raises the metrical problems noted above. The

solution proposed here is to delete line 11 and treat κώλυε μηδὲ συγχώρει as the end of the epimythium.²⁵⁾ Thus another violation of Porson's Law is eliminated.

This leaves 99.4.²⁶⁾ In this fable an eagle proposes partnership to a lion. "Fine," says the lion

3 "ἀλλ' ἄ γ' >²⁷⁾ ἐνέχυρον δώσεις
τῷ κυπτέρῳ²⁸⁾ σου μὴ μεθεῖναι τὴν πίστιν.
πῶς γὰρ φίλῳ σοι μὴ μένοντι πιστεύσω;"

It must be admitted that apart from violating Porson's Law the end of line 4 is unexceptionable. "So as not to let go your pledge" means "so as not to break your pledge."²⁹⁾ The aorist aspect after negation and the article ("your") are both in order.

Thus one could argue that Pr. 1.15 and 99.4 support one another and that two instances of word-end after a long ninth element should be admitted in the *Mythiambi*. But against this we should note the following. (1) Not only are there no other instances of this metrical anomaly in some 1700 verses, but a short is almost universal in element 9. (2) Three instances of this anomaly in A are shown to be corrupt on the evidence of other witnesses; two occur in epimythia that are probably interpolated. (3) Neither at Pr. 1.15 nor at 99.4 are we dealing with technical terms or proper names that could not otherwise be accommodated in the choliambus. (4) The anomaly at Pr. 1.15 is itself the result of conjecture. We are thus entitled to conclude that the text in both passages is corrupt. The easiest solution at 99.4 is to read μὴ μεθεῖναι πίστιν,³⁰⁾ and at Pr. 1.15 Seidler proposes ἤμιν for ἡμῶν.³¹⁾

In conclusion, Pr. 1.14-16 should read:

μαθὼν δ' ἄρ' οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχοντα καὶ γνοίης
ἐκ τοῦ σοφοῦ γέροντος ἤμιν Αἰσώπου
μύθους φράσαντος τῆς ἐλευθέρης μούσης.

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

NOTES

1) (Urbana 1957, rpr. Rome 1970) 250ff n. 236 (henceforth: *ManTradEur.*)

2) On Triclinius' activities on fol. 3^r see Turyn, *ManTradEur* 250f n. 236 with pl. XV.

3) This and subsequent reports of A are based on autopsy.

- 4) φράσαντ... A: suppl. Triclinius. ἐλευθέρας A post corr.
- 5) *Babrii fabulae iambicae CXXIII*, ed. J. F. Boissonade (Paris 1844).
- 6) *Babrii fabulae Aesopeae*, ed. O. Crusius (*ed. mai.* Leipzig 1897). Henceforth: Crusius.
- 7) Cf. Crusius, pp. III-IV.
- 8) *Aesopica* I (Urbana 1952) p. 237; *Babrius and Phaedrus* (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1965) pp. 2f. In both editions Perry reprints Crusius' μάθοις ἄν without noting the deletion of δ'.
- 9) I infer this from the paleographic errata at CP 52 (1957) 23 n. 7. For the truth cf. Knoell, *WSt* 31 (1909) 205f, who collated the original.
- 10) I wish to thank the director and staff of the *Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes* for the opportunity to collate a microfilm copy of this MS.
- 11) *WSt* 3 (1881) 192f, *WSt* 31 (1909) 204.
- 12) Cf. W. J. W. Koster, *Autour d'un MS d'Aristophane ...* (Groningen 1957) 84 n. 1.
- 13) Index, s.v. ἄρα (p. 322).
- 14) Cf. Goodwin, *GMT* § 224; Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 1048.
- 15) On the usage see Kühner-Gerth 1.225f and Schwyzler-Debrunner 2.325.
- 16) On caesura see Crusius, pp. XLVI-VII; on hiatus, *id.* p. L.
- 17) On these forms see Eur. *Hipp.* ed. W. S. Barrett (Oxford 1964) p. 425.
- 18) *Op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 5).
- 19) Cf. Crusius, pp. XL-XLI.
- 20) That these lines are interpolated is proven by an ancient witness, *P Bour* 1 (fourth century A.D.). For the text cf. P. Collart, *Les Papyrus Bouriant* (Paris 1926) p. 25. On the interpolations in A cf. Immisch, "Babriana," *RhM* N.F. 79 (1930) 158-167; Perry, "Babriana," CP 52 (1957) 16f. Contrast B. Gatz, *Weltalter, goldene Zeit und sinnverwandte Vortellungen* ("Spudasmata" 16: Hildesheim 1967) 84 n. 55, who fails to take the metrical evidence into account.
- 21) The fundamental modern study is E. Hohmann, *De indole atque auctoritate epimythiorum Babrianorum* (Diss. Königsberg 1907). See also Perry, *op. cit.* 2 (*supra*, n. 8) pp. lxii-lxiv; Luck, *Gnomon* 39 (1967) 569f.
- 22) Contrast Hohmann, 30-33. Note that the violation of Porson's Law arises from Boissonade's correction of A's hypermetric reading at 13.13.
- 23) Indicated by a later hand (not Triclinius') in A.
- 24) Apart from 82.9, 11 there are 18 examples of resolved element 2 following long element 1 in Babrius. Five parallel 82.9 (30.6, 62.1, 54.2, 86.5, 112.9); one parallels 82.11 (80.4: note that the "dactylic" opening of 75.6 results from an unnecessary conjecture of Crusius). The occurrence of two such "dactyls" in the space of three lines has no parallel in Babrius.
- 25) For the use of μηδέ see Kühner-Gerth 2.293; Denniston, *Greek Particles*² 191. For the stylistically unexceptionable pleonasm see Kühner-Gerth 2.586. Hohmann, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 21) 103 holds that the epimythium as a whole misses the point of the fable, but his argument is not cogent.

26) By assuming false prosody we can create a violation of Porson's Law at 65.1a Crusius (quoted by the *Suda*): Αίβυσσα γέρανος ἥδε ταῶς εὐπήληξ. But if we are to assume that Babrius scanned the alpha of ταῶς long, we might as well give him the form ταός assumed by τινες at Choerob. in *Theod.* 1.284.13ff: cf. ταοί at Jacoby, *FGrHist* 541 F 2 (Menodotus) = Athen. 14.655A; Pollux 6.52.

27) The two MSS (A and V) that preserve this fable have probably lost a short syllable between ἀλλ' and ἐνέχυρον, since a word of type ~~~ in elements 8-10 is more probable than a word of type ~~~~ in elements 7-9. The former is found at 102.5, 140.6 (cf. 47.8); the latter, only by conjecture in v. 3 of Pr. 1.3-5 interpolated in A (see Crusius' text and apparatus), though 2.14 is a possible parallel. Thus AV probably lack a short in element 7, which is most easily supplied by Eberhard's supplement printed here (made in *Babrii fabulae* ed. A. Eberhard [Berlin 1875]). For ἀλλά γε see J. Blomqvist, *Greek Particles in Hellenistic Prose* 129 with n. 65.

28) So V, as interpreted by Rutherford in his edition of Babrius (London 1883) *ad loc.* Contrast P. Knöll, "Neue Fabeln des Babrius," *SBWien* 91 (1878) 675. The word here means "wing," not "quill-feather:" cf. *Anth Pal* 5.179.5 (= Gow-Page, *HellEpigr* line 4032) with Gow-Page *ad loc.* (vol. 2, p. 612).

29) Cf. ἀθετεῖν τὴν πίστιν found in Polybius and the *NT* (see Bauer, *WörterbNT*, s.v. ἀθετέω 1.a). Babrius may be imitating Homeric μεθήμι χόλον. Cf. also Aesch. *PV* 1037f, *Pers.* 699; Eur. *Med.* 176f, 590.

30) A. Eberhard, *Verbesserungsvorschläge zum Text des Babrios* (Berlin 1866) 12. The article, which would be natural in prose, was inserted by error. Then the aspect of the infinitive was changed to yield a verse of twelve elements.

31) In Eberhard's edition of Babrius (*supra*, n. 27). Rutherford, who supposes that the corruption in A lies too deep to yield to so easy a cure, may well be right (*op. cit.* [*supra*, n. 28] *ad loc.*).

Τί μοι λοιπὸν καταλέγειν τὰ περὶ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ Διονύσου καὶ Ἡρακλέους, ἢ Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς φιλοκόλπου καὶ Ἀφροδίτης τῆς ἀναισχύντου, ἀκριβέστερον πεποιηκότων ἡμῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον;

The point at issue in this characteristic outburst of Theophilus of Antioch¹⁾ is the meaning of the apparent *hapax legomenon* φιλόκολπος and its appropriateness to Athena. In his recent and judicious discussion, Miroslav Marcovich,²⁾ rightly scouting all current explanations,³⁾ has recourse to the emendation φιλόκομπος. If the text is to be changed, that is certainly the most attractive of the various proposals. But need we emend? In the sense of "garment lover", the epithet is defensible on two counts.⁴⁾ First, it would suit Athena in the light of the old Panathenaic ceremony of draping her statue with a new robe. Second, and perhaps more to the point, given her present juxtaposition with the shameless Aphrodite, Theophilus might be thought of as drawing upon the epigrammatic motif whereby a girl or woman dedicates her spinning implements to Athena, either in simple honour or because she is going over to the erotic service of Aphrodite.⁵⁾ In terms of language, it is worth subjoining that in one poem (AP 6.247) Athena is addressed as φιλέριθος, an epithet almost as rare⁶⁾ as the one in question.

University of Calgary

NOTES

1) *Ad Autolyicum* 3.3.22; cf. 1.9.9; 2.7.1, for similar effusions.

2) 'Theophilus of Antioch: Fifty-five Emendations,' *Illinois Classical Studies* 4 (1979), 89-93.

3) Which are mainly sexual in nature.

4) Thus, Ardizzone came closest to what is here proposed as the truth in taking the epithet to criticise Athena for devotion to elegant clothes; cf. Marcovich for reference and discussion.


5) AP 6.39, 47-8, 160, 174, 247, 283, 285, 288-9; cf. H. L. Levy, 'Terence, *Andria* 74-79, and the Palatine Anthology,' *AJP* 89 (1968), 470-1.

6) Seemingly only here and Theocritus 28.1.

PLOTINUS' ETHICAL THEORY

PAUL PLASS

In his treatise *On Dialectic* (I.3.6.6) Plotinus remarks that the theoretical part of ethics is provided by dialectic, while practical discipline is something 'added on.' Brief though it is, this is an accurate account of the status of ethics, which does rest directly on the ontological hierarchy traced by dialectic (I.3.4).



Vice and civic virtue both center on bodily life but differ in so far as the body dominates a life of vice, while the soul is dominant in a life of civic virtue. Civic or 'natural' (I.3.6.18) virtue represents the best in traditional public values (I.4.16.4; I.2.7.25: the 'decent' and 'good' man). It is the general code of restraints and common deficiencies which we observe to make life in the world with our fellowmen possible.¹⁾ Since body and the irrational soul at work in it (I.8.4.1f) are closely tied to matter, they display an absence of measure, and civic virtue accordingly is specifically the 'measure' imposed on physical passions (I.2.2.11f).²⁾

As measures, civic virtues resemble the noetic paradigm from which they are derived, and for that reason Plotinus concedes them a certain value. It is, he admits, unreasonable to hold that civic virtues completely fail to make us like the gods, and so tradition is correct in calling men of great public virtue 'divine' (I.2.1.23f). Heracles is an example: his active virtue and nobility won him the rank of god (I.1.12.31f). Similarly in his discussion of love

(III.5; I.6) Plotinus follows Plato in allowing substantial value to civic virtue, and in connection with reincarnation he says that civic virtue guarantees that the soul will reappear in human form (III.4.2.28).


But there is another side to the matter. Heracles' active virtue is actually embodied in his *ghost* and that is in Hades (cf. IV.3.27 where the ghost again represents his lower self). His career of endless wandering, building and fighting is preeminently an illustration of the external or environmental nature of civic virtue. But such virtue makes us resemble the gods only 'to a degree', and the myth thus dramatizes a deficiency which Plotinus elsewhere deals with more explicitly. Only inner virtue is truly free, since civic virtue presupposes external evils and is therefore under compulsion (VI.8.5.20f). Conventional values are imitations and 'traces' of the paradeigms (I.2.2.19), but it is also true that they *merely* imitate and are *mere* traces because they are tied to body.³⁾ Imitation is thus also a sign of inferiority, and that is so because the noetic paradeigm is itself *not* 'virtue'.⁴⁾ The paradeigm is beyond virtue, which exists only in the soul (I.2.1.28f; I.2.2.3; I.2.6.14f; I.2.7.2). As a result, though civic virtues do resemble the paradeigm, their resemblance is remote and therefore largely illusory.

This startling assertion of *discontinuity* between phenomena and paradeigm undergirds Plotinus's radical deprecation of conventional virtue.⁵⁾ He explains the discontinuity further by distinguishing the similarity between two things derived from a common source from the similarity between two things, one of which is derived from the other. In the former case the two things must also resemble each other; in the latter there need be no resemblance since the pair are not coordinate and the superior member may be quite different (I.2.2.5 f).⁶⁾ The second case is a rough application of the distinction between transcendent and immanent Form or instantiation: as the Form of heat is not itself hot (I.2.1.32f), so the Form of phenomenal virtue is not itself virtue or virtuous. The inferiority of civic virtue lies in its being a merely *immanent* empirical measure, which is in that respect unlike its paradeigm. The oddness of the situation is marked by

Plotinus's occasional apologetic use of the phrase 'as it were' when speaking of the paradeigm (I.2.6.17; I.2.7.3; I.2.2.3); it is a paradeigm, but one whose difference is especially strange in this context. And the reason for the discontinuity is at first sight equally odd: civic virtue (i.e., 'measure') is not really like the pattern because noetic reality displays no 'order, arrangement or symmetry' (I.2.1.45).⁷⁾ We can see how drastic Plotinus's revision of 'virtue' is going to be.

The gap between civic virtue and the 'non-virtuous' paradeigm has been opened in order to be filled by true virtue. As virtue, it has some relation to body (as does civic virtue), but unlike civic virtue it is tied closely to the paradeigm and is therefore 'very much a resemblance' (I.2.3.11). Since true virtue is an 'escape' to noetic reality (I.2.3.6; I.8.7.12), in becoming different from physical reality it becomes as 'like' as anything can be to the paradeigm.

We now have the following scheme. Secondary evils (physical misfortunes and moral evil) are evil by participation in primary evil (i.e., matter, I.8.8.38f). Civic virtue, which attempts to 'measure' secondary evil, is virtue by distant participation in the noetic paradeigm. True virtue is for the most part dissociated from secondary evil and beyond 'measure' because it participates in the noetic paradeigm more directly.



This general pattern lies behind a passage like II.9.2.3f:

There is one Mind, always the same and unchangeable, imitating the Father [the One] as far as it can. One part of our soul is always focused on noetic reality, another on phenomena, a third is between them. For since the soul is one nature, at times all of it is carried along with the best part, at times the worst part is dragged down and takes with it the middle (for the whole soul cannot be dragged down). This happens to it when it does not remain in the most beautiful sphere, where soul is not a part [but whole]...

As is often the case, a precise distribution of the phases is difficult. The upper level may be true virtue, the middle may be civic virtue (embodying a realistic compromise), and the lower may be a life of vice. Or perhaps the phases should be shifted one step up: the lowest level would be civic virtue, the middle true virtue (which from one point of view also mediates) and the highest would be direct grasp of noetic reality and therefore not 'virtue' at all.⁸⁾

All of this yields a strikingly negative view of true virtue, epitomized in Plotinus's characterization of it as 'stripping' or 'purification' (I.2.3.9).⁹⁾ Civic *sōphrosynē* measures desires, true *sōphrosynē* simply eliminates them (I.2.7.18f). The negativity comes to the surface most clearly at two points: Plotinus's devaluation of conventional virtue and the nature of his own metaphysical ethical principles. The former is a standard feature of Platonism going back to Plato's own criticism of 'demotic' virtue. The latter are more complex and enable Plotinus to reshape virtue in two closely related respects: true virtue turns out to be empirically empty and highly generic. The reality with which civic virtue deals is in terms of Plotinus's ontology 'dimensional', i.e., it is tied to the extended (spatial, temporal, material) world which makes up the context or environment for the many specific objects to which man reacts. It is discrete, concrete and divided (for the 'dividedness' of soul and body, cf. I.1.8.11f). Since Plotinus, however, takes account of a second noetic world he must rethink ethics for a second, wholly different situation: one that is not environmental or contextual, that is radically unified and unextended, internal rather than external and non-specific because there can be no events.

Conventional virtue, then, is limited by its own deficiency, that is to say, by the environmental *threats* which it is

forced to meet with a wide variety of 'measured' virtues or goods: preservation of life, satisfaction of basic physical needs (health, food, drink), adequate wealth, social standing and security, proper pleasure, political power, physical beauty, commanding personal presence, artistic skills, sound opinions and judgments, etc. Such implicitly futile goods figure prominently in Plotinus's critique of astrology, which is preoccupied with calculating ('measuring') relative goods and evils. Thus in II.3.14 he lists various goods which fall within the orbit of civic virtues and depend on environmental factors (cf. *to exō* in II.3.12.7). Conventional virtue at its best was epitomized in the four cardinal virtues summed up by Plotinus as follows (I.2.1.17f): wisdom is competence in discursive reasoning, bravery deals with aggressive impulses, self-control balances desire and reason, justice is proper distribution of authority and obedience. As products of habit and training (and not of wisdom) such virtues are defined by a social environment, and like it they are tied to vices (I.1.10.12f) and entail 'sin' (true virtue is 'sinless': I.2.6.1; I.1.9.1f; I.1.12.1).

Deprecation of civic virtue is thus due to the radical dissociation of soul from body on which Plotinus insists (e.g., I.1 or III.6.1-6) and which he can conceive of in drastic terms (e.g., his theory of multiple selves and unconscious mental processes). Dual personality raises in acute form the problem of the status of the empirical self, a problem implicit in *Ennead* I.1 ('What is a living creature?'). Even something so obviously our own as sexual desire is called in question: is man as a whole or some part of him its true agent (I.1.5.25f)? In the next section Plotinus uses the notion of soul's 'presence' (*parousia*) to define empirical man as a combination of body and the image emitted by soul as it is present to space. The elusiveness of such a creature leads him in I.1.7.6 to wonder how 'we' can be said to perceive, and in I.1.9.26 he still refers to the living creature in bafflement - 'whatever it is.' This is the more striking because *Ennead* I.1 is one of the latest treatises; after a lifetime of reflection Plotinus is still puzzled about something which might well seem self-evident. Little wonder, then, that the

civic virtue which goes with our ordinary selves is also problematic. Virtue is needed by those faced by evils not by those at peace, but that does not mean that virtue aims at *mastery* of the environment. In fact, the soul's encounter with eternals (*ta exō*) is more apt to occasion evil, and even civic virtue is tied to necessity. True virtue, on the contrary, is abandonment of environment, 'fleeing from here' and returning to the soul's 'ancient state' (II.3.8.13ff). In commenting again on the dictum 'one must flee from here' Plotinus remarks that it does not mean actually leaving this life but simply 'being just, holy and wise while living on earth' (I.8.6.10). This sounds ordinary enough, but he in fact redefines the major virtues in such a way that they are unearthly, radically unified and emptied of specific content.

	I.6.6	I.2.6	I.2.3.14
Self-control:	no association with bodily pleasure	reversion inward to Mind	impassivity
Courage:	no fear of death	impassivity due to likeness to the impassive paradeigm	detachment from body
Wisdom:	noesis which directs soul upward and turns it from lower concerns (cf. I.2.7.7)	contemplation of Mind's content	solitary activity
Justice:	—	soul's activity toward Mind	dominance of reason without opposition from other elements

These are highly abstract definitions, which reflect the fact that truth is for Plotinus radically internal; we *are* soul and do not 'have' a soul (I.1.13).¹⁰⁾ Purified soul is, in fact, a Form or *logos* (I.6.6.14; cf. I.8.1.9), and at this level the various virtues imply each other (I.2.7.1) in the sense that they all ultimately reduce to thought.¹¹⁾ We can again see why Plotinus refers to the Forms of virtues as 'quasi'-paradeigms - true virtue is so abstract and introverted that it scarcely answers to concrete ethical experience.

Plotinus describes the denial of environment and of its empirical content in various ways. In simplest terms, true virtue is 'closing the eyes' (I.6.8.4 and 25) - a natural image (which also suggests connections to initiation) because in Mind seeing becomes wholly internal as seer and seen coincide (V.8.10.35f). By the same token, waking up the soul is making it 'cease to see the so-to-speak external sights' in its dreams (III.6.5.10f); that is to say, empirical reality is a mere dream. The wider social/physical context of civic virtue is similarly denied when true beauty is sought not in external bodies but in one's own or others' inward beauty (I.6.5). Lovers accordingly 'long to withdraw themselves from bodies' (I.6.5.7), as soul generally 'gathers itself into its own places, so-to-speak' (I.2.5.6; cf. I.8.14.31).

As we have seen, the noetic plane has no 'order, arrangement, or symmetry' (I.2.1.45).¹²⁾ Moreover, the world soul - which occupies the highest position of any soul related to body and can be said to have no environment because it is not actually 'in' its body (III.4.4.4f) - dispenses with ordinary self-control and bravery because it has nothing external to fear, and it is without desire for pleasure because there is nothing external to acquire or enjoy (I.2.1.11f; cf. I.1.2.13; cf. I.4.11.11; I.4.3.29).¹³⁾ Though the visible gods have matter, they do not suffer from moral evil (I.8.5.31f), and by the same token they are beyond moral virtue as is the world soul. The world soul thus serves as a somewhat odd *ethical* model: when we can control our body with ease, we will be 'like' the world soul or astral souls (II.9.18.22f). This combination of true virtue, cosmic order and denial of environment proves to be useful to Plotinus in his controversy with the Gnostics, who in their way shared his rejection of environment. It enables him to take a middle position between their largely justified rejection of earthly life as evil and their unjustified rejection of the entire cosmos. Thus in II.9.5 and 7 he glosses over earthly evils and points instead to heaven to show that creation as a whole is the best possible. Starting as it does from the premiss that good and evil are not defined in any decisive way by the earthly environment, his line of argument is sound.

But it requires that celestial life be treated in effect as non-environmental, and Plotinus provides for that in his doctrine that celestial souls care for celestial bodies automatically, without deliberation and without involvement.

Detachment from environment is again a factor at work in Plotinus's critique of astrology and its ethical implications. His attack focusses on its preoccupation with the visible universe (II.3) and especially on its insistence that planets are specific causes of individual external events. In fact, true causation is psychic and unified. Astrology thus assigns the role of wholes to mere parts and ignores the inner autonomy of soul (e.g., II.3.15.15f) and of virtue.¹⁴⁾ In III.1.1f he broadens his criticism to include a wider variety of theories which emphasize external causation. But soul in fact is the true cause, though it is so only when free from external factors. His own view of providence is, of course, bound to start from the undeniable fact that the goodness of the universe is mixed with evil and is dependent in part on the components of the universe being in their proper environment. But all such contextual and relative value is subordinate to the wholly unified logos which undergirds specific goods and evils: 'The universal logos is one, though divided into unequal parts', (III.2.17.75; cf. III.3.1). Our bodies are subject to astrological and magical influences (IV.4.40ff) since what is external can indeed be 'charmed', but Plotinus is skeptical about any influence which stars might have on character (IV.4.31.40f). He is guided by the same principle that leads him to deny creation of the universe in time: specific decisions are impossible in the noetic world because they presuppose time. Creation in time would be a specific event, hence derivation of the universe from the noetic world is intelligible only if it is non-temporal and non-specific. In the same way, while the world soul as a (timeless) whole exercises choice (*prohairesis*, IV.4.35.21f), its (temporal) parts do not, and in any case world soul's choice is directed not toward realizing specific empirical events but toward the Good.¹⁵⁾ That is why it is an ethical model, and since the Good - i.e., the One - is empty of empirical content and devoid of any environment, true virtue in

its own way must be denial of both empirical content and environment. 'Lives, fates and choices' are 'indicated' but not 'caused' by stellar patterns (IV.3.12.22), while virtue is entirely free (IV.4.39.2). Hence it - not specific external events - is the decisive cause. Providence thus stands to the universe much as true virtue stands to daily life: both respond to the specific demands of empirical existence, yet neither is immanent because their intention or vision remains non-specific. Though he is sympathetic to the inwardness of Stoic ethics, this line of thought leads Plotinus to reject their understanding of happiness as 'rational life'. He does so because as materialists (who also accepted astrology) they are bound to understand life in environmental terms (I.4.2.32f). Their contention that the wise man is happy even in the bull of Phalaris is admirable (and true) enough, but not demonstrable on materialist premises (I.4.13.7). Happiness must instead be focussed in noetic life so that it is not an (external) quality of life but radically at one with it (I.4.3.16f). Once inside this spaceless world, soul enjoys true virtue which is simply 'to be active alone', free of interaction with an environment (*apathēs*: I.2.3.15).

The other feature of noetic reality is its paradeigmatic or generic character. The paradeigms are generic because they are non-spatial and non-temporal. The former property is guaranteed to true virtue by the radical simplicity and unity which we have considered. The latter is argued for at length in I.5, where Plotinus shows that true happiness is totally independent of temporal events. Because it is timeless (*ou chronikon*) and dimensionless (*adiastaton*, I.5.7.24), it provides no environment for specific events, and any external factors that do flow from it - e.g., 'fine actions' and their 'results', I.5.10.13f - are irrelevant, since (as facets of *civic* virtue) they can be measured, while true virtue cannot be temporally quantified (I.5.3f). The timelessness of true virtue can be indicated by tense forms suggesting absence of process. The state of 'being purified' is inferior to that of 'having been purified' (I.2.4.4; I.2.7.9; cf. 'having been turned' to Mind, I.2.4.17; I.4.11.8).¹⁶⁾ True virtue makes

temporal psychic processes superfluous, for they take place in the 'trace' (or 'light' or 'image') projected by soul directly into the body in order to share in its life (I.1.6ff). That trace disappears (I.1.10.11; I.1.12.30) when separation from the processes rooted in genesis takes place. The adverb *ēdē* ('now', 'already') often signals the instant of transition from temporal process to a frozen, timeless state. In I.2.4.5 *ēdē* is combined with the timeless perfect tense: 'the virtue in being purified is less complete than that in having been purified, for the latter is already (*ēdē*) a sort of end or perfection.' 'True pleasures go with the presence of (true) goods and are not in movement or process, for now (*ēdē*) the goods are present' (I.4.12.5); desire for true life is not desire for past or future but for 'what now (*ēdē*) is' (I.5.2.13; cf. I.1.10.6; I.4.4.14; and perhaps I.1.9.19 and I.1.7.12).

Though Plotinus can speak of our identity (*tautotēs*) with god in purification (I.2.5.2), he commonly observes the distinction between true virtue and its paradeigm - i.e., between soul and Mind - and thus turns true virtue into the conceptual grasp of Forms which structure phenomena. Virtue is a direct vision or recollection of Forms but we still only receive their immaterial impression (*typos*),¹⁷ just as vision is distinct from its object (I.2.4.19; cf. I.2.7.6). Mind itself grasps by direct touch, soul by contemplation. Virtue is 'someone's', while each paradeigm is 'of itself', without parts. Civic justice expresses itself in multiple parts, while true justice is 'activity in one's own sphere' but now in a true 'one' (I.2.6.13f). In the next section (I.2.7) Plotinus offers definitions of the paradeigms of virtue. Wisdom (*noēsis*) is simply itself, i.e., '*epistēmē*' or '*sophia*'; self-control is 'relation to itself'; justice is 'an entity's own activity'; bravery is 'freedom from matter and purity in itself.' If we add these definitions to the definitions of virtue (above, p. 246), we have the following, progressively introverted grades: civic justice (for example) is keeping to one's place in the world, true justice is focusing one's reason on Mind, the paradeigm is Mind's internal activity. The contrast between the two virtues is that between our experience of specific instantiations (in civic

virtue) and our knowledge of the true virtues as objective, generic structures. Objectivity is preeminently a mark of Forms, and that phase of true virtue comes to the fore throughout I.4 as Plotinus contends that well-being is a wholly objective state independent even of consciousness. The notion of universals is explicitly introduced in the discussion of the relationship between dialectic and virtue in I.3.6. Plotinus begins with the general statement that ethics takes its theory from dialectic and adds (concrete) 'discipline and character'. Other (moral) virtues apply discursive reasoning to specific passions and actions; wisdom (*phronēsis*) is an additional discursive reason dealing with specifics yet doing so in a more universal way (*katholou*), while dialectic and *sophia*, in turn, provide 'in universal form without matter' everything needed by wisdom. It is not clear whether true virtue is restricted to the last phase or whether it includes one of the other phases. In any case, soul answers to the level of virtue which it has reached and so it too is either universal or particular: when separate (i.e., in true virtue) it is not individual but whole (*pasa*), and when not separate it focusses on (*epistatousa*) an external object and is partial (VI.4.16.32f).

The philosopher, then, has substantially abandoned civic virtue yet still lives in an environment, and that fact forces Plotinus toward the notion of multiple and partially unconscious selves. We have two selves (I.1.10.5; I.1.7.17f); in so far as the philosopher is wholly free of involuntary impulses he is a god 'following the First,' but if they persist 'he is a double person - god and demon - or rather he has with him someone else who has a different virtue' (I.2.6.3f). For all its metaphysical abstractness and preoccupation with the true self Plotinus's ethical theory is forced to remain concrete at the point of overlap between the two realms, and that is where we have some idea of what a life of true virtue is actually like.

In I.4.4-6 and 11 Plotinus analyzes human motivation in terms of a loose distinction between non-environmental will (*boulēsis*) and environmental wish (*thelein*). The former is the driving force of true virtue and expresses its unity; in

willing we 'are what we have' and seek no more because will embraces its object for its own sake. But there are environmental factors to be considered, too. Though necessities are not objects of will, the man of true virtue does 'know' them and uses discursive reason to avoid difficulties. The distinction, then, comes to this:

(A) we do not *will* to avoid evils (though we *wish* to do so)

(B) rather, we *will* not to *have* to avoid them (i.e., we will to be safe in Mind).¹⁸⁾

Plotinus shows that will is dissociated from environment by noting (I.4.6.26) that we are indifferent to health - i.e., we do not truly will it - when we have it. (B) corresponds to the denial of environment in true virtue. Civic virtue and 'wish' are introduced into the discussion of motivation in I.4.11. The good man 'would wish' that all evils be gone and all men prosper (=A), though his happiness is not affected if they do not. But if such a wish is wholly serious (i.e., if it becomes something willed) it is absurd, for evils are bound to exist. A serious and authentic 'will' can only be internal (=B). (A) is a gesture of common decency to the concerns of civic virtue; to wish evils away - sincerely but not *too* seriously - is (so to speak) a pious fraud pointing to the ambiguity of true virtue's relation to the world. The serious wish is a violation of (A), i.e., it is the illusion that specific evils can really be dealt with on their own level.¹⁹⁾

In I.4.14.21f Plotinus remarks that a young man actually is better off if he experiences poor health. An old man needs neither pleasure nor pain, and though he will resist pain with his natural powers, health is not of real worth to him. Will and wish overlap in a delicate balance here between 'willed' denial of environment and 'wished' response to it. Plotinus's view of suicide follows the same pattern (I.9). It is not permissible because we are bound to care for our body, but we do so by allowing it to die, i.e., neglecting to kill it. Not specifically killing it is the 'positive' gesture of 'wishing' care toward the most immediate environment which we have - a gesture so void of content, however, that it is simultaneously a 'willing' generic denial

of the environment as such.

The residual empirical life of the man who has attained true virtue, then, has an oddly suspended quality to it. He is like the stars or like a 'great and beautiful statue studied in face and chest with stars' (III.2.14.25f) - images which are suggestive both of remoteness and unreality. On the one hand, the wise man responds to the demands of circumstance and in his personal relationships he is neither unfriendly nor insensitive. Yet there is a touch of unintentional irony when Plotinus adds that as the wise man is to others 'so he is to himself' (I.4.15.23). He is anything but well-disposed to himself in any ordinary sense of the term, and in respect to others he can group *pity* with envy and jealousy as examples of moral evils to which true virtue is superior (I.1.10.14f). The wise man 'knows' death, but the distress he feels at the death of friends and relatives affects only his irrational part; 'he himself' simply refuses to accept grief (I.4.4.32f; III.2.15.49f). Because his knowledge is generic he is immune to specific grief. Though evil men have a place in the scheme of things, part of that scheme is that we do not feel sympathy for them (III.2.17.15). After death the higher part of soul is still able to recollect without passion the best experience transmitted to it from the lower soul: friends, children, wife, country. But gradually it forgets them too, 'for it is best even on earth to detach oneself from human concerns' (IV.3.32). As we have seen, Plotinus criticized the Stoics for failing to justify their conviction that the wise man is happy even in Phalaris' bull. They failed because as materialists they had no way of truly transcending the material environment and its values. Plotinus himself meets the difficulty with his conception of a non-environmental self. But in a sense he succeeds too well. For if our true self is radically free from body, 'we' are detached not only from emotional distress but from everything phenomenal,²⁰⁾ and Plotinus does not justify the continuing involvement in ordinary life which he evidently assumes.²¹⁾ In III.6.5.1 he raises the question of what role philosophy can have if the soul is essentially passionless, and he does not really find an adequate answer.²²⁾ The picture sketched

in Porphyry's *Life* illustrates the contradiction: Plotinus is deeply engaged in some ordinary concerns of life, wholly indifferent to others. The situation is epitomized in the curious account of how he was 'present at once to himself and to others' (8.12f) and so could carry on a social conversation without breaking the train of his philosophic thought.

In Plotinus' ethical theory, then, the wise man sees ordinary life as a routine, ritual or play. He views the world of temporal events as though he were a spectator in a theater (III.2.15.44f). His seat is the noetic world made up of fixed patterns, the temporal world is the stage of free will and chance, and the two are held together by providence, which brings into events such coherence as they have. The Forms are very general patterns quite different from time; on the other hand, events are highly specific occurrences quite different from Forms, and as a function of transcendent soul providence binds the two. It does so by embodying the *pattern* of events and thus constitutes a 'transcendent' time in so far as it embodies *timeless* patterns. This elusive intermediate region is characterized by Plotinus in terms that recall his distinction between the phase of virtue that consists in 'being purified' and the phase that 'has been purified'; like the latter, the pattern 'has been written' (II.3.7.6). Elsewhere Plotinus likens providence to a play which is already written by the cosmic playwright and which we perform in time (III.2.15.25f; 17f). True virtue is what guides a man who lives his life in accordance with the supra-temporal 'script.' From this point of view the Forms become in effect a collection of rough sketches, an epitome or shorthand version of the story-line of time. Providence and true virtue are generic, time and civic virtue are specific. Time, i.e., discursive 'history', occurs when the pattern is actually played out under the influence of free will and chance, while the pattern itself is generic in the sense that it is a fixed outline contained in logoi or Forms. True virtue is the code which shapes the life of a man who exists in both worlds but who in a very special sense only 'goes through the motions' because he lives for true, motionless reality. This generic

view of things is bound to lend a sense of unreality, remoteness and ambiguity to the experience of time.²³⁾ The choice of lives in Plato's myth of Er suggests such a generic view of time, and in III.4.5 Plotinus does interpret the choice of a complete 'life-type' (*bios*) along with a guardian daemon as a symbol for souls' 'universal, general choice and disposition.' Soul's choice reflects its character and that has a pretemporal dimension. Hence when Plotinus himself uses astrological motifs (e.g., each soul enters its temporal life as though boarding a ship and Necessity then assigns it a seat, 6.48f), he is not thinking primarily of specific, immanent material causes but of generic causation. Life and its values are intelligible only from a general, timeless point of view, and that is especially true of the wise man, who sees his own life as an exemplification of noetic reality in the form of true virtue.²⁴⁾ Taken in conjunction with the world soul's role as model for true virtue (above, p.247), passages which speak of individual souls joining the world soul in governance of the universe (e.g., IV.8.2.20) again imply a non-discursive grasp of time - now on a scale much larger than that in the choice of an individual life. True virtue is an assimilation of our lower to our higher self resulting in 'felt realization of immortality, of the goodness of Providence, of the existence in eternal reality of the world of Forms.'²⁵⁾ It is not yet a full vision of the One, and since it is part of continuing though detached earthly life it embodies the ambivalence which Plotinus himself catches in the distinction between the present and perfect tenses of 'purification' (above, p.249). As everything environmental is stripped away the soul becomes at once empty and full, because in terms of Platonic ontology to be emptied of phenomenal reality is to be filled with true reality.

Even the peroration which ends I.6 has a notably abstract flavor despite its hymnic eloquence. We must chisel off unwanted parts to make ourselves into fine statues and permit the 'godlike glory of virtue to shine out.' Then we will not be hindered in 'becoming one' and 'being pure with ourselves'; in fact we will be pure light or all eye, not 'measured by spatial dimensions great or small' but 'unmeasured' because

we are greater than any measure. Chiseling is 'being purified', the glory which shines out is 'having been purified', the 'measure' is civic virtue, and the transmutation into statue, eye or light is true virtue.

University of Wisconsin

NOTES

1) Cf. VI.3.16.27f for immanent civic or practical virtues which do achieve what is desirable and not merely necessary. II.9.9.14f emphasizes the competition in civic virtue through which each gets what he deserves (though the results do not in any case really matter).

2) Since virtue is the function of a moral agent, it is 'measure' in the soul rather than in the body, and soul then becomes a kind of 'matter' (I.2.2.19f). By using the Form/matter model Plotinus can make soul itself 'measured' in respect to virtue or Form and 'measuring' in respect to matter. As *logos*, soul carries Form into matter.

3) 'Trace', 'shadow' or 'image' are regular terms for the lowest levels of soul's activity (e.g., IV.3.10.39; IV.4.18.7; IV.4.19.3).

4) Cf. 'Quantity does not itself have quantity' (II.4.9.5). Forms are not qualities (II.6), which are not properly parts of noetic being and scarcely of phenomenal being either. They are rather empirical states subsequent to 'being,' and when Plotinus mentions 'virtues and vices, beauty and ugliness' (II.6.2.23f) he is thinking of qualitative, empirical civic virtues as opposed to the paradeigms. I.8.8: Form by itself 'does' nothing and therefore matter must be the cause of (empirical) evil. Soul comes under a similar principle. As something simple it does not admit what it causes in others (I.1.2.7), e.g., it gives body power to have passions but itself remains *apathēs* (I.1.6.5). For soul as Form cf. I.8.1.9.

5) In I.2.1.52 he admits how drastic his position is by promising 'persuasion' in addition to the 'force' of the argument which establishes the discontinuity.

6) The restatement of the distinction in I.2.7.25f apparently treats the three things in the former case as all coordinate. For when Plotinus says that one must abandon the life of the good man as defined by civic virtue and emulate the gods, he is implying that in the similarity which civic virtue entails there is only an immanent standard: good men are similar to another good man who is their model. They are not similar to the genuine paradigm of virtue as is the man of true virtue.

7) As a Form, true Beauty, too, is not a matter of symmetry but of simplicity (I.6.1.21f; cf. VI.7.22.25). Cf. I.2.3.20f: true virtue is soul's pure activity (thought), and that genuinely resembles the paradigm. At the same time, since only soul and not Form is 'disposed', even true virtue is unlike the paradigm.

8) Since Plotinus thinks hierarchically, multiple levels of virtue appear frequently in the *Enneads*. III.5.1.25f: (1) love of true beauty,

(2) 'sinless' and restrained love of physical beauty (i.e., civic virtue), (3) vice. V.9.1: (1) some divine men are able to 'fly home above the clouds', (2) others fall back to a life of (civic) virtue, (3) others never rise above matter. IV.4.17 treats the three levels in 'Augustinian' terms as three cities: (1) the best city is ruled by the man of reason, (2) the middle preserves a certain degree of order, (3) the lowest is popular misrule. II.9.9: (1) men of true virtue, (2) men of civic virtue, (3) the mob, which provides necessities for its betters. III.2.8: (1) some men are like gods, (2) some are like animals, (3) the majority are in between and deservedly end up as the victims of the worst men because they neglect to discipline themselves. Plotinus probably would here connect the majority with civic virtue, which he views more optimistically in the next section (9.20f). Plotinus's theory of the major planes on which soul exists provides the model into which the three levels of virtue and vice fit: (1) All-soul, (2) world soul and celestial souls, (3) individual souls in bodies. IV.8.2: souls at the intermediate level are not properly 'in' bodies or are so only in a universal, 'whole' manner, while other souls 'go farther into body' to become 'partial' and specific (cf. IV.3.17).

9) Cf. J. Trouillard, 'Valeur Critique de la Mystique Plotinienne,' *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 59 (1961), 440. For the negative, introverted and asocial nature of virtue cf. R. Arnou, *Le Désir de Dieu* (U. Grégorienne: Rome, 1967), 43f (for Plotinus men do not have relationships with each other but like radii run parallel and meet only in the center, 47); P. Hadot, 'Le Mythe de Narcisse et son Interpretation par Plotin,' *Nouvelle Revue de Psychoanalyse* 13 (1976), 105f; O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung* (de Gruyter: Berlin, 1940), 26f; P. Hadot, *Plotin ou la Simplicité du Regard* (Plon: Paris, 1963), 70f.

10) For a more detailed classification cf. W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia* (Triltsch: Würzburg, 1959), 150. Himmerich identifies the noetic paradigms with the four major classes of Being (153f).

11) For the close connection of mind and virtue cf. VI.8.5.34: virtue is a 'kind of mind' or mind's *energeia* (VI.2.18.15).

12) Mind, of course, does have complex order from another point of view, since it is made up of many Forms (e.g., I.2.7). All physical order - especially that of the universe - is derived from Mind.

13) Soul and the universe do not get anything from 'outside' (circular motion has no *exō*, II.2.1.11), but they do take from 'higher' planes of reality (I.2.1.15; I.2.4.18; I.2.6.18). The word *ekeithen* ('from yonder') often marks this second, non-external relation. For the doctrine of inner and outer *energeia* (the latter being spatial activity in the case of soul) cf. V.1.3.8f; V.1.6; V.3.7.26f; I.1.2.8f. Civic virtue is a form of the latter.

14) In so far as their determinism reduces all causes to one great pantheistic cause the Stoics' understanding of astrology might be thought of as itself highly generic. Plotinus observes that such a single cause is tantamount to absence of any cause (III.1.4.12f), and in any case strictly immanent, material causation cannot be generic in his sense of the term because it exists only in its instances. Cf. G. Clark, 'Plotinus' Theory of Empirical Responsibility,' *The New Scholasticism* 17 (1943), 18f.

15) Cf. V.1.2.30 for world soul directing the universe by *boulēsis*; VI.8.5.20: *boulē* and *logos* are free, while (civic) virtue depends on external actions.

16) The pairs *chōrizomenē/chōristē* in I.1.10.9 and *anachōrēsis/chōrismos* in I.1.12.18 perhaps point to the same distinction; for the perfect tense marking a timeless state cf. I.4.4.15.

17) Throughout I.2.4 Plotinus struggles to preserve a distinction between Mind and soul (and true virtue). Cf. VI.5.7.3 for *typoi* as inferior to the full identity of subject and object in Mind. In V.9.13.11 he moves a step closer to identity: the virtues in our soul on earth are not merely images of the noetic patterns, but the patterns are 'here in some other way.'

18) Cf. I.4.8.28: we do not *wish* misfortune (=A), rather, we set virtue against it to make the soul difficult to disturb, (i.e., we *will* avoidance of the possibility of grief =B). In III.8.6.5f Plotinus observes that men of action seek to internalize the object of their activity by 'knowing' it. That is to say, all men really 'will' to have and be the Good as they 'wish' to have goods. VI.8.5 and 6: soul 'wills' not to need to exercise (civic) virtue and does not 'plan' (= 'wish') to be affected by necessary external events, but when it is, it takes whatever steps are needed to preserve its inner autonomy (=its 'will'). But Plotinus often ignores a distinction between wish and will.

19) Cf. I.4.7.1f: A man of true virtue does 'wish' to have necessities, since external evils may be fatal or at least may intrude into the relationship between soul and true being as an unwelcome third. This = (A). I.2.6.1f: drastic curtailment of bodily demands makes us 'sinless', but our true intent (*spoudē*) 'is not to be sinless but to be gods.' Apotheosis is (B); sinless detachment from the body here seems equivalent to (A), i.e., the lower phase of true virtue in which we are 'being purified'; 'sin' is civic virtue. I.4.7.33f is especially interesting. Only an odd man would be content to die before witnessing (say) the enslavement of his daughters on the ground that an evil he has not seen cannot happen. Everyone knows that such specific evils may and will occur (this seems to be the force of *an doxai hōs kai genēsomenou*), (though we all *wish* that they do not =A). But if the possibility does not affect our happiness, the actual event should not do so either (=B). The argument is that if even in the case of ordinary virtue happiness is not held hostage to the uncertainty of temporal life (where many things may or may not happen), all the more in the case of true virtue should it not be affected when evil actually occurs. It is precisely the aim of true virtue to turn such detachment from actual evil into a way of life, (though Plotinus goes on to mention purely empirical reasons - some people are better off, after all, for being slaves, and suicide in any case is always available; cf. III.2.18.17f). His fundamental point is that 'overcoming' specific evils by merely avoiding them is empty; they must be made to vanish once for all in a generic view of existence.

20) Though Plotinus admits that civic virtues are a necessary stage for true virtue (I.3.6.15f), it ultimately makes them irrelevant (I.2.7.23f). In fact, if body ceased to exist, soul would not be distressed (II.1.4.33; cf. II.9.7.23f and V.5.12.43f for the general principle of high level indifference to lower levels).

21) For Plotinus's failure fully to integrate ethics into metaphysics cf. J. Rist, *The Road to Reality* (Cambridge U: Cambridge, 1967), 165f. Another aspect of the same problem is the ambiguous status of soul's descent: in so far as emanation is necessary, the descent is neutral or good, but in so far as it is a subjective, willed 'fall' the descent is evil. Rist, 112f; H. Blumenthal, *Plotinus's Psychology* (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1971), 4f; J. Katz, *Plotinus's Search for the Good* (Columbia U:

N.Y., 1950), 52f; V. Schubert, *Pronoia und Logos* (Pustet: Munich and Salzburg, 1968), 103f; H. Schlette, *Das Eine und das Andere* (Hueber: Munich, 1966), 204f, 224; Clark (above, n. 14), 16f.

22) Cf. Blumenthal (above, n. 21), 54f, 66, who reduces the difficulty to some extent by construing *apathēs* as 'morally resistant to evil.'

23) The elusiveness of temporal existence comes out also in the elusiveness of our empirical self; cf. H. Buchner, *Plotins Möglichkeitslehre* (Pustet: Munich and Salzburg, 1971), 111 on the desire of the human soul to destroy itself; Himmerich (above, n. 10), 73f, 84; Blumenthal (above, n. 21), 109f; G. O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self* (Irish U: Shannon, 1973); Rist, 'Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus,' *American Journal of Philology* 49 (1967), 417f.

24) This typically abstract NeoPlatonic view of life may have contributed to the intellectual climate which produced the deficient medieval sense of time and history (P. Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past*, Arnold: London, 1969, 1f, 19).

25) Rist (above, n. 23), 419f.

SOME REMARKS ON THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF
THE MAXIMUS FLORILEGIUM

MARGARET B. PHILLIPS

The sacred-profane florilegium attributed to Maximus the Confessor has long been known to exist in two main versions at least,¹⁾ one consisting predominantly of short gnomic sayings of literary or oral origin and represented by the printed editions,²⁾ and another version characterized by the presence of numerous long literary excerpts in addition, taken mostly from late prose writers such as Dio Cassius, Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, Dio Chrysostom, and others. Accepted scholarly opinion is that the former version is the original, arising perhaps in the late ninth or the tenth century (which no demonstrable connection with the historical seventh-century Maximus the Confessor), and that the latter version is an expanded recension, the result of large-scale interpolation of the longer excerpts into the original version, arising perhaps in the tenth or eleventh century.

A study of several manuscripts of the full version, however, suggests that the situation is not so simple.³⁾ I will argue in this paper that there is evidence to discard the assumption that the shorter version was the original, although exactly what form the prototype took is not so clear. At the very least, in its original form the florilegium appears to have included material generally considered characteristic of the longer, so-called expanded version, long literary excerpts not generally found in the short version. It was not, however, necessarily exactly as we now have it in the long version, as I will show later. The short version appears to be abridgements made from the full prototype by compilers relatively uninterested in the longer less gnomic excerpts, and it may have arisen almost immediately.

Evidence suggesting that the short version is not likely to have been the original comes from two major observations. First, and most striking, occasionally some of the short rather gnomic sayings or excerpts so

characteristic of the short version turn out to be part of longer literary excerpts extant in the long version; sometimes they are in a string of selections from the same author, and those selections which exist in both versions often occur in the same order in both long and short versions. It is quite easy to imagine an excerptor taking a sentence here and a precept there from long excerpts in an original florilegium in constructing an abridged version, but it is less easy to imagine an industrious interpolator searching for the location of a given aphoristic fragment in a multi-volume literary source in order to continue with a longer extended excerpt.

One example occurs in Chapter 20, concerning silence. A long string of selections under the rubric of Plutarch and beginning with short gnomic sayings concludes with at least 15 long literary excerpts, which appear in all the long-version manuscripts I examined but none of the short-version manuscripts, with one exception. This exception is an apophthegm (a pithy anecdote about, or a *bon mot* attributed to, a famous personage⁴⁾) which begins what in the long version is a long excerpt from *Moralia* 505 A, and the apophthegm appears alone in all the short version manuscripts I have examined: Ἀνάχαρσις ἐστιαθεὶς παρὰ Σόλωνι καὶ κοιμώμενος ὤφθη τὴν μὲν ἀριστερὰν χεῖρα τοῖς μορίοις, τὴν δὲ δεξιὰν τῷ στόματι προσκειμένην ἔχων· ἐγκρατεστέρου γὰρ ᾤετο χαλινοῦ δεῖσθαι τὴν γλῶτταν.⁵⁾

The second major observation supporting my argument is a pattern of arrangement of excerpts in the Maximus florilegium, a pattern which has often been noted but with different conclusions. Generally, in both the patristic and classical portions, similar sayings appear together in groups of short gnomic excerpts followed by groups of long excerpts from literary sources. Each chapter begins with relatively brief biblical quotations, first New Testament, then Old Testament, and generally in the same order (the first quotation in each chapter is always from one of the Gospels, the second from an Epistle, and so on). Next come excerpts from patristic writers followed by classical and late classical. Both patristic and non-patristic selections follow the same general pattern, although the details and the relative completeness vary from chapter to chapter. In its most complete form, the pattern consists of gnomic prose sayings often taken from known medieval collections (see below), followed by gnomic, aphoristic poetry and prose excerpts from literary sources, followed by longer literary excerpts in the long version, generally prose but occasionally poetry. This pattern is most pronounced, repeated on a smaller scale

several times within each chapter, in strings of excerpts of varying types all attributed to the same name, particularly in long chapters. Frequently the name is Plutarch, and quite often, in around half of the 71 chapters in some or all of the manuscripts I have examined, the first group of non-patristic selections in a chapter is attributed to Plutarch, with some or all of these types of selections included, that is, short gnomic precepts or apophthegms from known medieval collections, then aphoristic literary excerpts, then long excerpts.

Most commentators have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the grouping together of long literary excerpts reveals a later insertion of groups of long literary selections into an existing florilegium of shorter gnomic selections (more on this below), but it is at least as plausible to assume that the original compiler selected groups of sayings or excerpts from numerous sources, including collections of long excerpts or even the literary works themselves, integrating the various groups into chapters arranged topically in the tradition of the collections of Stobaeus.

In fact, we already know that many short gnomic selections or series of selections in the Maximus florilegium had just such an origin. The presence of groups of precepts or apophthegms obviously copied from known earlier medieval collections is extensively documented, in florilegia in general and the Maximus florilegium in particular. The ninth chapter of the Maximus florilegium contains a particularly clear illustration of the process, involving three extant sources. The chapter contains a string of at least four precepts and apophthegms found in a collection, the so-called Corpus Parisinum Profanum, extant in a thirteenth-century Paris manuscript. Following this group in the Maximus florilegium are two or perhaps three from a collection of sayings attributed collectively to Democritus, Isocrates, and Epictetus, followed by at least three from a collection of apophthegms from a Vatican manuscript.⁶⁾ A comparison of two long-version manuscripts (Codd. Vat. Gr. 739 and Vat. Barb. Gr. 158) and one short-version manuscript (Cod. Vat. Gr. 741) with the source collections shows the borrowing very clearly (see n. 6 for descriptions of the source collections):

<i>Long version</i>	<i>Short version</i>	<i>Source</i>
Agathon	Agathon	Corp. Par. 543 Elt. Agathon
Antigonus	Antigonus	C.P. 544 Elt. Antigonus
Epaminondas	following Antigonus	C.P. 545 Elt. Epaminondas

Philip	Philip	Gnom. Vat. 545
following Philip	following Philip	following Philip
Epictetus	Epictetus	?
		C.P. 555 Elt.
following Epictetus	following Epictetus	following Epictetus
following Epictetus	following Epictetus	D.I.E. 84
— —	Isocrates	D.I.E. 82
— —	Chaeremon	D.I.E. 83
Eumenes	Eumenes	?
		Gnom. Vat. 293
following Eumenes	— —	Eumenes
(but is apophthegm		Gnom. Vat. 374 Cotys
about Cotys)		
following the above	following Eumenes	Gnom. Vat. 379
		following Cyrus

Different manuscripts might show different details. For example, Cod. Vat. Barb. Gr. 6 (short version) omits the attribution to Agathon in the second selection and includes, for the next, the rubric Epaminondas. Such differences merely strengthen the hypothesis that in its original form, the Maximus florilegium was all-inclusive.

The order of the three selections evidently taken from the Democritus-Isocrates-Epictetus collection does not correspond exactly to their order in Wachsmuth's text (numbers 84, 82, 83), but it does correspond exactly to their order in one of Wachsmuth's manuscripts, the same Cod. Par. Gr. 1168 which contains the Corpus Parisinum Profanum (above, n. 6). In this Paris manuscript the three are numbers 37, 41, and 42 (Wachsmuth's numbering).

It can also be seen that two fragments, one attributed to Isocrates (an excerpt from the *Ad Nic.* 24) and the other a trimeter attributed to Chaeremon, appear in the short-version manuscript (Vat. Gr. 741) but not in the long version, while another, an apophthegm concerning Cotys but with no formal attribution and following an apophthegm attributed to Eumenes, appears in our long version manuscripts only. Both the Isocrates selection and the Cotys apophthegm, and presumably also the Chaeremon trimeter, are clearly parts of strings of selections lifted from earlier collections, suggesting that the original form of the florilegium contained all the selections under discussion. If this is the case, then both the short versions are abridgements of the original to a lesser or greater extent.

If groupings of short excerpts like the above from known sources can be explained as copying by the compiler of the florilegium, would it not also be plausible to explain groupings of longer literary excerpts from known literary sources as copying of the same sort by the same compiler

as part of the process of putting together the original florilegium? This might be the case whether the Maximus compiler's source was the literary text itself (Plutarch, for instance), or compilations of long excerpts not now extant.⁷⁾

The argument that the groupings described above indicate wholesale interpolations of long, literary selections is frequently taken for granted in the literature. I have demonstrated above that interpolation is not the most persuasive explanation for the grouping together of long literary excerpts. In addition, it may be worthwhile to consider the only substantially articulated argument for the traditional interpolation view known to me.

H. Schenkl⁸⁾ considered the possibility that the full version was the original only to reject it on two grounds. First, he mistakenly supposed that all selections originating in the so-called Corpus Parisinum (above, n. 6) and appearing in the full version were present in the short version, and he concluded that it was unrealistic to suppose that an excerptor, working from a full version, would unerringly leave out only non-Corpus Parisinum fragments. Actually it is possible to find such Corpus Parisinum selections present in the long version or some of its manuscripts but not in the short version, at least in manuscripts I have seen, as well as the other way around. More importantly, though, he is correct to observe that selections not in the Corpus Parisinum do predominate among the selections present in the long version but missing in the short version. But surely the explanation has to do with intrinsic differences: the Corpus Parisinum fragments tend to be short and gnomic in nature (with a few exceptions), whereas the longer excerpts characterizing the long version and generally lacking in the short version lack the quotable appeal to excerptors looking for a pithy "quotable quote" (with some exceptions, again).

Schenkl's second argument involves the pattern of arrangement of excerpts mentioned above. He observed that generally the excerpts from historians and orators which characterize the long version appear together. Except for literary excerpts from Plutarch and Isocrates, which often immediately follow short gnomic selections attributed to the same name and under the same rubric, literary excerpts in the long version alone often occur at the beginning (after the biblical and patristic) or end of a chapter, implying wholesale later addition, Schenkl felt. But this pattern can equally well be explained by the nature of the compilation of the original, described above, in which the compiler selected groups of

excerpts from various sources into topically-arranged chapters. In the patristic selections, the pattern is more clearly short selections followed by (in the long version) long excerpts or (in the short version) possibly shorter excerpts from the long excerpts, in the case of the popular patristic sources: Basil, "Theologus" (Gregory of Nazianzus), Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril, and some others. When the patristic portion of a chapter begins with a lengthy excerpt from the first author (usually Basil), generally there are no short Basil selections in the chapter. Similarly, when the patristic excerpts end with short quotations from the last author (often Philo of Alexandria, a sort of bridge to the classical and late classical authors, who was sometimes considered patristic and placed at the end of the patristic selections and sometimes considered classical and placed among the non-patristic fragments), generally longer Philo excerpts are not to be found in the chapter.

I do not know whether the compiler actually used texts of any authors for the long literary excerpts or whether he relied totally on compilations by predecessors who had already combed the literary texts and produced their own collections, such as the selections in Wachsmuth's "Parallela" (see n. 7). If the latter, the major accomplishment of the Maximus compiler was simply to integrate, under topical headings, numerous current florilegia or selections from them which were often arranged by form (collections of gnomic precepts, collections of apophthegms) or by author (grouped under the name of the person to whom the saying was attributed, like the Corpus Parisinum, which contains subsections under different names), or alphabetically. If the former, the Maximus compiler was himself familiar with much ancient and patristic literature. It should be noted that the fifth-century Stobaeus collections, *loci communes* of topically-arranged chapters like the Maximus florilegium and at least indirectly one of its sources, also contain some excerpts of comparable length, up to several printed pages in some cases. Although Stobaeus might have been a direct source for the Maximus compiler in a few instances, in most cases the numerous excerpts which appear in both the Stobaeus and the Maximus collections can be shown (or can reasonably be assumed) to have passed to the Maximus florilegium through some intervening step.

It should be noted that despite my distinction between short gnomic selections characteristic of the short version and the long literary excerpts which occur in addition in the long version, the distinction is actually somewhat blurred. Some short gnomic selections appear in some

manuscripts of both the short and the long versions, but not in others, and some longer excerpts appear in some short version manuscripts but not in some of the long version. The fact that some manuscripts in each version contain considerably fewer selections than some others in the same version is easily attributable to selective copying. There is no reason to assume a different cause for differences between long and short versions.

Earlier I remarked that the actual form taken by the prototype is not so clear as the conclusion that the prototype must have at least included the long literary excerpts characteristic of the long version. The majority of long strings of long literary excerpts contain no evidence suggesting that they are not identical to the prototype. However, from time to time there is a hint that some aspects of the short version are indeed closer to the hypothetical prototype, at least to judge from their relative fidelity in these instances to the known sources of the Maximus florilegium. These hints of short-version fidelity might at first glance lead us back to the traditional interpolation view and probably go a long way towards explaining why few scholars ever considered the possibility that the long version might be original. These hints involve better readings in the short version or strings of selections in which the short version preserves the order of the original better than does the long version.

An example of a better reading in the short version (by no means the only instance) is the name to which a couplet in Chapter 12 is attributed. The couplet appears in Stobaeus, where the rubric is Κράντορος.⁹⁾ In the Corpus Parisinum the couplet appears among γυνῶμαι Κράτωνος (485 Elter), and that is the attribution of the couplet in the editions (Gesner 1609, Combefis) and at least one short version manuscript (Vat. Gr. 741). In our two long version manuscripts, however (Codd. Vat. Gr. 739 and Vat. Barb. Gr. 158), the name has been further corrupted to Κάτωνος.

Another example suggesting a greater fidelity to the prototype in the short version than in the long version involves the order of a string of long literary excerpts. In the middle of Chapter 6, a lengthy chapter on friendship, the long version manuscripts I have examined contain seven excerpts from Dio Chrysostom of varying lengths, the first from Book 1 and the remaining six, immediately following, from Book 3. The six from Book 3 occur in the following order in the long version (references are to the de Budé text of Dio Chrysostom): 3.101 combined with 3.104-107; 3.113-114; 3.89; 3.102 (a); 3.102 (b), a direct continuation of the preceding in the

text of Dio Chrysostom; 3.110.

In the three short version manuscripts I have examined, however, the Book 3 selections are widely separated from the one Book 1 selection and placed near the end of the chapter. Only part of the first half of the long 3.101+104-107 is there; the rest is missing, as is the other long excerpt, 3.113-114. This selective copying and excerpting from the long version is characteristic of the short version, as we have seen. The order of the excerpts, however, is significant. The selections which are present in the short version occur in the following order, which, as can be seen, exactly parallels the order in which a reader of Dio Chrysostom would encounter them in the text: 3.89, 3.101 (partial), 3.102 (a+b), 3.110. Notice that the two contiguous excerpts from 3.102, two separate selections in the long version, are in the short version one excerpt, just as they are in the text. We have noted above the improbability of the assumption that a later interpolator into an original short version would search out the location of a short excerpt in the text of Dio Chrysostom in order to lengthen it. But it is equally unlikely, supposing again that an excerptor had before him the full version as we have it, that he would search out the text of Dio Chrysostom in order to unscramble the jumbled order of the fragments.

We are left with the conclusion that the prototype of the Maximus florilegium, which was by definition ancestor of both the extant full and short versions, was essentially all-inclusive and was copied selectively but in different ways by different copyists, producing the long version as we know it, essentially the same as the prototype but with some changes, omissions, and scribal errors, and the short version as well, much abridged by copyists who preferred shorter selections but who on occasion preserved features of the original which the long version lost.

St. Louis University

NOTES

1) See M. Richard, "Florilèges Spirituels Grecs," *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité ascétique et mystique* 5 (Paris 1964) 486-499, cols. 488-492, for a summary of scholarship on the florilegium. Richard categorizes manuscripts from his lengthy list in the two main versions and numerous derivative versions as well.

2) Particularly the only edition likely to be readily accessible, the

1865 reprint in J.-P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* 91, of Fr. Combefis' 1675 edition. Earlier editions (1546, 1581, 1609) by C. Gesner are hopeless and useless jumbles of unnamed Maximus manuscripts cavalierly combined with manuscripts of other related florilegia.

3) The only manuscripts I have been able to examine are some from the various Vatican libraries contained on microfilm in the Vatican Microfilm Library of St. Louis University. I am grateful for the opportunity to see the manuscripts and for the help provided by the staff. Manuscripts of the short version I have examined are Codd. Vat. Gr. 385 (14th century), Vat. Gr. 741 (11th century), and Vat. Barb. Gr. 6 (13th century); full-version manuscripts are Codd. Vat. Gr. 739 (11th century), Vat. Barb. Gr. 158 (11th-12th centuries), and one sixteenth-century manuscript not previously recognized as containing a copy of the Maximus florilegium, Vat. Gr. 2269. Unfortunately Cod. Vat. Gr. 2269 is merely a worthless copy of Cod. Vat. Barb. Gr. 158.

4) For a description of the various forms of gnomic sayings, see K. Horna, "Gnome, Gnomendichtung, Gnomologien," *RE Supplementband* 6 (1935) 74-87.

5) The final excerpt in this string may provide another example. In the long version it is an excerpt from Plutarch, *Moralia* 39 B, beginning with a quotation from Aeschines Socraticus which actually comprises most of the selection excerpted from Plutarch. In some printed editions, which appear to be based on the short version, only the opening gnomic expression appears, πανταχοῦ τῷ νέῳ κόσμος ἀσφαλὴς ἐστὶν ἡ σιωπή. The entire quotation from Aeschines Socraticus, quoted by name by Plutarch, is included among the fragments of Aeschines (fragment 38 Dittmar p. 289). Presumably this opening *gnome* can be found in a short version manuscript, but I have seen it only in Gesner's 1609 edition (see above, n. 2). Whatever the manuscript basis of Gesner's edition, it did not provide anything resembling the full version. However, because of the poor quality of the editions, I have refrained from basing any argument on evidence from them alone.

6) See Richard (above, n. 1) for a summary of the relationships of numerous florilegia and the reliance of the Maximus florilegium on its sources. From the research of C. Wachsmuth, *Studien zu den griechischen Florilegien* (Berlin 1882, reprinted Amsterdam 1971), can clearly be seen the reliance of the Maximus florilegium on the Democritus-Isocrates-Epictetus collection (among others), the text of which he published in Chapter 5 from several manuscripts. The importance of the Corpus Parisinum (Cod. Par. Gr. 1168, fol. 80^r-121^v; the same manuscript elsewhere [fol. 140^r-146^v] contains part of Wachsmuth's Democritus-Isocrates-Epictetus collection) as a source of the Maximus florilegium has been thoroughly documented; see e.g. Richard (above, n. 1) 489, Wachsmuth p. 131, H. Schenkl, "Die epiktetischen Fragmente. Eine Untersuchung zur Ueberlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen Florilegien," *Sitzungsberichte der Oest. Akademie Wien, Philosophisch-historische Classe* 116 (1888) 443-546 *passim*, and A. Elter, *Gnomica Homoeomata* (Bonn 1900-1904) I 72ff. The Vatican apophthegms were published and edited by L. Sternbach, *Gnomologium Vaticanum e Codice Vaticano 743* (*Wiener Studien* 9 [1887] 175-206, 10 [1888] 1-49 and 211-260, 11 [1889] 43-64 and 192-242, reprinted Berlin 1963). I have not seen manuscript sources of these texts. The Democritus-Isocrates-Epictetus and Vatican collections are well edited by Wachsmuth and Sternbach respectively, but for the contents of the Corpus Parisinum I have had to rely on second-hand reports. The item numbers given in the chart are those of A. Elter, who apparently had compiled a massive amount of material intending to publish an edition of the collection which, unfortunately, never

appeared so far as I can tell. However, many of his contemporaries made use of his material and used his numbering system when referring to a given fragment. When this information is available in other works on a second-hand basis, it at least helps establish the order of appearance of the selections, but lack of such information does not necessarily mean absence of the selection from the Corpus Parisinum. The contents of such collections are generally considered to be apocryphal on the whole, although not infrequently an origin in a literary text can be ascertained, such as aphoristic precepts from the corpus of Isocrates. A similarly apocryphal medieval "Plutarch" collection is a source for many short fragments attributed to Plutarch; see A. Elter, *Gnomica Homoeomata* III and "Fragmenta Incerta" in Bernardakis' edition of Plutarch, Vol. 7, p. 153.

7) The distinction between an original literary text and a compilation of excerpts might sometimes be blurred, as for instance in the case of the gnostic precepts comprising the Isocratean *Ad Nicoclem* and *Ad Demoniacum*. They might be considered florilegia (see e.g. Wachsmuth, *Studien* 165; K. Wefelmeier, *Die Sentenzensammlung der Demonicea* [Diss., Cologne 1961, Athens 1962]) or not (B. Rosenkranz, "Die Struktur der Ps.-Isokrateischen Demonicea," *Emerita* 34 [1966] 95-129). Similarly, the *Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata* attributed to Plutarch and the apophthegmata related by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives* are small collections in the context of a literary corpus. Many of the long literary excerpts, patristic and non-patristic, may well have come from a collection of "Parallela" no longer completely extant but which Wachsmuth explored as a source for subsequent florilegia including the Maximus collection. Certainly, a common source helps to explain close similarities between Maximus, selections from the "Sacra Parallela" preserved in a fourteenth-century Florentine manuscript (Cod. Laur. plut. VIII n. 22), and others. In this Florentine manuscript, selections are arranged alphabetically by the first two letters of the chapter title. See Wachsmuth, *Studien* Chapter I pp. 1-44. Some of the excerpts quoted by Wachsmuth are among the long literary selections found in the long version of the Maximus florilegium but not in the short version.

8) Above, n. 6.

9) 4.32.33 (Hense) in the edition of C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium* (Berlin 1884-1912), 5 vols. Vols. 1-2, Books I and II, *Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae*, ed. Wachsmuth; vols. 3-5, Books III and IV, *Anthologium (Florilegium)*, ed. Hense.

A PROPOS DU VATICANUS GRAECUS 207.

LE RECUEIL SCIENTIFIQUE D'UN ÉRUDIT CONSTANTINOPOLITAIN DU XIII^e SIÈCLE ET L'EMPLOI DU PAPIER "A ZIG-ZAG" DANS LA CAPITALE BYZANTINE.

PAUL CANART

Pour le paléographe, le codicologue et l'historien du livre, les XIII^e et XIV^e siècles représentent un domaine complexe, difficile, mais fascinant. Le point de départ obligé de toute recherche est constitué par les trois importants recueils de fac-similés de manuscrits datés qu'avec ténacité, abnégation et exemplaire acribie, le Professeur Alexander Turyn a procurés au monde savant. C'est pour rendre un hommage reconnaissant et ému à sa mémoire que, dans le présent travail, on présentera un recueil érudit de la deuxième moitié du XIII^e siècle, dont l'achèvement est datable, semble-t-il, des années 1265-1268.

Le *Vat. gr.* 207 n'est pas un inconnu. Son contenu, décrit avec précision dans le catalogue des *Vaticani graeci* 1-329, a été exploité à mainte reprise;¹⁾ la liste de prêts de livres inscrite sur un des premiers feuillets et recopiée par G. Mercati a attiré l'attention de plus d'un spécialiste.²⁾ Mais on n'avait pas dégagé jusqu'ici l'économie de ses différentes parties ni relevé une particularité singulière de sa constitution matérielle. La première jette une lumière nouvelle sur la nature et la datation du volume; la seconde est importante pour l'histoire de l'emploi du papier à Byzance. L'exposé s'articulera autour de ces deux points.³⁾

I. LE RECUEIL: ORGANISATION, AUTEUR ET DATE.

Sur l'économie du volume, le catalogue ne dit à peu près rien.⁴⁾ Il s'agit en fait d'un "recueil organisé",⁵⁾ dont

on commencera par distinguer et analyser les parties constitutives, avant de préciser les liens qui les unissent. Le recueil est formé de six parties, que je numérotterai de I à VI, et qui correspondent aux ff. 4 à 366. S'y rattachent également des additions en tête et en queue: les ff. VII + 1-3 et 367-372.⁶⁾

I (ff. 4-117)

- mat.: du papier arabe oriental, qui présente les deux particularités suivantes: 1) les vergeures sont tantôt horizontales, tantôt verticales; les changements sont fréquents, mais irréguliers; 2) nombre de *bifolia* n'ayant pas les dimensions requises, un ou deux côtés ont été élargis au moyen de bandes de papier (oriental également), soigneusement collées *avant* la copie du texte. On reviendra plus loin sur les implications de ce curieux procédé.

- cah.: 4+5 ff.⁷⁾ (12), 4 quat. (44), 1 quin. (54), 7 quat. (110), 4+3 ff.⁸⁾ (117). Les signatures ne sont pas primitives; on en parlera donc plus loin.

- cont.: œuvres de rhétorique: (ff. 4-113) Sopatros, Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων; (ff. 113-116) Kyros, Περὶ διαφορᾶς στάσεων et Μέθοδος ἐπὶ τὰς εὐρέσεις τῶν στάσεων. Ce noyau est l'œuvre de deux copistes; à cela s'ajoutent des additions contemporaines (f. 116^V + 1-5; f. 117^V) et postérieures (ff. 116^V + 5-117): les premières sont un remède et des définitions de la géométrie et de diverses sciences, les secondes des extraits liturgiques et hagiographiques.

- cop.: copiste 1:⁹⁾ ff. 4-63 + 9,¹⁰⁾ 87-94^V; additions des ff. 116^V + 1-5 et 117^V; il utilise alternativement une encre oncre assez pâle et une autre brun-noir; le texte est corrigé à l'encre noire (par le copiste lui-même?), les titres rouges et les cadres rouges qui entourent les lemmes ont été repassés (quand et par qui? le problème sera traité plus loin); - copiste 2:¹¹⁾ ff. 63 + 9-86^V, 95-116; les corrections à l'encre noire sont d'une autre main. - Les additions des ff. 116^V + 5-117 sont d'une main postérieure du XIV^e siècle.

II (ff. 118-146)

- mat.: papier occidental, qui sera décrit plus loin.

- cah.: 2 quat. (133), 5+4 ff. (142), 1 bin. restauré (146). Sur les signatures, voir plus loin.

- cont.: (ff. 118-146 13) Euclide, Éléments. Suit (f. 146^{r-v}) une liste de noms, qui est une addition postérieure du XIV^e siècle.

- cop.: copiste 1: ff. 118-124, 125 + 22-146 + 13; il utilise une encre plus ou moins brune ou noire (f. 146); corrections d'une autre main au f. 145^v; "rubriques" d'abord mauves, puis rouge vif; - copiste 3:¹²⁾ ff. 124^v-125 + 21; son encre est noire.

III (ff. 147-164)

- mat.: papier occidental comme au II, sauf les ff. 147-148 + 155-156, de papier oriental à vergeures verticales.
 - cah.: 1 quin. (156), 1 quat. (164).
 - cont.: (ff. 147-164) Cléomède, Sur les météores; - f. 164^v blanc.
 - cop.: copiste 1: ff. 147-155 + 12 (à la fin, une ligne et demie d'une autre encre); copiste 4:¹³⁾ ff. 155-164; son encre est noire ou très brune.

IV (ff. 165-194)

- mat.: papier occidental, qui sera décrit plus loin.
 - cah.: 2 ou 3 cah. dont la composition n'est plus discernable actuellement¹⁴⁾ (180); 1 quat. (188); 1 tern. (194).
 cont.: (ff. 165-194^v) Ammonios, Commentaire sur l'Isagogè de Porphyre.
 - cop.: (ff. 165-174 13) copiste 5,¹⁵⁾ à l'encre brune: (ff. 174 14-180^v, 191 + 26 [ou 27?] - 194 + 9) copiste 4, à l'encre noire ou très brune; (ff. 181-188^v) copiste 6 (?);¹⁶⁾ (ff. 189-191 + 12) copiste 2, je crois, mais écrivant plus petit; (ff. 191 + 12-26 [ou 27?], 194 + 9-194^v) copiste 1, je crois.

V (ff. 195-278)

- mat.: mélange de papier oriental et de plusieurs sortes de papiers occidentaux, sur lesquels on reviendra plus loin.
 - cah.: 2 quat. (210), 1 cah. de 9 ff.¹⁷⁾ (219), 4 quin. (259), 1 quin. dans lequel un f. (f. 263) a été intercalé (270), 1 quat. (278).
 cont.: (ff. 195-236^v) Aristote, Topiques; (ff. 237-273 et 273-277+278^v), Boèce, Sur les Topiques et Sur les syllogismes hypothétiques, dans la traduction de Maxime Holobolos. - Sur les ff. 277^v-278, restés blancs,¹⁸⁾ une addition du XIV^e siècle: une liste de noms comparable à celle du f. 146^{r-v} (v. la partie II).
 - cop.: les copistes 1 et 2 ont collaboré pour la copie d'Aristote et du commentaire de Boèce sur les Topiques: pour le premier, le copiste 1 est responsable des ff. 195-220^v, 236 + 18-236^v,¹⁹⁾ le copiste 2 des ff. 221-236 + 18; pour le second, le copiste 1 est auteur, aux ff. 237 et 238^v, des titres rouges et, semble-t-il, des épigrammes sur Boèce, ajoutées par après; il a ajouté aussi sur les ff. 270 + 11 sv. et sur le f. additionnel

263 les schémas rhétoriques de Thémistios et de Cicéron, tandis que le copiste 2 a exécuté le texte: ff. 237-270 + 10, 270^V-273 + 13. Dans un second temps,²⁰⁾ le copiste 1, d'une écriture petite et serrée, a ajouté le texte de Boèce sur les syllogismes hypothétiques. - Comme on l'a signalé à propos du contenu, l'addition des ff. 277^V-278 est d'une main plus tardive du XIV^e siècle.

VI (ff. 279-366)

- mat.: papier occidental, sur lequel on reviendra plus loin.
- cah.: 3 quat. (302), 2 quin. (322), 3 quat. (346), 2 quin. (366).
- cont.: (ff. 279-366 + 6) œuvres du pseudo-Denys, avec épigrammes et scholies; suit (f. 366 + 7-17) un fragment de glossaire. - Le reste sont des additions postérieures: (f. 366) un fragment d'une poésie religieuse de Léon le Sage; (f. 366^V) différentes gloses.
- cop.: les copistes 1 et 4 se sont partagé la transcription du texte de pseudo-Denys: (ff. 279-334^V + 10, 347-352^V, 358^{R-V}[?] copiste 1; (ff. 334^V + 11-346^V, 353-357^V, 359-366) copiste 4; toutes les scholies (ff. 279-356^V et 365^V) sont de la main de 1. - Le glossaire du f. 366 + 7-17 est du copiste 4, les additions (ff. 366 + 1-7, 366^V), de mains postérieures du XIV^e siècle.²¹⁾

Les additions du début et de la fin.

- Le fait important est que les compléments anciens sont tous²²⁾ de la main du copiste 1, qui se révèle ainsi comme l'organisateur du recueil.
- f. VII (VII^V est blanc): papier occidental à vergeures horizontales; contenu: liste de prêts de livres d'un érudit (original écrit à la première personne).
 - f. 1: papier occidental à vergeures horizontales, probablement identique à celui des ff. 367-371; contenu: (f. 1) remèdes variés; (f. 1^V) poèmes de Théodore Prodrome.
 - f. 2: papier très endommagé, probablement occidental; le recto est blanc; contenu: (f. 2^V) divisions des *στάσεις*; il s'agit évidemment d'un complément à la partie I.
 - f. 3: papier occidental à vergeures horizontales; contenu: (f. 3) divisions de la rhétorique; c'est aussi un complément à la partie I; (f. 3^V) *pinax* du manuscrit, écrit en rouge.
 - ff. 367-371: 5 ff. du même papier occidental à vergeures horizontales; contenu: poésies variées:²³⁾ celles des ff. 367^V-371 + 17 sont de la main du copiste 1; une main postérieure du XIV^e s. a ajouté celles des ff. 367, 371 + 1-5.

- f. 372: moitié supérieure d'un feuillet de papier occidental à vergeures verticales; contenu: encore des vers, une énigme, deux lettres de Phalaris; le f. 372 est d'une main du XIV^e s., le f. 372^v d'une autre main contemporaine.

De cette analyse, dégageons les éléments qui établissent les liens entre les différentes parties et, en conséquence, la nature du volume.

Le premier et le plus important n'est autre que l'uniformité de dimensions du volume, obtenue grâce en rapiéçage des cahiers constitués de papier oriental. Ce rapiéçage prouve à lui seul que nous avons affaire, non à un recueil factice, non à un manuscrit unitaire, mais à un recueil organisé. On a vu en effet que la partie I avait été copiée sur du papier oriental remanié *au préalable*. Cette opération, qui n'a pas demandé un mince travail, avait évidemment pour but de faire coïncider les dimensions de la partie I avec celles des parties (ou au moins d'une des parties) copiées sur papier occidental. Et voilà qui prouve l'organicité du volume. Mais le rapetassage affecte la première partie et la première partie seulement du manuscrit. Celle-ci a donc été copiée après les autres (ou au moins après une des autres) et, dans un second temps seulement, mise en tête du volume.²⁴⁾ Nous n'avons donc pas affaire à un manuscrit unitaire, copié en une fois du début à la fin, mais à un recueil organisé, même s'il l'a été dans un laps de temps relativement bref.

D'autres particularités viennent compléter cette démonstration. Elles établissent que toutes les parties ont été, sous la direction d'un érudit-copiste, copiées puis rassemblées en un volume.

Envisageons d'abord la série unique des numéros des cahiers: en voici la liste.

ff.	4-12 <α'>	63-70 [η']	117-125 ιε'	175-180 [?]
	13-20 β'	71-78 θ'	126-133 ις'	181-188 κδ'
	21-28 γ'	79-86 [ι']	134-142 [ιζ']	189-194 κε'
	29-36 δ'	87-94 ια'	143-146 ιη'	195-202 [κς']
	37-44 ε'	95-102 ιβ'	147-156 ιθ'	203-210 κζ'
	45-54 ζ'	103-110 ιγ'	157-164 κ'	211-219 [κη']
	55-62 ζ'	111-116 ιδ'	165-174 [?]	220-229 κθ'

230-239	λ	271-278	λδ´	303-312	λη´	339-346	μβ´
240-249	λα´	279-286	[λε´]	313-322	λθ´	347-356	μγ´
250-259	λβ´	287-294	λς´	323-330	μ´	357-366	μδ´
260-270	λγ´	295-302	λζ´	331-338	μα´		

Les signatures sont l'œuvre d'une seule main, qui les a inscrites à l'encre, en lettres minuscules, dans l'angle supérieur interne de la première page des cahiers. Dans la partie I, tant que le texte est de la main du copiste l'encre est celle même du texte, tantôt plus pâle, tantôt plus foncée; au contraire, les cahiers copiés par le copiste 2 et ceux des parties suivantes ont reçu leur numérotation dans un second temps; mais tous les numéros sont, je crois, de la main du copiste 1. Actuellement, il n'y a pas de signature α´ visible. La numérotation commence avec β´ (f. 13) et se poursuit normalement jusqu'au cahier ιγ´ (ff. 103-110).²⁵⁾ Nous rencontrons alors une première anomalie: tant le papier que le contenu montrent que les ff. 111-117 constituaient un cahier original,²⁶⁾ le dernier de la partie I, tandis que les ff. 118-125, d'un autre type de papier, sont le premier quaternion de la partie II; cependant, les signatures ιδ´ et ιε´ divisent les deux cahiers en ff. 111-116 et 117-125; la numérotation a donc été apposée après la réunion des parties I et II, sans que le responsable tînt toujours compte de la composition originale des cahiers. Suivent normalement les signatures ις´- κ´, puis des mutilations font que la série recommence au n° κδ´, qui marque le quaternion ff. 181-188; ce sont donc 16 feuillets (165-180) qui constitueraient les trois cahiers κα´-κγ´; malheureusement, la reliure actuelle du manuscrit ne permet pas de distinguer les *bifolia* centraux des cahiers et, d'autre part, le texte ne présente pas de lacune; plutôt que d'admettre la succession de trois cahiers plus petits que la normale (p. ex., 2 ternions + 1 binion), je croirais que l'auteur des signatures a omis un numéro par inadvertance. Dans la suite, la numérotation des cahiers ne présente plus de particularité digne de remarque. La conclusion rejoint celle tirée de l'examen du papier. Lorsqu'il a commencé à copier la partie I, le copiste 1 avait décidé de la mettre en tête du recueil et, au fil de la transcription, il a pourvu les premiers cahiers de leurs numéros; tout de suite après,

probablement, il a réuni les parties et complété la numérotation de l'ensemble.

Plus significatives encore sont les interventions dans chacune des parties et dans la plupart des feuillets additionnels d'une même main, qui est encore celle du copiste 1. On a signalé plus haut la part prise par ce dernier dans les différentes parties; à elle seule, elle suggère déjà son rôle prééminent. En outre, le même homme est intervenu plusieurs fois comme correcteur et rubricateur. Bien qu'il soit souvent difficile d'attribuer une correction à une main plutôt qu'à une autre, il n'y a guère de doute que le copiste 1 a revu après coup les parties I, IV, V et VI²⁷⁾ et y a corrigé le texte, soit à l'encre noire,²⁸⁾ soit dans un rouge carmin épais,²⁹⁾ qui est celui de beaucoup de titres et de petits ornements. Précisément, le copiste 1 a, dans la plupart des parties, joué le rôle de "rubricateur", soit au moment de la copie (la sienne³⁰⁾ ou celle d'un autre),³¹⁾ soit un certain temps après: dans ce cas, il ajoute des titres à l'encre ordinaire (f. 115^v + 15) ou en carmin épais (ff. 147, 356-357^v), encadre les lemmes de traits rouges doubles, agrémentés de petits ornements,³²⁾ repasse en carmin épais les initiales,³³⁾ les traits des schémas logiques,³⁴⁾ les lignes ornementales tracées à l'encre.³⁵⁾ Le copiste 1 dessine lui-même de manière assez fruste des bandeaux de rinceaux, d'entrelacs, de coeurs.³⁶⁾ Dans la partie VI seulement, il ne dédaigne pas les initiales zoomorphiques assez complexes,³⁷⁾ exécutées avec plus de soin qu'ailleurs: les recopierait-il sur son modèle?

Enfin, comme on l'a dit, le copiste 1 a rempli lui-même la plupart des feuillets additionnels. Parmi ces textes, nous nous arrêterons pour le moment à celui qui constitue le *pinax* ou table des matières du manuscrit. Il ne sera pas inutile de le recopier, tel qu'il se présente dans le manuscrit.³⁸⁾

τάδε ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇδε τῇ βίβλῳ

α' ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν ζητημάτων ἡ παρὰ τοῦ Σωπάτρου:-
β' Εὐκλείδ(ου) γεωμετρικ(ῶν) στοιχείων [[τὰ πέντε]]:³⁹⁾-
γ' τὰ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων τοῦ Κλεομήδους:-
δ' συλλογισμοὶ ὑποθετικοὶ τοῦ Λατίνου Βοετίου μεταγλωττισθέντες⁴⁰⁾

παρὰ τοῦ ἀξιολογωτάτου ἐν πατριαρχικοῖς ἄρχουσι θεοφιλεστάτου
[[--]]⁴¹⁾ μοναχοῦ κυροῦ Μαξίμου τοῦ 'Ολοβόλου:-

ε' αἰ ε' φωναὶ τοῦ Πορφυρίου ἐξηγημέναι παρὰ τοῦ 'Αμμωνίου:-
ς' τὰ τοπικά τοῦ 'Αριστοτέλους:-

ζ' ἡ τοῦ Λατίνου Βοετίου διαλεκτικὴ μεταγλωττισθεῖσα καὶ αὕτη
παρὰ [[τοῦ σοφῶ[τάτου].....]]⁴²⁾ τοῦ ἀξιολογωτάτου ῥήτορος +
η' ἡ βίβλος τοῦ ἁγίου ἱεροφάντου Διонуσίου τοῦ 'Αρεοπαγίτου:-

προτέθηντ(αι) δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων μαθημάτων καὶ ὑποτέθηντ(αι)
εἰκότως τὰ μεταγλωττισθέντα· ὁ γὰρ μεταχυμίσας⁴³⁾ αὐτά, δίκ(αι)ον
ἔχει τιμᾶσθαι· [[---]]⁴⁴⁾ τὸ τέλος δὲ ἔχει ἡ βίβλος τοῦ ἁγίου
Διонуσίου εἰκότως μάλιστα· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν θεῖον ἀπόστολον· ἐπεὶ
διὰ τῆς σοφίας παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δοθείσης τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, οὐκ ἔγνω ὁ
κόσμος τὸν θεὸν ἠδὲ δόκησεν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τῆς σ(ωτη)ρίας τοῦ κηρύγ-
ματος σῶσαι τοὺς πιστεύοντας:- λόγος δὲ κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις [+12
lettres]⁴⁵⁾ τέρῳ κειμένοις ἡμῖν τιμώμενος μάλιστα.

Ce *pīnax* se réfère évidemment au recueil actuel: outre qu'il est placé en tête et sort de la plume du copiste 1, son contenu coïncide trop bien avec celui du manuscrit et est trop particulier pour qu'on pense à un remploi. Et cependant, l'ordre et le libellé des titres posent des problèmes. Pourquoi συλλογισμοὶ ὑποθετικοί a-t-il pris la place d'un autre titre? Pourquoi, dans les deux traités de Boèce, le nom du traducteur a-t-il été chaque fois écrit après grattage, comme s'il avait été substitué à un autre ou à un intitulé différent du même? Pourquoi l'ordre des œuvres d'Ammonios, d'Aristote et de Boèce est-il différent dans le *pīnax* et dans le recueil? De ces particularités - ou anomalies -, certaines sont plus facilement explicables que d'autres. Il est probable, tout d'abord, que la substitution de συλλογισμοὶ ὑποθετικοί à un autre titre est liée au fait que le texte de ce traité a été ajouté après coup à la fin de la partie V: la place qu'il y occupe n'est pas la bonne et le responsable du recueil, non content d'avoir présenté ses excuses au lecteur dans une note marginale,⁴⁶⁾ a voulu rétablir l'ordre logique dans le *pīnax*; l'emploi de l'encre noire confirme que la correction est postérieure à l'établissement et à la transcription en rouge du *pīnax*. Mais quel était le titre féminin de premier jet? Il ne pouvait s'agir des τόποι διαλεκτικοί,

puisque ceux-ci figurent normalement, sous le n° ζ' et le titre *διαλεκτική*, après les Topiques d'Aristote; alors? le traité sur les syllogismes hypothétiques, mais sous un titre inexact, vu que l'organisateur du recueil n'avait pu encore le vérifier? Le double grattage avant le nom d'Holobolos est encore plus curieux, car il a été fait les deux fois *in scribendo*: une fois, on aurait pu croire à une bévue banale; pour deux, l'explication ne tient pas;⁴⁷⁾ d'autre part, s'il y a eu modification de nom ou de titulature,⁴⁸⁾ comment se fait-il que le copiste a opéré *immédiatement* la correction? Faut-il supposer qu'il rédigeait le *pinax* de mémoire ou d'après une autre source et que, par deux fois, il s'est aussitôt repris en se référant aux titres qui figurent dans le texte lui-même?⁴⁹⁾

Quoi qu'il en soit, il est important de noter que tant le *pinax* que les titres de la partie V interdisent de considérer l'attribution à Holobolos comme le fruit d'une correction postérieure à la confection du recueil. Quant au *pinax*, la manière dont il est rédigé montre que l'organisation du volume répond à une intention bien précise: à des textes de philosophie païenne imparfaite, l'auteur du recueil a voulu faire suivre l'exposé, par Denys l'Aréopagite, de l'authentique philosophie chrétienne.

A ce point, le doute n'est plus permis. Celui que nous avons nommé le copiste 1 est un érudit, qui, avec l'aide de quelques collaborateurs,⁵⁰⁾ a, pour son propre usage, copié une série de textes, les a complétés et corrigés, en a amélioré la présentation extérieure, les a réunis en volume et a muni celui-ci d'un *pinax*. Ce faisant, il avait laissé blancs quelques feuillets ou parties de feuillets. Certains vides ont été comblés par lui-même, d'autres l'ont été quelques décennies plus tard par un ou plusieurs autres possesseurs érudits. Parmi les additions, il en est une qui revêt une importance capitale: la liste de prêts du f. VII. Pour la facilité du lecteur, on la reproduira une nouvelle fois.⁵¹⁾

+ εἰς τὰς ιβ' τοῦ νοε(μβ)ρ(ίου) τῆς ιβ' ἰνδικτιῶνος δέδωκα¹⁾ |⁵²⁾
 τὸ ὄργανον μου τῷ σ[υμ]πενθέρῳ μου τῷ Μόσχῳ κυρ(ῶ) Κων(σταντι-
 νῳ) + 2 | τὸ πρῶτον τῆς παλαιᾶς ἐδόθη τῷ [γ]υναικαδέλφῳ μου
 κυρ(ῶ) Βα(σιλεῖῳ) καὶ τὸ δεύτ(ε)ρ(ον)³⁾ | [ἐ]δόθη τῷ συγγάμβρῳ

[μ]ου τῷ Βέκκῳ· τὸ ὄργανόν μου πρὸ τοῦ ⁴ | μὲ ἀρξα...αι ..βά-
 νειν⁵³) εἰς τὸ πατριαρχ(εῖον) κ(α)τ(ὰ) τὸν σεπτέ(μβ)ρ(ιον)
 μῆνα. ⁵ | τῷ συμπένθέρῳ μου τῷ Μόσχῳ κυρ(ῶ) Κων(σταντίνῳ)
 κ(α)τὰ τὴν δευτ(έ)ραν τοῦ νοε(μβ)ρ(ίου) ⁶ | τῆς ιδ' [ἰνδικτιῶ-
 νος] ⁵⁴) τῆς παλαιᾶς. μηνὶ ἀπριλλ(ίῳ) ἰνδικτιῶνος ιδ'
 ἐδόθη τῷ συγγάμβρῳ μου τῷ Βέκκῳ ἡ μουσικη:- ⁷ | κ(α)τὰ τὴν
 τετ[άρ]την τοῦ σεπτε(μβ)ρ(ίου) μηνὸς τῆς ζ' ἰνδικτιῶνος ἡτή-
 σατο ὁ Μόσχος καὶ εἴληφε τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὸ ⁵⁵) κείμενον:- ⁸ |
 μηνὶ μαίῳ ἰνδικτιῶνος ζ' ἀπῆρεν ὁ γυναικάδελφός μου ὁ ἀρχων
 τῶν ἐκκλη(σιῶν) κύρ Μα(νουήλ) ὁ Ξιφιλῖνος τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν
 μου:- ⁹ | κ(α)τὰ τὴν πρώτην τοῦ σεπτε(μβ)ρ(ίου) μηνὸς τῆς
 αὐτῆς ζ' ἰνδικτιῶνος ἡτήσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ὁ ἀδελφός μου ὁ κύρ
 Λέων⁵⁶) τὴν εἰς τὰς στάσεις ἐξήγησιν τοῦ Δοξαπατρῆ ἥπερ ἐστὶν
 ἐμὰ γράμματα + ⁵⁷) ¹⁰ | μηνὶ ἰουνίῳ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁ παπᾶς Βασίλ(ειος)
 ὁ Σγουρὸς ἀπῆρε τὸ νομοκάνονον: † κ(α)τὰ τὴν ς' τοῦ σεπτε(μβ)-
 ρ(ίου) τῆς η' ἰνδικτιῶνος ἀπὸ τοῦ Σιδηριώτου ¹¹ | [τὸ] μικρὸν
 βιβλίον τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ κείμενον †.χ.† κ(α)τὰ τὴν ιθ' τοῦ ἰαν-
 νουαρ(ίου) μηνὸς ἡμέραν ς' τῆς ἐβδομάδος ¹² | ἀπεστάλη διὰ τοῦ
 Πεντ[εκκλησι]ώτου τῷ δικαίῳ τοῦ Ἀντιοχείας κυρ(ῶ) Θεοδωρ(ῶ)⁵⁸)
 τὸ βιβλίον τοῦ Δαμασκηνοῦ ὅπερ ἡτήσατο αὐτός ¹³ | παρ' ἐμοῦ
 κ(α)τὰ τὴν ιζ' τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἡμέρα δ' ὥρα ἐχ[η]τ⁵⁹) γινομένου
 μου ἐν τῷ κελλίῳ αὐτοῦ ἰνδικτιῶνος η':- μηνὶ ἰουν(ίῳ) ς' τὸ
 ὄργανον τῷ Πεντεκκλη[σ]ίῳ(τη) ¹⁴ | μηνὶ ἰουλ(ίῳ) β' ἡμέρα γ'
 [...]ω[...]δ[....]⁶⁰) τῷ πατριαρχῇ ἡ ἀριθμητικῇ. μηνὶ νοε(μβ)-
 ρ(ίῳ) κ' ἐδόθη τῷ Βέκκῳ τὸ κείμενον ὄργανον ἰνδικτιῶνος θ' ¹⁵ |
 [μ]ηνὶ ἰαννουαρ(ίῳ) εἰς τὰς γ' ἐδόθη τῷ [γυναικ]αδέλφῳ μου
 κυρῷ Μιχαήλ τῷ Ξιφιλίνῳ τὰ ἀσκητικὰ τοῦ [μεγ]άλου Βασ(ι)λ(εῖου)
¹⁶ | [?] ⁶¹) ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ π..σαρμ..ας:-⁶²) μηνὶ .εχ(εμβ)ρ(ίῳ) ⁶³)
 θ' ἡμέρα τρίτη ἰνδικτιῶνος ι' ἐδόθη τῷ Πηγηνῶ, ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ
 μου:- ¹⁷ | [μ]ηνὶ ι..() ι' ἰνδικτιῶνος [] ⁶⁴) ἐδόθη τῷ πριμ-
 μικ(η)ρ(ίῳ) τῶν πατριαρχικῶν νοτα(ρίων) τῷ Βεκκῳ τὸ ὄργανόν
 μου τὸ κείμενον:- ¹⁸ | κ(α)τὰ τὸν μάρτιον μῆνα τῆς ι' ἐπινεμή-
 σεως ἐδόθη τῷ Ἰασίτῃ ἡ ἐξήγησις τοῦ μεγάλου⁶⁵) Βα(σιλείου)
 εἰς τὸν προφήτην Ἑσαίαν. ¹⁹ | κατὰ τὸν ἀπρίλ(ι)ον μῆνα τῷ
 ἀνεψιῷ μου κυρ(ῶ) Ἀλεξίῳ ἡ ρητορικὴ τὸ κείμενον· ὡσαύτως
 ἐδόθη αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸν ἰουλ(ίον) ιη' καὶ ἡ ἐξήγησις ²⁰ | τοῦ
 Δοξαπατρῆ καὶ διαιρέτου· ὦ[.....] ἡτησάμην ἀπὸ τοῦ
 Σκουταριώτου κυρ(οῦ) Νικολ(άου) τὴν εἰς τὸν ²¹ | Ἑσαίαν ἐξή-
 γησις τοῦ Θεοδωρίτου καὶ ἐδόθη τῷ ἐξαδέλφῳ τοῦ συγγάμβρου μου

τῷ κυρῷ Μιχ(αήλ).

Deux questions essentielles se posent au sujet de cette liste: est-elle bien de la main de l'auteur du recueil? A-t-elle été copiée sur un feuillet blanc du volume ou ajoutée par après?

Il n'y a pas de doute, à mon avis, que l'érudit auteur de la note est aussi celui qui présida à la confection du recueil. Les écritures coïncident parfaitement. Le contenu des livres prêtés par l'auteur de la note révèle les mêmes intérêts que ceux de l'organisateur du volume: tous deux sont à la fois collectionneurs et copistes⁶⁶⁾ (copistes parce que collectionneurs, selon une habitude répandue à l'époque), tous deux font circuler leurs livres parmi des amateurs.⁶⁷⁾

Les prêts ont-ils été inscrits au fur et à mesure sur un feuillet blanc du recueil? C'est la solution de loin la plus vraisemblable. On ne voit guère pourquoi la liste, après avoir eu une existence séparée assez longue (les mentions de prêt s'échelonnent sur treize années) comme feuille volante ou feuillet de garde d'un autre manuscrit, aurait été attachée en tête du volume qui nous intéresse. On peut donc considérer le f. VII comme un feuillet de garde du volume primitif, ce que confirment les mots τῶν οὐ(ρα)νίων inscrits en majuscules épigraphiques rouges sur le recto, d'une main qui semble contemporaine de celle des copistes et pourrait bien être encore une fois celle du copiste 1.

Une fois acquises les deux réponses affirmatives, il est permis de préciser la personnalité de l'auteur du recueil et la date de confection de ce dernier. Le responsable du volume est un fonctionnaire du patriarcat,⁶⁸⁾ un érudit approfondissant pour son compte les matières classiques du *trivium* et du *quadrivium* et la littérature théologique. Dans le cercle de parents et d'amis qui partagent les mêmes goûts, on trouve le patriarche lui-même et plusieurs fonctionnaires du patriarcat. Ses beaux-frères (γυναικάδελφοι) Michel et Manuel Xiphilinos sont connus par ailleurs: le premier est cité par Pachymère comme notaire (γραμματικός) impérial;⁶⁹⁾ le second, ἀρχων τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, est attesté avec le même titre dans une liste synodale de 1277.⁷⁰⁾ La même liste fait également mention de Georges Bekkos, primicier des notaires patriarchaux;⁷¹⁾ c'est

évidemment le même que le Bekkos primicier auquel l'érudit prête son *Organon*; est-ce le même Bekkos qui est "co-beau-frère" (σύγγαμβρος) de l'érudit et a comme cousin germain (ἐξάδελφος) le κύρ Michel? La parentèle érudite de l'auteur du recueil comprend encore son "co-beau-père" (συμπένθερος) Constantin Moschos, un frère, le κύρ Léon, un autre beau-frère (γυναικάδελφος), le κύρ Basile, un neveu (ἀνεψιός), le κύρ Alexis. Parmi ses amis et connaissances, le Pentekklèsiôtes pourrait bien être Jean Pentekklèsiôtès, gendre du grand économiste Théodore Xiphilinos et σύγγαμβρος du référendaire Michel Eskammatisménos;⁷²⁾ un autre nom connu est celui de Nicolas Skoutariôtès, qui, en 1277, avait la fonction d'ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς καταστάσεως;⁷³⁾ quant au Iasitès, il y a des chances que ce soit Michel Iasitès, ὁ ἐν διακόνοις ἐλάχιστος sur la liste synodale de 1277.⁷⁴⁾ Parmi les noms des emprunteurs, il reste à relever ceux du *papas* Basile Sgouros, d'un Sidériôtès, d'un Pègènos et enfin du κύρ Théodore, δίκαιος du patriarche d'Antioche. Bref, il s'agit d'un cercle assez restreint, lié à un milieu bien défini et nettement situé dans le temps. C'est du reste ce qui a permis à V. Laurent et à E. Trapp⁷⁵⁾ de préciser les données chronologiques de la liste de prêtres, laquelle ne donne jamais les années du monde, mais seulement les dates des mois, les indictions et parfois les jours de la semaine; la concordance entre les trois éléments confirme pleinement les dates des années 1280 et 1281. Les prêtres s'échelonnent donc du 12 novembre 1268 au 18 août 1282.

Compte tenu de ces éléments, il y a maintenant moyen de fixer avec assez de précision l'époque de composition du recueil. Si on tient pour acquis que les prêtres ont été notés au fur et à mesure sur un feuillet de garde du volume, le *terminus ante quem* de la confection est le 12 novembre 1268; les différentes parties sont bien entendu quelque peu antérieures. Le *terminus post quem* est fourni par la carrière de Manuel-Maxime Holobolos. Dans la 5^e partie, les deux titres, de première main, le qualifient d'ἀξιολογώτατος ῥήτωρ;⁷⁶⁾ or, c'est sous le patriarcat de Germain III (25 mai 1265 - 14 septembre 1266) et à la demande de celui-ci que l'empereur Michel Paléologue, revenant sur la disgrâce infligée à Holobolos, lui conféra

le titre de rhéteur, avec les fonctions d'enseignement et de prédication qui y étaient attachées.⁷⁷⁾ C'est donc entre le milieu de l'année 1265 et novembre 1268 qu'on doit situer la réunion en volume des parties du *Vat. gr.* 207, et cela, quelle que soit l'opinion qu'on professe au sujet de la paternité holobolienne des traductions de Boèce.⁷⁸⁾ Mais, sans entrer dans le fond du problème, il est permis de remarquer que cette chronologie renforce singulièrement la thèse de l'attribution à Holobolos.⁷⁹⁾ Et qui sait si les modifications du *pinax* ne sont pas liées, d'une façon ou d'une autre, au changement de statut dont bénéficia, grâce à sa réputation de savant, celui qui avait été, en 1261, victime du ressentiment de l'empereur?⁸⁰⁾

II. LE VAT. GR. 207, PREMIER TÉMOIN SÛR DE L'EMPLOI DU PAPIER "À ZIG-ZAG" DANS LA CAPITALE BYZANTINE

On sait que, dès avant le XIII^e siècle, le papier a été assez largement utilisé dans l'empire byzantin pour la copie des manuscrits; et, dans le courant du XIII^e siècle, la proportion des manuscrits sur papier augmente considérablement. Mais, sur la nature du papier employé, les traités de paléographie comme les catalogues de manuscrits restaient singulièrement vagues, ambigus, voire erronés. Les travaux de J. Irigoin ont jeté sur la question une lumière décisive. Tout d'abord, il a dégagé et défini les critères qui permettent de discerner, avant le XIV^e siècle, le papier arabe oriental (celui qu'on appelait communément bombycin) du papier occidental, de fabrication italienne. Ensuite, affinant et précisant les distinctions, il a défini les caractéristiques des différents papiers susceptibles d'être rencontrés dans les manuscrits grecs et esquissé l'histoire de leur emploi. Ce n'est pas le lieu ici de reprendre ces exposés.⁸¹⁾ Rappelons simplement qu'on peut et doit maintenant distinguer, dans les manuscrits grecs, quatre sortes de papier: l'arabe oriental (Iraq, Syrie-Palestine, Égypte), l'arabe occidental (Maghreb et Espagne musulmane), l'espagnol (avant tout catalan) et l'italien (du type de Fabriano). Les trois derniers peuvent être qualifiés d'occidentaux; ils présentent, du point de vue de la couleur, de la qualité de la pâte et de l'encollage

un aspect assez voisin. Pour les distinguer, on se base sur le format, l'aspect et l'écartement des pontuseaux et des vergeures, ainsi que sur la présence éventuelle du signe du "zigzag": jusqu'il y a peu, celui-ci n'avait jamais été signalé dans les manuscrits grecs et il faudra maintenant l'y rechercher systématiquement. J. Irigoin a également énoncé les règles à suivre dans la description d'un papier ancien. En les appliquant au cas du *Vat. gr.* 207, on aboutit à des constatations curieuses et significatives. Mais avant d'en apprécier la portée, il convient de reprendre et d'explicitier les données déjà fournies dans l'analyse codicologique des différentes parties. Celle-ci a déjà relevé l'utilisation, parfois à l'intérieur de la même partie, de différents types de papier orientaux et occidentaux. Nous envisagerons d'abord les premiers.

Les papiers orientaux

Pour des raisons sur lesquelles nous nous interrogerons plus loin, l'organisateur du *Vat. gr.* 207 a été amené à utiliser des papiers de formats différents: de l'arabe oriental d'une part,⁸²⁾ de l'occidental de dimensions "italiennes" d'autre part;⁸³⁾ en fait, dans les parties II à VI, le papier oriental n'est employé que très rarement comme appoint: deux *bifolia* dans la partie III, deux autres dans la partie V; mais toute la partie I est composée exclusivement de papier oriental. L'emploi dans un même volume, de dimensions nécessairement uniformes, de deux papiers de formats incompatibles pose un problème d'adaptation. Comme le montrent déjà les dimensions du volume (partout 286/288 x 220/225 mm), l'organisateur a choisi d'adapter le papier oriental à l'occidental. Il aurait pu le faire assez aisément en utilisant une des deux solutions suivantes ou en les combinant: 1° retailler des *bifolia* orientaux de format intermédiaire;⁸⁴⁾ 2° couper en deux des *bifolia* orientaux de grand format et, de chaque feuillet retaillé, faire un *bifolium* de dimensions occidentales.⁸⁵⁾ Notre homme ne s'est pas borné à ces deux procédés: assez souvent, il a utilisé des *bifolia* trop petits en largeur ou en hauteur ou dans les deux dimensions et les a complétés par des bandes de papier (oriental également) soigneusement coupées et collées. Pour faire voir les

solutions adoptées et tâcher d'en comprendre le mécanisme, on présente, sous forme de tableau (2), la manière dont les *bifolia* de papier oriental ont été taillés et éventuellement complétés, ainsi que leur répartition cahier par cahier dans la partie I. L'examen de ces données montre que l'organisateur du volume n'a pas cherché une solution cahier par cahier: le mélange désordonné des différents types de *bifolia* suffit à le prouver. S'il y a une explication logique à cette anarchie apparente, on peut espérer la trouver en considérant l'ensemble des *bifolia*: les types utilisés et leur fréquence proportionnelle. Évidemment, si l'organisateur ne s'est pas contenté des solutions 1° (un *bifolium* de type 1) et / ou 2° (deux *bifolia* de type I), c'est pour des raisons d'économie: il voulait tirer le meilleur parti possible de la surface offerte par les feuilles orientales dont il disposait. Tenant compte des trois formats orientaux (le petit, l'intermédiaire et le grand), j'ai tâché, dans le tableau 3, de présenter les principales solutions auxquelles il pouvait avoir recours. La solution 3° lui fournissait un *bifolium* de type 4; la 4°, un *bifolium* de type III et un de type IV; la 5°, un *bifolium* de type 1, un de type 2, un de type I; la 6°, deux *bifolia* de type 3 et deux de type 4; la 7°, un *bifolium* de chaque type 1, 2, 3 et 4. Si on compare ces formules théoriques (tableau 3) aux types de *bifolia* réellement attestés (tableau 2), on reste quelque peu perplexe. La formule 4° n'est pas attestée, puisque nous n'avons aucun *bifolium* de type III ou IV; cela ne veut pas dire que l'organisateur n'a pas utilisé de papier oriental de format intermédiaire pour obtenir des *bifolia* de type 1; mais la formule 5°, par exemple, pouvait lui procurer un nombre égal de *bifolia* I et 1. Supposons alors un moment que le constructeur des cahiers n'ait eu à sa disposition que du papier oriental de grand format. D'où proviennent les *bifolia* de type II? Pourquoi le nombre des *bifolia* 1 et I excède-t-il autant celui des autres types? Des *bifolia* de type II pourraient provenir d'un grand format oriental dont la grande dimension serait quelque peu inférieure à la valeur théorique sur laquelle nous avons tablé; dans ce cas, les *bifolia* de type I seraient fournis par la formule 2°; mais les *bifolia* 1 seraient toujours en sur-

nombre... Bref, il n'est pas facile d'expliquer parfaitement le mécanisme de construction des *bifolia* de la partie I du recueil. Mais quelles qu'aient été les solutions adoptées, elles restent un témoignage curieux et intéressant des difficultés qu'un érudit de la Constantinople à peine reconquise pouvait éprouver pour se procurer un type précis de papier. Ou bien faut-il supposer que nous sommes en face d'un cas individuel, celui d'un homme quelque peu avare, habitué à récupérer toute espèce de papier utilisable, quitte à se livrer à de longues et fastidieuses manipulations? L'examen des papiers occidentaux permet des constatations plus intéressantes encore.

Le papiers occidentaux

La plus grande partie du volume est faite de papier occidental, reconnaissable à sa couleur légèrement plus claire et à la présence de pontuseaux assez régulièrement espacés, pas toujours parfaitement parallèles et presque toujours discernables, mais tantôt plus, tantôt moins. Il est plus délicat de décider si nous avons affaire à un ou plusieurs types de papier différents. La disposition des vergeures est toujours la même, horizontale, et, vu les dimensions, indique un pliage in-folio. Les mesures d'écartement des vergeures et des pontuseaux, pas toujours faciles à faire, auraient dû être multipliées pour permettre de retrouver à coup sûr les paires de formes différentes. Avant de tirer des conclusions d'ensemble, voici le résultat des mesures faites; je distingue les parties du recueil, parce que, a priori, s'il y a changement de papier, il est plus probable qu'il se vérifie d'une partie à l'autre.

1. *Partie* II (ff. 118-146). Entièrement de papier occidental, d'un seul type je crois.

- 20 vergeures: 30 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 121+122): ⁸⁶⁾ ̅42/49/47/44/44̇44/49/45/42/46̅ ̅; moyenne: 45,5 mm.

2. *Partie* III (ff. 147-164). Deux *bifolia* de papier oriental (147+148 et 155+156). Le reste de papier occidental, qui me semble du même type que celui de la partie II.

- 20 vergeures: 30 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 160+161) ̅47/45/48/49/43̇45/48/49/47/45̅ ̅; moyenne: 46,7 mm.

3. *Partie* IV (ff. 165-194). Entièrement de papier occidental. Un seul type aux pontuseaux plus visibles que ceux des parties II et III.

- 20 vergeures: 32/34 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 169+170) $\overline{\text{E}}_{42/41/46/43/45/47/45/45/52/47\text{E}}$; moyenne: 45,5 mm.
(ff. 185+184) $\overline{\text{E}}_{42/43/47/42/47/46/46/46/53/48\text{E}}$; moyenne: 46,2 mm.

4. *Partie* V (ff. 195-278). Mêlé plusieurs sortes de papier. Le cahier 195-202 est fait entièrement de papier occidental, le cahier 203-210 mêle l'oriental (203, 206-208) et l'occidental (204-205, 209-210), le cahier 211-219 est entièrement de papier oriental; les ff. 220-278 sont des quinions de papier occidental. Il semble qu'on puisse distinguer quatre sortes de papier occidental:

a) ff. 195-202: à rapprocher de celui des parties II et III.

- 20 vergeures: 34 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 198+199) $\overline{\text{E}}_{47/46/47/45/43/43/44/47/43/49\text{E}}$; moyenne: 44,7 mm.

b) ff. 204-205 et 209-210:⁸⁷⁾ les pontuseaux sont parfois presque indiscernables; il n'est pas facile non plus de compter les vergeures.

- 20 vergeures: 28 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 204+210, dont on peut croire qu'il s'agit d'un *bifolium* original) $\overline{\text{E}}_{34/42/45/49/47/39/51/46/54/32\text{E}}$; moyenne: 46,6 mm.

c) ff. 220-272:⁸⁸⁾ les quinions qui composent cette tranche du manuscrit sont faits d'un papier aux pontuseaux et vergeures bien visibles (les vergeures n'ont pas un aspect parfaitement uniforme: à certains endroits, elles ont tendance à être alternativement plus épaisses et plus fines). Le signe du zig-zag, imprimé au tiers de la feuille (c'est-à-dire du *bifolium*) est nettement visible aux ff. 233 et 271, mais pas ailleurs.⁸⁹⁾

- 20 vergeures: 34 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 234+235) $\overline{\text{E}}_{27/53/52/54/58/59/50/51/51/5\text{E}}$; moyenne: 53,5 mm.⁹⁰⁾

(ff. 233+236) $\overline{\text{E}}_{31/49/51/50/49/44/51/48/49/36\text{E}}$; moyenne: 48,9 mm.

d) ff. 273-278: ce papier, d'aspect général proche du précédent, s'en distingue par les pontuseaux plus rapprochés.

- 20 vergeures: 35 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 275+276) $\overline{\text{E}}_{25/43/42/41/46/39/42/42/43/44/42\text{E}}$; moyenne: 42,4 mm.

5. *Partie* VI (ff. 279-366). Entièrement de papier occidental, d'un seul type probablement, mais dont les pontuseaux sont tantôt bien visibles, tantôt quasiment indiscernables.

- 20 vergeures: 31 mm.

- pontuseaux (ff. 298+299) $\overline{543/50/46/45/35:44/45/45/47/42\overline{5}}$; moyenne:
44,6 mm.

(ff. 361+362) $\overline{541/48/45/46/41:39/43/45/50/45\overline{5}}$; moyenne:
44,6 mm.

Il n'est pas facile, au vu de ces mesures, de dire de combien de paires de formes différentes sont sorties les feuilles de papier occidental employées pour copier le *Vat. gr.* 207. Deux types de papier, cependant, semblent trancher sur les autres: le papier Vd à 10 pontuseaux (alors que les autres en ont 9), avec un écartement moyen de 42,4 mm., et le papier Vc, caractérisé par le zig-zag et un écartement moyen des pontuseaux supérieur à celui des autres papiers à 9 pontuseaux (53,5 ou 48,9 contre 44,6 à 46,7 mm.); ces derniers ont beaucoup de chances d'avoir une origine commune, même s'ils sortent de plusieurs paires de forme. Quant à la localisation, il faut aussi être prudent. Le format est celui du papier italien du XIII^e siècle, mais convient également pour l'espagnol.⁹¹⁾ La même remarque vaut pour l'écartement des pontuseaux: à la date de 1565/68, les moyennes relevées sont compatibles avec les deux hypothèses italienne et espagnole. Mais au moins dans un cas (Vc), la présence du zig-zag permet de trancher: cette empreinte caractérise le papier arabe occidental ou l'espagnol; le format indique que nous avons affaire à ce dernier. La conclusion a une certaine importance: c'est, je crois, le premier exemple sûr d'emploi de papier espagnol à Constantinople même, et non seulement dans les parties occidentales (Italie méridionale surtout) de l'aire culturelle byzantine. De plus, si l'argumentation présentée dans la première partie de cet exposé est valable, cet emploi est datable à quelques années près.

Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana

NOTES

1) *Codices Vaticani graeci*, recensuerunt Ioh. MERCATI et P. FRANCHI DE' CAVALIERI, t. I. *Codices 1-329* (*Bybl. Apost. Vat. codices manu scripti recensiti...*), Rome, 1923, pp. 249-254. Voir la bibliographie chez P. CANART - V. PERI, *Sussidi bibliografici per i manoscritti greci della*

Biblioteca Vaticana, (*Studi e Testi*, 261), Cité du Vatican, 1970, pp. 390-391. Compléments et additions (les dépouillements des *Sussidi* s'arrêtent à 1967): V. LAURENT, *Bulletin critique. Catalogues de manuscrits grecs et textes byzantins*, dans *Échos d'Orient*, t. 21 [année 31^e] (1928), pp. 444-445. - A. PERTUSI, *La fortuna di Boezio a Bisanzio*, dans *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves* [de l'] Université de Bruxelles, t. 11 (1951) [= Παγκόσμια. *Mélanges Henri Grégoire*, 3, pp. 314-315.] - W. D. ROSS, *The Text of Aristotle's Topics and Sophistici Elenchi*, dans *Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts à A. Diès*, Paris, 1956, p. 215. - R. STICHEL, *Studien zum Verhältnis von Text und Bild spät- und nachbyzantinischer Vergänglichkeitsdarstellungen* (*Byzantina Vindobonensia*, 5), Vienne, 1971, p. 20 n. 13. - N. G. WILSON, *Books and Readers in Byzantium*, dans *Byzantine Books and Bookmen. A Dumbarton Oaks Colloquium*, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 7. - D. HARLFINGER, dans *Aristoteles Graecus. Die griechischen Manuskripte des Aristoteles*, ed. P. MORAUX etc., t. I (*Peripatoi*, 8), Berlin et New-York, 1976, p. 248. - E. TRAPP, *Probleme der Prosopographie der Palaiologenzeit*, dans *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, t. 27 (1978), pp. 198-199 (cité par erreur *Vat. gr.* 2207).

2) Voir les articles de V. LAURENT, N. G. WILSON et E. TRAPP, cités à la note précédente.

3) Je me suis intéressé au *Vat. gr.* 207 à la demande de M. Dimitrios Nikitas, qui préparait en 1979 une dissertation doctorale à l'université de Mannheim sur les traductions de Boèce attribuées à Manuel Holobolos. Au cours de nos échanges de vues, M. Nikitas m'a fait, à propos de la datation du manuscrit, d'intéressantes remarques, dont j'ai tiré profit pour l'exposé qui va suivre. Mais je ne sais pas si M. Nikitas a terminé sa dissertation et quelles ont été ses conclusions finales. On verra que, dans cet article, j'évite de prendre position au sujet du problème qui faisait l'objet spécifique de la recherche de M. Nikitas.

4) La description du contenu aligne 27 numéros mis sur le même pied; l'analyse codicologique se borne à signaler l'intervention de plusieurs mains, la couleur des titres et la présence des signatures de cahiers, dont quelques-unes sont relevées.

5) Je m'inspire des notions et de la terminologie du *Guide pour l'élaboration d'une notice de manuscrit*, publié, à l'initiative de J. GLÉNISON et sous la responsabilité de Marie-Jose BEAUD et de Lucie FOSSIER, par l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (*Bibliographies. Colloques. Travaux préparatoires. Série Informatique et Documentation textuelle*), Paris, 1977. Je cite: "du point de vue matériel, un manuscrit peut être: homogène s'il est d'une seule venue et provient d'un seul atelier, qu'il soit écrit par une ou plusieurs mains, hétérogène s'il est composé d'éléments de dates et d'origines diverses, rassemblés à un ou des moments donnés... Du point de vue intellectuel, il faut préciser aussi s'il s'agit d'un recueil organisé (autour d'un même auteur ou d'un thème) ou d'un recueil factice (dont la constitution semble le fruit du hasard)." (p. 6).

6) Les ff. I à VI et 273 sont des additions au recueil primitif. On peut distinguer, dans l'ordre chronologique: les ff. I et 273, gardes de parchemin arrachées à un manuscrit latin du XIV^e siècle; le f. IV, de papier, dont le recto présente un index latin du contenu, datable du XVI^e siècle; le *bifolium* II-III, de papier, qui constituait la garde d'une reliure antérieure; le f. II présente au recto une cote ancienne (N° 10) et celle que portait le manuscrit dans la *Bibliotheca parva secreta* vers 1559: N 6. 5 *Plu secr*, c'est-à-dire 5^e pupitre, n° 6

(v. R. DEVRESSE, *Le fonds grec de la Bibliothèque Vaticane des origines à Paul V* [Studi e Testi, 244], Cité de Vatican, 1965, p. 437); enfin, les ff. V-VI, de papier, insérés au XVII^e siècle, contiennent (f. v^r-v) l'index du contenu rédigé par Léon Allacci et recopié par Laurent Portius (sur ce type de *pinax Allatianus*, v. P. CANART, *Les Vaticani graeci 1745-1962. Notes et documents sur un fonds manuscrit de la Bibliothèque Vaticane* [Studi e Testi, 284], Cité du Vatican, 1979, pp. 104-105). On reviendra plus loin sur les titres donnés à certaines œuvres dans les *pinaces* des ff. IV et v^r-v et dans les inventaires de la Bibliothèque Vaticane.

7) D'après la disposition des vergeures, il s'agit probablement d'un quaternion suivi d'un feuillet isolé.

8) D'après la disposition des vergeures (h = horizontales, v = verticales): hvh/hvh, le deuxième feuillet (f. 112) pourrait être isolé.

9) Écriture de type cursif, à volutes et inclusions, avec de gros kappa et gamma majuscules. Reconnaisable à une forme de τω assez particulière, où le tau surmonte l'oméga, tandis que l'accent circonflexe part de la base du tau, à laquelle il est lié.

10) Les flèches + et † suivies d'un chiffre indiquent le nombre de lignes à partir respectivement du haut ou du bas de la page.

11) Écriture de type mi-traditionnel; axe vertical; tréma et esprit rude caractéristiques.

12) Écriture de style bêta-gamma. Reconnaisable à son thêta "biblique" et à l'inclusion fréquente dans le bêta du trait horizontal qui lui donne la valeur d'un chiffre.

13) Écriture de style bêta-gamma, avec forte influence de la *Fettaugen-Mode*. Reconnaisable à son oméga ouvert lié à un large accent circonflexe.

14) D'après le nombre de ff., il s'agirait normalement de deux quaternions; mais la numérotation des cahiers, comme on verra, passe de κ' (157-164) à κδ' (181-188); or le contenu n'est pas lacuneux.

15) Écriture de style bêta-gamma, avec nette influence de la *Fettaugen-Mode*. Reconnaisable à son oméga minuscule assez large et aplati et aux lettres tau et omicron superposées.

16) Il offre à la fois des caractéristiques des copistes 1 et 5! Je n'ai pas cru indispensable, dans le cadre de cette étude, de pousser plus à fond l'analyse paléographique en vue de déterminer si le copiste 6 doit être vraiment distingué de 1 ou de 5.

17) Sa composition est aujourd'hui indiscernable; son caractère originel semble garanti par le type de papier: exclusivement oriental à vergeures horizontales.

18) Par suite d'une erreur du copiste?

19) La couleur de l'encre présente des variations sensibles, de l'ocre au gris.

20) Dans une note marginale au f. 273, il prévient un reproche des lecteurs: s'il a copié le texte sur les syllogismes hypothétiques après celui sur les Topiques, contrairement à l'ordre logique, c'est que le premier lui est venu entre les mains après le second: μηδεὶς ἐπιφύεσθω τῷ γράψαντι τοὺς ὑποθετικούς συλλογισμούς ἐνταῦθα, μετὰ τοὺς διαλεκτικούς τόπους· ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῆς λογικῆς πραγματείας, πρότερον γράφεσθαι τούτους· ἐγράφησαν δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὕστερος, ὅτι καὶ ὕστερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἦλθον εἰς χεῖρας

ἡμῶν: ὁ δὲ μετερχόμενος τὴν λογικὴν πραγματείαν, οἶδε πάντως ὅτι τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς δεόν μετέρχεσθαι πρῶτον.

21) Dans ce cas-ci également, il m'a semblé superflu de pousser plus loin l'analyse paléographique: les annotateurs du XIV^e siècle sont au moins deux, mais la plupart des suppléments sont dus à la même main, qui utilise une belle petite écriture érudite du style que j'appellerais "néo-classique".

22) Pour les ff. 1 et 3 considérés isolément, je dirais que l'attribution est seulement probable; mais l'écriture des autres ff. additionnels et la nature du recueil accroissent cette probabilité.

23) Voir le détail dans le catalogue des *Vaticani graeci*, cité à la note 1.

24) Voit-on le maître d'œuvre rassembler en une fois des cahiers vierges d'écriture, les uns normaux, les autres rapetassés, et mettre ceux-ci en tête, en calculant qu'ils serviront juste pour une première série de textes? Il est évident que c'est contraint et forcé que, dans un second temps, le responsable du recueil a recouru à la solution de fortune du rapiéçage.

25) Les signatures η' et ι' ont péri par suite de dommages matériels.

26) Même si, actuellement, sa composition n'est pas régulière.

27) Dans la partie II, je n'ai pas relevé d'exemple sûr de son intervention: les corrections du f. 145^v sont d'une main postérieure, me semble-t-il. Dans la partie III, des corrections à l'encre noire (ff. 153 + 21, 155^v + 14) sont probablement de sa main.

28) Exemples: I: ff. 10 + 2, 11 + 7, 65 + 6; III: ff. 153 + 21, 155^v + 14; IV: ff. 169 + 3, 5 etc. 182^v + 18; V: f. 238^v + 6 (du texte).

29) Exemples: I: ff. 13^v + 7, 18 + 1; IV: ff. 174 + 10, 179^v + 18, 182^v + 18; V: f. 237 + 7 (du texte).

30) Il utilise alors l'encre noire (ff. 4, 207^v) ou différentes nuances de rouge: vif (ff. 130, 131^v etc.), terne (ff. 195, 200), tirant sur le mauve (ff. 118-127, 236).

31) Titres complétés tout de suite après la copie: en noir (f. 113), en rouge épais (ff. 219^v, 237, 238^v).

32) Exemples: I: ff. 7, 8^v... 73; IV: f. 165^v; V: ff. 204^v-205.

33) Exemples: I: ff. 4, 5, 7^v, 8^v... 73; IV: f. 185^v + 19.

34) Exemples: IV: ff. 168, 168^v, 169 etc.

35) Exemples: I: f. 17; V: ff. 238^v-239.

36) Exemples: ff. 4, 147, 165, 279, 294.

37) Exemples: ff. 282, 289, 289^v, 326, 329, 332, 334^v.

38) L'édition est diplomatique et utilise les sigles habituels. Seules les abréviations par suspension sont marquées par les parenthèses.

39) Les mots τὰ πέντε ont été grattés, probablement par le copiste lui-même.

40) δ' συλλογισμοὶ ὑποθε et les désinences -οι et -οθέντες sont une correction en noir, sur grattage, de la main du copiste 1. Les mots grattés représentaient certainement un titre d'œuvre au féminin, comme en témoignent les désinences -τικὴ et -θεῖσα encore lisibles.

41) Deux ou trois mots grattés, dont il reste des traces, mais que je n'ai pas réussi à déchiffrer. Les traces excluent, je crois, la lecture *Μαξίμου τοῦ Πλανούδη* proposée par PERTUSI (v. l'article cité n. 1) et sur laquelle on reviendra plus loin.

42) Trois (ou quatre?) mots ont été grattés, dont le dernier reste malheureusement illisible.

43) *Μεταχουρίζω* signifie évidemment "traduire"; je ne sais si le verbe est attesté ailleurs et dans ce sens; celui-ci est à rapprocher de l'emploi byzantin du mot *χύμα* pour dire "texte suivi" (sur cette acception de *χύμα*, v. J. LEROY dans *Le Musée*, t. 71, 1958, pp. 351-352).

44) Une ligne absolument illisible, à cause d'une déchirure du papier; celle-ci est due probablement à un grattage.

45) Le début de cette ligne a été coupé en grande partie avec la marge.

46) V. ci-dessus la note 20.

47) D'autant plus que le grattage après *δίκαιον ἔχει τιμᾶσαι* a probablement supprimé lui aussi une phrase qui concernait le traducteur.

48) C'est la seconde hypothèse qui me semble la plus probable.

49) On pourrait imaginer la solution suivante. Le copiste 1 rassembla d'abord les premières parties du recueil (p. ex., II+III+IV, puis I, adaptée aux dimensions des suivantes). Ensuite, il eut l'idée d'un recueil plus ample et plus organique, dont il composa et transcrivit le *pinax*. Mais, à ce moment, il ne disposait pas encore du texte des traductions de Boèce; il se le procura un peu après et confectionna la partie V. S'apercevant que, s'agissant de Boèce, les titres du texte et du *pinax* ne concordait pas, il corrigea ceux du *pinax*. Mais cette hypothèse ne tient pas: si les choses s'étaient passées ainsi, l'auteur du *pinax* n'aurait pas laissé deux fois, à la fin du titre, l'espace juste nécessaire pour écrire l'intitulé corrigé. C'est bien le fait que les corrections ont été opérées *in scribendo* qui est difficile à expliquer! Reste alors l'hypothèse de PERTUSI (v. l'article cité n. 1). D'après ce dernier, il s'agirait d'un faux opéré par le copiste du *Vat. gr.* 207 au moment même de la copie. Mais Pertusi considérerait évidemment le volume comme un manuscrit unitaire: une fois la substitution faite dans le *pinax*, le copiste aurait, dans la copie, mentionné uniquement le nouveau nom. Il n'est pas absolument impossible d'adapter cette solution à la réalité du recueil organisé. On reprendrait, en la modifiant, l'explication imaginée plus haut: le copiste 1 aurait composé le *pinax*, en opérant le faux au moment de la transcription; puis, il aurait confectionné la partie V, en tenant compte seulement du nouvel auteur. Mais pareil faux, qui remonterait presque à l'époque de rédaction des traductions, semble bien invraisemblable. L'hypothèse deviant peut-être plus acceptable si, au lieu d'une substitution d'auteur, on pense seulement à une modification dans la titulature de celui-ci. On reviendra sur ce point après avoir traité de la date de confection du recueil.

50) Des amis du même cercle, des étudiants?

51) Les critères d'édition sont ceux définis à la n. 38. On a mis à profit l'excellente transcription de G. Mercati et le complément suggéré par Trapp à propos de *Pentekklésiôtès*.

52) Le feuillet est déchiré après *δέδωκα*, mais il ne semble pas qu'il y ait de lacune; les lignes 2 à 4 sont aussi plus courtes que les autres, bien que plus longues que l'actuelle ligne 1.

53) *ἀρξασθαι* et *λαμβάνειν* proposés par G. Mercati.

54) Les traces qu'on voit à cet endroit proviennent d'une décharge d'encre d'un autre feuillet.

55) Corrigé *in scribendo* sur des lettres illisibles.

56) Malgré les surcharges, le nom semble sûr.

57) Et non συγγράμματα, lecture de Mercati.

58) Et non ΜΟΔΕΣΤ(Ω), lecture de Mercati.

59) ὦρα δ' de Mercati n'est certainement pas bon.

60) Après γ', les traces qu'on discerne se mêlent inextricablement à une décharge d'encre d'un autre feuillet.

61) Il n'est pas sûr qu'il y ait une lacune à cet endroit.

62) Il s'agit probablement d'un *incipit*, que je n'ai pu identifier.

63) La lecture du nom du mois est assez douteuse, mais durant l'indiction 10 (1281/2), le seul mois où le 9 soit un samedi est précisément décembre.

64) Le chiffre de l'indiction est absolument indéchiffrable; ce devait être 1', à moins de supposer un saut de 15 ans entre le prêt de la ligne 17 et celui de la ligne 19. Si la série des derniers prêts se situe au cours d'une même indiction 10, le mois de la ligne 18 doit être janvier.

65) με corrigé *in scribendo* sur προ.

66) L'érudit a copié de sa main (ἡπερ ἐστὶν ἐμὰ γράμματα) le commentaire de Doxapatrès sur les *Staseis* d'Hermogène.

67) C'est évident pour l'auteur de la liste. Celui du recueil prévoit que celui-ci aura des lecteurs, puisque, dans la note marginale du f. 273, il réfute d'avance une objection que ceux-ci pourraient lui faire (v. ci-dessus la n. 20).

68) On peut le déduire, je crois, de l'expression πρὸ τοῦ μὲ ἀρξα-[σθ]αι [λαμ]βάνειν εἰς τὸ πατριαρχεῖον.

69) Pachymère, *Michel Paléol.*, V, 25 (éd. Bonn, I, 409, 4-5); référence déjà donnée par LAURENT et TRAPP; elle se rapporte à l'année 1275.

70) J. DARROUZÈS, *Recherches sur les 'Οφφίκια de l'Église byzantine* (*Archives de l'Orient Chrétien*, 11), Paris, 1970, p. 532, n° 11.

71) *Ibid.*, n° 12.

72) Voir sur ce personnage V. LAURENT, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, I, 4. *Les Regestes de 1208 à 1309*, Paris, 1971, n° 1447 et 1504. C'est ce Jean Pentekklèsiotès qui fournit au grand économiste Théodore Xiphilinos le livre qui contenait l'homélie de Grégoire de Nysse (la 3^e sur le Pater: P.G. 44, 1160) attestant la formule ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ. Eskammatisménos ne trouva rien de mieux que de gratter l'expression litigieuse, ce qui provoqua toute une affaire (v. LAURENT, *Regestes*, n° 1447). Ce rôle d'intermédiaire de Jean Pentekklèsiotès est aussi celui du Pentekklèsiotès de la liste de prêts. En 1285, Jean Pentekklèsiotès était diacre patriarcal (DARROUZÈS, *'Οφφίκια*, p. 533).

73) DARROUZÈS, *'Οφφίκια*, p. 532, n° 18.

74) DARROUZÈS, *'Οφφίκια*, p. 532, n° 24. LAURENT (*Regestes*, n° 1495, Crit. 4) fait allusion à "un certain Michel Iasitès", responsable d'un cas inédit de falsification.

75) V. les articles cités à la n. 1.

76) C'est aussi la fonction qui lui est attribuée dans le *pinax*. Le ῥήτωρ ou ῥήτωρ τῶν ῥητόρων était compté au nombre des archontes patriarcaux (v. DARROUZES, 'Ορφικά, p. 111); ainsi s'explique la première mention d'Holobolos dans le *pinax*.

77) La source est G. Pachymère, Michel Paléol., V, 12 (éd. Bonn, I, 283-284). Sur la chronologie du patriarcat de Germain, v. V. LAURENT, dans *Revue des Études Byzantines*, t. 27 (1969), pp. 143-144. Sur le titre et les fonctions de rhéteur assumées par Holobolos, v. DARROUZES, 'Ορφικά, pp. 110-111.

78) Sur le problème de l'attribution à Manuel Holobolos ou à Maxime Planude des traductions de Boèce, *De differentiis topicis* et *De syllogismo hypothetico*, v. M. TREU, *Manuel Holobolos*, dans *Byzant. Zeitschrift*, t. 5 (1896), pp. 552-559; S. KUGEAS, *Analekta Planudea*, *ibid.*, t. 18 (1909), pp. 120-126; A. PERTUSI, *La fortuna...* (cité à la n. 1), pp. 312-315. Ces auteurs ont proposé des considérations intéressantes, mais qui ne tranchent pas la question. Il faut reprendre celle-ci sur la base d'un examen approfondi de la tradition manuscrite, de la langue et du style de ces traductions.

79) Le seul autre candidat sérieux est Maxime Planude. Mais si celui-ci est bien né en 1254 ou 1255 au plus tard, comme l'a précisé A. TURYN (*The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides* [Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, 43], Urbana, 1957, p. 53 n. 88), il n'a pu traduire Boèce dans les années 1265-68! L'aurait-il fait, pour quoi, dans le *pinax* du f. 3^v, son nom aurait-il été remplacé aussitôt par celui d'Holobolos? On s'explique mieux que, dans la tradition manuscrite, le nom de Maxime Planude ait, à cause de la diffusion du *De consolatione philosophiae* dans la version de ce dernier, supplanté à l'occasion celui de Maxime Holobolos. Il est curieux de constater que cette substitution a été opérée, à un moment donné, dans les notices des inventaires de la Bibliothèque Vaticane concernant le *Vat. gr.* 207. Voici, dans l'ordre chronologique, comment les traductions grecques de Boèce sont signalées: 1) inventaire de 1518 (*Vat. lat.* 3955, f. 86, n° 49): "... Boetij de locis de differentiis topicis interprete (sic) Maximo ologolo (sic)"; 2) inventaire grec de 1539 environ: texte du *pinax* du manuscrit, à part quelques fautes d'orthographe sans importance (mais, pour Denys l'Aréopagite, les titres sont modifiés); 3) inventaire de la "petite secrète" (*Vat. lat.* 7131): dans la rédaction grecque d'E. Provataris (f. 129): "Βοετίου διαλεκτικοῦ τόπου"; dans la version latine (f. 136): "Boetij loci dialectici"; 4) inventaire de Federico Ranaldi, peu avant 1583 (*Vat. lat.* 13.191, f. 112^{r-v}, n° 1100): "Boetij latini dialectica in graecam linguam conversa per Maximum planudem"; 5) catalogue de Léon Allacci recopié par Léon Portius (*Sala Cons. Mes.*, n° 321): "Βοετίου περί τόπων διαλεκτικῶν, διαίρεσις εἰς τὴν ἐλλάδα φωνὴν ὑπὸ Μαξίμου τοῦ Ὀλοβόλου μετενεχθεῖσα / Τοῦ αὐτοῦ περί συλλογισμῶν ὑποθετικῶν, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μαξίμου ὡσαύτως μετενεχθέν; 6) *pinax Allatianus* du manuscrit, f. v^{r-v}: "Βοετίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου περί τόπων διαλεκτικῶν διαίρεσις μεταγλωττισθεῖσα ὑπὸ Μαξίμου τοῦ Πλανούδη / Τοῦ αὐτοῦ περί συλλογισμῶν ὑποθετικῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μαξίμου μεταγλωττισθέντων". Il semblerait donc que Federico Ranaldi soit le responsable de la modification: l'a-t-il faite volontairement ou machinalement, parce que le nom de Planude lui était plus familier? L. Allacci, dans son catalogue, a d'abord conservé l'attribution à Holobolos; est-ce lui, est-ce L. Portius qui est responsable de la modification introduite dans le *pinax Allatianus* du manuscrit?

80) Quand, à la fin du *pinax*, l'auteur écrit, à propos du traducteur de Boèce, "il a le droit d'être honoré", n'y aurait-il pas là

une protestation contre le supplice et le confinement infligés à Holobolos? La ligne grattée immédiatement après contenait peut-être des précisions à ce sujet, rendues soudain caduques par le retour en grâce du savant. Celui-ci avait profité de sa période de réclusion pour approfondir ses études philosophiques et, notamment, traduire les commentaires de Boèce.

81) Je rappelle les principaux: *Les premiers manuscrits grecs écrits sur papier et le problème du bombycin*, dans *Scriptorium*, t. 4 (1950), pp. 194-204; *Les débuts de l'emploi du papier à Byzance*, dans *Byzant. Zeitschrift*, t. 46 (1953), pp. 314-319; *Les types de formes utilisés dans l'Orient méditerranéen (Syrie, Égypte) du XII^e au XIV^e siècle*, dans *Papiergeschichte*, t. 13 (1963), pp. 18-21; *Les origines de la fabrication du papier en Italie*, *ibid.*, pp. 62-66; *Les conditions matérielles de la production du livre à Byzance de 1071 à 1261 (XV^e Congrès International d'Études Byzantines. Rapports et co-rapports)*, Athènes, 1976; *Papiers orientaux et papiers occidentaux*, dans *La paléographie grecque et byzantine. Paris 21-25 octobre 1974 (C.N.R.S. Colloque international n° 559)*, Paris, 1977, pp. 45-54.

82) Un seul type de papier oriental, ce me semble, est employé partout. La pâte, d'aspect assez homogène, est de tonalité brunâtre. Les vergeures, généralement bien visibles, sont assez épaisses; 20 occupent généralement 38/40 mm; elles présentent parfois une légère courbure et ne sont pas toujours parallèles aux bords des feuillets. Les pontuseaux sont presque toujours indiscernables; rarement, on en distingue un isolé ou deux rapprochés, très fins.

83) Le tableau 1 visualise la différence entre les trois formats arabes courants et le format italien.

84) Dans ce cas, le sens des vergeures est le même (horizontal) dans les *bifolia* occidentaux et orientaux; v. le tableau 3.

85) Dans ce cas, le sens des vergeures est vertical dans les *befolia* orientaux retaillés: v. le tableau 3.

86) J'ai tâché de mesurer tous les intervalles pour une feuille, qui correspond dans notre cas à un *bifolium*. Les traits ondulés indiquent les bords de la feuille, les traits pleins les pontuseaux visibles, les traits interrompus le pli central du *bifolium*, qui peut, éventuellement, dissimuler un pontuseau. L'état du papier ne permet pas de reconnaître avec certitude la face de la feuille appliquée sur le réseau de fils de la forme; la série des intervalles peut donc se lire de gauche à droite ou de droite à gauche.

87) Le cahier 203-210, normal quant au texte, était de composition artificielle dès l'origine, comme le montre la succession des feuillets: or. - occid. - occid. - or. / or. - or. - occid. - occid. C'est ce qui explique qu'au moment de la dernière opération de reliure, le f. 203 ait été placé dans le sens bas - haut et verso - recto.

88) Le cahier 26' (ff. 271-278) est artificiel. Il est composé d'un binion (originel? la restauration empêche de se prononcer) et d'un ternion, lequel est fait d'un autre type de papier.


89) Il faut considérer à part le f. 263, qui a été intercalé dans le quinion 27' et présente au recto, de la main du copiste 1, la suite de l'addition du f. 270 + 11 sv. Ce feuillet, dont le tiers inférieur manque, a été collé sur un feuillet de papier récent, ce qui rend très difficile l'examen de sa texture: il est probable, cependant, qu'il s'agit de papier occidental à pontuseaux régulièrement espacés.

90) J. Irigoin, qui a bien voulu lire cet article avant l'impression, me fait noter que cette marge réduite à 5 mm. est un fait anormal. Il pourrait s'expliquer, dit-il, par l'emploi d'une feuille de grand format (+ 350 x 490 mm.) - d'où le plus grand écart des pontuseaux -, réduite aux dimensions du format courant - d'où la marge artificielle de 5 mm. Mais, ajoute-t-il, cette explication vaudrait pour du papier italien plutôt que pour de l'espagnol. Or, cette partie est précisément celle où se trouve le zig-zag.

91) Cependant, J. Irigoin est tenté de croire que, dans tous les cas, on a affaire à du papier espagnol.

TABLEAUX

1. *Les formats arabes orientaux et italien au XIII^e siècle.* Les traits serrés indiquent le sens des vergeures pour chaque format.




Formats orientaux: grand: mm 750 x 520; intermédiaire: mm 520 x 375; petit: mm 375 x 260. Format occidental: mm 460 x 290.

2. *Les types de bifolia dans le Vat. gr. 207 et leur répartition dans les cahiers.* Les hachures indiquent les bandes de papier rapportées.


Bifolia à vergeures horizontales

Type:

1



2




Fréquence:

18

8


Type:



Fréquence:

2 3
Bifolia à vergeures verticales


Type:



Fréquence:

14 9

Type:



Fréquence:








0 0

Répartition des types dans les cahiers:

ff. 4	I	ff.13	2	ff.21	I	ff.29	1	ff.37	1
5	1	14	I	22	II	30	I	38	II
6	3	15	1	23	2	31	II	39	II
7	4	16	1	24	3	32	1	40	4
-		--		--		--		--	
8	4	17	1	25	3	33	1	41	4
9	3	18	1	26	2	34	II	42	II
10	1	19	I	27	II	35	I	43	II
11	I	20	2	28	I	36	1	44	1
ff.45	1	ff.55	1	ff.63	I	ff.71	I	ff.79	I
46	II	56	1	64	1	72	I	80	2
47	2	57	1	65	I	73	1	81	4
48	2	58	II	66	2	74	I	82	1
49	II	--		--		--		--	
--		59	II	67	2	75	I	83	1
50	II	60	1	68	I	76	1	84	4
51	2	61	1	69	1	77	I	85	2
52	2	62	1	70	I	78	I	86	I
53	II								
54	1								

ff.87	1	ff.95	I	ff.103	2	ff.111	1
88	1	96	1	104	2	112	
89	I	97	1	105	2	113	I
90	I	98	II	106	II	114	1
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91	I	99	II	107	II	115	1
92	I	100	1	108	2	116	I
93	1	101	1	109	2	117	1
94	1	102	I	110	2		

3. *Comment tailler des bifolia de dimensions occidentales dans du papier arabe.* Les rectangles en traits pleins représentent les *bifolia* des trois formats orientaux; ceux en pointillés ceux de format occidental: ils portent les numéros des types définis au tableau 2. Les trois traits serrés indiquent le sens des vergéures.



NOUVELLES DONNÉES SUR JOASAPH,
COPISTE DU MONASTÈRE DES HODÈGES

LINOS POLITIS

Il y a plusieurs années, j'avais présenté l'activité d'un centre de copie situé dans le fameux monastère des Hodèges (τῶν Ὁδηγῶν) à Constantinople.¹⁾ Par le présent article, dédié à la mémoire de l'éminent philologue et paléographe, que fut Alexander Turyn, spécialiste des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles, j'ajoute quelques données nouvelles sur le membre le plus renommé de ce centre de copie, Joasaph.

Des éléments nouveaux, en effet, ont été publiés, aux cours des dernières années, sur le scriptorium du monastère des Hodèges, et notamment sur Joasaph; ainsi l'image que nous avons aujourd'hui de ce scriptorium s'est-elle considérablement enrichie. Sur ce point, la contribution des historiens de l'art fut remarquable; ils ont fait ressortir la position particulière des manuscrits produits par les copistes du scriptorium des Hodèges, et surtout par Joasaph, dans l'évolution de l'art à l'époque des Paléologues. On n'aurait qu'à rappeler les cinq manuscrits enluminés de Joasaph récemment découverts, ajoutés au seul témoin de cette sorte connu auparavant:²⁾ un Psautier à Oxford, le manuscrit égaré de Jean Climaque, autrefois à Halki, retrouvé à l'Université de Michigan, le *Synod. Gr.* 429 de Moscou, contenant l'*Akathistos* et d'autre textes hymnographiques, et, enfin, deux manuscrits des Évangiles, un à Kutlumus et l'autre à la Vaticane.³⁾

Pourtant, même avant la découverte de ces nouveaux manuscrits et l'attribution au monastère des Hodèges, Hans Belting était arrivé à la conclusion que le couvent des Hodèges, situé dans la capitale, pouvait être, d'une certaine façon, considéré comme un substitut du scriptorium du palais

impérial.⁴⁾ Il a surtout signalé deux faits décisifs: les relations étroites que la famille impériale entretenait avec le monastère (où Andronic III et Jean V furent ensevelis), et le fait que les copistes du scriptorium confectionnaient des manuscrits de luxe sur la commande des membres de la famille impériale. Des études ultérieures de H. Belting ainsi que de H. Buchthal ont déterminé d'une façon plus précise le rôle du scriptorium dans l'évolution de l'art de la miniature à l'époque des Paléologues.⁵⁾ Une importance particulière a été donnée au problème de l'existence ou non, à côté du centre de copie du monastère, d'un centre de miniaturistes, et de la relation, en général, entre l'écriture, l'ornementation et les miniatures. Un bon exposé et une récapitulation du problème sont donnés par Annemarie Weyl Carr dans sa récente étude (voir bibliographie).

Parallèlement aux travaux des historiens de l'art, des études proprement paléographiques et codicologiques ont déterminé la place spéciale du centre de copie du couvent des Hodèges au cours des XIV^e et XV^e siècles. On devrait noter que les études des historiens de l'art ont particulièrement aidé celles des paléographes, et vice versa. Les conclusions importantes auxquelles avaient abouti les premiers s'appuyèrent sur les données paléographiques, et surtout sur l'existence d'un centre de copie, cohérent et de longue durée, dans la capitale, où furent confectionnés quelques-uns des manuscrits les plus somptueux de l'époque, ornés ou non de miniatures. La distinction, par ailleurs, de certains groupes homogènes (comme, par exemple, celui "de la Paléologina"),⁶⁾ signalés par les historiens de l'art, partant de l'affinité du style des miniatures ou de l'ornementation, a permis aux paléographes de constituer, à leur tour, leurs groupes ou de dater, avec plus de précision, des manuscrits isolés.

Pour citer un exemple, H. Belting et H. Buchthal, s'appuyant toujours sur l'analyse du style des miniatures et de l'ornementation, ont associé au groupe "de la Paléologina" deux Tétraévangiles postérieurs, Lavra A 46 (de 1333) et Patmos 81 (de 1335), écrits tous les deux de la même main.⁷⁾ Les recherches paléographiques ont attiré, d'autre part, l'attention sur un autre groupe de Tétraévangiles, identiques à

ceux-ci en ce qui concerne l'écriture et les éléments codicologiques, tandis que ces mêmes éléments (et, en premier lieu, la façon très simple d'indiquer la date) ont été signalés sur deux autres manuscrits des Quatre Évangiles, Lavra A 54 et Dionysiou 9 (auxquels E. Lamberz a ajouté un troisième, Vatopédi 938), dont l'écriture est, pourtant, différente de celle des autres; elle n'a pas le module arrondi du groupe déjà cité, mais un autre, anguleux, oblong et plus serré. Ils sont écrits, assurément, tous les trois de la même main, et datés de la même année, 1304. Six manuscrits à Vatopédi, qui constituent une série cohérente, contenant les Commentaires de St Jean Chrysostome sur les Actes et les épîtres de Saint Paul, présentent la même écriture. Ils sont tous écrits vers 1335 par un moine Joasaph, qui, pour des raisons chronologiques, ne peut pas être celui du monastère des Hodèges. Trois autres manuscrits, également à Vatopédi, avec le même contenu (Commentaires de Chrysostome), les mêmes dimensions et éléments codicologiques, et une ornementation semblable, sont écrits, pendant les mêmes années (1332 et 1334), par Chariton, copiste du scriptorium des Hodèges.⁸⁾ La conclusion est plus qu'évidente: l'ensemble des neuf volumes des Commentaires chrysostomiens fut écrit dans le même centre de copie; et puisque l'un des copistes, Chariton, appartient au scriptorium du couvent des Hodèges, il s'ensuit que l'autre lui appartient également. Nous lui avons donné le nom de Joasaph I, pour le distinguer de son homonyme célèbre. Son identification avec celui qui a écrit le groupe des trois Tétra-évangiles de 1304 (Lavra-Dionysiou-Vatopédi), comme je l'avais supposé, n'est pourtant pas du tout certaine.⁹⁾ La distance considérable de trente ans (1304-1335) entre le groupe des trois Évangiles et l'activité de Joasaph I, renforce l'incertitude. Une analyse paléographique plus approfondie (comme celle qu'a entamée H. Hunger - voir plus bas) des manuscrits anonymes qui appartiennent assurément au scriptorium des Hodèges, pourrait éventuellement attribuer aussi d'autres unités à ce nouveau copiste; il serait très important de pouvoir de cette façon combler la lacune de trente ans, et obtenir une succession de moines calligraphes dans le monastère des Hodèges: Joasaph I (1304-1335), Chariton (1319-

1346), Joasaph II (1360-1406).¹⁰⁾

On a depuis longtemps constaté la différence entre l'écriture "littéraire" et l'écriture "liturgique" au cours des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles. Les recherches paléographiques étaient orientées de préférence vers la première, chose, d'ailleurs, naturelle, puisque les manuscrits les plus importants des auteurs classiques, voire byzantins, présentent ce mode d'écriture. Pourtant, l'intérêt s'est récemment tourné également vers l'écriture liturgique, et des efforts se sont manifestés pour fixer, dans ce vaste cadre, des manières plus distinctes d'écriture. Nous avons aujourd'hui, sur ce point, deux études exhaustives et excellentes, parues à peu près en même temps, celles de G. Prato et de H. Hunger.¹¹⁾ Le premier examine l'écriture archaïsante en module rond qui imite consciemment les modèles anciens des X^e et XI^e siècles.¹²⁾ Il nous donne, à la suite, un inventaire des manuscrits en écriture archaïsante, et, au moyen d'observations minutieuses, met en évidence les différences entre les imitations et leur modèle; à la fin il cite les copistes les plus importants, parmi lesquels Théodore Hagiopetritès, "un des exemples les plus significatifs des graphies d'imitation de l'époque des Paléologues". J'avais autrefois proposé d'appeler cette manière d'écriture "style d'Hagiopetritès";¹³⁾ mais les termes "scrittura libraria arcaizzante" (Prato) ou "archaisierende Minuskel" (Hunger) sont assurément beaucoup plus appropriés. Prato fait aussi mention, à la fin de son étude (pp. 181-184), du scriptorium des Hodèges, en rendant immédiatement clair que "la graphie des manuscrits provenant de ce célèbre scriptorium ne peut pas être considérée comme faisant partie des écritures purement mimétiques".

Cette mise au point devient plus nette dans l'étude de H. Hunger, qui distingue formellement deux sortes d'écriture liturgique au XIV^e siècle, la "minuscule archaïsante" et le "style des Hodèges", et procède à une analyse détaillée de leurs éléments caractéristiques. La "minuscule archaïsante", qui apparaît dans des manuscrits de la fin du XIII^e et du début du XIV^e siècle, est une imitation volontaire de la "Perlschrift" des X^e et XI^e siècles et est utilisée pour les manuscrits du Nouveau Testament, surtout des Quatre Évangiles,

pour les livres (et les rouleaux) liturgiques, mais aussi pour les manuscrits de l'Ancien Testament, des Pères de l'Église, et pour les commentaires théologiques. Une liste des manuscrits présentant cette graphie, divisés selon leur contenu, et dont on possède des spécimens d'écriture facilement accessibles, est donnée à la suite (pp. 197-198). Le module de cette écriture est tout à fait différent de l'écriture du scriptorium des Hodèges, à laquelle Hunger donne le nom réussi de "Hodegonstil". Il présente un inventaire des copistes appartenant au scriptorium des Hodèges et des manuscrits produits par eux (pp. 201-208), ainsi qu'une analyse approfondie des éléments caractéristiques de l'écriture individuelle de chacun, analyse d'une extrême importance pour qui voudrait entreprendre la tâche difficile d'attribuer à des copistes concrets le grand nombre de manuscrits anonymes du scriptorium. Dans ce but, le Répertoire des copistes grecs, cette entreprise de grande envergure patronnée par l'Académie des Sciences Autrichienne, et en cours de réalisation sous la direction de H. Hunger, va rendre de précieux services.¹⁴⁾

Quant à la personnalité de Joasaph, nous sommes à présent mieux informés, grâce surtout aux épigrammes que lui a dédiées Johannes Chortasmenos et que H. Hunger a publiées.¹⁵⁾ Il s'agit de cinq épigrammes, dont une iambique et les autres "héroïques" (c'est à dire en hexamètres), "εἰς τὸν μακάριον ἐκεῖνον μοναχὸν κύρ 'Ιωάσαφ, τὸν καλλιγράφον καὶ ἡγούμενον τῆς μονῆς τῆς ὑπεραγίας Θεοτόκου τῆς Ὁδηγητρίας, κοιμηθέντα ἐν ἔτει ς' α' ιε', μηνὶ νοεμβρίῳ α', ἰνδ. ιε' [1406]". Le titre nous donnait déjà deux informations précieuses: premièrement la date exacte de sa mort, inconnue jusqu'alors, et deuxièmement le fait que Joasaph fut higoumène du couvent des Hodèges; son higouménat est également mentionné par la première et la deuxième épigramme (καὶ ποιμενάρχου σῆς μονῆς καταστάντος - ποιμὴν ἀγλαομόρφου τῆσδε μονῆς ἱερᾶς τε μεγίστης), et sa qualité de καλλιγράφος est expressément citée tant au titre que dans la première épigramme. Cette même épigramme iambique (qui est la plus importante)¹⁶⁾ le qualifie aussi de "ἄνδρα βίῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ κοσμηθέντα". D'ailleurs, le fait même qu'un humaniste et intellectuel de l'époque tel que Chortasmenos était l'ami de Joasaph ajoute à la personnalité

de ce dernier une autre dimension.

A. Turyn,¹⁷⁾ dans sa description du Chis. R. V. 29, écrit par notre copiste, croit que le Joasaph de l'épigramme de Chortasmenos est un autre personnage, et cela parce qu'il y est mentionné comme μοναχός et non comme ἱερομόναχος, ce qu'était notre calligraphe. Hunger, pour sa part,¹⁸⁾ réfute cette opinion en observant que parmi les trente-deux manuscrits de Joasaph qui nous sont connus, un seul, Athen. 2114 (*Schreiberschule*, 33 n° 29), ajoute la qualification d'ἱερομόναχος, et suppose que notre copiste est devenu hiéromoine à la fin de sa vie (l'Athen. 2114 est de 1405), chose que Chortasmenos ignorait ou qui échappa à son attention. Il est peu probable que Chortasmenos l'ait ignoré; car, selon les règles monastiques, l'higoumène d'un couvent ne pouvait être qu'hiéromoine. Ceci en définitive est de peu d'importance; en tout cas, l'opinion de Turyn, selon laquelle nous avons affaire à deux personnages différents, est peu vraisemblable, du moment que Chortasmenos qualifie expressément de calligraphe le personnage qu'il célèbre. Mais l'hypothèse de Hunger, selon laquelle Joasaph est devenu hiéromoine seulement à la fin de sa vie, ne semble pas non plus être justifiée: ce n'est pas seulement dans le manuscrit athénien de 1405 que Joasaph est mentionné comme hiéromoine; Hunger lui-même renvoie (p. 111, n. 3) au rouleau de Lavra n° 25 (Politis, 1958, 27 n° 3, cf. le même, 1957, 398 n° 25), de juillet 1366, qui porte la souscription Ἰωάσαφ πέφυκα λευίτου [= prêtre] πόνος.¹⁹⁾ Le rouleau de Lavra est une des premières œuvres, dans lesquelles notre copiste n'avait pas encore stabilisé sa signature: Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ Ἰωάσαφ πόνος. Cette formule stable ne laissait pas de marge pour que sa qualité d'hiéromoine puisse y être mentionnée; dans le manuscrit athénien de 1405, cité plus haut, cela est fait dans une note additionnelle qui révèle aussi le nom du commanditaire: Ἡ παροῦσα βίβλος τοῦ ἁγίου εὐαγγελίου ἐγράφη διὰ χειρὸς ἐμοῦ Ἰωάσαφ ἱερομονάχου, ὁ δὲ ταύτην φιλοτιμησάμενος ὥστε γενέσθαι ταύτην etc. En conclusion: Joasaph était déjà, en 1366, ordonné hiéromoine, et, bien naturellement, continua à l'être jusqu'à la fin de sa vie.

Je ne sais pas si deux documents patriarcaux pourraient

jeter quelque lumière sur ce point;²⁰⁾ le premier, daté, selon Darrouzès, de septembre 1355, est une sentence de déposition prononcée par le patriarche contre deux moines du monastère des Hodèges; l'un d'eux, nommé Joasaph, y est accusé d'avoir eu des relations avec une femme "φαύλη τε καὶ ἐκδεδιητημένη", qui entraît librement dans sa cellule; sa peine fut de rester "ἀργός καὶ ἐπισχημένος εἰς τὴν ἱερωσούνην αὐτοῦ". Le second acte est postérieur de quinze ans, daté du 12 mai 1370. C'est un acte de déposition également, du (même?) hiéromoine Joasaph (παπᾶς Ἰωάσαφ); il y est accusé d'avoir des relations coupables ("συνεφθείρετο") avec une religieuse du couvent de Saint-André de Krisis. L'ayant rendue enceinte, il avait reçu du "sorcier" Syropoulos une drogue qu'il donna à la religieuse pour la faire avorter. Le prêtre Joasaph avoua son péché devant le saint synode, qui, en présence du patriarche, prit la décision de déposer le prêtre ("μόνης τῆς ἱερωσούνης ἀπογομνωθῆναι"), peine jugée suffisante, puisqu'elle le privait de la dignité du sacre.

Le Joasaph, hiéromoine du monastère des Hodèges, puni deux fois (en 1355 et en 1370) pour un délit du même genre - ou s'agit-il de deux personnages différents? - est-il le même que notre copiste? Darrouzès semble n'avoir pas de doute sur ce point.²¹⁾ Pourtant, dans un couvent très peuplé comme celui des Hodèges, l'existence de plusieurs moines portant le même nom monastique dans le même espace de temps ne serait pas étrange. En tout cas, si l'on suppose qu'une telle identification n'est pas exclue, on peut éventuellement expliquer pourquoi Joasaph se qualifie, en 1362 et en 1366,²²⁾ de prêtre (λευΐτης), et seulement quarante ans après, à la fin de sa vie, se nomme ἱερομόναχος. Il faut, naturellement, supposer qu'il a, dans l'intervalle, obtenu sa réintégration (συχώρησις). Mais, même si Joasaph le calligraphe n'a rien à faire avec le Joasaph accusé de fornication, le problème du moine ou hiéromoine Joasaph n'existe pas en vérité, puisque, comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, notre copiste n'ajoutait qu'exceptionnellement après son nom sa qualité monastique et qu'en tout cas, il ne s'est jamais qualifié de simple moine.

Je donne, à la suite, une liste des nouveaux manuscrits qui ont été découverts ou ont été attribués à Joasaph aux cours des dernières années. L'énumération continue celle de la liste antérieure (*Schreiberschule*, 27-33).

a) *Manuscripts datés*

33. Athènes, Bibliothèque Nationale 220, a.1362. Pap.: Jean Chrysostome. 'Εγρᾶ(φη) ἐν ἔτει ρωοᾶ' ἰνδ. α' μηνὶ σепτεμβρίῳ. Πόνημα τοῦτο 'Ιωᾶσαφ λευΐτου. Τῷ συντελεστῇ τῶν καλῶν Θ(ε)ῷ χάρις. Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ πόνοϋ 'Ιωᾶσαφ [additif postérieur, en monocondyle:] καὶ ταπεινοῦ μ(η)τροπολίτου Δράμας. - Le manuscrit était attribué par moi (1958, 20 n° 1) à Joasaph qui fut plus tard métropolitite de Drama et ensuite de Larissa, à cause surtout de l'additif postérieur. L'écriture du Joasaph de Larissa est apparentée à celle des Hodèges, et Hunger (1980, 206) le place parmi les représentants de l'"Hodegonstil", qui se distingue, pourtant, (ajoute-t-il) "durch einen besonderen Duktus von den übrigen Hodegon-Schreibern". Hunger, après avoir examiné en détail les éléments caractéristiques de son écriture, conclut que le manuscrit d'Athènes ne peut pas lui être attribué, mais bien au Joasaph du couvent des Hodèges. L'additif ταπεινοῦ μητροπολίτου Δράμας est, selon lui, de beaucoup postérieur, peut-être du XVI^e siècle; et la souscription, qui diffère de la formule typique de notre copiste, ne constitue pas un indice du contraire, puisque Joasaph, comme nous le savons, n'avait pas encore, dans ses premières œuvres, stabilisé sa signature. 23)

33a. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 134, a.1371. Parch.: Jean Climaque. "Ετους ρωοθ' ἰνδ. θ' μηνὶ μαΐῳ ιε'. Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ 'Ιωᾶσαφ πόνοϋ (fig. 1). - Le manuscrit a été identifié déjà par M. Richard (*Répertoire*, 1958, p. 109) avec le manuscrit égaré de Halki, Kamariotissa 34 (*Schreiberschule*, 28 n° 8). Se trouvant auparavant au monastère du Prodrome à Sozopolis, il fut transporté, au début du XVII^e siècle, à Panagia Kamariotissa dans l'île de Halki. A. Papadopoulos Kerameus le trouve là, en 1900, et en donne la description (*Viz. Vrem.* 7, 1900, 661-695), mais, en 1934, le métropolitite Athénagoras ne l'y retrouve plus (*EEBS* 10, 1934, 264); nous venons d'apprendre qu'il fut acheté, en 1924, à Istanbul,

par F. W. Kelsey, et qu'il entra ensuite dans la Bibliothèque de l'Université du Michigan.

Nous possédons aujourd'hui, sur ce précieux manuscrit retrouvé, une très bonne étude due à Annemarie Weyl Carr (1981). Il est richement orné, c'est le plus riche en ornementation de tous les manuscrits que nous avons de la main de Joasaph, avec des initiales et des ornements en or et en bleu, et avec une miniature en pleine page au début. "A luxury book of the highest order".

34. Moscou, Bibliothèque Publique Lénine 26, a.1371. Parch.: Évangélaire. 'Ετελειώθη(η) ἐν ἔτει ,ζωοθ' μηνὶ ἰουλ-(ῖφ) ἰνδ. θ'. Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ 'Ιωάσαφ πόνοϋ (fig. 2).²⁴⁾ - Le manuscrit, en possession d'abord du métropolite d'Ekaterrinoslav, Gabriel, qui l'avait acquis, semble-t-il, à Constantinople, fut donné comme présent par lui, en 1793, au métropolite de Moscou et archimandrite du couvent de la Sainte Trinité (près de Moscou), théologien et auteur bien connu, Platon Levč'in (dont le livre "Ὁρθόδοξος διδασκαλία" fut traduit - de l'allemand - et publié par Korais en 1783). Une note sur le manuscrit (voir fig. 2) provient de sa plume. Le manuscrit était conservé jusqu'en 1931 dans le trésor du couvent de la Sainte Trinité, d'où il fut transporté à la Bibliothèque Publique de Moscou.

35. Athos, Lavra, rouleau 32, a.1384. Parch.: Liturgie de Chrysostome. "Ετους [,ζωρβ' ἰνδ.] β' μηνὶ αὐγ[ούστῳ]. La note est effacée, mais la restitution est assurée à cause des noms de Jean V et de son épouse Eudocie, cités dans le texte de la liturgie - voir Politis, 1958, 272 n° 2, et 1957, 400 (fig. 3). Le rouleau ne porte pas la signature du copiste et fut attribué par moi, avec hésitation, à Joasaph. Hunger (1980, 200) le classe parmi les manuscrits provenant de sa main, à cause, je pense, de la date qui correspond à la période de l'activité de Joasaph.²⁵⁾

36. Oxford, Christ Church 61, a.1391. Parch.: Psautier. Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ 'Ιωάσαφ πόνοϋ. Χ(ριστ)ὲ δίδου μογῆσαντι τετὴν πολὺολβον ἀρωγὴν. "Ετους ,ζωρθ' ἰνδ. ιδ' μηνὶ ἰανουαρίῳ κα' ἡμέρ(α) σα(ββάτῳ). Le manuscrit contient trois miniatures en pleine page. - Une description du manuscrit, suivie d'une présentation des miniatures du point de vue de l'histoire de

l'art, est donnée par P. L. Vokotopoulos, 1975-76.

b) Manuscrits non datés

Les trois premiers de la liste sont des manuscrits enluminés.

37. Moscou, Musée Historique, *Synod. gr.* 429. Parch.: *Akathistos* et autres textes hymnographiques. Aux ff. 34^v et 61^v Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον (sans mention du nom). - Le manuscrit fut présenté et attribué à juste titre à Joasaph par G. M. Prochorov, 1972. C'est un manuscrit somptueux, richement orné, spécialement dans sa première partie (ff. 1-34), qui contient le texte de l'*Akathistos*, 23 miniatures et 24 initiales figuratives. D'excellentes reproductions en couleur sont contenues dans le livre de Vera Lichačeva, 1977, 45-49 (voir l'article de la même, 1972). Prochorov est arrivé à la conclusion que le manuscrit fut effectué sur la commande du patriarche Philotheos Kokkinos pour être offert à son ami l'empereur Jean Cantacuzène. Il le place entre 1355 et 1363.

38. Athos, Kutlumus 62. Parch.: Évangélaire. Τῷ τῶν χαρίτων χορηγῶ Θ(ε)ῷ χάρις. Miniature de l'Évangéliste Jean (voir Θεσσαυροὶ τοῦ Ἀγίου Ὁποῦς 1,453, et ici fig. 4).²⁶⁾ - Le manuscrit ne porte pas de souscription; il fut attribué, ainsi que le suivant (Vatic. gr. 1160), au scriptorium des Hodèges par H. Buchthal, 1975, 166 et fig. 34 et 35, en raison, principalement, de l'affinité du style des miniatures avec celles du manuscrit parisien des œuvres de Jean Cantacuzène (Par. gr. 1242, *Schreiberschule*, 29 n° 11). Tous les deux, dit-il, ont été écrits, à coup sûr, par le même copiste en une écriture qui ressemble beaucoup à l'écriture du manuscrit parisien, sans, pourtant, qu'on puisse affirmer que la main est de Joasaph lui-même; ce qui est sûr, c'est que tous les deux sont issus du scriptorium des Hodèges. J'avais également (1958, 276) attribué l'Évangélaire de Kutlumus au scriptorium des Hodèges, mais plutôt comme un spécimen précoce de l'école, au début du XIV^e siècle. Le rapprochement de Buchthal, sur la base solide de l'analyse de l'art des miniatures, avec le manuscrit parisien (daté de 1370-1375) place le manuscrit athonite dans cette même période tardive.

39. Vatic. gr. 1160. Parch.: Quatre Évangiles. Pas de

souscription, Miniatures des quatre évangélistes. - L'attribution au scriptorium des Hodèges, et probablement à Joasaph lui-même, fut soutenue par Buchthal pour les mêmes raisons que celles qui sont invoquées ci-dessus à propos de l'Évangélaire de Kutlumus.

40. Moscou, Musée Historique, *Synod. gr.* 279. Parch.: Taktikon de Jean Cantacuzène. - Attribué à Joasaph par Prochorov, 1972, 242-244. En dehors de l'analyse paléographique de l'écriture et de la comparaison avec l'écriture de Joasaph, spécialement dans le *Synod. gr.* 429 (voir ici n° 37), Prochorov a abouti à ce résultat en s'appuyant sur les éléments codicologiques communs, et surtout sur la confection des quaternions, qui est la même dans les deux manuscrits.

41. Moscou, Musée Historique, *Synod. gr.* 290. Pap.: Oeuvres de Nicolas Cabasilas. - Présenté aussi par Prochorov, 1979; il est écrit, dans sa plus grande partie, par Manuel Tzycandylès, le copiste bien connu; pourtant, quelques folios (et notamment les ff. 78-95, 215-223, et 282-289) proviennent de la main de Joasaph (voir *ibid.* p. 34, fig. 1, où l'on voit Tzycandylès se substituant à Joasaph au milieu de la page). L'écriture est, bien sûr, celle du scriptorium des Hodèges, pourtant, quant à savoir si elle est celle de Joasaph, le petit spécimen que nous donne Prochorov ne suffit pas pour en être sûr. Prochorov, s'appuyant sur l'examen des filigranes, date le manuscrit des années 1360-1380. Mais Tzycandylès était installé, de 1362 à 1372, à Mystra, tandis qu'en 1374 il se trouve à Constantinople, où il écrit le manuscrit Zurich, Stadtbibliothek [aujourd'hui Zentralbibliothek] 170, contenant une œuvre de Cantacuzène.²⁷⁾ Le manuscrit de Moscou doit donc avoir été copié vers 1374, c'est à dire pendant la même période où Joasaph écrivait le manuscrit de luxe (Paris. gr. 1242) des œuvres de Cantacuzène.

42. Paris. gr. 411. Parch., rouleau: Liturgie de Chrysostome. - L'écriture est absolument identique à celle de Gédéon, et c'est pour cela que j'avais attribué autrefois (1958, 273 n° 12) le rouleau à ce dernier. Plus tard, étudiant à Paris les rouleaux liturgiques de la Bibliothèque Nationale, j'ai constaté que le manuscrit portait un colophon, presque complètement effacé. On pourrait, pourtant, avec beaucoup

de peine, discerner les traces de quelques lettres qui permettraient de compléter le nom de Joasaph; ce qui fut vérifié ensuite par Ch. Astruc au moyen d'une lampe de Wood.^{27a)} Le rouleau présente le ductus employé par Joasaph pendant la dernière période de son activité; Omont l'avait daté du XV^e siècle. Aux diptyques des défunts on lit, de la main du copiste, et de façon qu'elle soit rendue évidente, la note suivante: Μνήσθητι Κ(ύρι)ε Ὑακίνθου ἀρχιερέως καὶ Κυρίλλου μοναχοῦ. S'agirait-il d'Hyacinthe, originaire de Chypre et moine au couvent des Hodèges, devenu vers 1345, et pour une courte durée, métropolite de Thessalonique? Ami d'Acindyne, il semble avoir joué un rôle considérable dans la querelle hésychaste et avoir poursuivi, comme métropolite de Thessalonique, les adeptes de Palamas.²⁸⁾

43. Leningrad, Académie des Sciences, Fonds de l'Institut Archéologique Russe de Constantinople, n° 2.²⁹⁾ Parch., rouleau: Liturgie de Chrysostome. - Prochorov, 1972, 243 n. 17, a attribué le rouleau à Joasaph. "The script (écrit-il) rather large, is surprisingly similar in size to the script of the *Akathistos*, i.e., to the first illustrated section of *Synod. gr.* 429"; voir *ibid.*, fig. 6, un bon spécimen de l'écriture. On a ici affaire au même problème que celui du numéro précédent: la ressemblance avec l'écriture de Joasaph est, en effet, surprenante; mais un autre copiste du scriptorium ne peut pas être exclu, avant tout Gédéon, dont l'écriture se rapproche le plus de l'écriture du maître, spécialement dans sa dernière période. La comparaison avec le rouleau Lavra n° 22,³⁰⁾ écrit par Gédéon, et surtout avec la note marginale en rouge ἐκφῶ(ως), presque identique, serait plutôt un indice pour cette seconde attribution.

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A la liste des manuscrits qui ne portent pas le nom du copiste, mais qui appartiennent sans doute au scriptorium des Hodèges, G. Prato³¹⁾ propose d'ajouter les suivants: Vatopédi 938, Pantéléimon 18, et, avec quelque hésitation, Christ Church 28.

Pour le premier, Prato remarque qu'il est assez semblable à Dionysiou 75, écrit par Joasaph en 1376.³²⁾ Pourtant, nous l'avons vu plus haut, E. Lamberz, intervenant dans la

discussion au Colloque de Paris, a rapproché ce même manuscrit du groupe Lavra A 54 - Dionys. 9, signalé par moi;³³⁾ Vatopédi 938, daté, comme les autres, de 1304, et écrit assurément de la même main que ceux-ci, est l'un des tous premiers représentants du style des Hodèges. La ressemblance, donc, signalée par Prato, avec le manuscrit bien postérieur de Joasaph (1376) n'est due qu'aux traits communs du scriptorium. Quant à Pantéléimon 18 (Parch., Liturgies, fig. 5), l'écriture, de grand module, est d'une qualité telle, qu'on pourrait, avec une grande probabilité, l'attribuer à Joasaph lui-même.

La liste des manuscrits appartenant au scriptorium (ou au "style") des Hodèges pourrait être encore augmentée des cinq suivants qui me sont connus de visu.

1. Paris. Suppl. gr. 469 (Omont). Parch., rouleau liturgique. Fragment. Initiales en or et en bleu.

2. Paris. Suppl. gr. 915 (Astruc-Concasty). Parch., rouleau: Liturgie de Chrysostome. Parchemin lissé.

3. Genève, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, n° 24 (Omont). Parch., rouleau: Liturgie de Chrysostome (fig. 6) - Le rouleau est orné d'une miniature au début et d'initiales figuratives très élégantes. Souscription presque effacée: Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ Ἱωάννου πόνος || οὗ καὶ με ης ης ὅυτα.³⁴⁾ Le nom du copiste semble être certain; il faut, donc, enregistrer Jean dans la liste des copistes du scriptorium. On ne saurait dire s'il est le même que celui qui a écrit le quaternion (ff. 231-236) avec les tables de lecture, inséré aussi dans le manuscrit Chis. R. V. 29 et qui porte la signature Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ πόνος Ἱωάννου. Turyn³⁵⁾ attribue ce quaternion au scriptorium des Hodèges "cum ob subscriptionis verba tum ob scripturae habitum". La même formule, Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ Ἱωάννου πόνος, apparaît aussi au manuscrit non daté Lavra A 122 (Liturgie des présanctifiés et Euchologe).³⁶⁾

4. Sinaï, Sainte Catherine, n° 2252. Parch.: Quatre Évangiles.³⁷⁾ Volume de grandes dimensions, parchemin lissé, ornements et initiales au commencement de chaque évangile. Écriture coulante, de grand module. A la fin: Δόξα τῷ παντοκράτορι Θ(ε)ῷ ἀμήν. Pas d'autre indice, mais la haute qualité de l'écriture et de l'ornementation rendent

l'attribution à Joasaph très probable.

5. Sinaï Sainte Catherine, n° 2254. Pap.: Évangélique. Θ(εο)ῦ τὸ δῶρον καὶ Μωϋσέως νόμος. Le manuscrit présente tous les traits caractéristiques du style des Hodèges; on doit, donc, après Jean du rouleau genevois, ajouter également Moïse à la liste des copistes du scriptorium. Il est probable que le Praxapostolos Sinaï 295, daté par Gardthausen du XV^e siècle (voir aussi Vogel-Gardthausen, p. 327), provient lui aussi de sa main.

Athènes

NOTES

1) Politis, *Schreiberschule*, 1958.

2) Ce manuscrit, le seul parmi les trente-deux sortis de sa main (voir la liste, Politis, 1958, 27-33), est le Paris. gr. 1242, contenant les œuvres de Jean Cantacuzène (n° 11 de la liste); un autre, l'Évangile de Kosinitza, est égaré.

3) Voir plus bas, p. 306 et suiv., les nos 36, 33a, 34, 38 et 39 resp. Les deux derniers ne portent pas de souscription, mais peuvent être attribués avec certitude à Joasaph.

4) Belting, 1970, 55.

5) Voir Buchthal, 1975; Buchthal-Belting, 1978.

6) Belting, 1970, 62.

7) Buchthal-Belting, 1978, 30-31.

8) Pour tous ces détails voir Politis, 1977, 292 (*ibid.* p. 295 l'intervention de E. Lamberz). Pour le copiste Chariton, voir Politis, 1958, 262-265.

9) H. Hunger, 1980, 201-202, qui a donné à l'anonyme de 1304 le nom de "Schreiber X", croit que cette identification est très possible, mais non certaine ("durchaus möglich, wenngleich nicht sicher").

10) Voir Politis, 1977, 293.

11) G. Prato, 1979, et H. Hunger, 1980 (surtout le chapitre II, pp. 192-210).

12) Qu'il s'agisse d'une imitation ("mimesi grafica") et non d'une persistance conservatrice, comme je me le suis demandé autrefois (voir *Paléographie grecque* 1977, p. 290, Discussion, cf. p. 291), est aujourd'hui, après ces deux excellents exposés, hors de doute.

13) Politis, 1977, 292.

14) *Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Veröffentlichung der Kommission für Byzantinistik,

herausgegeben von Herbert Hunger). De cette œuvre, attendue par tous les paléographes et les philologues, nous possédons déjà une première partie, en trois volumes, qui contient les manuscrits de la Grande-Bretagne (1. Teil, *Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Grossbritanniens*, Vienne, 1981). Le deuxième volume, *Paläographische Charakteristika*, donne une analyse de l'écriture de chaque copiste, avec des esquisses des lettres et des groupes de lettres qui la caractérisent. Cette première partie déjà éditée comprend, parmi les copistes connus du scriptorium des Hodèges, seulement Joasaph (n° 208) et Méthodios (n° 273 - attribution nouvelle). Le Chariton du Lond. Add. 11868 (n° 378) n'est pas l'homonyme du couvent des Hodèges (actif 1319-1346); il est, selon Hunger, 1980, 201 et 208, et le *Repertorium*, qui le datent de la deuxième moitié du XIV^e siècle, "un collaborateur probable du couvent de Hodèges".

15) Hunger, 1969, 193-194, v. aussi p. 111. Cf. le même, Johannes Chortasmenos, ein byzantinischer Intellektueller der späten Paläologenzeit, *Wiener Studien* 70 (1957) 153-163. Cette étude est parvenue à ma connaissance après la publication de mon article sur la "Schreiberschule".

16) J'ajouterais qu'elle est aussi la plus parfaite au point de vue philologique; les autres, en hexamètres, ne sont qu'un canton composé d'emprunts homériques et de lieux communs. On pourrait, à cette occasion, se demander si les vers iambiques de la souscription du manuscrit Hagias Triados 10 (*Schreiberschule*, 32 n° 28) ne proviennent pas, eux aussi, de la plume de Chortasmenos.

17) Turyn, *Vaticani*, p. 178 suiv.

18) Hunger, 1969, 111.

19) Le manuscrit Athen. 220, que Hunger attribue également à Joasaph des Hodèges (voir plus bas, p. 306, n° 33), porte une semblable souscription: Πόννημα τοῦτο Ἰωάσαφ λευίτου.

20) Miklosich-Miller, *Acta et Diplomata*, I 442-443 (n° 187) et 541-550 (n° 292), et J. Darrouzès, *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*, vol. I, fasc. V, Paris, 1970, nos 2385 et 2574.

21) C'est à dire que le Joasaph de 1355 et celui de 1370 sont un seul et même personnage, identique à Joasaph le calligraphe, bien qu'à l'Index des noms propres, Joasaph "moine des Hodégoi" et Joasaph "moine de l'Hodégétria" soient classés séparément. Il est vrai que dans le document de 1355 le monastère est appelé "σεβασμιά τῶν Ὁδηγῶν μονή", tandis que, dans celui de 1370 il est dit "σεβασμιά μονή τῆς πανυπεράγνου δεσποίνης ἡμῶν θεοτόκου τῆς Ὁδηγητρίας"; mais il s'agit, sans aucun doute (et Darrouzès est d'accord sur ce point), du même monastère (voir Politis, 1958, 271 n. 91, et Darrouzès, p. 557).

22) Dates des manuscrits Athen. 220 (voir note 19) - si l'attribution de Hunger est juste -, et Lavra rouleau n° 25.

23) Un examen récent m'a persuadé que l'attribution de Hunger est pleinement justifiée; le grand module et le ductus aisé et facile de l'Athen. 220 sont au niveau des plus beaux spécimens issus de la main de notre Joasaph. Quant à l'additif καὶ ταπεινοῦ μητροπολίτου Δρόμας, il ne peut être, à mon avis, si tardif; il semble plutôt qu'il provienne de la main de Joasaph de Larissa, à qui, d'ailleurs, appartenait le manuscrit, l'un des quinze qu'il a offerts au monastère τοῦ ἁγίου Μετεώρου. On pourrait même supposer que c'est précisément ce manuscrit qui a servi de modèle pour la formation de son propre style d'écriture, jusqu'à la formule de sa signature: voir, par exemple, la souscription de l'Athen. 629, où nous retrouvons tous les éléments de la souscription de l'Athen.

220 de Joasaph ('Ετελειώθη ..., Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον..., Τῷ συντελεσ-
τῇ..., Πόνημα τοῦτο...).

24) Le manuscrit n'est pas mentionné dans le catalogue de A. Každan (Richard, *Répertoire* 617), mais nous est connu par la mention faite par G. M. Prochorov, 1972, 245 n. 17; il a eu l'obligeance, par une lettre de mai 1973, de me procurer des informations plus détaillées sur le manuscrit, ainsi que la photographie de la fig. 2. D. V. Dragunskij préparaît une étude spéciale sur le manuscrit, mais je n'ai pas pu constater si elle a été publiée.

25) Aucun spécimen d'écriture du rouleau n'était disponible jusqu'à présent. La fig. 3 provient d'une photo que j'ai prise en 1955.

26) Il est dommage que les Θησαυροὶ τοῦ Ἀγίου Ὁρους (selon la mauvaise habitude des éditeurs) ne présentent aucune page avec spécimens de l'écriture; il en est presque de même de la fig. 35 chez Buchthal, qui, elle aussi, ne contient que trois lignes du texte. La fig. 4 que je donne ici provient d'une photo que j'ai prise en 1956.

27) Voir Vogel-Gardthausen p. 282. Pour le séjour de Tzycandylès à Mistra, voir *ibid.* et Turyn, *Great Britain*, 231. Il faut ajouter que le Vat. gr. 674, écrit par Tzycandylès en 1370 à Mistra, contient également une œuvre de Cantacuzène.

27a) Monsieur Astruc a eu la bonté de me donner, par une lettre récente (du 9 janvier 1982) les informations supplémentaires que voici: "Tout à la fin, vers le bas du verso, apparaissent les vestiges de la formule: Θῦ τὸ δῶρον κ/ Ἰωάσαφ πόνος. On devine le *thêta* initial et il y a place pour le κ(αλ) abrégé; le nom Ἰωάσαφ est ce qui apparaît le mieux; je crois que πόνος est au début de la ligne suivante, occupée ensuite par une ou deux croix à paraphe. Une souscription proprement dite devait suivre, sur au moins une demi-douzaine de lignes, mais rien n'en est déchiffrable aujourd'hui".

28) Le peu que nous savons sur Hyacinthe est rassemblé par G. Mercati, *Notizie di Procopo e Demetrio Cidone* (Studi e Testi 56), Vatican, 1931, p. 221 n. 2. Dans une des lettres d'Acindyne à Jacques de Monembasie (Loenertz, *EEBS* 27, 1957, 91), Hyacinthe est cité en ces termes: " Ὑάκινθος ὁ θαυμασίος ὁ τῆς μονῆς οἰκῆτωρ Ὁδηγητοῦ τῆς παναγοῦς Θεομήτορος· οὗτος γὰρ νῦν ἀρχιερεὺς Θεσσαλονίκης κεχειροτόνηται".

29) I. N. Lebedeva, *Grečeskie Rukopisi* (Akadem. Nauk SSSR), Leningrad, 1973, pp. 63-64.

30) Politis, 1958, pl. XIV, fig. 15.

31) Prato, 1979, 183 n. 78. Je dois à son obligeance des photos des manuscrits Pantéléimon et Christ Church; celle de la fig. 5 a été prise par moi en 1956.

32) Politis, 1958, 29 n° 13.

33) Voir *La Paléographie grecque* pp. 292-293 et 295. Hunger, 1980, 199 et 201, attribue ce groupe de trois manuscrits au "Schreiber X" (voir ci-dessus p. 301 et n. 9).

34) Je crois avoir pu déchiffrer, au deuxième vers, quelques lettres en plus par rapport à l'édition d'Omout (du reste, μελ, qu'il a lu avant la lacune, n'est pas du tout certain). - Le rouleau n° 25 de la même Bibliothèque (*Schreiberschule* 273, n° 13) porte, aux diptyques des défunts, de la main du copiste, la note suivante: Μνήσθητι Κ(ύρι)ε τῇν ψυχὴν τῆς δούλης σου... [vide] καὶ τῇν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου

Μανουήλ ... [vide]. Le rouleau n° 27A (*ibid.* n° 14), en parchemin lissé, porte aussi, à la fin des diptyques des défunts, de la main également du copiste, la note: ἐν πρώτοις μνήσθητι Κ(ύρι)ε τοῦ ἀρχιεπισκόπου ἡμῶν Ἀντωνίου.

35) Turyn, *Vaticani*, 172. Pour Chis. R. V. 29 voir Politis, 1958, 31 n° 25.

36) Daté, dans le catalogue d'Eustratiadès, du XV^e siècle.

37) Ce manuscrit et le suivant appartiennent aux nouvelles acquisitions de la Bibliothèque du monastère; ainsi ne sont-ils pas décrits dans les vieux catalogues de Gardthausen et de Benešević. Dans celui de M. Kamil (Richard, *Répertoire* 770, voir aussi la traduction anglaise, Wiesbaden, 1970), la description des manuscrits non catalogués auparavant (après le n° 2150) est confuse. Ainsi, les n°s 2252 et 2254 (qui sont les cotes de la Bibliothèque, placés sous les n°s d'ordre Kamil 2263 et 2264) sont décrits comme "Current affairs, XVII^e siècle". Pour les défauts et les imperfections du catalogue de Kamil, voir le compte rendu de Chr. Hannick, *JÖB* 20 (1971) 358-359.

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[illegible]

Fig. 3. Lavra, roulaeu N° 32

Ο μακάριος φιλάθεος
 πατριάρχης ὁ ἁγίων ἁγίων
 ὑπομενῶν πρὸς ὡς ὡς τῶν
 ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνου
 ἔστω τὸ κέθος κὶ οὐκ ἔστω
 φέστω ἐν ὡς οἱ τὰ μὲν
 Σαραπίας ἀνδρῶν καὶ
 ἀρχαγέλων κὶ κλειτουρῶν
 ἀμτῆς σὴς δόξης, ποίησον
 σὺν τῇ εἰσόδῳ κὶ μὲν εἰς
 δὸν ἀγίων ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι
 συλλειτουργῶν ὡς τῶν κλει
 Σὺν δόξῳ ὡς τῶν κλει

Fig. 5. Pantéléimon 18, f. 8^v

DIE VORLAGEN DES KOPISTEN VALERIANO ALBINI

MARTIN SICHERL

Die von dem Kopisten Valeriano Albini aus Forlì in der Zeit von 1528 bis 1548 gefertigten griechischen Handschriften¹⁾ sind für die Sammlungen griechischer Handschriften in der Zeit der Renaissance, denen er seine Vorlagen entnommen hat, allen voran die in der Katastrophe des Jahres 1687 untergegangene Bibliothek von S. Antonio di Castello in Venedig²⁾, sehr aufschlussreich. Dies beruht nicht zuletzt darauf, dass der Schreiber seine Kopien in aller Regel mit Angabe des Ortes und der Zeit subskribiert hat. Wenn ihre Vorlagen untergegangen sind, können sie auch textkritisch von Bedeutung sein³⁾. Bei dem folgenden Versuch, seine Vorlagen festzustellen, werden Argumente aus der Textgestalt mit den kodikologischen Gegebenheiten kombiniert. Auf diese Weise wird es nicht nur möglich sein, bereits vorliegende Ergebnisse der Textkritik zu stützen, zu präzisieren oder zu modifizieren, sondern auch dort, wo solche noch nicht vorliegen, Hinweise zu geben, die der philologischen Kritik hilfreich sein können, sich aber natürlich ihrerseits dem Textbefund stellen müssen. So mag auch diese Arbeit mit der Einbettung abstrakter Stemmatik in den lebendigen historischen Kontext zeigen, wie sich Textgeschichte und Handschriftengeschichte gegenseitig ergänzen und einander stützen können, wofür Paul Canart vor kurzem ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel geliefert hat⁴⁾.

In der Kopistentätigkeit Valerianos lassen sich vier Perioden unterscheiden, die seiner Ausbildung im Griechischen und ersten Kopistentätigkeit im Kloster S. Antonio di Castello in Venedig (bis 1529), die Wanderjahre mit Aufenthalten in verschiedenen anderen Klöstern seines Ordens (1529-1538), die Zeit als Bibliothekar von S. Antonio di Castello in Venedig (1539-

1545) und die Zeit in Rom als Prior von S. Lorenzo fuori le Mura (seit 1545). Die meisten seiner Kopien lassen sich schon auf Grund der Subskriptionen einer dieser Perioden zuweisen, bei anderen wird dies aus philologischen oder kodikologischen Gründen möglich sein. Er hat sich dabei, wie natürlich, meistens aber nicht immer, der Handschriften als Vorlagen bedient, die er am Ort vorfand. Der strikte Beweis dafür lässt sich natürlich nur dort führen, wo die Überlieferung der betreffenden Autoren aufgeklärt und die jeweilige Vorlage seiner Kopien mit philologischen Mitteln festgestellt ist. Das trifft nur für einen Teil seiner Kopien, in der Regel die von antiken Autoren, zu. Bei den byzantinischen Texten fehlen oft entsprechende Untersuchungen. Es ist aber anzunehmen, dass er in den ungeklärten Fällen sich derselben Bibliotheken bedient hat wie in den übrigen.

Das Kloster S. Antonio di Castello in Venedig, wo Valeriano Albini seine Ausbildung erhielt, gehörte seit 1471 zur Kongregation der regulierten Augustinerchorherren von S. Salvatore in Bologna, seit 1475 als selbständiges Priorat⁵⁾. Dementsprechend subskribiert Valeriano als μοναχὸς oder κανονικὸς τῆς πολιτείας καλουμένης τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν. In diesem Stift liess Kardinal Domenico Grimani (1461-1523), der einem der vornehmsten venezianischen Geschlechter entstammte und Patriarch von Aquileia war⁶⁾, 1522 den grössten Teil seiner Bibliothek, die zu den grössten seiner Zeit gehörte, darunter alle griechischen Handschriften, zu öffentlicher Benutzung aufstellen, nachdem er zu diesem Zweck einen eigenen Bibliotheksbau hatte aufführen lassen. Über seine griechischen Handschriften sind wir durch mehrere Verzeichnisse unterrichtet⁷⁾, unter denen das erste des Vat. lat. 3960 (ff. 1-13^r *Index voluminum graecorum Bibliothecae D. Card. Grimani*) das wichtigste ist. Es wurde noch zu seinen Lebzeiten angelegt und gibt den ursprünglichen Bestand der Bibliothek an griechischen Handschriften wieder. Obwohl der Stifter strenge Vorkehrungen getroffen hatte, ist es im Laufe der Zeit nicht ohne erhebliche Verluste abgegangen, aber auch Neuerwerbungen müssen hinzugekommen sein. Über den Bestand um die Mitte des 17. Jh. orientiert der gedruckte Katalog der venezianischen Handschriftensammlungen von Tomasini⁸⁾. Auf diese beiden Verzeichnisse wird im folgenden jeweils Bezug genommen.

Aus seiner ersten Periode, in der er, wie er selbst bezeugt⁹⁾, von Augustinus Steuchus, dem nachmaligen Bibliothekar der Vatikanischen Bibliothek, ins Griechische eingeführt wurde, ist nur ein Codex mit Ortsangabe von seiner Hand bekannt, der am 10. Juni 1528 im Kloster S. Antonio subskribierte Bonon. 2280, ff. 1-168^r, der die Geographie des Klaudios Ptolemaios enthält¹⁰⁾. Seine Vorlage wird man natürlich in diesem Kloster selbst suchen, und tatsächlich weist das Verzeichnis Grimanis dieses Werk zweimal aus, unter Nr. 22 und 385. Eines davon wird also die Vorlage gewesen sein, obwohl es auch in der Marciana zwei Exemplare davon gab, Marc. gr. 388 und 516. Eines davon stand nach Tomasini S.15 auf der linken Seite des Bibliotheksraums im Pluteus XIII Graecorum: *Cl. Ptolemei Geographia, elegantissime scripta*. Man kann vermuten, dass es sich Valeriano als Vorlage empfohlen hat.

Dagegen findet sich im Verzeichnis Grimanis kein Titel, der die Vorlage für den 'Εξηγητῆς ἀνώνυμος (Proklos) εἰς τὴν τετραβιβλον Πτολεμαίου gewesen sein könnte, den Valeriano am 4. April 1529 ohne Ortsangabe subskribiert hat (Bonon. 2280, ff. 169-253), und ebensowenig einer für die Eisagoge des Porphyrios in die Apotelesmatik des Ptolemaios, deren Subskription auch keine Datumsangabe enthält (Bonon. 2280, ff. 305-317^v). Diese beiden Schriften stehen aber im Marc. gr. 314, aus dem sie gewiss auch Andronikos Nuntzios für Diego Hurtado de Mendoza im Jahre 1541 abgeschrieben hat (Scor. T.I.14, ff. 383-536^v)¹¹⁾; dass sie Valeriano dort entnommen hat, scheint schon das Fehlen der sonst üblichen Angabe seines Klosters anzuzeigen.

Die Wanderjahre führten Valeriano Albini mit seinem Lehrer Agostino Steuco zunächst (1529) nach Reggio/Emilia ins Stift seines Ordens S. Marco¹²⁾. Dort kopiert er die pseudojustinische Schrift Cohortatio ad gentiles und Exzerpte aus der pseudojustinischen Expositio rectae fidei (Bonon. 1497, ff. 62-81)¹³⁾. Es kann als ziemlich sicher angenommen werden, dass der Ricc. 80¹⁴⁾ die unmittelbare Vorlage war, da er diese beiden Texte in der gleichen Reihenfolge und mit dem gleichen Kolophon wie der Bononiensis enthält. Hinzukommt, dass er am 25.1.1515 von Michael Damaskenos in Mirandola für Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, den Neffen des bekannten Philosophen Giovanni Pico della Mirandola und Vetter des Fürsten Alberto Pio von Carpi


(1470-1533), geschrieben ist¹⁵⁾; dessen Bibliothek hat, wie wir gleich sehen werden, mehrfach für Valeriano Albini die Vorlagen geliefert. Antigraphon des Damaskenos mag dann der Mut. 126 gewesen sein, der sich damals in der Bibliothek des Fürsten von Carpi befand¹⁶⁾ und nach Mirandola ausgeliehen worden sein kann.

Im Oktober des folgenden Jahres (1530) subskribierte Valeriano seine Kopie von Dexippos' Kommentar zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles, des anonymen Traktats *De syllogismis* und des *Poimandres* des Hermes Trismegistos (Bonon. 2294, ff. 1-59)¹⁷⁾. Die Subskription enthält keine Ortsangabe, die Vorlage ist aber aus Gründen, die sich später ergeben werden,¹⁸⁾ die Nr. 1 Grimanis: *Dexippi philosophi in arist. predicamenta dubitationes et solutiones de sylogismo. Mercuri trimegisti Pimander*. Die Schrift *De syllogismis* ist bisher nur von Vettore Trincavelli 1536 in Venedig, wahrscheinlich nach dem Codex Grimanis¹⁹⁾, ediert worden. Die fehlende Ortsangabe deutet wieder darauf hin, dass Valeriano nicht in S. Antonio in Venedig schrieb. Er wird also die Vorlage von dort mitgenommen haben, wie wir es auch in anderen Fällen sehen werden.

Wenige Monate später, am 1. März 1531, beendet Valeriano in S. Salvatore in Bologna, dem Mutterkloster seines Ordens, die *Quaestiones naturales* und die Schrift *De fato* des Alexander von Aphrodisias (Bonon. 2294, ff. 61-148)²⁰⁾. Die beiden Schriften stehen zusammen in den nahe verwandten Codices Mut. gr. 210, ff. 229^v-343, und Marc. gr. IV 10, ff. 1-111^r, in der Bibliothek Grimanis aber in zwei getrennten Handschriften (Nr. 79 und 118). Der Marcianus lag zur Zeit der Niederschrift des Bononiensis schon in Venedig²¹⁾, der Mutinensis ist erst in der Bibliothek des Kardinals Rodolfo Pio von Carpi, des Neffen Alberto Pios, nachweisbar²²⁾ und sein vorheriger Aufenthaltort unbekannt. Eine Probekollation²³⁾ des Anfangs von *De fato* zeigt aber, dass keiner von beiden die Vorlage Valerianos war. In seiner ausführlichen Subskription gedenkt Valeriano seines Ordensoberen Peregrino ebenso wie in der langen Subskription, die er um dieselbe Zeit, jedenfalls aber zwischen dem 3. Mai 1529 und dem Frühjahr 1531 in Bologna unter die Kopie des Theon Smyrnaeus setzt, die sein Ordensbruder Fulgenzio Guglielmi aus Forlì im Kloster S. Antonio, gewiss nach der

Nr. 11 Grimanis, angefertigt hat²⁴⁾.

Etwa ein und drei Viertel Jahre später, am 1. Dezember 1532, setzt Valeriano die Subskription unter seine Kopie der *Demonstratio evangelica* Eusebs (Bonon. 2304, ff. 1-239), die er nach seinem eigenen Zeugnis im Kloster der hl. Magdalena in Mirandola, das zu seiner Kongregation gehörte²⁵⁾, nach einer Vorlage aus der Bibliothek des Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola geschrieben hatte²⁶⁾. Mirandola ist etwa 25 km von Bologna entfernt, ebenso weit wie Reggio/Emilia. Die Vorlage, die schon Donatus Veronensis für seine lateinische Übersetzung (1498) benutzt hat, die einzige Handschrift, die er in Italien fand, ist nach Heikel²⁷⁾ "entweder mit einer der bekannten jungen Handschriften identisch oder diesen doch sehr ähnlich". Unter den erhaltenen direkten oder indirekten Abschriften des Archetypus Paris. gr. 469, aus dem 12. Jh., der aus dem Besitze des Kardinals Ridolfi stammt, kommt nur der Ambros. L 109 sup. in Betracht, da alle übrigen, die Heikel anführt, erst im 16. Jh. entstanden sind: der Oxon. Coll. S. Iohannis 41 ist von Ioannes Mauromates, einem der Schreiber des Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, des Botschafters Karls V. in Venedig (1539-1547), geschrieben²⁸⁾, und in diese Zeit werden auch Paris. gr. 472 und der nach Heikel daraus abgeschriebene Paris. gr. 470 durch ihr Papier verwiesen²⁹⁾. Ähnliches gilt gewiss auch für Paris. gr. 471³⁰⁾. In Venedig ist um diese Zeit sicher auch der untergegangene Scor. O. II. 19, der aus dem Besitze Hurtados de Mendoza stammte³¹⁾, entstanden, und schliesslich hat Valeriano selbst eine zweite Kopie dieses Textes nach seinem eigenen Zeugnis am 4. September 1543 im Kloster S. Antonio subskribiert, den Paris. gr. 473³²⁾. Der seltene Text muss also um 1540 in Venedig vorgelegen haben und als begehrtes Desiderat eifrig kopiert werden sein. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, dass dies der Codex des 1533 ermordeten Gianfrancesco Pico war und dass dieser identisch ist mit dem von Gian Vincenzo Pinelli stammenden Ambrosianus, der einzigen unter den jungen Handschriften, die dem 15. Jh. angehört. Jedenfalls ist die *Demonstratio evangelica* weder in der Marciana noch im Index Grimanis noch bei Tomasini zu finden. Wir kommen damit zu folgendem hypothetischen Stemma³³⁾:



Die Praeparatio evangelica Eusebs, die im Oxon. Coll. S. Iohannis 32, ff. 1-218^V, von Valeriano geschrieben ist (ff. 221^F-246^V sind von einer zweiten, ff. 246^V-458^V von einer dritten Hand)³⁴⁾, steht nicht im Verzeichnis Grimanis, wohl aber im Katalog Tomasinis (S.8, *parte dextra*, *Pluteus XIX*), ist also erst nach 1523 in die Bibliothek von S. Antonio eingegangen. Man könnte vermuten, dass der Oxoniensis daraus ebenso kopiert wurde wie das verlorene Exemplar des Hurtado de Mendoza (Scor. O. II. 20)³⁵⁾. Aber nach Mras ist der Oxoniensis "anscheinend aus D [= Paris. gr. 467, geschrieben von Michael Damaskenos³⁶⁾] abgeschrieben", und diese Annahme hat sich mir bei der Kollation von S.57,14-59,20 Mras bestätigt³⁷⁾. Man kann vermuten, dass der Parisinus ebenso wie die Demonstratio evangelica, Justin (Ricc. 80) und ein Neues Testament (Bodl. Canon. 34) von Michael³⁸⁾ für den theologisch interessierten Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola³⁹⁾ geschrieben und dann, um die gleiche Zeit wie die Demonstratio evangelica oder später in Venedig, von Albini kopiert wurde. Nach Venedig kann der Paris. 467 ebenso gekommen sein wie die Demonstratio Gianfrancescos, aber mit der Nummer Tomasinis kann er nicht identisch sein, da der von Hieronymus Fondulus kommende Codex 1650 bereits in Paris lag⁴⁰⁾.

Der Bodl. misc. 212 (Auct.T. 2. 12)⁴¹⁾ ist zwar nicht von Valeriano Albini geschrieben, sondern, wie Lobel nachgewiesen hat, von Georgios Kokolos⁴²⁾, er reproduziert aber nach Justins Brief an Zenas und Serenus die Subskription Οὐαλερίανος ὁ Ἀλβίνου κανονικῶς τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ταύτην ἔγραψεν

βίβλον, 1532. Dem Brief folgen Athenagoras De resurrectione und dessen Legatio. Alle drei Schriften befinden sich auch im Mutinensis gr. 247, der auf f.1^r den Vermerk trägt: *Hec Hoc in volumine continentur. quae florentie exscribi fecit Jo. Fr. picus mirand.* (es folgt der Index)⁴³⁾. Valeriano hat also auch diese Texte im Jahre 1532 in der Bibliothek des Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola abgeschrieben. An vierter Stelle enthält der Mutinensis Tatians Oratio adversus Graecos. Diese Schrift steht auch im Bonon. 2304 hinter der oben erwähnten Demonstratio Eusebs in einem eigenen Faszikel von zwei Quinionen (ff. 1-20), wieder von der Hand Albinis mit der Subskription vom 13. Januar 1533⁴⁴⁾, ist also sechs Wochen nach Euseb geschrieben. Man wird deshalb vermuten, dass Albinis diesen Text ebenfalls dem Mut. gr. 247 in Mirandola entnommen hat. Schwartz hat in seiner Ausgabe Tatians die Stellung des Bononiensis nicht bestimmt und dafür auf eine spätere Arbeit verwiesen⁴⁵⁾, die aber, so weit ich sehe, nie erschienen ist. Wohl aber hat er nachgewiesen, dass der Bodleianus in den beiden Schriften des Athenagoras ebenso wie Mut. gr. 247 vom Paris. gr. 174 abhängt⁴⁶⁾. Er ist also sicher dem Mut. gr. 247, dem Exemplar Gianfrancesco Picos, entnommen, und danach trifft dasselbe gewiss auch auf Tatian zu. Alle diese Schriften fehlen im Verzeichnis der Codices Grimanis.

Vier Monate nach dem Tatian des Bonon. 2304, am 6. April 1533, vollendete Valeriano das Werk Herons von Byzanz über die Kriegsmaschinen (Poliorketika) und dessen Geodäsie im Bonon. 1497, ff. 162-207^v ⁴⁷⁾. Die Subskription enthält keine Ortsangabe. Wescher⁴⁸⁾ hielt die Vorlage für verloren, aber K. K. Müller⁴⁹⁾ hat sie im Vat. gr. 1605 nachgewiesen. Dieser Codex ist erst gegen 1650 in die Vaticana eingegangen. Um 1458 hatte er Johannes Sophianus als Vorlage für seine Übersetzung gedient, aber weitere Vorbesitzer sind nicht bekannt⁵⁰⁾. Die Handschrift erscheint weder in der Liste der Handschriften Lollinos, noch der des griechischen Kollegs in Rom, noch in der von Grottaferrata⁵¹⁾. Da Valeriano aber seit 1532 und bis zum 13. Januar 1533 nach Vorlagen der Bibliothek Gianfrancesco Picos della Mirandola kopiert hat, ist auch der Bononiensis aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach dort geschrieben. Die Bibliothek, jedenfalls die griechischen Handschriften Gianfrancescos, wurden nach

seinem Tode (1533) zerstreut⁵²⁾. Im Jahre 1540 muss der Vaticanus aber ebenso wie die Demonstratio evangelica Eusebs in Venedig gewesen sein, da gewiss dort der Lond. Add. 15276 für den französischen Botschafter in Venedig, Guillaume Pélicier (1539-1542), aus ihm abgeschrieben wurde⁵³⁾.

Am 5. Mai 1533 ging Augustinus Steuchus als Prior von S. Secondo in seine Vaterstadt Gubbio⁵⁴⁾. Als Vikar stand ihm Fulgenzio Guglielmi zur Seite, und bald darauf finden wir dort auch Valeriano. Steuchus verliess diese Stelle schon im Jahr darauf, um sich nach Rom zu begeben⁵⁵⁾, Valeriano aber muss mehrere Jahre in Gubbio geblieben sein, da er in den Jahren 1534-1537 alle seine mit Ortsangabe subskribierten Kopien ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀγίου ἀμβροσίου μοναστηρίῳ geschrieben hat. Das Kloster S. Ambrogio, das ausserhalb der Porta Castello von Gubbio lag, war zu Beginn des 15. Jh. von den Augustinereremiten an die regulierten Chorherren der Bologneser Kongregation von S. Salvatore übergegangen und 1455 mit dem nahegelegenen Stift der Augustinerchorherren der Congregatio Portuensis S. Secondo vereinigt worden⁵⁶⁾.


Im Kloster S. Ambrogio in Gubbio schrieb Valeriano Anfang September 1534 den Neapol. II A 13, der nur die Legatio des Athenagoras enthält⁵⁷⁾, im Jahre 1534 ohne nähere Angabe, aber doch wohl auch in Gubbio, den Etonensis 100 mit der Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum, den beiden Schriften des Athenagoras und der Oratio Tatians⁵⁸⁾. Darauf folgt Anfang März 1535, also ein halbes Jahr nach dem Neapolitanus, eine Kopie der Resurrectio des Athenagoras (Bonon. 1497, ff. 28-49^r), einen Monat später, Anfang April 1535, eine weitere Kopie der Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum (Bonon. 1497, ff. 52-60^v). Im Jahre 1535 ohne nähere Angabe, also wohl ebenfalls in Gubbio, ist Athenagoras' Legatio in Bonon. 1497, ff. 2-27, geschrieben⁵⁹⁾.

Es erhebt sich die Frage, nach welchen Vorlagen Valeriano diese Kopien in dem verlassenen Bergnest angefertigt hat, in dem er gewiss keine griechischen Handschriften vorfand. Schon W. Worth hat in seiner Ausgabe (Oxford 1700) erkannt, dass der Tatian des Etonensis aus dem Bonon. 2304 abgeschrieben ist⁶⁰⁾. Valeriano muss also dessen entsprechenden Faszikel (ff. 1-20) mit nach Gubbio genommen haben. Danach werden wir vermuten,

dass er auch für die übrigen in Gubbio geschriebenen Kopien seine eigene Vorlage mitgebracht hat; das kann dann nur die 1532 geschriebene, heute verlorene Vorlage des Bodl. misc. 212 gewesen sein, die alle drei Schriften, nämlich Athenagoras' Legatio und Resurrectio und die pseudojustinische Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum, enthielt, während Tatian im Bodleianus fehlt und dementsprechend auch in seiner Vorlage nicht vorhanden gewesen sein wird. Dieser Vorlage werden auch die restlichen Kopien dieser Schriften entnommen sein, die Valeriano in Gubbio geschrieben hat. Die Resurrectio des Athenagoras im Neap. II A 13 hängt nach Schwartz wie der bereits oben erwähnte Mut. gr. 247 und der Bodl. misc. 212 vom Paris. gr. 174 ab. Für beide Schriften des Athenagoras im Bonon. 1497 gilt dasselbe wie für den Neapolitanus und den Brief an Zenas und Serenus im Bonon. 1497, der an die Schriften des Athenagoras anschliesst und einen Monat nach diesen beendet wurde. Die beiden Schriften des Athenagoras und die Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum stehen, von Valeriano geschrieben, aber auch im Angelicus gr. 96⁶¹⁾, der zwar vom Schreiber nach jeder Schrift subskribiert ist, aber jedesmal ohne Ort und Datum. Auch er hängt nach Schwartz wie Mut. 247, Bodl. misc. 212 und Eton. 100 vom Paris. 174 ab, muss also auch entweder nach dem Mutinensis direkt oder nach einem der anderen beiden Codices geschrieben sein. Die von Schwartz verzeichneten Varianten stellen ihn aber eng neben den Mutinensis und Neapolitanus. Da letzterer nur die eine der beiden Schriften des Athenagoras enthält, kann er nicht die Vorlage des Angelicus sein. Die Variantenprüfung ergibt, dass er unabhängig vom Etonensis aus der Vorlage des Bodleianus abgeschrieben ist. Im übrigen hat schon Schwartz festgestellt, dass alle Valerian-Kopien des Athenagoras auf einen Archetyp zurückgehen, den Mut. gr. 247, oder besser auf einen Codex, der diesem sehr ähnlich gewesen sei. Das letztere trifft also zu, und dieser simillimus des Mutinensis ist die von Valeriano im Jahre 1532 nach dem Mutinensis gefertigte Kopie, die der Bodl. misc. 212 insgesamt reproduziert. Den Bonon. 1497 kennt Schwartz nicht.

Dasselbe Verhältnis wie für die Valerian-Codices des Athenagoras ist für den pseudojustinischen Brief an Zenas und Serenus anzusetzen, der mit jenen zusammen in der Vorlage des

Bodl. misc. 212 stand und wie jene im Bodleianus reproduziert wurde, ebenso auch von Valeriano selbst im Etonensis und im Angelicus. Die Reihenfolge der drei Schriften ist nicht immer dieselbe: J(ustin), R(esurrectio), L(egatio) im Bodleianus, JLR im Etonensis, RLJ im Angelicus; Valeriano hat also seine Abschriften einzeln als selbständige Hefte gefertigt, die dann beim Binden eine andere Reihenfolge erhielten als die Vorlage. Es ergibt sich also folgendes Stemma:



Die Kopien des Tatian Bonon. 2304, ff. 1-20, des Briefes an Zenas und Serenus und der beiden Schriften des Athenagoras waren nicht die einzigen, die Valeriano in Gubbio zur Verfügung hatte. Wie ich an anderer Stelle nachgewiesen habe⁶²⁾, hat er dort am 10. März 1536 'Olympiodors' Kommentare zum Phaidon und Philebos im Paris. gr. 1823 und Anfang März 1537 Iamblichos De mysteriis im Bonon. 2290 aus dem Codex Grimani 11 abgeschrieben; er hatte ihn aus Venedig ausgeliehen und später wieder dorthin zurückgebracht. Im Neapol. II A 13, Eton. 100 und Paris. 1823, die sich auf die Jahre 1534-1536 verteilen, verwendete er gleiches Papier⁶³⁾, im Paris. 1823 auch ein anderes⁶⁴⁾.

Von Gubbio führen Valeriano die Wege nach Ferrara, wo er am 31. März 1538 den Paris. gr. 452, fr. 107-228, im Kloster seines Ordens S. Maria del Vado subskribiert (Ioannes Klimakos und Ioannes Rhaitu)⁶⁵⁾. Als Vorlage könnte man wohl den heutigen Mut. gr. 94 vermuten, der damals in der Bibliothek der Fürsten von Carpi stand⁶⁶⁾, aber schon in Bestand und Titeln der Prolegomena gibt es gravierende Differenzen, und der Βίος ἐν ἐπιτομῇ zeigt eine andere Version als im Mutinensis (BHG 882c gegen BHG 882). Dies alles schliesst den Mutinensis als Vorlage aus. Vermutlich hat Valeriano sich eines der drei Codices des

Klimax bedient, die es in seinem Heimatkloster S. Antonio gab (Nr. 104, 106, 367)⁶⁷⁾. Dazu passt, dass Paris. 452 unter Franz I. seinen Einband erhielt, also vermutlich von dessen Botschafter in Venedig (1539-1542) Guillaume Pélicier geliefert wurde.


Seit 1539 finden wir Valeriano wieder in S. Antonio in Venedig, wo er das Amt des Bibliothekars innehat⁶⁸⁾. Von da an bis 1543 haben alle datierten Kopien die Ortsangabe Venedig ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀγίου ἀντωνίου μοναστηρίῳ, und es ist kein Wunder, wenn sich ihre Vorlagen in diesem Kloster nachweisen lassen.

Das gilt gleich für den Paris. gr. 1830 aus dem Jahre 1539⁶⁹⁾, der Proklos' Theologia Platonica und dessen Institutio theologica enthält. Beide Werke sind nachweislich aus dem Bodl. Laud. gr. 18 abgeschrieben, der sich durch das Exlibris Domenico Grimanis als die Nr. 18 seines Verzeichnisses ausweist⁷⁰⁾. Von der Theologia Platonica hat H. D. Saffrey noch drei weitere Kopien nachgewiesen, den mit Paris. 1830 etwa gleichzeitigen Paris. gr. 1829, den von Georgios Tryphon um 1550 für Hans Jakob Fugger geschriebenen Monac. gr. 98 und den aus der Bibliothek des Bischofs von Belluno, Aloisius Lollino, kommenden Vat. gr. 1739⁷¹⁾.

Im Jahre 1539 schrieb Valeriano im Kloster S. Antonio auch den Paris. gr. 2376, ff. 173-236, der folgende Texte enthält: ff. 173-179^r Πλήθωνος περὶ ἀρετῶν (PG 160, 865-882); ff. 172^v-213^r Γεωργίου γεμιστοῦ [scil. Πλήθωνος] πρὸς τὰς σχολαρίου ὑπὲρ ἀριστοτέλους ἀντιλήψεις (PG 160, 979-1020); ff. 213^v-236^v Plethons Werk περὶ ὧν ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς πλάτωνα διαφέρεται (PG 160, 889-929). Dieselben Texte hat Andronikos Nuntzios im Scor. T.II.1, ff. 7^v-54^v, für Hurtado de Mendoza geschrieben, nur in umgekehrter Reihenfolge. Beiden hat offenbar die Nr. 72 Grimanis als Vorlage gedient: *Plethon de iis quibus differt Aristoteles a Platone, idem contra responsiones scolarii, idem de virtute*. Aber während sich Valeriano mit diesen Stücken begnügte, hat Andronikos, der auch die Reihenfolge seiner Vorlage beibehielt, dieser noch weitere Stücke entnommen.

Ich habe schon früher gezeigt, dass die Texte, die Valeriano in Gubbio aus dem Codex Grimani 11 kopiert hat, nämlich 'Olympiodors' (Damaskios') Kommentare zum Phaidon und Philebos, Iamblichos De mysteriis und Albinos De ordine librorum Platonis,


auf die entsprechenden Handexemplare Marsilio Ficinos zurückgehen⁷²⁾. Dasselbe ist offenbar auch hier der Fall. Denn die drei Stücke finden sich in der gleichen Reihenfolge wie in Grimani Nr. 72 und im Scorialensis auch im Ricc. 76, ff. 1-84^v 73), geschrieben wie das Handexemplar Ficinos von Iamblichos De mysteriis (Vallic. F 20, ff. 1-137) von Ioannes Skutariotes, und Ficino hat den Text der ersten beiden mit griechischen Lemmata versehen⁷⁴⁾. Die Vorlagen für den Riccardianus können die Autographa Plethons gewesen sein, für die ersten beiden Werke (ff. 1-73) der Marc. gr. 517, ff. 13-65⁷⁵⁾.



Die gleiche Filiation Ficino-Grimani-Albini trifft nun offenbar auch auf die Sententiae und De abstinencia des Porphyrios zu, die Valeriano im gleichen Jahre 1539 in S. Antonio geschrieben hat (Barb. gr. 252 = II 73)⁷⁶⁾. In den Sententiae hatte er dabei nach Lamberz⁷⁷⁾ dieselbe verlorene Vorlage wie die von Ioannes Skutariotes geschriebenen Codices Bodl. misc. 105 und Laur. 80,15. L. G. Westerink⁷⁸⁾ schliesst daraus, dass diese die Nr. 85 des Kardinals Grimani gewesen sei (*Porphyrius de abstinencia animalium libri tres. Idem de iis que ducuntur* (sic, aber -ur ist getilgt) *nos in cognitionem intelligibilium*), die offenbar aus dem Besitz des Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Nr. 311, Calori Cesis⁷⁹⁾ S.59) komme. Die Vorlage der Skutariotes-Kopien muss sich aber in Florenz befunden haben. Wäre sie auch die Vorlage des Valerian-Codex Barb. gr. 252, so müsste sie in den Besitz Grimani und mit dessen Bibliothek als Nr. 85 nach S. Antonio in Venedig gelangt sein. Blickt man aber auf die Grimani-Codices 11 und 72, so ist es wahrscheinlich, dass der Grimani-Codex des Porphyrios eine Kopie der gleichen Vorlage gewesen ist, aus der auch Bodl. misc. 105 und Laur. 80,15 von Skutariotes abgeschrieben wurden.

Den Scor. y.I.10 leitet Lamberz zögernd aus dem Barberinianus her, weil er vor 1543 geschrieben sein müsse und die


Korrekturen des Barberinianus in seinem Text erscheinen, andererseits aber der Barberinianus noch nicht korrigiert gewesen zu sein scheine, als Petrus Victorius ihn mit Monac. gr. 171 verlich, den er selbst zum Zwecke der Editio princeps (1548) aus dem Laur. 80,15 abgeschrieben hatte. Den paläographischen Befund, der Lamberz Schwierigkeiten bereitet, würde ich so deuten: Aus dem Grimani-Codex 85 schrieb Valeriano den Barb. gr. 252 ab. Diesen korrigierte dann eine zweite Hand, und aus dem korrigierten Barberinianus kopierte Andronikos Nuntzios für Hurtado den Scor. y.I.10. Den Barberinianus hat vielleicht Arnoldus Arlenius, der von 1542 bis 1547 Hurtados Bibliothekar gewesen war, und dann wieder in Florenz mit dem Buchdrucker Torrentinus zusammen arbeitete⁸⁰⁾, Pietro Vettori zur Korrektur des Monac. gr. 171 zur Verfügung gestellt. Dieser berücksichtigte dabei nur den Grundtext des Barberinianus, nicht die Korrekturen der zweiten Hand. Arlenius wäre dann nicht erst 1549, sondern schon vorher, vermutlich nach Mendozas Umzug von Venedig nach Rom (1547), zu Torrentinus nach Florenz zurückgekehrt.



Das Exemplar Ficinos, nach dem er die Sententiae und De abstinentia übersetzt hat, geht mit dem Bodleianus und dem Laurentianus, kann aber keiner dieser beiden Zeugen gewesen sein⁸¹⁾. Danach ist mehr als wahrscheinlich, dass auch dieses aus deren Vorlage stammte oder diese selbst war. Wenn letzteres der Fall war, hätten wir es mit einer genauen Parallele zu Iamblichos' De mysteriis, den Kommentaren 'Olympiodors' zum Phaidon und Philebos, dem Prologos des Albinos und zu Plethon zu tun, wo das Handexemplar Ficinos jedesmal das Antigraphon eines Grimani-Codex gewesen ist, und dasselbe gilt


vielleicht auch für Theon⁸²⁾.

Das gleiche gilt aber auch für die Texte, die Valeriano ein Jahr später (1540) in S. Antonio im Montepessulanus 127⁸³⁾ und im Paris. gr. 1954 geschrieben hat, die sehr wahrscheinlich kodikologisch eng zusammengehören, auch wenn sie eigene Lagenzählungen haben. Der Montepessulanus enthält ff. 33-64^V die Reden 21 und 20 des Themistios und die Rede Julians auf Helios, auf ff. 1-18^V (beim Binden versetzt) Julians Misopogon, der Parisinus 1954 Priskianos Lydos. Die Reden Julians führt Bidez⁸⁴⁾, wenn auch zögernd, auf den Monac. gr. 461 zurück, der Priskianos ist nach Bywater⁸⁵⁾ *eiusdem fere stirpis ac Monacensis* [461], und dasselbe Verhältnis gilt offenbar für die Reden des Themistios. Hier gehört der Montepessulanus zu einer Gruppe der Handschriften, die nur die Reden 21 und 20 enthalten⁸⁶⁾, und unter ihnen befindet sich auch der Monac. gr. 461. Der Monacensis, der ff. 1-77 Themistios und Julian, gefolgt von Priskianos, in der gleichen Reihenfolge enthält wie ursprünglich der Montepessulanus, ist hier von Ioannes Skutariotes geschrieben und war im Besitze Marsilio Ficinos, der den Priskianos mit Varianten versehen⁸⁷⁾ und gewiss danach ins Lateinische übersetzt hat⁸⁸⁾. Die gleichen Texte wie im Monacensis standen aber in der gleichen Reihenfolge im Codex Grimani Nr. 194: *Themistii philosophi liber qui inscribitur philosophus. Eiusdem oratio in patrem. Juliani orationes de Sole ad Salustium. Eiusdem liber qui inscribitur Antiochicus vel Misopogon. Prisciani lydi philosophi paraphrasis in librum Theophrasti de sensu et fantasia*. Aus Grimani 194 stammt sicher auch Scor. T.II.1, ff. 154-199 (Themistios und Julian). Dieser Codex kommt, wie bereits oben (S. 333) erwähnt, aus dem Besitze von Hurtado de Mendoza und ist zum Teil (ff. 1-153. 246-306) von Andronikos Nuntzios geschrieben. Wir kommen damit zu folgendem Stemma, in das ich auch die Vorlagen des Ficino-Exemplars Monac. gr. 461 einbeziehe⁸⁹⁾:



Dieselbe Filiation Ficino-Grimani-Albini ergibt sich schliesslich auch für die oben (S. 326) erwähnten Kopien des Dexippos, der Schrift *De syllogismis* und des *Poimandres* des Hermes Trismegistos im Bonon. 2294, ff. 1-59. Die gleichen Texte finden sich nämlich nicht nur, wie oben bereits erwähnt, im Verzeichnis der *Codices Grimani*, sondern auch im Laur. 71,33. Diesen Codex hatte der Mönch Leonardo da Pistoia "aus Macedonien" nach Florenz gebracht und Cosimo de' Medici übergeben; Cosimo beauftragte Marsilio Ficino, daraus den *Poimandres* zu übersetzen⁹⁰). Später wurde der Codex, wie eine Eintragung auf f. 208^V besagt, von Angelo Poliziano dem Ficino abgekauft: *Angeli Politiani liber: emptus aureis duabus a Marsilio Ficino*. Nach dessen Tode (1494) ging er mit zahlreichen anderen *Codices* des Humanisten in die *Laurenziana* ein⁹¹).

Dass der Codex Grimani 1 aus Laur. 71,33 stammt, ergibt sich auch daraus, dass der Scor. T.II.1, ff. 200-235^V (*Dexippos*), nach Busse⁹²) mit dem *Laurentianus* übereinstimmt, aber von Andronikos Nuntzios für Hurtado de Mendoza geschrieben⁹³) und deshalb nicht in Florenz, sondern in Venedig entstanden ist, die Marciana aber keinen *Dexippos* besitzt. Der *Scorialensis* enthält im Anschluss an *Dexippos* auch die Schrift *Περὶ σολογισμῶν*. Den *Bononiensis* kannte Busse nicht. Wir kommen damit zu nachstehender Filiation:



Vom Codex Grimani 11 hat sich Iamblichos De mysteriis als Vindob. gr. 264 erhalten⁹⁴⁾. Ich habe früher⁹⁵⁾ die Vermutung ausgesprochen, dass Grimani 11 aus dem Besitz von Giovanni Pico kommt, dessen Bibliothek im Jahre 1498 von Kardinal Grimani erworben wurde. Aber alle für die Herkunft von Pico vorgebrachten Argumente reichten nicht aus, sie zu beweisen. Alles musste im Bereich einer Hypothese bleiben, die vielleicht eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich hatte. Jetzt, nachdem wir weitere Exemplare der Bibliothek Grimanis kennen, die von Handexemplaren Ficinos abgeschrieben sein müssen, können wir definitiv sagen, dass dies nicht der Fall ist; keines dieser Exemplare ist in der Bibliothek Giovanni Picos nachweisbar⁹⁶⁾. Vielmehr eröffnet sich ein neuer Blick auf die Herkunft dieser Exemplare in der Bibliothek Grimanis.

Ich habe schon früher gezeigt, dass der Vindob. phil. gr. 264 von einem Schreiber stammt, dem in der Folge D. Harlfinger den Namen Librarius Florentinus gegeben hat, da er nachweislich viele Codices in Florenz geschrieben, aber nie subskribiert hat und auf diese Weise anonym geblieben war⁹⁷⁾. Inzwischen hat Paul Canart⁹⁸⁾ das Geheimnis um diesen Schreiber gelüftet. Er ist mit moralischer Sicherheit kein anderer als der Grieche Demetrios Damilas, der 1476 in Mailand an der Edition des ersten gedruckten griechischen Buches, der Grammatik des Konstantinos Laskaris, mitgewirkt hatte und spätestens seit 1484 in Florenz für hohe Persönlichkeiten Handschriften kopierte. Von 1490 bis ins 16. Jh. hinein schreibt er in Rom für mehrere Gelehrte, um schliesslich 1506 professionell für die Vatikanische Bibliothek zu kopieren. Man wird deshalb annehmen können, dass er in Florenz die Handexemplare Ficinos für Domenico Grimani selbst kopierte, der um 1489 sich in Florenz im Kreise um Ficino aufgehalten hatte und mit Angelo Poliziano

und Giovanni Pico della Mirandola befreundet war⁹⁹⁾. Gerade in diese Zeit wird die Entstehung des Vindob. phil. gr. 264 zu setzen sein, entgegen der von mir früher errechneten Datierungsspanne auf Grund eines nur ähnlichen Wasserzeichens. Danach würde wahrscheinlich nicht nur der Codex Grimani 11, sondern auch 85, 195 und 1 von Demetrios Damilas geschrieben gewesen sein.

Diese Überlegungen waren bereits formuliert, als ich feststellte, dass im Dexippos und Poimandres nach Busse und Nock¹⁰⁰⁾ der Coisl. gr. 332 aus dem Ficino-Codex Laur. 71,33 stammt und Bonon. 2294 im Poimandres ebenfalls (Busse kannte ihn nicht), der Coislinianus aber nach Canart von Demetrios Damilas geschrieben ist. Es war danach zu vermuten, dass der Coislinianus identisch ist mit Grimani Nr. 1. Die Autopsie des Coisl. 332 am 5. März 1981 in Paris ergab, dass auch er, wie nicht anders zu erwarten, die Schrift *De syllogismis* enthält (ff. 124^V-133^V *περὶ συλλογισμῶν*), die Omont und Busse nicht erwähnen. Aber darüber hinaus ist auf der Innenseite des Vorderdeckels unter dem lateinischen Index eine Zeile von 9 cm Länge ausgeschabt, die etwa dem üblichen Besitzvermerk *Grimanis Liber Dominici Grimani Car^{lis} S. Marci*¹⁰¹⁾ entspräche. Wie Canart richtig vermerkt, sind auf ff. 1 und 3 die Wappen ausgekratzt, aber die prächtig illuminierte Initiale der ersten Seite enthält ein Wappen von der gleichen Form wie der ebenfalls von Demetrios Damilas geschriebene Laud. gr. 58, den ich im April 1968 eingesehn habe, auf f. 2^r und f. 133^r. Der Inhalt des Wappens ist auf f. 2^r wie im Coislinianus ausgeschabt, aber unter der Ultraviolettlampe konnte ich die Teilung des Wappens in zwei Hälften, rechts blau, links in einer helleren Farbe, gut erkennen. Auf f. 133^r aber ist das Wappen unbeschädigt erhalten geblieben; die rechte Hälfte ist hier dunkelblau, die linke schwarz (?) glasiert, enthalten aber sonst nichts. Der Laud. gr. 57 und die vom selben Schreiber geschriebenen Laud. gr. 56 und 58 trugen auch einen Besitzvermerk etwa in gleicher Länge wie im Coisl. 332, er ist aber nicht ausradiert, sondern herausgeschnitten; in Laud. 57 und 58 ist noch der erste Buchstabe zu lesen, ein *D*. Schon damals ist es mir nicht gelungen, das Wappen, das einem der florentinischen Auftraggeber gehören muss, zu identifizieren. Aber wie dem auch sei, wenn der Coisl.

gr. 332 nicht der Grimani-Codex ist, so ist er jedenfalls ein Zwilling von diesem, und wahrscheinlich war dann auch der Grimani-Codex wie der Iamblichos-Codex Vindob. phil. gr. 264 von Demetrios Damilas geschrieben. Man wird ohnehin vermuten dürfen, dass ein und derselbe Schreiber alle Kopien der Handexemplare Ficinos hergestellt hat.

Das Werk *De contemnenda morte* des Demetrios Kydonios hat Albini zweimal geschrieben, einmal im Eton College 11 im Jahre 1539 in S. Antonio¹⁰²⁾, das andere Mal im Monac. gr. 392, ff. 18-36 (2 Quaternionen und ein Binio, dessen letztes Blatt fehlt)¹⁰³⁾, der zwar subskribiert ist, aber ohne Angabe des Ortes und des Datums. Das Wasserzeichen dieser Kopie ist ähnlich Briquet 6289 und sicher auch dem des Polyainos im Paris. gr. 1687 vom 8. November 1540 (unten S. 341), das Schindler mit Briquet 6299 vergleicht, ohne dass die Masse und Proportionen ganz übereinstimmen. Der Monac. gr. 392 bildet nach Deckelmann¹⁰⁴⁾ mit den Fugger-Codices Monac. gr. 58 und 100 und dem Paris. gr. 963 eine Familie, deren Glieder wie ein Ei dem anderen gleichen, aber voneinander unabhängig sind. Dazu gehört, wie nicht anders zu erwarten, auch der Eton-Codex, den Deckelmann nicht kannte. Nach den mir vorliegenden beiden Probeseiten scheint auch er mit den übrigen Vertretern dieser Familie unabhängig aus derselben Vorlage zu stammen. In der Grimani Nr. 12 steht an achter Stelle *Liber Cydone de contemptu mortis*, und dazu passt der Titel im Monac. 58 Τοῦ Κυδώνη περὶ τοῦ καταφρονεῖν τὸν θάνατον, während die Valerian-Kopien den Titel tragen: Τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ λογιστάτου κυρ(οῦ) δημητρίου τοῦ κυδώνη (κυδόνου Eton) λόγος, ὅπως ἄλογον τὸ τοῦ θανάτου δέος ἀποδεικνύων, ebenso auch Paris. 963 in Übereinstimmung mit der anderen Klasse. Jedenfalls hat das Antigraphon Valeriano in S. Antonio vorgelegen, und die Fugger-Codices Monac. 58 und 100 kommen gewiss ebenso aus Venedig¹⁰⁵⁾, wo letzterer nachweislich geschrieben ist, wie Monac. 392, der mit dem Nachlass des Manuel Glynzunios aus Venedig nach Augsburg kam¹⁰⁶⁾. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die Vorlage aller dieser Kopien ebenfalls nach einem Exemplar Ficinos kopiert war. Jedenfalls steht in dem Ficino-Codex Ricc. 76 ein Auszug¹⁰⁷⁾ von der Hand des Skutariotes (S. 15,5 Φαμέν τὸν ἄνθρωπον - 36,22 διδάξιν χρῆσασθαι in der Ausgabe von Deckelmann), und dessen fehlender

Titel ist von Ficino selbst in der Form Δημήτριος καδόνης περί ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας ergänzt¹⁰⁸). Ioannes Skutariotes würde dann die Vorlage von Ricc. 76 abgeschrieben haben. Das Interesse Ficanos an dem Thema erhellt auch aus seiner Übersetzung des pseudoplatonischen Axiochos (Xenocrates De morte)¹⁰⁹).

Für Damaskios, den Valeriano im Juli 1540 in S. Antonio geschrieben hat (Berol. 116)¹¹⁰), liegt ein Stemma nicht vor, da längst bekannt ist, dass der Archetyp, Marc. gr. 246, erhalten ist. Da es aber ein Exemplar in S. Antonio gab (Nr. 269), wird man annehmen können, dass dieses, nicht einer der Marciani (245, 246, 247), die Vorlage war. Die Nr. 269 Grimani ist insgesamt reproduziert von Andronikos Nuntzios für Hurtado de Mendoza im Scor. T.I.14, ff. 1-421^r.


Am 8. November desselben Jahres subskribierte Valeriano in S. Antonio seine Kopie der Strategemata des Polyainos im Paris. gr. 1687¹¹¹). Sie stammt ebenso wie Ravennas 432 und der von Petros Karnabaka für Diego Hurtado de Mendoza geschriebene Scor. Ω.1.11 aus einem verlorenen Deszendenten des Urbinas 107¹¹²). Dieser kann kein anderer gewesen sein als Grimani 308.

Die Scholien des Palladios zum 6. Buch der Epidemien des Hippokrates hat Valeriano im Dezember 1540 in S. Antonio beendet (Berol. 121, ff. 1-98^r)¹¹³). Sie stehen im Verzeichnis von S. Antonio unter der Nr. 345¹¹⁴) und sind jedenfalls nach dieser auch von Nikolaos Nathanael für Hurtado de Mendoza reproduziert worden (Scor. γ.I.8, ff. 82-159), da es sie in der Marciana nicht gibt. Der Scorialensis ist nach Dietz eine Abschrift von Ambros. B 113 sup., ff. 85-171^r ¹¹⁵), und dieser ist 1603 in Venedig von Gabriel Severos gekauft worden¹¹⁶). Er kann aber nicht die Grimani-Nr. 345 sein.

Der oben erwähnte Montepessulanus 127 enthält ausser den dort genannten Texten als einen selbständig konzipierten Teil aus zwei Lagen, einem Quaternio und einem Ternio (α^{ov}, β^{ov}), die Charaktere des Theophrast (ff. 19-32, 31^v und 32 leer), geschrieben von Valeriano im Jahre 1540 im Kloster S. Antonio¹¹⁷). Als Vorlage kann man eines der beiden Exemplare dieses Klosters annehmen, Grimani 150 oder 248, obwohl es auch in der Marciana ein Exemplar gab (Marc. gr. 513). Da Grimani 150 sich im Barb. gr. 97, ff. 1-16, erhalten hat¹¹⁸), müsste sich die Frage durch eine Kollation des Montepessulanus mit dem Bar-

berinianus lösen lassen.

Im Brand des Jahres 1904 untergegangen ist Valerianos Kopie von Herons Pneumatik, der im Dezember 1541 in S. Antonio subskribierte Taur. gr. 298¹¹⁹⁾. Dieses Werk fehlt im Verzeichnis Grimanis, existiert aber im Marc. gr. 516. Nach W. Schmidt (S. 80) kann der Taurinensis aber nicht aus dem Marcianus abgeschrieben sein. Seine Vorlage scheint verloren zu sein, dürfte aber wie für den Bruxell. 3608 so auch für den Scor. Φ .I.10 als Vorlage gedient haben, den Nikolaos Murmuri für Hurtado de Mendoza schrieb und am 28. April 1542 beendete¹²⁰⁾, falls nicht der Taurinensis selbst deren Vorlage war¹²¹⁾. Aus dem Scorialensis stammt nach Smith' überzeugendem Nachweis der Paris. gr. 2428. Dieser hat auch die mathematischen Texte seiner Vorlage (Scor. Φ .I.10, ff. 73-127) übernommen, aber zwischen Heron und diese Theon Smyrnaeus und Nemesios, den Grimani 27 enthält, eingeschoben. Alle drei Codices kommen aus demselben venezianischen Scriptorium¹²²⁾. Die mathematischen Texte standen in der Nr. 4 Grimanis, von der sich ein Teil als Vat. gr. 1411 erhalten hat¹²³⁾, und dieser muss sie Nikolaos Murmuri entnommen haben¹²⁴⁾. Wir kommen damit unter Einbeziehung von Philoponos' Kommentar zur Introductio arithmetica des Nikomachos und der pseudoheronischen Geodäsie (unten S. 345) zu folgender Arbeitshypothese:



Am letzten Tag desselben Jahres (31. Dezember 1541) beendete Valeriano in S. Antonio die Kommentare des 'Olympiodor' (Damaskios) zum Phaidon und Philebos im Lond. Add. 10063¹²⁵⁾. Ihre Vorlage war wie für die in Gubbio geschriebenen Kopien (Paris. gr. 1823 und Bonon. 2290, oben S. 332) der Grimani-Codex 11, den er von dort wieder nach Venedig zurückgebracht hatte¹²⁶⁾. Dasselbe gilt für die Kopie der Eisagoge des Albinos

im Voss. Q 13, die zwar nicht subskribiert ist, aber ebenfalls in den Jahren 1539-1542 geschrieben sein muss, weil sie von Guillaume Pélicier kommt¹²⁷⁾. Übrigens hat Valeriano, wie nicht anders zu erwarten, auch die Vorlage seiner Kopien des Athenagoras und Ps.-Justin von Gubbio nach Venedig gebracht. Denn der Bodl. misc. 212 ist gewiss hier, im Zentrum der Abschreibetätigkeit jener Zeit, von Georgios Kokolos¹²⁸⁾ geschrieben. Möglicherweise ist auch der Angelicus gr. 96 (oben S. 331) erst hier geschrieben worden¹²⁹⁾.

Nachdem wir so oft wahrscheinlich machen konnten, dass Handschriften des Escorial aus dem Besitze des Diego Hurtado de Mendoza von anderen Schreibern nach Exemplaren der Bibliothek von S. Antonio hergestellt wurden, treffen wir nun auf eine von Valeriano Albini selbst für den spanischen Botschafter geschriebene Kopie, den Scor. X.I.4, ff. 1-264, in dem er zweimal subskribiert hat, das erste Mal nach Euklids Catoptrica, Phaenomena, Optica und Data auf f. 112 als ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀγίου ἀντωνίου μοναστηρίου μοναχός am 1. November 1542, das andere Mal (f. 264^V) lediglich mit der Angabe des Jahres (1542)¹³⁰⁾. Die Catoptrica und die Optica dieses Codex sind nach Heiberg aus dem Paris. gr. 2350 abgeschrieben, aber sein Beweis überzeugt nicht, und seine Behauptung wird durch den kodikologischen Befund positiv widerlegt: der Parisinus ist von Pierre Vergèce, dem Neffen des Ange Vergèce, in Frankreich (sicher in Paris) geschrieben¹³¹⁾, das Wasserzeichen, ein Krug mit der Inschrift SIMONET vom Typ Briquet 12.819-12.831, beweist die französische Herkunft (Champagne) des Papiers, und im Katalog der Pariser Bibliothek von 1550 erscheint er noch nicht. Die Data Euklids im Scorialensis geben nach Ausweis des Kolophons die Recensio Theonina: Εὐκλείδου δεδομένα τῆς θέωνος ἐκδόσεως. Diese findet sich vollständig nur im Bonon. Comm. A 1,18,19 aus dem 11. Jh. und seiner Abschrift Laur. 28,1 aus dem 14. Jh. In drei anderen beginnt die Recensio Theonina erst mit S. 220,11 Menge¹³²⁾. Unter diesen befindet sich der Berol. Phill. 1542 (= gr. 138), der aus dem Besitze Péliciers kommt und 1542 in Venedig geschrieben wurde. Da dies auch für Scor. X.I.4 zutrifft, werden beide auf die gleiche Vorlage zurückgehen, und da es in der Marciana die Data in der Recensio Theonina nicht gibt, wird man diese in der Bibliothek

von S. Antonio suchen. Aber das Verzeichnis der Grimani-Codices weist lediglich unter Nr. 186 die Elemente aus, und auch im Katalog Tomasinis findet sich kein Euklid-Codex mit dem gesuchten Inhalt verzeichnet, sondern nur ein *Euclides* ohne nähere Bestimmung (S. 2, *a parte dextra, Pluteus II*). Zu den drei erwähnten Zeugen, die die Data nur teilweise in der Recensio Theonina haben, gehört auch der von Ioannes Rhosos 1487-1488 geschriebene Paris. gr. 2352, der ff. 97-168 dieselben Stücke Euklids enthält wie der Berolinensis und der Scorialensis und auch in der gleichen Reihenfolge. Es nimmt deshalb nicht wunder, dass diese Zeugen auch in den Phaenomena aufs engste miteinander verwandt sind¹³³). Dieser Codex kam in die Pariser Bibliothek über Hurault de Boistaillé (+ 1572), dessen Vermerk auf dem Verso des dritten Vorsatzblattes vorn zwar ausgeschabt, aber unter der Ultraviolettlampe wenigstens teilweise noch mit einiger Sicherheit zu lesen ist: *Emi ... a Nicolao greco*. Hurault de Boistaillé hat seine griechischen Handschriften als Gesandter in Konstantinopel und Venedig zusammengebracht¹³⁴). Es ist deshalb nicht unwahrscheinlich, dass sich der Parisinus schon um 1540 in Venedig befand und dort daraus Berol. 138 und Scor. X.I.4 abgeschrieben wurden. Mit der erwähnten Nummer von S. Antonio kann er schon deshalb nicht identisch sein, weil diese sich noch 1650 in diesem Kloster befand.

Die übrigen Texte, die sich im Scor. X.I.4 an Euklid anschliessen, sind, abgesehen von dem letzten (Theon), im Verzeichnis Grimanis nicht zu finden. Für Autolykos von Pitane (ff. 113-121^V) hat Mogenet¹³⁵) den Marc. gr. 304 als Vorlage festgestellt, ebenso De Falco¹³⁶) für Hypsikles (ff. 144^V-148^V). Da auch Aristarch De magnitudine et distantia solis et lunae (ff. 149-164^V) sowie Theodosios De habitationibus und De diebus et noctibus (ff. 165-216^V) im Marcianus, wenn auch in anderer Reihenfolge, stehen, wird dieser auch für sie die Vorlage gewesen sein¹³⁷).

Der letzte Bestandteil des Scorialensis, der von Albin geschrieben wurde, ist Theon Smyrnaeus (ff. 217-264). Hier liegt ein Stemma nicht vor. Da der Scorialensis aber den Text nur bis S. 119,21 Hiller enthält, muss er mittelbar oder unmittelbar aus dem Marc. 307 geflossen sein. Nun enthält aber den Theon Smyrnaeus auch der Codex Grimani Nr. 11, den Vale-

riano in anderen Teilen kopiert hat und aus dem auch sein Ordensbruder Fulgenzio Guglielmi den Bonon. 2293, ff. 152-184, abgeschrieben haben wird¹³⁸⁾, und auch diese Kopie enthält den Text nur bis S. 119,21 Hiller, stammte also direkt oder indirekt aus Marc. gr. 307. Das Nächstliegende ist, dass Valerianos Vorlage auch hier Grimani 11 war. Dieser Text kann im Codex Grimani 11 ebenso vom Exemplar Ficinos von Demetrios Damilas kopiert worden sein wie die früher behandelten¹³⁹⁾.

Undatiert ist die Kopie von Philoponos' Kommentar zur Ἀριθμητικῇ Εἰσαγωγῇ des Nikomachos von Gerasa (Berol. 145), da sie aber für Guillaume Pélicier angefertigt wurde, fällt sie gewiss in die Jahre 1539-1542, und ihre Vorlage ist dann entweder die Nr. 213 Grimanis gewesen: *Jo. Grammatici comm. in Arithmeticam et (!) isagogen*, oder die Nr. 4 Grimanis, von der sich der entsprechende Teil im Vat. gr. 1441, ff. 43-60^r und 98-106^r, erhalten hat¹⁴⁰⁾. Aus einem der Grimani-Exemplare wurden sicher auch zwei Scorialenses, die aus dem Besitz Hurtados de Mendoza kommen, der anscheinend von Petros Karnabaka geschriebene Y.I.12, ff. 1-80, und der aus dem Jahre 1544 stammende X.I.9, ff. 95-266, abgeschrieben. Dem Grimani-Codex 4 (Vat. 1441, ff. 13^r-16^r)¹⁴¹⁾ dürfte auch 'Herons' Geodäsie im Berol. 144, ff. 77-85, entnommen sein.

Undatiert ist auch der Scor. Y.I.8 mit Prokopios von Kaisareia, *Bellum Persicum* 1-2 und *Bellum Vandalicum* 1-2, er ist aber nach den Wasserzeichen (vgl. Briquet 3055 und 762) sicher ebenfalls in den 40er Jahren in Venedig geschrieben. Das sehr ähnliche Papier Briquet 761 wurde dort häufig für Hurtado de Mendoza verwendet¹⁴²⁾, und auch dieser Codex gehörte Mendoza. Die Vorlage war wahrscheinlich die Nr. 154 Grimanis (*Procopii Caesariensis historia*), obwohl auch Marc. gr. 398 denselben Inhalt hat.

Ebenso undatiert ist 'Plethons' Chorographie Thessaliens (= Strabo 9, 430A ff.) im Lond. Royal MS 16 D 14, ff. 106-117, deren Vorlage sicher Grimani 184 war, aus der auch der von Andronikos Nuntzios für Hurtado de Mendoza geschriebene Scor. T.II.1, ff. 122-131, und der von Konstantinos Mesobotes geschriebene Paris. gr. 2376, ff. 241-249^v, wo eine Kopie Valerianos vorangeht, stammen werden¹⁴³⁾. Nach A. Diller¹⁴⁴⁾ ist der Vat. gr. 1759, ff. 241-260, ein Teil von Grimani 185;

davon enthalten die ff. 249-260 Πλήθωνος Θεσσαλίας χωρογρα-
φία¹⁴⁵⁾, und davon müssten also Scor. T.II.1, ff. 122-131,
Paris. gr. 2376, ff. 241-249^V, und auch Lond. Royal 16 D 14
abgeschrieben sein.

Der Ottob. gr. 45, ff. 84-139^V, dessen Schreiber Harl-
finger ebenso wie bei Royal 16 D 14 identifiziert hat, enthält
den Text des Appian. Der Codex besteht aus mehreren Teilen,
die aber, soweit identifiziert, durchweg von Schreibern stam-
men, die in Venedig für Hurtado de Mendoza tätig waren: Ioan-
nes Mauromates, Petros Karnabaka, Valeriano Albini¹⁴⁶⁾. Für
die ersten Teile (ff. 1-83) sind die Vorlagen entweder in der
Bibliothek Bessarions nachgewiesen (ff. 15-19 De lineis und
Theophrast De sensibus ff. 1-13^V) oder so gut wie sicher; ebenso
sicher ist seine Entstehungszeit in der ersten Hälfte der
40er Jahre des 16. Jh. In dieselbe Zeit wird auch der Appian-
Teil fallen, und da Appian im Verzeichnis Grimanis fehlt, wer-
den wir als Vorlage den Marc. gr. 387 vermuten¹⁴⁷⁾.

Im Basil. F.II.1c¹⁴⁸⁾ ist der erste Teil (ff. 1-36), der
aus 6 regelmässigen Ternionen besteht (316 x 210 mm, scr.
225 x 125, ll. 30), von Valeriano Albini mit zwei Stücken aus
Maximos Confessor beschrieben (ff. 35^V und 36 leer). Er enthält
f. 1^r Τοῦ ἁγίου μαξίμου πέμπτη ἐκοντάς, inc. Εἷς θεὸς ἀναρχος,
ἀκατάληπτος ὅλην ἔχων, des. τοῦ λόγου γεγωνὶς κατοικητήριον =
PG 90,1084-1173A; f. 31^V Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἁγίου μαξίμου περὶ θεότητος
καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσεως, inc. "Ενεστιν τὸ ὑπεράναρχον καὶ ὑπερούσιον,
des. φυσικῆς περιγραφῆς ζημειωθισόμεθα = PG 90,1177-1185C5.
Der Text ist nicht subskribiert, und die Wasserzeichen sind
schwer erkennbar (darunter eine Armbrust und eine Kontermarke
AB). Wie andere Basler Handschriften aus dem Besitze von Remi-
gius Faesch gehört sie zu einer Gruppe, die der Basler Buch-
drucker Henricus Petri um 1550 von dem Flamen Arnoldus Arle-
nius erhielt¹⁴⁹⁾, der auch den Text unseres Manuskripts mit
Varianten versehen hat. Arlenius war 1542-1547 Bibliothekar
des Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, und so werden wir kaum fehlgehen
mit der Annahme, dass die Opuscula des Maximos der Sammelhand-
schrift seiner Werke Scor. γ.III.3 aus dem 12. Jh. (ff. 170^V-
196^V) entnommen sind, die Hurtado de Mendoza besass, und in
Venedig kopiert wurden, bevor Valeriano Albini nach Rom ging
(1545), zumal Maximos im Verzeichnis Grimanis nicht vorkommt

und im Basileensis auf das Valerian-Manuskript, wenn auch von anderer Hand, der Kommentar zum Herrengebet folgt, den auch der Scorialensis (ff. 117^V-126^V) enthält.

Seit 1545 finden wir unseren Kopisten in Rom als Prior des Klosters S. Lorenzo fuori le Mura, das 1511 unter Julius II. mit der Bologneser Kongregation vereinigt worden war¹⁵⁰). Hier schreibt er in diesem Jahre den Diophantos des Scor. T.I.11, ff. 1-160^V, der aus dem Besitze des Diego Hurtado de Mendoza kommt, aus Vat. gr. 200 ab¹⁵¹).

Vom 7. Dezember 1547 bis zum 9. April 1548 lieh er sich aus der Vaticana Pappos und Eunapios¹⁵²), zweifellos um sie ebenfalls für Mendoza zu kopieren, der im Jahre 1547 Botschafter in Rom geworden war. Bei Pappos muss es sich dabei um den heutigen Vat. gr. 218 gehandelt haben, der bereits 1533 in der Vatikanischen Bibliothek war¹⁵³). Denn aus diesem stammt Scor. T.I.11, ff. 167-200 + Scor. γ.I.7, ff. 1-243¹⁵⁴), der entgegen der Behauptung von Charles Graux¹⁵⁵) nicht von Ioannes Mauro-mates, sondern von Valeriano Albini geschrieben ist¹⁵⁶). Im Vat. 218 geht dem Pappos voran Anthemios De mirabilibus machinis, und dieses Werkchen steht dementsprechend auch im Scor. T.I.11, ff. 163-167. Valerianos Vorlage für Autolykos, Hypsikles und Aristarch im selben Codex (γ.I.7, ff. 245-280) war nach Mogenet¹⁵⁷) der Barb. gr. 186 aus dem 15. Jh., der seinerseits aus dem Vat. gr. 203 stammt. Der Barb. gr. 186 kommt aus der Bibliothek des Alberto Pio von Carpi (+ 1531) und fehlt im Inventar seines Erben Kardinal Rodolfo Pio di Carpi (+ 1564)¹⁵⁸), kann also 1545 schon in Rom gewesen sein. Valeriano hat also den jungen Barberinianus vor den älteren Codices, deren es schon damals im Vatikan mehrere gab (Vat. gr. 204 aus dem 9./10. Jh., 191, 202 und 203 aus dem 13. Jh.)¹⁵⁹) bevorzugt. Interessant ist, dass im Scor. γ.I.7 am Ende des Pappos-Textes und im Hypsikles Papiersorten verwendet sind, dafür das 15. Jh. nachgewiesen sind¹⁶⁰). Valeriano scheint also in Rom noch ältere Papiervorräte in seinem Kloster vorgefunden zu haben.

Der Roman des Eustathios Makrembolites über die Liebe der Hysmine und des Hysminias im Ambros. B 155 sup. ist von Valeriano nur mit der Jahreszahl 1545 subskribiert. Seine Vorlage war nach dem schlüssigen Nachweis von Hilberg¹⁶¹) der heutige

Paris. gr. 2915, der aus dem Besitz des Kardinals Niccolò Ridolfi (1501-1550), des Neffen Giovannis de' Medici (Papst Leos X.), kommt. Er dürfte deshalb eher in Rom als noch in Venedig geschrieben sein. Nach Hilberg ist auch Marc. gr. XI, 14 eine Kopie des Paris. 2915. Da dieser von Kaisar Strategos geschriebene und von Markos Musuros mit einer Zueignung an den venezianischen Patrizier Alvise Bembo versehene Codex in Florenz entstanden ist¹⁶²), hat der Parisinus zu Beginn des 16. Jh. in der Stadt der Medici gelegen.

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

ANMERKUNGEN

1) M. Vogel - V. Gardthausen, Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance (Zentralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen, Beiheft 33, Leipzig 1909, ND Hildesheim 1966), 369-372; Berichtigungen und Ergänzungen dazu: Miscellanea Aristide Colonna (im Druck). Im folgenden werden ausser Vogel-Gardthausen abgekürzt zitiert: BHG = F. Halkin, Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca³ (Subsidia Hagiographica 8a, Bruxelles 1957); Briquet = C. M. Briquet, Les filigranes. Dictionnaire historique des marques de papier dès leur apparition vers 1282 jusqu'en 1600. A facsimile of the 1907 edition with supplementary material, ed. A. Stevenson 1-4 (Amsterdam 1968); Harlfinger, Wasserzeichen = D. & J. Harlfinger, Wasserzeichen aus griechischen Handschriften 1.2 (Berlin 1974-1980); PG = Patrologiae cursus completus cur. J. P. Migne. Series Graeca (Paris 1857-1866); TU = Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, hrsg. von O. v. Gebhardt und A. v. Harnack (Leipzig 1882ff.); Samberger = Catalogi codicum graecorum, qui in minoribus bibliothecis Italicis asservantur 1-2 (Lipsiae 1965).

2) Th. Freudenberger, "Die Bibliothek des Kardinals Domenico Gri-mani", Historisches Jahrbuch 56 (1936), 15-45.

3) Zur Qualität seiner Kopien vgl. Otto (unten A. 41) 6, S. XVIII: *Linguam autem graecam parum cognitam habuit*; E. Schwartz, TU 4,2, 1891, X: *Omnes [codices] negligenter scripti omnisque generis vitiis inquinati sunt*; A. Dain (unten A. 49) 49f.: *scribe sans élégance, paléographie médiocre; il copie en tout cas si négligemment, qu'on est en droit de se demander s'il avait quelque connaissance du grec*; M. Sicherl, Die Handschriften, Ausgaben und Übersetzungen von Iamblichos De mysteriis (TU 62 = 5,7, Berlin 1957), 49. Ungünstiges Urteil auch bei Mogenet (unten A. 135), 104. Das Urteil Harnacks TU 1, 1/2 (Leipzig 1882), 5 und 23, er habe seine Vorlagen mit grosser Freiheit behandelt, beruht auf deren ungenügender Kenntnis. Unzutreffend ist auch das Urteil Guillaume Péliciers bei Freudenberger, Steuchus (Anm. 12), 61, er schreibe besser und korrekter als jeder andere in Venedig (der Text ausgeschrieben bei Mercati, Studi e Testi 164, 1952, 167,2).

- 4) P. Canart, "Démétrius Damilas, *alias* le 'Librarius Florentinus'", *Rivista di Studi Bizant. e Neoecl.*, N.S. 14-16 (1977-1979), 281-347.
- 5) M. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche* ¹² (Paderborn 1933), 428f.; I. Mozzagrugno, *Narratio rerum gestarum canonicorum regularium in plures libros distributa* (Venetiis 1622), Liber VII, 17; Freudenberger, Steuchus (unter A. 12), 42.
- 6) P. Paschini, *Domenico Grimani Cardinale di S. Marco* (+ 1523), (*Storia e Letteratura* 4, Roma 1943).
- 7) Freudenberger 39-42.
- 8) J. Ph. Tomasini, *Bibliothecae Venetae manuscriptae publicae et privatae* (Utini 1650).
- 9) Subskription im Bonon. 2293, f. 185^r; sie ist oft abgedruckt worden, die Stellen sind in *Byz. Zeitschr.* 67 (1974), 320, A. 33, verzeichnet.
- 10) A. Olivieri - N. Festa, *Indice dei codici greci delle Biblioteche Universitaria e Comunale di Bologna*, *Studi Ital. di Filologia Classica* 3 (1895), 397ff. = Samberger 1, 15-19.
- 11) A. Revilla, *Catálogo de los códices griegos de la Biblioteca de El Escorial* 1 (Madrid 1936), 432-437. Die *σχόλια ἐκ τῶν Δημοφίλου* (ff. 311-317^v) werden im *Catalogus codicum astrologorum graecorum* 2 (Bruxelles 1900), 2, nicht erwähnt, müssen aber im Laur. 28,20 enthalten sein, auf den unter dem Marc. 314 verwiesen ist, da er ebenso wie Scor. T.I.14 endet; vgl. auch, trotz seiner Verwechslungen, Ch.-É. Ruelle, *Rev. Et. Gr.* 24 (1911), 335. Der Scor. T.I.14 enthält ebenso wie der Bononiensis auch das folgende *καὶ νότιον*; es wird also auch im Marc. 314 stehen. Mit Bonon. 2280, ff. 169-253; 305-318, ist inhaltlich identisch Magliab. 7, saec. XVI: Vitelli (unten A. 14), 548 = Samberger 1, 212.
- 12) Th. Freudenberger, Augustinus Steuchus aus Gubbio Augustinerchorherr und päpstlicher Bibliothekar (1497-1548) und sein literarisches Lebenswerk (*Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte* 64/65, Münster i.W. 1935), 71. Das Stift: Mozzagrugno VII, 23.
- 13) Olivieri 388f. = Samberger 1, 6f. Die Subskription hat keine Datumsangabe, vgl. *Byz. Zeitschr.* 67 (1974), 321, A. 47.
- 14) G. Vitelli, "Indice de' codici greci Riccardiani, Magliabecchiani e Marucelliani", *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 2 (1894), 527 = Samberger 1, 191.
- 15) Ebenso ist auch Bodl. Canon. gr. 34 von diesem Schreiber für Gianfrancesco Pico in *Mirandola* geschrieben, mit Subskription vom 18. Juli 1517, vgl. Vogel-Gardthausen 104.
- 16) G. Mercati, *Codici latini Pico Grimani Pio e di altra biblioteca ignota del secolo XVI esistenti nell' Ottoboniana e i codici greci Pio di Modena etc.* (*Studi e Testi* 75, Città del Vaticano 1938), 217; 213.
- 17) Olivieri 401 = Samberger 1, 19.
- 18) Unten, S. 337.
- 19) Vgl. meine Abhandlung "Die griechischen Erstausgaben des Vettori Trincavelli" (in Vorbereitung). Dexippos und De syllogismis stehen auch im Scor. T.II.1, ff. 200-244^v, von Andronikos Nuntzios für Hurtado de Mendoza geschrieben, s. unten S. 337f.
- 20) Olivieri 401f. = Samberger 1, 19f.
- 21) "Musuros-Handschriften", in: Serta Turyniana. *Studies in Greek Literature and Palaeography in Honor of Alexander Turyn* (Urbana-Chicago-London 1974), 584; 593ff.

22) Mercati, Codici latini Pico Grimani Pio 229 und 244, Nr. 104.

23) I. Bruns, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensi praeter commentaria scripta minora: Quaestiones. De fato. De mixtione* (Supplementum Aristotelicum 2,2, Berolini 1892) kennt den Bononiensis nicht.

24) Bonon. 2293, f. 185^r, dazu unten S. 344f.

25) Mozzagrugno (oben A. 5) VII, S. 22f.

26) Olivieri 402 = Samberger 1, 20.

27) Eusebius' Werke 6. Die Demonstratio evangelica (Griechische Christliche Schriftsteller 23, Leipzig 1913), XVf.

28) Für Schriftproben und Auskünfte danke ich dem Assistant Librarian des St. John's College, Herrn Charles Morgenstern.

29) Die Wasserzeichen sind eine Armbrust = Briquet 761 und eine spezielle Variante der Buchstabenkombination JB in der Blattecke (offenbar identisch mit der einen Form des von Petros Karnabaka und Nikolaos Murmuris für Hurtado de Mendoza geschriebenen Scor. Φ.I.5 (abgebildet bei Harlfinger, Wasserzeichen, Lettres 66 oben links) und der von Scor. X.I.4), zwei Marken, die besonders in den für Hurtado de Mendoza in Venedig hergestellten Kopien häufig auftreten. Ich verweise dazu auf meine "Iamblichos-Handschriften" (oben A. 3), 47; 51; 54; 58; 76 und 51f.; 54; 63; 66; 76; Harlfinger, Textgeschichte (unten A. 146), 196; O. L. Smith, *Scriptorium* 27 (1973), 96-101, und das Register IX des Katalogs des Escorial von G. de Andrés. Die Buchstabengruppe JB ist, wie ich mich im September 1974 im Escorial überzeugen konnte, viel häufiger vertreten als Andrés sie ausweist; um sie handelt es sich auch mehrfach bei den *letras unidas*, bei BE, IB und BΓ. Beide Zeichen treten wiederholt im selben Codex auf. Der Paris. gr. 470 kommt aus dem Besitz von Gianfrancesco d'Asola, vgl. H. Omont, *Catalogues des manuscrits grecs de Fontainebleau sous François I et Henri II* (Paris 1889), XXIV, und dazu O. L. Smith 100.

30) Das eine der beiden Wasserzeichen, eine Armbrust, am ehesten vergleichbar Briquet 753, scheint dasselbe zu sein wie in dem 1536 geschriebenen Paris. gr. 1823.

31) G. de Andrés, *Catálogo de los códices griegos Escorialenses desaparecidos de la Real Biblioteca de El Escorial* (El Escorial 1968), 193; Ch. Graux, *Essai sur les origines du fonds grec de l'Escorial* (Paris 1880), 252, Nr. 15. Vermutlich diesen Codex hat Gesner 1545 in der Bibliothek Hurtados gesehen, vgl. Graux 242.

32) H. Omont, "Les manuscrits datés des XV^e et XVI^e siècles de la Bibliothèque Nationale et des autres bibliothèques de France", *Revue des Bibliothèques* 2 (1892), 161, und schon bei B. de Montfaucon, *Palaeographia Graeca* (1708), 88. Der Inhalt ist bei Vogel-Gardthausen 370 falsch angegeben. Das Wasserzeichen ist ein Kreis mit Stern = Briquet 3086, nur dass die beiden Zeichen der Kontermarke links und rechts von der Sternstange stehen. Dasselbe Wasserzeichen findet sich im Scor. γ.I.12 (1542 in Venedig von Nikolaos Gaitanos geschrieben), Monac. gr. 49 (1548 in Venedig von Petros Karneades geschrieben) und Berol. Phil. 1417 (von Guillaume Pélicier), s. Harlfinger, Wasserzeichen, Cercle 51 und 52; ferner im Scor.Φ.I.2, ff. 1-71 (geschrieben von Nikolaos Murmuris in Venedig für Hurtado de Mendoza), wo de Andrés ungenau Briquet 3077 angibt.

33) Meine Kollationen von Bonon. 2304, Paris. 471, 472, 473 (S. 13,8-18,20 Heikel) und Oxon. 41 (S. 13,8-16,35 Heikel) bestätigen die von Heikel implizit behauptete Unabhängigkeit dieser Zeugen voneinander. Ihnen allen ist gemeinsam die nach Heikel in Paris. 469 nicht vertretene Lesart

S. 14,18 εὐλόγηκεν. Sie müsste im Ambrosianus stehen (den ich nicht kenne), wenn meine Vermutung über dessen Stellung richtig ist. In S. 13,16 haben Paris. 471 und 473 ἀφηγώσ, in Paris. 471 steht στ über dem γ. Da beide voneinander unabhängig sind, wird die Doppellesung von 471 schon in der Vorlage gestanden haben. In S. 15,30 hat Paris. 473 nach αὐτοῦ zunächst πάλιν geschrieben, es aber wieder getilgt. Vermutlich begann in seiner Vorlage mit S. 15,29 πάλιν eine Zeile, die der Schreiber im Begriff war zu wiederholen, es aber rechtzeitig merkte.

34) Für diese Angaben und die Lieferung von Schriftproben auch dieser Handschrift danke ich Herrn Charles Morgenstern.

35) G. de Andrés, Catálogo de los códices griegos Escorialenses desaparecidos (El Escorial 1968), 193, Nr. 550; vgl. auch Gesner bei Graux 242: *et reliqua hujus authoris fere omnia habet quae extant.*

36) Die Subskription ist ausgeschrieben in: Eusebius Werke 8. Die Praeparatio evangelica, hrsg. von K. Mras 1 (Berlin 1954), XLIV; vgl. Vogel-Gardthausen 311 (undatiert).

37) Der Oxoniensis hat die Korrekturen zweiter Hand in D übernommen und ahmt wiederholt die Abbreviaturen von D nach, einmal (58,21 βασιλεῦς) ist ihm die Auflösung misslungen. 59,18 steht in D πραγμάτων, darüber von D² γραμ, im Oxoniensis dagegen πραγματων, das π ist aber durchgestrichen und darüber γ geschrieben. Albini hat also mit dem Grundtext von D begonnen und ist in scribendo auf die Korrektur übergegangen. Das 9. Buch (genauer S. 478,20 αἱ δυνάμεις - 557,23 μάλιστα ζη-) ist, wie schon Mras XLVI feststellte, von anderer Hand aus dem Marc. 341 oder dessen Kopie Marc. 342 abgeschrieben. Hier stammt der Oxoniensis nicht aus D. Das 9. Buch ist in D erst nachträglich (als Ersatz des ursprünglichen Textes, wie die kodikologische Untersuchung zeigt) eingefügt worden, als der Oxoniensis schon geschrieben war.

38) Vogel-Gardthausen 310. Vom Ambros. L 109 sup. habe ich keine Schriftprobe.

39) Ch. B. Schmitt, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533) and his critique of Aristotle (Archives Internat. d'Histoire des Idées 23, The Hague 1967).

40) L. Delisle, Le cabinet des manuscrits 1 (Paris 1868), 151; H. Omont, Catalogues des manuscrits grecs de Fontainebleau IV f.; 371f.; ders., Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque Nationale 1 (Paris 1886), VI; XVI. Die in der Liste des Paris. gr. 3064, f.68, aufgeführten Titel kann Fondulus nicht schon 1529 geliefert haben, da der sicher richtig identifizierte Paris. gr. 2376 zum Teil von Albini im Jahre 1539 geschrieben ist (unten S.333f). Sie werden also erst in der Zeit gekauft worden sein, als Fondulus von dem gesandten Franz' I. in Venedig, Guillaume Pélicier, für den Erwerb griechischer Handschriften beschäftigt wurde, also in den Jahren 1539-1542.

41) H. O. Coxe, Catalogi codicum mss. Bibliothecae Bodleianae 1 (Oxford 1853), 770; I. C. Th. Otto, Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi 7 (Ienae 1857), XVI; H. Omont, Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes 46 (1885), 55.

42) "Hands and scribes", Class. Quart. 22 (1928), 202,2.

43) V. Puntoni, Indice dei codici greci della Biblioteca Estense di Modena, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 4 (1896), 523 = Samberger 1, 439. Der Codex befand sich später bei den Theatinern in Reggio, vgl. G. Mercati, Codici latini Pico Grimani Pio 245. Auf f. 1^r steht der Vermerk: *di S. Spirito di reggio.*

67) Einer davon, Nr. 104, liegt heute in der Biblioteca Arcivescovile von Udine (Utin. gr. 11), vgl. H. Omont, Centralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen 12 (1895), 415f.; A. Turyn, Dated Greek manuscripts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the libraries of Italy 1 (Urbana, Illinois 1972), 128; A. Diller, Scriptorium 29 (1975), 160. Dieser Codex kann nicht Valerianos Vorlage gewesen sein.

68) H. Omont, Bibl. de l'École des Chartes 46 (1885), 621; G. Mercati, Studi e Testi 164 (1952), 167, A. 2; vgl. Freudenberger, Hist. Jahrb. 56 (1936), 28, und Steuchus 61.

69) Omont, Revue des Bibliothèques 2 (1892), 154.

70) Proclus, Théologie platonicienne 1. Texte établi et traduit par H. D. Saffrey - L. G. Westerink (Paris 1968), CXI-CXVI; Proclus, The Elements of theology. A revised text with transl., introd. and comm. by E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1963), XXXVII.

71) Saffrey-Westerink CXVII-CXIX.

72) Byz. Zeitschr. 67 (1974), 323f.; 327ff.

73) Vitelli (oben A. 14) 523-525 = Samberger 1, 187-189; Iamblichos-Handschriften (oben A. 3), 26. Ich besitze davon einen Mikrofilm.

74) Dasselbe wie für Plethon gilt vielleicht auch für Synesios De insomniis, das Ficino übersetzt hat (P. O. Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum 1. Florentiae 1937, CXXXVIIff.). Der Traktat findet sich mit Noten Ficanos im Ricc. 76, ff. 164-187, in Grimani 38 und 203, und im Monac. gr. 461.

75) Vg. A. Diller, Scriptorium 10 (1956), 28f. Nach Diller 40 ist Vind. hist. gr. 78 ein Teil von Grimani 72.

76) Porphyrii Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. E. Lamberz (Leipzig 1975), XIXf. Dass nur Porphyrios von Albin geschrieben ist, nicht aber Eunapios (so Vogel-Gardthausen 370), hatte schon Mercati, Studi e Testi 164 (1952), 167, A. 2, vermerkt. Zu De abstinence siehe Porphyre, De l'abstinence 1. Texte établi et traduit par J. Bouffartigue (Paris 1977), LXXff., und dazu die Rezension von E. Lamberz, Gnomon 51 (1979), 321-332.

77) S. XXXVIff. und Stemma S. XLI.

78) Gnomon 49 (1977), 350.

79) F. Calori Cesis, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola etc. (Mirandola 1897).

80) B. Jenny, "Arlenius in Basel", Basler Zeitschrift f. Geschichte und Altertumskunde 64 (1964), 23.

81) Lamberz LIXff.

82) S. auch unten S. 344f.

83) Omont, Revue des Bibliothèques 2 (1892), 157; S. Oppermann, Θεμιστος I. Εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα II. Βασανιστῆς ἢ φιλόσοφος (20. und 21. Rede). Überlieferung, Text und Übersetzung. Diss. Göttingen 1962, der S. XIV die Subskription ebenfalls ausschreibt, gibt zwei Probeseiten (S. 140f.). Die Datierung auf 1540 gilt streng genommen nur für den Theophrast-Text (unten S. 341), aber da die Handschrift von Pélicier kommt, ist die Entstehung in Venedig zwischen 1539 und 1542 gesichert.

84) La tradition manuscrite et les éditions des Discours de Julien l'empereur (Univ. de Gand. Recueil de travaux publiés par la Fac. de Philos. et Lettres 61, Gand-Paris 1929), 62.

85) Prisciani Lydi quae extant, ed. I. Bywater (Supplementum Aristotelicum 1,2, Berolini 1886), VII. Der Paris. 1954 weist als Wasserzeichen zwei gekreuzte Pfeile mit sechsstrahligem Stern fast = Briquet 6299 auf.

Da nach Schindler (unten A. 112) auch das des Paris. 1687 Briquet 6299 sehr ähnlich ist, sind beide Codices vielleicht aus demselben Papier. Paris. 1687 ist am 8. November 1540 in S. Antonio subskribiert. Briquet 6299 ist etwas kleiner als Briquet 6292, das Zeichen des Barb. gr. 252, der im Jahre 1539 in S. Antonio geschrieben wurde (oben S. 334). Papiere mit sehr ähnlichen Wasserzeichen (etwas kleiner als 6299) hat Valeriano auch im Berol. gr. 116 (Juli 1540), Berol. 121 (Dezember 1540), Paris. 452 (März 1538) und Eton. 11 (1539) verwendet: Harlfinger, Wasserzeichen, Flèche 18; 21; 23; ferner im Paris. 1830 und 2376 (beide 1539), Scor. y.I.7 (Rom 1547-1548) und mit anderer Form der Pfeilspitzen in Neap. II A 13 (September 1534), Eton. 100 (1534) und Paris. 1823 (März 1536): ebenda, Flèche 19. Zu Briquet 6299 vgl. auch Scor. Ψ.I.13, zu Briquet 6297 Scor. y.I.5 (de Andrés 3, 18f.); beide wurden von Andronikos Nuntzios für Hurtado de Mendoza geschrieben.

86) H. Schenkl, Beiträge zur Textgeschichte der Reden des Themistios (Sb. Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl. 192,1. Wien 1919), 53f.; Oppermann S. Xff.

87) Scriptorium 16 (1962), 54; 61. Ein Faksimile aus Themistios bei Oppermann S. 138.

88) Die Vorlage des Monacensis, Laur. 87,20 (vgl. Bywater S. VII), hat keine Noten Ficinos. Dass der Laur. 87,20 das Antigraphon des Monac. 461 ist, geht aus seiner Textgestalt (*textus ad scripturam Laurentiani haud raro proxime accedit*) und Ficinos Bemerkung (Opera. Basileae 1576 [ND Torino 1962], 1801 = Bywater S. VII) hervor: *Graecum exemplar unicum invenerimus*. Auch von Iamblichos De mysteriis sagt er: *unicum est apud nos exemplar*, was sich auf die Vorlage seines von Skutariotes geschriebenen Arbeitsexemplars beziehen muss, vgl. Iamblichos-Handschriften (oben A. 3), 29, und Scriptorium a.O. Auch diesen Traktat hat Ficino ins Lateinische übertragen (P. O. Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum 1. Florentiae 1937, CXXVIIIff., Nr. XV), ebenso Exzerpte aus Psellos De daemonibus (Kristeller 1, CXXXV, Nr. XXI), wofür ihm Laur. 87,20 als Vorlage diente: P. Gautier, "Le De daemonibus du Pseudo-Psellos", Revue des Etudes Byzantines 38 (1980), 125.

89) Die Ableitung der Reden 21 und 20 des Themistios im Scor. T.II.1 aus dem Montepessulanus durch Oppermann ist nicht haltbar, da sie vom selben Schreiber stammen wie Dexippos und De syllogismis (dazu s. unten). Der für Hurtado de Mendoza hergestellte Codex ist in seinen übrigen Teilen von dem bekannten Schreiber Hurtados Andronikos Nuntzios geschrieben, der sich dabei der Handschriften Grimanis bediente: für ff. 1-100^v der Nr.72, für ff. 122-131^r der Nr. 185. Die Platon-Kommentare und Iamblichos De mysteriis des Basil. F.II.1b hat er aus derselben Vorlage abgeschrieben wie Valeriano, dem Grimani-Codex 11, vgl. Iamblichos-Handschriften 57-62; Byz. Zeitschr. 67 (1974), 322ff. Harl. 6299 stammt ebenfalls aus dem Monac. 461, nicht umgekehrt. Dass er nicht die Quelle der anderen (Monac. 461, Montep. 127, Scor. T.II.1, Monac. 59) gewesen sein kann, zeigen allein schon seine Auslassungen und Sonderlesungen, s. Schenkl, Wiener Studien 21 (1899), 229; Oppermann S. XVf. Dabei ist S. 6,11 Opp. $\delta\alpha\delta\omicron\upsilon\chi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ falsche Konjekture, ebenso S. 4,6 Opp. $\omicron\mu\alpha\lambda\omega\varsigma$ nach $\omicron\mu\alpha$ im Monac. 461, einer Minuskelverlesung von $\alpha\mu\alpha$. Die Herleitung des Monacensis aus dem Harleianus durch Oppermann ist anscheinend bedingt durch Schenkl's falsche Datierung des ersteren ins 16. Jh. (Wien. St. 20, 1898, 209), die Oppermann übernimmt. Dass Vat. 1448 aus Vat. 1883 stammt, den Schenkl und Oppermann nicht kennen, haben schon Foerster, Libanius 1, 431, und Bidez, Discours 55f. gesehen. Der Monac. 461 stammt ebenfalls aus Vat. 1883, Bidez 57f. Er ist etwa 1440-1450 geschrieben, als der Vaticanus, der um 1463 in die Vaticana eingegangen ist (P. Canart, Codices Vaticani Graeci. Codices 1745-1962, tom. 1, 1970, 489), noch in Florenz gelegen haben kann.

Der Monac. 59, der am 31. März 1550 in Florenz beendet wurde, kann danach nur aus Monac. 461 abgeschrieben sein, mit dessen Deszendenz er die Bindefehler 36,1/2 (Oppermann XII) und 35,23 (Oppermann X) teilt. Übereinstimmungen mit Laur. 60,5 und Marc. gr. 251 sind als Fehlerkoinzidenzen zu erklären. Aus Vat. gr. 936 hat Vat. 1448 weitere Reden des Themistios (7; 10; 9; 5; 4; 2; 25; 26; 24) bezogen, Schenkl, Wien. St. 20 (1898), 212. Geschrieben kann er erst nach 1488 sein, als sich sein Schreiber Damilas (Canart, oben A. 4, 336) bereits in Rom befand, da sich die eine seiner beiden Vorlagen seit 1463, die andere spätestens 1475 in der Vaticana befand; zu Vat. 936 vgl. R. Devreesse, *Le fonds grec de la Bibliothèque Vaticane des origines à Paul V* (Studi e Testi 244, Città del Vaticano 1965), S. 9, A. 5, und S. 55.

90) A. M. Bandini, *Catalogus codicum bibliothecae Laurentianae 3* (Florentiae 1770, ND Lipsiae 1961), 22f.; P. O. Kristeller, *Studies in Renaissance thought and letters* (Storia e Letteratura 54, Roma 1956), 223.

91) Vogel-Gardthausen 7.

92) Dexippi in Aristotelis *Categorias commentarium*, ed. A. Busse (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4,2, Berolini 1888), IX.

93) Revilla (oben A. 11), 451ff. 94) Byz. Zeitschr. 67 (1974), 318ff.

95) Ebenda 330-335.

96) Das gilt auch für die *Sententiae* des Porphyrios (oben S. 334).

97) Byz. Zeitschr. 67 (1974), 322f.

98) Bei D. Harlfinger, *Specimina griechischer Kopisten der Renaissance* 1 (Berlin 1974), 33, Nr. 75, und jetzt in der oben A.4 genannten Arbeit.

99) Freudenberger, *Hist. Jahrb.* 56 (1936), 16; Paschini (oben A.6), 9ff.

100) Busse (oben A. 92), S. VI; *Corpus Hermeticum*, éd. par A. D. Nock - A. J. Festugière (Paris 1960), XVII.

101) Siehe etwa E. Mioni, *Aristotelis codices graeci, qui in bibliothecis Venetis adservantur* (Patavii 1958), 109-113.

102) James (oben A. 58), S. 6. Herrn Bibliothekar P. R. Quarrie danke ich für Kopien der ersten und letzten Seite.

103) Byz. Zeitschr. 49 (1956), 50. Die Jahreszahl 1543, die auf einer Verwechslung der Angaben von I. Hardt, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae Bavaricae* 4, 208, beruht, ist zu tilgen.

104) Demetrii Cydonii *De contemnenda morte oratio*, ed. H. Deckelmann (Lipsiae 1901), VIff.

105) Vgl. P. Lehmann, *Eine Geschichte der alten Fuggerbibliotheken* 1 (Schwäbische Forschungsgemeinschaft bei der Kommission für Bayerische Landesgeschichte 4,3: Studien zur Fuggergeschichte 12, Tübingen 1956), 61ff. Vgl. auch Freudenberger, *Hist. Jahrb.* 56 (1936), 30ff., und oben zu Monac. gr. 88. 106) Byz. Zeitschr. 49 (1956), 42ff.

107) Vgl. H.G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im Byzantinischen Reich* (Handbuch der Altertumswiss. 12,2,1, München 1959), 736, wo es statt Ricc. 70 heissen muss: Ricc. 76.

108) Vgl. den analogen Fall bei der Eisagoge des Albinos, Byz. Zeitschr. 67 (1974), 327f. und 331.

109) Kristeller, *Supplementum Ficinianum* 1, CXXXVif., Nr. XXIV.

110) W. Studemund - L. Cohn, *Verzeichnis der griechischen Handschriften*

der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin (Die Handschriftenverzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin 11,1, Berlin 1890), 47.

111) Omont, *Revue des Bibliothèques* 2 (1892), 157; ders., *Fac-similés de manuscrits grecs des XV^e et XVI^e siècles* (Paris 1887, ND Hildesheim 1974), 15 und Taf. 48.

112) F. Schindler, *Die Überlieferung der Strategemata des Polyainos* (Sb. Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl. 284,1, Wien 1973), 88-101.

113) Studemund-Cohn 49.

114) Vat. lat. 3960, f. 61^r. Im alphabetischen Verzeichnis steht *Palladius sophista in epidemia Hipp.*, unter Nr. 345 nur *Hippocratis quedam*.

115) Apollonii Citiensis, Stephani, Palladii... scholia in Hippocratem et Galenum 2, ed. F. R. Dietz (Regismontii Prussorum 1834), Vf.

116) A. Martini - D. Bassi, *Catalogus codicum graecorum Bibliothecae Ambrosianae* 1 (Mediolani 1906, ND Hildesheim 1978), 151.

117) Omont, *Revue des Bibliothèques* 2 (1892), 157; Oppermann (oben A. 83), S. XIV.

118) Mercati, *Studi e Testi* 79 (1937), 159,1; V. Capocci, *Codices Barberiniani graeci* 1 (Bybliotheca Vaticana 1958), 132ff., Nr. 97.

119) J. Pasinus, *Codices manuscripti bibliothecae regiae Taurinensis Athenaei* 1 (Taurini 1749), 390; W. Schmidt, *Heron's von Alexandria Druckwerke und Automatentheater* (Heronis Alexandrini Opera 1, Suppl. Leipzig 1899), 7f.

120) G. de Andrés, *Catálogo de los códices griegos de la Real Biblioteca de El Escorial* 2 (Madrid 1967), 17.

121) Dazu s. Schmidt 80f.

122) O. L. Smith, *Scriptorium* 27 (1973), 96-101.

123) G. Mercati, *Opere minori* 4 (Studi e Testi 79, 1937), 159-168. Die Pneumatik enthielt Grimanis Nr. 4 nicht; Smith scheint die Arbeit Mercatis nicht zu kennen.

124) P. Tannery, *Mémoires scientifiques* 2 (Toulouse-Paris 1892), 310f., der den Scorialensis nicht kennt oder übergeht, leitet den Parisinus direkt aus dem Vaticanus her. Smith glaubt, dass auch der Bruxellensis aus dem Scorialensis kopiert ist, aber sein Beweis überzeugt nicht. Es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass der Schreiber des Bruxellensis, nachdem er f. 29^v beendet hatte, in seiner Vorlage umblättert und dabei noch statt eines Blattes gleich eine ganze Lage nahm, und dass er dann nicht mit dem Seitenbeginn seiner Vorlage, sondern mit Zeile 10 einsetzte, kann sich Smith selbst nicht erklären. Der paläographische Befund ist vielmehr so zu deuten, dass im Vaticanus die ursprüngliche 19. Lage (Tannery 313) bis auf das äusserste Doppelblatt verloren gegangen und dieses in den Text der Pneumatik geraten war, als daraus der Bruxellensis abgeschrieben wurde, während sie noch an ihrer Stelle vorhanden war, als der Scor.Φ.I.10 geschrieben wurde. Die Partie S. 132,15-134,12 Tannery umfasst im Druck 29 Zeilen, die Partie 134,12-168,7 unter Berücksichtigung der Unvollständigkeit von Zeilen im Druck, die es in der Handschrift sicher nicht gegeben hat, ziemlich genau das Vierzehnfache. S. 168,7-28 macht im Druck zwar nur 20 Zeilen aus, aber hier mag der Schreiber vorzeitig abgebrochen haben, als er merkte, dass der Text nicht hingehörte. Die 19. Lage des Vaticanus war also ein Quaternio. Die Vorlage des Bruxellensis muss sich also auch in S. Antonio befunden haben wie der Vaticanus, obwohl er weder im Verzeichnis Grimanis noch im Katalog Tomasinis zu finden ist. Dort wurde ja auch der

Taurinensis geschrieben.

- 125) Omont, *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes* 45 (1884), 350.
- 126) *Byz. Zeitschr.* 67 (1974), 323f. 127) Ebenda, S. 328f.
- 128) Vogel-Gardthausen 78; Ch. G. Patrinelis, 'Επετηρὶς τοῦ Μεσ-
σωνικοῦ Ἀρχεῖου 8-9 (1958-59, Athen 1961), 91; K. A. de Meyier,
Scriptorium 18 (1964), 260.
- 129) Nach Mitteilung des Direktors der Angelica, C. Vitto, vom 3.12.
1980 lässt sich das Wasserzeichen nicht identifizieren.
- 130) G. de Andrés 2, 245.
- 131) *Euclidis Optica. Opticorum recensio Theonis. Catoptrica*, ed.
I. L. Heiberg (*Euclidis Opera omnia*, edd. I. L. Heiberg - H. Menge 7,
Lipsiae 1895), XXVI; XLIV.
- 132) *Euclidis Data cum commentario Marini et scholiis antiquis*, ed.
H. Menge (*Euclidis Opera omnia* 6, *Lipsiae* 1896), XXXI. Von zwei weiteren,
unserem Scorialensis und dem vermutlich daraus abgeschrieben Tolet.
Bibl. Capit. 98-13, hatte Menge nur bibliographische Angaben.
- 133) Vgl. *Euclidis Phaenomena et scripta minora*, ed. H. Menge. *Frag-
menta coll.* I. L. Heiberg (*Euclidis Opera omnia* 8, *Lipsiae* 1916), XXX.
- 134) L. Delisle, *Le cabinet des manuscrits* 1 (Paris 1868), 213; H.
Omont, *Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque Natio-
nale* 1 (Paris 1886), VII; XIX.
- 135) J. Mogenet, *Autolycus de Pitane. Histoire du texte suivie de
l'édition critique des traités de la sphère en mouvement et des levers
et couchers* (Univ. de Louvain, *Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philo-
logie* 3,37, Louvain 1950), 95ff.
- 136) Hypsikles, *Die Aufgangszeiten der Gestirne*, hrsg. u. übers. von
V. de Falco und M. Krause, mit einer Einführung von O. Neugebauer (Abh.
Akad. Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Kl. 3. Folge 62, Göttingen 1966), 27.
- 137) R. Fecht, *Theodosii De habitationibus liber. De diebus et noctibus
libri duo* (Abh. der Gesellsch. d. Wiss. Göttingen, *Phil.-hist. Kl. N.F.*
19,4, Berlin 1927) nimmt hinsichtlich der Überlieferung auf Heiberg,
Sphaerica (ebenda 19,3) Bezug, der aber den Scorialensis nicht erwähnt,
da er die *Sphaerica* nicht enthält. Im Scorialensis sind die Lagen der
ff. 1-264 durchgezählt (α' - ιγ'); hier scheint also die Beobachtung von
Harlfinger, *Textgeschichte* (unten A. 146), 26ff., nicht zuzutreffen.
- 138) Im Bonon. 2293, f. 185, sagt Valeriano ausdrücklich, dass den vor-
angehenden Theon-Text Fulgenzio im Kloster S. Antonio in Venedig geschrie-
ben hat, siehe *Miscellanea Colonna*.
- 139) *Byz. Zeitschr.* 67 (1974), 329; 332.
- 140) Tannery, *Mémoires scientifiques* 2, 311f.; G. Mercati, *Opere mi-
nori* 4 (*Studi e Testi* 79, 1937), 162f.
- 141) Mercati a.O. 163; Heronis Alexandrini *Opera quae supersunt omnia*
5, ed. I. L. Heiberg (*Lipsiae* 1914), LXVII. 142) Sieh oben A. 29.
- 143) Dazu vgl. oben S. 330, Tatian. 144) *Scriptorium* 10 (1956), 40f.
- 145) P. Canart, *Codices Vaticani graeci 1745-1962, tom. 1* (1970), 72f.
- 146) D. Harlfinger, *Textgeschichte der pseudo-aristotelischen Schrift
Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν* (Amsterdam 1971), 193f.
- 147) Herr Prof. M. R. Dilts teilte mir brieflich (11. März 1981) mit,

dass er vom Ottob. gr. 45 keine Kollationen besitze, dass aber Laur. 70,26 und Pal. gr. 51 unabhängig voneinander auf Vat. gr. 141 zurückgehen und Pal. gr. 61 auf Pal. gr. 51. Valeriano Albini habe wahrscheinlich eine der drei Kopien, möglicherweise aber Vat. gr. 141 benutzt. Da Pal. 51, ein Fugger-Codex, 1549 geschrieben ist (Lehmann, Fuggerbibliotheken, oben A. 105, 1, 133) und wahrscheinlich aus Venedig kommt (O. Hartig, Die Gründung der Münchener Hofbibliothek durch Albrecht V. und Johann Jakob Fugger, Abh. Bayer. Akad., Philos.-philol. Kl. 28,3, München 1917, 242), dürften er und Pal. 61, ebenso aber auch Laur. 70,26, als Vorlagen nicht in Betracht kommen, da Valeriano seit 1545 in Rom ist (siehe unten).

148) H. Omont, "Catalogue des manuscrits grecs des bibliothèques de Suisse", Zentralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen 3 (1883), Nr. 44.

149) Jenny (oben A. 80), 25f.

150) Mozzagrugno (oben A. 5), VII,25.

151) P. Tannery, "Les manuscrits de Diophante à l'Escorial", Nouvelles archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires 1 (1891), 383-385 = Mémoires scientifiques 2 (Toulouse-Paris 1912), 418-421; Diophanti Alexandrini Opera omnia cum graecis commentariis, ed. P. Tannery 2 (Lipsiae 1895, ND Stuttgartiae 1974), XXXf. Hurtado de Mendoza hatte aus der Marciana in der Zeit vom 28. Februar 1545 bis 24. März 1546 den Marc. gr.308 ausgeliehen, Graux (oben A. 31), 411; Tannery a.O.; Treweek (unten A. 152), 213. Graux 249 glaubte deshalb, dass dieser die Vorlage Albinis für Scor. T.I.11, ff. 1-160, gewesen sei, eine Hypothese, die Tannery auf Grund der Textanalyse fallen liess, aber zu Unrecht von A. Bravo García, Cuadernos de Filología Clásica 15 (1978) 287f., wenn auch zögernd, wieder aufgenommen wird, denn dann hätte Valeriano den Marcianus mit nach Rom nehmen müssen.

152) Mercati, Studi e Testi 164 (1952), 169f.; A. P. Treweek, "Pappus of Alexandria. The manuscript tradition of the Collectio Mathematica", Scriptorium 11 (1957), 209; 213.

153) Devreese (oben A. 89 am Ende), 309.

154) Treweek 213f.

155) Graux 190; 269. Danach Vogel-Gardthausen 178 und Mogenet (oben A. 135), 117.

156) G. de Andrés 2, 184. Durch die Freundlichkeit der Bibliothek des Escorial besitze ich eine Schriftprobe von y.I.7, die diese Identifikation bestätigt.

157) S. 115-125. Der Codex ist hier irrtümlich mit y.I.7 bezeichnet.

158) Mercati, Codici Pico Grimani Pio (oben A.16), 146.

159) Die ersten drei erscheinen bereits im Verzeichnis von 1475, der vierte in dem von 1510, Devreese 60; 162f.

160) Briquet 6071; 5938; 5671.

161) Eustathii Macrembolitae De Hysmines et Hysminiae amoribus libri XI, rec. I. Hilberg (Lipsiae 1876).

162) E. Mioni, Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum codices graeci manuscripti 3. Codices in classem nonam decimam inclusos et supplementa duo continens (Roma 1972), 96; M. Sicherl, Musuros-Handschriften (oben A. 21), 569; 593; 595f.

STYLISTIC CRITICISM IN ERASMUS' CICERONIANUS*)

H. C. GOTOFF

The complex subject of Erasmus as a critic of Latin style has never been fully investigated, perhaps for good reason. At its highest level of sophistication, such a study would entail minute analysis of his textual work on Latin authors, both sacred and profane; for, then as now, it is in the arena of textual criticism that a man best displays his critical acumen and reveals his own sense of language and nuance. As a humanist in the philological tradition of Valla and Politian, Erasmus was engaged in the slow, painstaking enterprise of recovering Classical Latin.¹⁾ Usage, idiom, preferences of particular authors, the demands of various genres of literature all raise questions that were essential in the early sixteenth century for a proper understanding of Latin Philology. The most logical, non-textual format for pursuing such studies might have been his *Epitome* of Valla's *Elegantiae*, Erasmus' *Epitome* is little more than just that, though his later revision of the work - which goes only part way through the letter A - is a clear indication of what Erasmus might have added to Valla's discoveries and insights.²⁾ On the other hand, and perhaps surprisingly, one reads in the *Ciceronianus* judgments, often general, but sometimes particular, on what comprises Latin style, what does not, and what variety is permitted based on the Classical corpus.

I say surprisingly, because the *Ciceronianus* is not essentially concerned with the Latinity of Cicero or, indeed, devoted primarily to Latin prose style. Beneath its light and genial surface, it is a major chapter in a searing polemic in which a defensive Erasmus proclaims his credo as a humanist scholar. The trouble with the doctrinaire Ciceronians, he

urges, lies not in their aesthetics or their stylistic inadequacies - though the latter are glaring -, but in the limitations on subject matter and scholarship imposed by their standards. Erasmus had no patience with the pretentious recreation of an ambiance suitable in its artificiality to Ciceronian eloquence. There was knowledge to disseminate; important questions of theology to discuss; an audience to be served, educated, and, perhaps, saved. The underlying thesis of the *Ciceronianus* is that if Cicero is worthy of imitation, it is as a communicator; and if one would communicate in the sixteenth century, Cicero's oratorical style is a highly inefficient and inappropriate medium. Such an argument does not depend on stylistic analysis of particular imitations, but would apply with equal force both to the most competent and the most perfunctory example of Ciceronianism: *si nostrum simulacrum, quo M. Tullium effingimus, careat vita, actu, effectu, nervis et ossibus, quid erit imitatione nostra frigidius?* (1374). Yet, there is a good deal of useful criticism and perceptive judgment of Latin prose style in the *Ciceronianus*. I have demonstrated elsewhere, for instance, that Erasmus alone of scholars up to his time and beyond - because later generations of scholars chose to ignore him - made and insisted upon a rigorous distinction between the sentence-structure of Cicero and his universally presumed model, Isocrates.³⁾ He, alone, saw through the specious arguments of another highly polemical work, Cicero's *Orator*, and realized that the Roman orator's admiration for the Greek stylist was severely limited (1509-11, cf. 1478-81).

Comparison between Erasmus' *Ciceronianus* and the later rhetorical works of Cicero, inadequately made by scholars who did not appreciate the intensely polemical quality of either, becomes more compelling when we understand the ulterior motivation of each. As in the *Brutus* Cicero parades a long list of Roman orators who failed to achieve the ideal of *orator perfectus*, so in the *Ciceronianus* Erasmus offers an extensive muster of Latin writers from antiquity to the present to show that not one had successfully reproduced Cicero's style (2791-4363).⁴⁾ There are, however, these differences: while Cicero's *orator perfectus* is an unattainable Platonic ideal, the corpus of Cicero offers a model and a standard by which to judge

Ciceronian imitation; secondly, while Cicero assumes that everyone, save only his perverse Atticist detractors, strove to achieve that ideal of oratorical perfection, Erasmus allows that many Latin stylists had no intention of imitating Cicero; and for this he praises both ancients and moderns. Finally - and here the similarities may outweigh the differences - Cicero praises authors whose oratorical style shows marked improvement over their predecessors, because, though they fell short of the ideal, they advanced the evolutionary process. Erasmus, in his account, records the history of Latin prose style from its Classical apex through its decline in late antiquity and demise in the Middle Ages and lavishes praise on those humanists who participated in the Renaissance rediscovery of the forms and usages of Classical Latin. For while he opposed the goal of strict adherence to Ciceronian standards, Erasmus expected and demanded proper Classical usage.

The corruption of Mediaeval Latin, which Petrarch had begun to protest a century and a half earlier, was still very much a presence in the intellectual world of Erasmus. When one considers the problem of learning what constituted proper Latinity and the difficulty first in finding out what others had discovered and then independently in purifying modes of expression with which one had grown up, the wonder is that the process moved so rapidly.⁵⁾ The goal was *reflorens eloquentia* (3053). Petrarch, Erasmus claimed, for all his efforts, never shook off the *saecli prioris horror* (3058). Leonardo Bruni represented a marked improvement, but among his weak points was an occasional failure to observe *Romani sermonis castimonia* (3082). Erasmus endorses Valla's criticism of Poggio's *impurus sermonis fluxus* (3097). Cicero had given as the first virtue of the orator *latinitas* - a canonical requirement also for treatises on oratory.⁶⁾ To Erasmus' audience, pure Classical Latin represented an ideal that required constant diligence and, often, new information. The scholar of Erasmus' day had less than we of the original material necessary for establishing Classical usage; he was further limited to ancient works of reference, inadequately edited and often whimsically indexed. We tend, from Sidney's slighting phrase, to disparage the "Nizzolian paperbooks",⁷⁾ prepared to keep devoted Ciceronians

to the straight and narrow of Ciceronian vocabulary and phrases. The fact is that Mario Nizzoli's work permitted Robertus Stephanus to produce his *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* in 1551.

Quite early in the *Ciceronianus* Erasmus shows that the goal of strict Ciceronian imitation had its genesis in the drive to relearn Classical Latin.⁸⁾ Petrarch had entertained no illusions about scrupulous adherence to the style of any one model. From the sound principle of learning the language by imitating its best practitioners came with Poggio, Guarino, and others, the more doubtful notion of mastering Latin by exclusive imitation of its best practitioner.⁹⁾ Erasmus knew of Valla's rejection of the latter goal and cites Politian's correspondence with Cortesi and Scala in which he argues against Ciceronian imitation (4299ff.).¹⁰⁾ Erasmus was not, therefore, attempting to break new ground in his theory of imitation. Rather, he was defending his right to do the kind of scholarship he believed important, though it was suspected of being crass popularization; expressing his fear, perhaps not wholly ingenuously, that doctrinaire Ciceronianism might lead to paganism (e.g., 2270); and contending, with supreme polemical irony, that the most sincere professed imitators of Cicero were making the poorest job of it.¹¹⁾

Much more successful and useful, Erasmus implied, were the contemporary Latinists who, without laying claim to Ciceronian imitation, were producing pure, clear Latin prose in addressing themselves with point or grace to subjects of contemporary interest. Erasmus knew that different genres of writing make different demands upon style: in an historian, for instance, one would expect and prefer the style of a Sallust to that of a Cicero (4263). He also knew that Cicero in his *Letters* produced a Latin style different from that of the orations (2722, cf. 4356). He might have gone beyond the hint at 2723 that the style of Cicero's expository works, while not in itself monolithic, is distinct from either the *Letters* or the orations. But, since Erasmus was convinced that the expository style was what was most needed for contemporary communication, he would hardly have suggested to the Ciceronians an alternative Ciceronian style. To them Cicero was the Cicero of the speeches; and for that reason their goal was irrelevant as well as futile.

The polarities of intention in both style and content can be seen in the following citations from the *Ciceronianus*:¹²⁾

Baptista Egnatius preferred learned to Ciceronian discourse (3243).

Faber preferred to talk like a theologian than a Ciceronian (3325).

Alciati preferred exposition to ornate oration (3263).

Bayfius, with an eye to exposition, preferred acuteness and vigor of expression, Attic style to Ciceronian (3354).

Latimer would rather master theology than Ciceronian eloquence (3450).

Linacre considered it better to resemble Quintilian than Cicero (3415).

Valla came closer to the precision and exactness of Quintilian than the spontaneous fluency of Cicero (3100).

This material might at first glance suggest that Erasmus was wholly opposed to the style of Cicero, strongly wedded to anti-Ciceronianism. This is not so; and a careful distinction must be drawn between Cicero and Ciceronianism. The question is one of appropriateness of style to subject. Since the apes of Cicero attempt to imitate his oratorical style - and Erasmus adds the further qualification that they limit themselves to Cicero's more elaborate *exordia* and perorations (1167ff.), they cannot be properly responsive to expository subjects. Even public policy, he notes, is not formulated in forensic debate in public assembly (2694ff.). Here Erasmus makes a virtually unique distinction between styles of oratory directed at different audiences. The main thrust of his argument is that, by and large, the serious business of the humanist should be scholarship (*docere*), which is not served by ornate rhetorical style (*rhetoricari*). If his opponents want to identify Cicero purely with rhetorical flourishes and establish a clear distinction between exposition in direct, accurate language and what Cicero does, so be it: *nec docent, nec movent, nec persuadent* (1116) - precisely the goals of oratory as expounded by Cicero. The *Institutio* of Quintilian is surely a better model for Valla than, say, the *First Verrine* or *De lege Manilia*. On the other hand, Erasmus makes no attempt to deny that Cicero's epistolary style is consistent with characteristics he otherwise identifies with Atticist or expository writers (2813).

Erasmus' use of the epithet, "Atticist", is different in meaning and color from Cicero's when the latter labels his detractors. Erasmus includes under the rubric, apparently,

all good expository writers, but not those who, as he says in the language of Cicero, claimed to emulate the Attic style of oratory while in reality being "arid, threadbare, and lifeless and unable to produce the precision, propriety, and attractiveness of the Greeks" (1155-60). From his description of various laudable practitioners, Erasmus offers a comprehensible, general picture of good Latin expository style. Besides purity of language and lucidity of expression in accordance with best Classical usage, these men are credited with achieving precision through literal vocabulary, careful accuracy through brevity and tight argumentation, and a straightforward, compelling address through the avoidance of ornamentation and self-conscious virtuosity. The qualities they eschewed were a more generous fullness of expression (more copious and eloquent) and any elevation of language beyond literal meaning of words (beyond, that is to say, *proprietas sermonis*) for a more colorful effect. For the main body of published books, this comprises a style undeniably more suitable than one distinguished by obvious rhetorical flourishes and structural arabesques.

The Latin, however, must be pure, i.e., Classical. It is especially instructive to look at Erasmus' descriptions of two men he liked and admired, of whom he would have wanted to speak well, but whose Latinity was defective. Thomas More is credited with unlimited talent; but, when he was a child, the scent of the better literature (Classical Latin as recovered by the humanists) had barely wafted to England. His father had insisted on More's learning English law, than which *nihil est illiteratius*. And, further, More's own commitment to public affairs hardly gave him time to address himself *ad eloquentiae studia*. (This is one of a number of places where Erasmus seems to deny the possibility of "civic humanism"). More's prose style tended rather to Isocratean structure and mediaeval dialectic than the free flow of Ciceronian style - though in urbanity he was not inferior to Cicero (3433-45). Isocratean sentence structure, for Erasmus, is associated with the wearying symmetries of Mediaeval antithesis and parallelism. This holdover from the pre-humanistic age vitiated the prose style also of Rudolphus Agricola. "He was a man of divine spirit,

deep learning, and a far from average style. His prose was strong, effective, elaborate, and well-constructed, but it smacked of Quintilian's eloquence and Isocratean structure (3538)". Since Quintilian is elsewhere praised, it is the collocation with Isocratean structure that is a vice in Agricola. Quintilian's diction is no more suitable to elaborate sentence structure than is the language of Cicero's perorations to the simple syntax of expository prose. But, further, elaborate sentence structure should follow the Classical model of supple periodicity exemplified by, though not limited to, Cicero, not the antiphonal balances of Mediaeval syntax, associated by Erasmus with Isocrates. In the end, though himself guiltless, Agricola was prevented from reaching the Ciceronian ideal (*Ciceronis effigiem effingere*) by the accident of nationality and time, neither of which honored *litterae politicores*. What was for Petrarch in Italy in the fourteenth century the *horror saeculi prioris* was a present impediment in Northern Europe in the fifteenth century, as it was still later for Reuchlin, whose prose smacked of his century - an age Erasmus called *horridius impolitiusque*, though Reuchlin was his contemporary (3587).

Whether fortunate enough to have been born in Italy after the first flush of humanist activity or compelled, alone, to fashion Classical Latin out of the inherited harshness, the gothic angularity of Mediaeval Latin, the contemporary Latinist was judged by Erasmus according to a high standard. Celio Calcagnani possessed erudition and eloquence; his style was both elegant and ornate, but to some degree it savored of scholastic philosophy, which, while it did not prevent him from expressing himself fully, nevertheless excluded him from the ranks of the Ciceronians (3295). Juan Luis Vives, on the other hand, is described in the process of elevating his style to the highest level: "He has talent, erudition, and memory; he possesses a ready abundance of words and thoughts; and although he was at first a trifle harsh, eloquence matures in him daily, giving rise to the hope that he may some day be numbered among the Ciceronians. Some of Cicero's virtues he had not yet mastered, however, especially delightfulness and delicacy of diction" (3676).

The harshness (*duritia*) which one must overcome to produce a praiseworthy Latin style did not begin with the Middle Ages. Erasmus noted a lack of facility in eloquence as early as in Ammianus Marcellinus (2863) and again in Hilarius who is *difficilis et obscurus* (2975). With the scholastic theologians eloquence gets buried and remains under the earth until resurrected by the humanists.

In assessing these writers, Erasmus lays no stress upon the Atticist qualities of concision, directness, plainness, brevity, lack of ornamentation, and absence of urbanity. Urbanity, deliberately eschewed by Linacre (whose model was Quintilian) (3418), is praised as a virtue in which More is not inferior to Cicero. Agricola was lauded for an elaborate style. Both More and Agricola are criticized not because they attempted to use complex syntactic structures, but because those structures were not articulated in the best Classical form. There appears to be a style of Classical Latin prose beyond the expository, plain style, that is worthy of praise. Cantiuncula approached the flow of language, the clarity, the richness and the pleasantness of Cicero. Peter Schade's diction was lively, florid, and clear (3384). Zazius' prose flowed from a rich source; it never stopped, stuck, or ceased to bubble (3618). Other passages might be added from the *Ciceronianus* describing with approval abundance; smooth, gentle, or rich flow; facility of expression; and eloquence.

Clearly, then, while Erasmus rejects the full oratorical style of Cicero as the model of Renaissance Latinity and recommends a plain, expository style as typified by, perhaps, Quintilian, he also countenances a kind of prose that, from his description of it, may be characterized according to the ancient formula of the three kinds of style, as middle. It is distinguished from the expository by its richer flow of language, greater ornateness, facility of diction, and supple complexity of syntactic structure. By including periodicity, as the measured sense of flow in *fluxus* and *flumen* seems to do, while denying the orotundity of Cicero's *exordia* and perorations, Erasmus seems to be making an important, and hitherto unnoticed, distinction: while Cicero wrote ornate, periodic prose, not all periodic prose is so ornate or exclusively Ciceronian. For, in

characterizing the style of Ambrose, Nosoponus says that he was a Roman orator, not a Ciceronian: "He rejoices in clever allusions... he speaks wholly in *sententiae*; his style is rythmical and modulated by phrases, clauses, and parallel constructions... but his style is very different from Cicero's" (2998). Augustine comes close to Cicero in that both round their periods with extensive suspensions, but Augustine does not punctuate that copious flow with phrases and clauses as did Cicero (2994). Leo I's style is praised as rhythmic, as well as clear and intelligent, but even this does not make of him a Ciceronian (3017). This is not, of course, to say, that Erasmus was recommending any of the above as models for Renaissance Latinity. Rather, in describing their essentially periodic styles without criticizing their intrinsic worth, he appears to be acknowledging a kind of Latin that, though not the kind prized by Ciceronians, is also distinct from Atticist or plain.

The whole notion of flow of language, whether limited to periodic syntax or not, is inapplicable to strictly Atticist writers; nor does Erasmus ever attribute *fluxus* to them. Though the *flumen* metaphor is identified with Ciceronian eloquence (e.g. 1519 *fluidum*), Erasmus, nevertheless, uses it of a number of Humanist writers, not only without stigma, but as a positive and laudable stylistic description. He recognizes the vice of such a style, beginning with Gellius' *verborum copia superfluens* (2898). Cicero himself had used *fluens* in both a good and bad sense, depending on the authors' control.¹³⁾ Erasmus seems not to use the metaphor in so complex a way as did Cicero, although he speaks once of a *fluxus impurus* and once of a *fluxus lutulentus*. On the other hand, there is one ancient label applied to excessiveness in the middle style that Erasmus uses in a wholly laudatory way.

The adjective *mollis* and a derived noun *mollitudo*, denoting softness, delicacy, or suppleness, is associated by Cicero with Demetrius of Phalarum, who first deflected oratory from its proper function, which is persuasion, to the goal of pleasing, or charming, its audience.¹⁴⁾ Erasmus cites from Quintilian the criticism leveled at Cicero himself, that he was so smooth in his composition that he seemed to the more severe

sensibilities *mollis* and less than manly (675ff.). But if *mollitudo*, in reference to an overabundance of delicacy or prettiness in eloquence can be a vice of style, it also has a positive side from Cicero onwards in describing an author's success in improving upon the harshness of expression in an earlier and less cultivated age. The Classical example might be Horace criticizing his predecessor Lucilius for his harshness and lack of control over his language. Horace uses the phrase, "he flowed like a muddy river" and the adjective *durus*.¹⁵⁾ After the Classical period, Erasmus can use the same notion to signal decline from the best standard. Hilaris is criticized for his harshness of expression and obscurity; in contrast, because both came from Gaul, Sulpitius Severus was *mollior*, more pleasing, and clearer - superior, surely, as closer to the Classical model (2981). Erasmus uses of Gregory I the same phrase Horace had used of Lucilius, the metaphor of the muddy river, calling him significantly a slave to Isocratean structure as well (3011). If a Renaissance writer can overcome harshness by means of *mollitudo* (as Erasmus claims Vives was doing day by day), if he can achieve a clear, pleasantly flowing style (*iucunditas*), he earns Erasmus' unstinting praise. Casselius has splendid language and sweet composition (3983). Pontanus is lauded for the calm flow of his diction; a certain sweetness in the sound of his words gentles the ear with a pleasing ring (3992). The *illaboratus fluxus* of Beraldus is counted as a great virtue (3337).

Despite his ulterior motivation, then, and a strongly polemical stance, Erasmus, in some important ways, remains true to the subtitle of the *Ciceronianus*, *de optimo genere dicendi*. He presents, in fact, more than one *genus*. His objection to the adoption of Cicero's oratorical style is logical and cogent, but he is fully as critical of style that fails of the Classical standard because of the taint of Mediaeval Latinity. And while he recommends an expository style without embellishment, copiousness, urbanity, or eloquence in the Ciceronian sense, he praises in some Humanist Latinists the presence of just such characteristics, so long as they do not become mere affectation. We may suspect that a style largely

modelled on, though not in slavish imitation of, Cicero's own expository middle style in the rhetorical works would have won Erasmus' approbation and endorsement.

University of Illinois at Urbana

NOTES

*) The argument of this paper was developed for a talk given at the Central Renaissance Conference, Urbana, Illinois, April 1980. I was fortunate to have received the criticism of Professor John J. Bateman, whose considerable knowledge of Erasmus and Renaissance humanism has helped me to avoid some of the grosser errors.

1) See, most recently, R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship 1300-1850* (Oxford 1976), ch. III.

2) *Epitome D. Erasmi Roterdami in Elegantiarum Libros Laurentii Val-lae*, ed. C. L. Heesakkers, J. Waszink: *Opera Omnia Erasmi Roterdami*, I.iv (Amsterdam 1973).

3) "Cicero vs. Ciceronianism in the *Ciceronianus*," *Illinois Cl. St. V* (1980), 163-73. See, too, my *Cicero's Elegant Style* (Illinois U.P. 1979), pp. 26-30, 53 and *passim* for description and demonstrations of the difference between the style of Cicero and Isocrates.

4) References are to A. Gambaro, *Il Ciceroniano* (Brescia 1965).

5) On the enormous popularity of Valla's *Elegantiae*, see J. IJsewijn and G. Tournay, "Un primo censimento dei manoscritti e delle edizioni a stampa degli *Elegantiarum linguae latinae libri sex* di Lorenzo Valla," *Humanistica Lovaniensia* XVIII (1969), 25-44.

6) Derived from a parallel standard in Greek *rhetorica*, it appears in the earliest Roman treatise on rhetoric [Cicero] *Ad Herennium* IV.12.16.

7) *Sir Philip Sidney, The Defense of Poesy et al.*, ed. A. Feuillerat (Cambridge 1923), p. 42.

8) The question of proper models for correct Latinity goes back to late antiquity; see R. Kaster, "Servius and the Idonei Auctores," *AJP* 99 (1978), 181-209.

9) The best study of the movement and the controversy is still that of R. Sabbadini, *Storia del Ciceronianismo* (Turin 1886).

10) In the letter to Vlatten that prefaces the second edition of the *Ciceronianus*, Erasmus claims to have learned only after completing the first edition of the correspondence between Pico della Mirandola and Bembo (Gambaro, *op. cit.*, p. 326ff.)

11) *nulli gestiunt insolentius nomine Ciceronis quam qui Ciceronis sunt dissimillimi* (1305).

12) In what follows I accept the critical vocabulary as Erasmus', whether it falls from the lips of Bulephorus or Nosoponus. I do not necessarily believe that it accurately, in all cases, characterizes the

writers to whom it is applied. But in areas of stylistic judgment the language of the two speakers is hardly distinguishable.

13) There is a striking contrast in two uses of the metaphor at *Orator* 198 *ut ne... aut dissoluta aut fluens sit oratio* and 199 *ad hunc exitum iam a principio ferri debet uerborum illa comprehensio et tota a capite ita fluere, ut ad extremum veniens ipsa consistat*, though in the first citation the prefix of the first adjective may, by a well-attested Latin practice, be felt with *fluens* as well. (See W. Clausen, "Silva Coniecturarum," *AJP* 1955, pp. 49-51, and C. Watkins, "An Indo-European Construction in Greek and Latin," *HSCP* 71 (1967), 115-119. But cf. *Orator* 220 *dissipata et inculta et fluens est oratio*; *De Or.* III.190 *ne fluat oratio, ne vagetur*.)

14) Cicero *Brutus* 38.

15) Horace *Serm.* I.4.8.

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ERRATA CORRIGE

Read:

VI, p.	V.11	Danemark	Denmark
	76. 5	ihn	sich
	76.39	merkte!	merkte, als er sie kommentierte!
	77.18	es	es auch
	77.22	da	als
	77.25	hier mitgespielt hat	ihm hier mit hineingespielt hat
	77.27	gerade	geradezu
	79. 5	Hermann, Eustathios	Hermann sich die Kontamination auf mechanischem Wege entstanden, indem er annahm, Eustathios
	80. 2	zitiert!):	zitiert!), wo die trojanischen Frauen, die den Chor bilden, beschreiben wie sie sich vorbereiteten für die erste Nacht die sie mit ihren Männern im Frieden zu verbringen gedachten:
	80. 3	ἐρωθυμίζομαι	ἐρωθυμίζομαι
	80. 5	dass	wo impliziert ist, dass
	80.18	von	vor
	80.22	<i>exstant</i>	<i>extant</i>
	80.26	wäre.	wäre--eine Deutung die, wie die Argumentation der Scholien zeigt, auf Aristarchs Entdeckung zurückgeht dass die homerischen Helden, im Gegensatz zu Homer selber, die σάλπιγξ nicht kennen (Aristonikos zu Σ 219 und Φ 388). LXXXVIII
	80.35	LXXXVII	LXXXVIII
	81.n.7	mitgespielt	mit hineingespielt
	81.n.9	zeigt also	zeigt also nur
	81.n.10	herausgeht	herkommt
	81.n.10	unpretentiöse	unprätentiose
	81.n.10	ist es fraglich	macht es fraglich
	87.10f.	Hayley	Hadley
	93.10	<i>ver</i>	<i>vel</i>
	93.19	an	no
	98.n.1	Oxford 1980	Oxford 1981
	100.n.34	curve	curved





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